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Aristotle's

TREATISE ON POETRY,

Translated.

VOL. II.

A

*Aristotle's
Poetics*

ARISTOTLE'S
TREATISE ON POETRY,

TRANSLATED:

WITH

N O T E S

● ON THE TRANSLATION, AND ON THE ORIGINAL;

AND

TWO DISSERTATIONS,
ON POETICAL, AND MUSICAL, IMITATION.

BY THOMAS TWINING, M.A.

THE SECOND EDITION,
IN TWO VOLUMES,
BY DANIEL TWINING, M.A.

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
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N O T E S.

NOTE 44.

P. 116. IN THE WAY, NOT OF NARRATION,
BUT OF ACTION.

IT is surprising, that so strange a phrase as *ἰδων — δρῶντων — formis — agentibus*—should have passed as genuine with any Greek scholar. It is still more so, that the obvious opposition of *δρῶντων* to *ἀπαγγελίας*, and the no less obvious absurdity of *opposing* narration to pity and terror, (*ὃ δὲ ἀπαγγελίας, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἴλεε καὶ φοβῆ*) should have escaped the notice of any commentator*.—I should write the passage thus; still considering it as imperfect:—*χωρὶς ἰκασῶ των ἰδων ἐν τοῖς μορίοις * * * [forte ΔΙΑ] δρῶντων καὶ ὃ δὲ ἀπαγγελίας*

* See the beginning of *cap. iii. Transl. sect. 4.*—I am glad to find myself well supported in these remarks by Mr. Winstanley's note on this passage. *Ed. Ox. 1780, p. 278.*—I cannot, however, but still regard the text as defective.

γίλιας * * * ἀλλὰ δι' ἑλπευ καὶ φοβῶ, κ. τ. αλ.

Thus the word *δραμάτων* will retain its proper sense, and the *active* imitation of the drama, which Aristotle every where makes its characteristic distinction, as opposed to the *Epic*, will be, as we might expect to find it, in a *formal* and *exact* definition of Tragedy, distinctly marked.

I will just observe, farther, that this mode of expression—*δραμάτων ΚΑΙ ΟΥ ΔΙ' ΑΠ.* is familiar to Aristotle.—Here however it may be justified by the necessity of marking clearly the distinction between Dramatic and Epic Poetry. In other instances, as, *ἰτερώς καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τροπον. cap. i. —ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβαλλόντα. cap. iii.—εἰδώς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν. Eth. Nic. v. 8.*—it seems hardly to admit of the same excuse. In the *Poets* we are less surprised to find it frequent. Victorius has pointed out Homer, *Il. Z. 333.*

—ἐπεὶ με κατ' αἴσαν ἐνακασας, εἰδ' ὑπερ αἴσαν.

and Sophocles :

- - - γινώτα, κ' ἐκ ἀγνώτα μοι

Προσηλθεὶς ἱμαρόντες. - - - *Oed. Tyr. 58.*

If any man, in reading the antients, can persuade himself to take such things for beauties, there is certainly no harm in it. The fact I take to be, that composition, even that of Poetry, was not yet so far improved and refined, as perfectly to exclude the inaccuracies and redundancies of popular and familiar speech.

NOTE 45.

P. 116. EFFECTING, THROUGH PITY AND TERROR, THE CORRECTION AND REFINEMENT OF SUCH PASSIONS.

Δι' ἱλως καὶ φόβου περαινεσθαι τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθῶ-
ματων καθαρσιν.—A history of the controversies
which this obscure passage has excited among
critics and commentators, and an exact statement
and examination of the various explanations which
have been given of it, would almost fill a volume.
Among these, however, the opinions, that are
worth regarding, or that can, with any shew of
probability, be deduced from Aristotle's expression,
are, I think, reducible to *two*. *One* is, that this
purgation, or *moderation*, of the passions, is merely
the effect of having them frequently excited, and
of being familiarized with the occasions of them, in
Tragic fiction; just as the passions of pity and
terror are actually purged, or reduced to mode-
ration, in a surgeon, a physician, or a soldier, by
their being *accustomed* to those terrible or piteous
objects that occasion them.—The *other* inter-
pretation attributes the effect to the *moral lesson*
and *example* of the drama: Tragedy *purges* the
passions by the striking pictures it sets before us
of the dreadful calamities occasioned by the un-
restrained indulgence of them; by giving useful
warnings, and preparing us to bear the ills of life

with patience.—One, or the other, or *both*, of these meanings, have, I think, been attributed to Aristotle by the best commentators and critics. For the *first*, the reader may see Mr. Harris's *Disc. on Music, Painting, &c. ch. v. note*^c.—Heins. *De Trag. Const.* cap. ii. p. 22, 23. and *Castelvetro*, p. 117, 118.—For the *second*, Madius;—D'Alembert in his letter to Rousseau, *Mélanges*, tom. ii. p. 414.—Dryden. *Obs. on the Æneid*.—Abbé Du Bos, *Refl. sur la Poesie*, tom. i. sect. 44. &c.—For an explanation compounded of the two, Robortelli, Piccolomini, and Dacier, who, by the way, after declaring that *all* the explanations of former commentators “*served only to obscure the passage,*” and that the true sense was *not to be found in any of them*, proceeds to give us, as that *true sense*, and as his own discovery, exactly what had been said before him^a.

Let us first see what Aristotle says. He says, that Tragedy, *by the means of pity and terror*, effects the purgation (*καθάρσις*) of *such* passions : i. e. of *pity and terror and other passions* of the same kind : for pity and terror seem clearly meant, by the expression, to be *included* in the effect. And this, in my opinion, is sufficient to overturn the *second* of the explanations just mentioned ; for, according to that, terror and pity are not both the *means* and the *object* of the purgation, as Aristotle, I think, asserts them to be, but they are the *means only*

^a See his note 8.

only of purging *other* passions—those passions, whatever they may be, which are supposed to produce the calamitous events exhibited to our view. Indeed, according to this idea, the object is rather the *vice* that arises from passion, than the passion *itself* which is the cause of it. But, besides this objection, I do not see any reason to think, that the *moral lesson* of the drama, and the effects it might have in moderating our passions through the *reflections* it excites in us, were at all in Aristotle's thoughts*. The *first* of the two explanations seems far more admissible. I believe it made a *part* of his idea, but I doubt whether it was the *whole* of it. What *was* precisely his meaning, and the whole of his meaning, will never, I fear, be the subject of a perfect, Stoical *κατα-λυσίς* to any man. There is, however, *one* passage in Aristotle's works, which throws *some* little light upon this; enough, at least, to keep us from false interpretations, if not to lead us to the true. It is in the *seventh* chapter of his *eighth* book *De Republica*. The Abbé Batteux is the only commentator I know of, who has paid a proper attention to this passage; but as I do not perfectly agree with him, either as to the translation he has given, or the use he makes of it, I shall produce so much of the original as appears to be of any importance to our present purpose, and subjoin a translation, with some necessary remarks.

The

* See the concluding NOTE.

The object of Aristotle, in the chapter referred to, is, to examine what kinds of *Music* (i. e. of melody and rhythm,) are proper to be used in the education of youth. He mentions and approves a division, made by some philosophical writers of that time, of the different kinds of melodies, into Moral, Active, and Enthusiastic: *τα μὲν ΗΘΙΚΑ, τα δὲ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΑ, τα δ' ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΑ*. By the first of these we are to understand a manly, grave, and simple melody. The sense of *πρακτικά* is less clear; but I suppose it means a more complicated and *imitative* sort of melody, adapted to express human *actions*; for, in the 49th of the *Harmonic Problems* [Sect. 19.] it is said of the *Hypo-Phrygian* mode, that it had ἡδὲ πρακτικὴν, and was, on that account, used only in the dialogue and action of the drama, never in the *choral* part^b. And the same epithet, *πρακτικός*, is applied, in this treatise, to the Iambic measure^c. As to *enthusiastic*, it wants no explanation.—Aristotle then proceeds to observe, that “Music was to be
“ used,

^b He says too—κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποφρυγίαν καὶ ὑποφρυγίαν, ΠΡΑΤΤΟΜΕΝ· ὃ ἐν οἰκίῳ ἐστὶ χορὸν· ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ χορὸς ἀνδρῶν ΑἰΠΡΑΚΤΟΣ.—κ.τ.λ. — The whole Problem, though mutilated, is curious, and throws some little glimmering of light upon the Greek drama, as far as *Music* is concerned.

^c Cap. xxiv.—το μὲν [i. e. the *Trochaic* tetrameter,] *τραχηλιῶν* το δὲ, [the *Iambic* verse,] ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΟΝ. Whence Horace's,—“*natum rebus agendis.*” A. P. 83.

“used, not for one useful purpose only, but for
 “several,” which he enumerates; and one of
 them is — ΚΑΘΑΡΣΕΩΣ ἕνεκα: with respect to
 which he says — τι δὲ λεγομένην τὴν καθάρσιν, οὐ
 μὲν, ἀπλῶς· παλιν δέ, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ,
 ἔρμηνευσαι σαφέστερον:—“What I mean by Καθαρίσις,
 “or *purgation*, I shall now explain only in a
 “short and general way; but hereafter, in the
 “books concerning *Poetry*, more explicitly and
 “clearly.”—And this, I suppose, he had done,
 in that part of this treatise which is lost.—
 He then proceeds thus:—

—Φανερόν, ὅτι χρῆσειον μὲν πασαις ταῖς ἁρμο-
 νίαις, ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πασαις χρῆσειον· ἄλλα
 πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν, ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις· πρὸς δὲ
 ἀκροασιν [f. ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ], ἑτέρων χειρουργημάτων,
 καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς, καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. ὁ γὰρ
 περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει παθεῖν ψυχὰς ἰσχυρῶς, τετο
 ἐν πασαις ὑπαρχῶν· τῷ δὲ ἥττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ
 μᾶλλον. οἶον, ΕΛΕΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΟΒΟΣ. ἐτι δ’ ἐνθου-
 σιασμῶ· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως
 κατακωχίμοι τινες εἰσιν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν μελῶν
 ἔρμαινεν τετῆς, ὅταν χρῆσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιαζούσι τὴν
 ψυχὴν μελεσί, καθισταμένως, ὡς περὶ ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑΣ
 τυχόντας καὶ ΚΑΘΑΡΣΕΩΣ. ταῦτο δὴ τετο
 ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τῆς ἐλεημονας, καὶ τῆς
 φοβητικῆς, καὶ τῆς ὁλως παθητικῆς· τῆς δ’ ἄλλης,
 καθ’ ὅσον ἐπιβαλλῆται τῶν τοιῶντων ἑκάστῳ, καὶ πασι

γυγνέσθαι ΤΙΝΑ ΚΑΘΑΡΕΙΝ, καὶ κυφίζεσθαι
μεθ' ἡδονῆς. [p. 458. Ed. Dindorf.] *

In

* This passage may be considered, alone, as a complete refutation of an opinion published some years ago by Professor Moor, of Glasgow, on the subject discussed in this note. He asserts, that by *παθήματα* Aristotle does not mean *passions*, but *sufferings*, or *calamities*; and that the sense of δι' ἐλεος καὶ φόβου πρᾶνναι τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθμάτων καθάρσιν, is—effecting, or endeavouring to effect, “the removal of such calamities,” (i. e. as are represented in Tragedy,) “by means of exciting the passions of pity and terror.” But the sense, both of *καθάρσις*, and of *παθήματα*, is fixed, beyond dispute, by the passage I have quoted, where *pity*, *terror*, and other *passions*, are clearly mentioned as the *objects* of the *καθάρσις*, or *purgation*. The Professor also asserts, that the word, which Aristotle uniformly uses to express the *passions*, is *πάθος*, and that by *παθήματα* is “always meant *sufferings*, or *calamities*.” This is a mistake. *Πάθος* is continually used by Aristotle in the sense of *sufferings*; and *παθήματα* sometimes, though less frequently, in the sense of *passions*. So *Rhet.* II. 22, p. 574. C. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡθῶν, καὶ ΠΑΘΗΜΑΤΩΝ—“concerning *manners* and *passions*.” See also, *Moral. Eudem.* II. 2. p. 205. B. where *πάθος* and *παθήματα* are used synonymously. Many other instances, I make no doubt, are to be found in Aristotle's works.

I should add, that I take my account of this explanation, and the arguments by which it is supported, from the *Monthly Review*, vol. xxx. p. 65; not having been able to procure the pamphlet itself, of which the title is—“*On the end of Tragedy, according to Aristotle: an Essay, in two parts, &c.—By James Moor, LL.D. Prof. of Greek in the Univ. of Glasgow.*”—It is mentioned again, with approbation, in the 64th vol. of the same Review, p. 556.

In this passage, for ἀρεσιν I have no doubt that we should read καθαρῶν. The similitude of the words is sufficient to account for the mistake of the transcriber; and the purport of the whole passage seems to require the correction. For Aristotle is here shewing, in what manner the *three* different kinds of melody were to be applied to the different *purposes*, which he had just enumerated: πρὸς ΜΕΝ τὴν ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΝ, ταῖς ἡθικ. πρὸς ΔΕ τὴν ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ,—ταῖς πρακτικαῖς, &c. The opposition is clear. And so, afterwards, a third purpose is mentioned—πρὸς ΑΝΑΠΑΥΣΙΝ. [p. 459.] The words immediately following, ἱερῶν χειρουργικῶν, probably contributed to this mistake. They allude to his doctrine, in the preceding chapter, that boys should not be allowed to practise or perform, *themselves*, any but the simplest kind of Music, and upon the simplest and easiest instruments, such as were not διοργανα χειρουργικῆς ἰκτισμένης. [p. 457.] But this was not the character either of the *active* and *enthusiastic* melodies, of which he here speaks, or of the *instrument* used in the accompaniment of them⁴.

I shall now give what I think a fair and *literal* version of the passage. - - -

“ It is manifest then, that *all* the different kinds
“ of melodies are to be made use of; not all,
“ however,

⁴ The An^o. See *ibid.* p. 459 and 457. And the 1st vol. of this Work, p. 225, note^o.

“ however, for the same purpose. For *education*,
 “ the most *moral* kind should be used: for
 “ PURGATION, both the *active*, and the *enthu-*
 “ *siastic*;—*performed*, however, by others. For
 “ those passions, which in *some* minds are *violent*,
 “ exist, *more or less*, in *all*; such as PITY, for
 “ example, and TERROR: and, again, *enthusiasm*;
 “ for with *this* passion some men are subject to
 “ be possessed: but when the *sacred melodies*,
 “ intended to compose the mind after the cele-
 “ bration of the orgic rites, have been performed,
 “ we see those men become calm and sedate, as
 “ if they had undergone a kind of *purgation*, or
 “ *cure*. And the case must necessarily be the
 “ same with those who are particularly liable to
 “ be moved by PITY, or TERROR, or any other
 “ passion; and with *other* men, as *far* as they
 “ are under the influence of any such passion;
 “ *all* of them experiencing *a sort of* PURGATION,
 “ and PLEASURABLE RELIEF.”

From this passage, though far enough, I am
 sensible, from being perfectly clear and explicit,
two things, at least, may, I think, be confidently
 deduced.—1. That *whatever* be the meaning of
 the term *katharsis*, or *purgation*, here, must also
 be its meaning in the treatise on Poetry; since to
that work Aristotle refers for a fuller explanation
 of it. The only difference is, that here, the term
 is applied to the effect of imitative *Music*; there,
 to that of imitative *Poetry*; of *that* species of it,

however, which depended, we know, upon *Music*, for a very considerable part of its effect. 2. It is plain, that, according to Aristotle's idea, pity was to be purged by pity, terror by terror, &c.; contrary to the *second* of the two explanations above-mentioned. For Aristotle is here *expressly* speaking of the use of *enthusiastic* Music applied *προς καθαρεν*; and he says, that men, agitated by enthusiasm, were *purged* or *relieved from that enthusiasm* by the *ἱερὰ μελῆ*, which were plainly *enthusiastic* melodies; i.e. such as *imitated*, or *expressed*, that passion, and were intended to calm the mind, which had been violently agitated and inflamed; not, as M. Batteux understands, by the sudden opposition of *Doric*, grave, and *moral* strains, [p. 280, 1.] but by *pleasurable indulgence* of the *same* passion in *imitative Music*: *καρπίζεσθαι μεθ' ᾠδῆς*. These melodies were, probably, such as those of Olympus, which had been mentioned just before [cap. 5.] and of which Aristotle says, that they, *Ὁμολογουμένως ΠΟΙΕΙ ΤΑΣ ΨΥΧΑΣ ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΑΣ*. Indeed, from the manner, in which the Music of Olympus is spoken of by Plato, and Plutarch, there is great reason to suppose, that these "*sacred melodies*" were no other, than the *very* melodies of that musician^f.

With

^f — τὰς νόμους τῆς ἁρμονικῆς ἐξενεγκεν [sc. *Olympus*.] εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, οἷς νῦν χρῶνται οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς τῶν θεῶν. *Plut. de Mus.* p. 2076. ed. H. S. See also Plato in the *Minos*, pag. 318.

With respect to this *καθαρσις* itself, Aristotle by no means gives us in this passage, nor, indeed, professes to give us, a full and satisfactory explanation of it. *Some* light, however, he has flung upon it by the expressions, *ιατρικα*, and *καταρξισθαι μετ' ἡδονης*, which he uses as synonymous to *καθαρσις*: "*Purgation, cure, pleasurable relief.*" The Abbé Batteux understands Aristotle to mean no more by this, than that the passions of *terror* or *pity*, which, when excited by real objects, are simply painful, or, at least, have a predominant mixture of pain, are, by *imitation*, and the consciousness of *fiction*, *purged* or *purified* from this alloy of the disagreeable and painful, and converted, on the whole, into an emotion of delight. His meaning may be clearer in his own words. Aristotle, he says, had established it as a principle—" *Que les objets désagréables " plaisent quand ils sont imités, même lorsqu'ils " le sont dans la plus grande vérité* ". En appli-
 " quant ce principe à la Tragedie, il s'ensuit, que
 " c'est l'imitation qui est la cause du plaisir
 " qu'elle produit, et non la nature des objets
 " imités, puisque ces objets sont par eux-mêmes
 " désagréables. C'est donc l'imitation qui ôte à
 " la

pag. 318. *ed. Serr.* where he says of the melodies of Marsyas and Olympus, that they are, ΘΕΙΟΤΑΤΑ, καὶ μὴ KINEI.—See Dr. Burney's *Hist. of Music*, vol. i, p. 359, &c.

* *Cap. iv. Transl. Part I. Sect. 5.*

“ la terreur et à la pitié l'accessoire désagréable
 “ qu'elles ont dans la réalité : c'est l'*imitation* qui
 “ opere la purgation Tragique, en mettant les
 “ malheurs imités à la place des malheurs réels,
 “ et en séparant par ce moyen ce que la pitié et
 “ la terreur ont d'agréable, comme émotions,
 “ d'avec ce qu'elles ont de désagréable, quand
 “ elles sont jointes à l'idée de malheurs réels ¹.”

This account, which is exactly Fontenelle's solution of the pleasure arising from Tragic emotion¹, is liable to a difficulty not easily, I think, surmounted. It confines Aristotle's meaning to the *present pleasure* of the emotion; it supposes all the *purgation* to consist merely in rendering the feeling of the passion pleasurable;—not in any good *effect* which the *habit* of such emotion may produce, in correcting, refining, or moderating, such passions, when excited by real objects. Now, though it must be confessed, that Aristotle has not, in that short and *professedly* imperfect explanation given of the *καθαρσις* in the passage adduced, said any thing directly pointing to such effect, yet, I think, the whole turn and cast of his expression

¹ Principes de la Literature, tom. iii. p. 81.—I refer to *that* work, because the author appears to me to have explained himself there with more clearness and precision than in the note on his translation of Aristotle in the *Quatre Poétiques*.

¹ Reflect. sur la Poétique, Sect. 36.—Hume's Essay on Tragedy.

expression is such, as leads one naturally to conclude, that it was his meaning. The phrase, *καρίζεσθαι μετ' ἡδονῆς*, does indeed appear to express the *present* effect only; but I can scarce conceive, that he would have used such a word as *καθάρις*, and still less, *ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑ*, without a view to something beyond the pleasurable *relief* or *vent* of the moment; especially, in a chapter, where he is professedly enumerating and examining the *uses* of music^k. Farther, the words, *ἐλευμενας, φοβητικας, παθητικας*, confirm this idea; being all words expressive of *habitual excess*, requiring correction and moderation^l.

But, what still more strongly opposes the Abbé Batteux's idea, is, that Aristotle is here, as Heinsius and others have well observed, evidently combating the doctrine of Plato, whose great objection to Tragedy, was, that it *feeds* and *inflames* the passions^m. It could be no answer to this, to allege, that the feeling of passion excited by Tragic imitation is *pleasurable*; for this is so far from being called in question by Plato, that it is the very foundation of his objection. The

pleasure

^k —ἐ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐνέκεν ΩΦΕΛΕΙΑΣ τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖν.—
Ubi supra.

^l The same thing seems implied in the word *καταρχήμαι*; and in the expression—ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐπὶ τῆς συμβαίνει κατὰ ψυχῆς ἰσχυρῶς——.

^m ΤΡΕΦΕΙ γὰρ ταῦτα, he says, in his figurative language, ΑΡΑΟΥΣΑ, δεῖν ΑΤΧΜΕΙΝ.—*De Repub. lib. x. p. 606. D.*

pleasure afforded by such Poetry is allowed by him in its utmost extent^a. "Let its advocates," he says, "undertake to shew us that it is not *merely pleasurable*, but *USEFUL* also, and we will lend a favourable ear to their apology; for we shall surely be gainers by the conviction^b." Now Aristotle, if I understand him rightly, undertakes this apology, and points out the *utility* required. And no one, I think, can reasonably doubt, that such was his intention, who has attended to the following passage of Plato:—
ἀπελαυνον ἀνάγκη ἀπο τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἴκια·
ΘΡΕΨΑΝΤΑ γὰρ ἐν ἱκανοῖς ἸΕΧΤΡΟΝ ΤΟ ΕΛΕΙ-
ΝΟΝ, ἡ ῥάδιον ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ΠΑΘΕΣΙ ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ^c.
For, to this objection, there cannot well be a more direct and pointed answer, than Aristotle's assertion, as *usually* understood—that the *habit* of indulging the emotions of pity, or terror, in the
fictitious

^a *Ibid.* p. 607, C. D. *et passim*.

^b Δομεν δὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀν καὶ τοῖς προσηταις αὐτῆς — λόγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἶπεν, ὡς ἔμμεν ἩΔΕΙΑ ἄλλα καὶ ΩΦΕΛΙΜΗ πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἔστι, καὶ εὐμενῆς ἀκωσόμεθα. κερδαίμεν γὰρ περὶ, ἐὰν μὴ μόνον ἴδεια φανῇ, ἀλλὰ ΚΑΙ ΩΦΕΛΙΜΗ.—*Ibid.*

^c *Ibid.* 606. B.—"The habit of indulging our passions in the concerns of others, will, of necessity, bring on the same habitual indulgence in those which relate to ourselves: for he, who has *nourished* and strengthened to excess the passion of *pity*, for example, by habitual sympathy, in the misfortunes of *other* men, will not find it easy to restrain the same kind of feelings in his *own*."

fictional representations of Tragedy, tends, *on the contrary*, to moderate and refine those passions, when they occur in real life.

But though the Abbé Batteux's idea of this *purgation* appears to me by no means to be the whole, it must, I think, be admitted as a *part*, and an essential part, of Aristotle's meaning. For the effect depends, not merely, as some commentators seem to suppose¹, on the having our passions *frequently* and *habitually* excited, but, on the having them so excited by *fictional representation*. Pity and terror *frequently* excited by such objects and such events in *real* life, as the imitations of the Tragic scene set before us, would rather tend to produce apathy than moderation. Nature would struggle against such violent and painful agitation, and the heart would become callous in its own defence. We must be insensible, that we might not be wretched. It is far otherwise with *fictional* passion. There, the emotion, though often violent in spite of the consciousness of fiction, is always, more or less, delightful. We indulge it, as one of the first of pleasures; and the effect of that indulgence, frequently repeated, is perhaps, that, while it moderates *real* passion by the frequency of similar impressions, it, at the same time, *cherishes* such sympathetic emotions, in their *proper* and *useful* degree,

¹ Heinsius *De Trag. Constit.* cap. ii. — Harris *On Music*, &c. ch. v. note ^c.

degree, by the delicious feelings which never fail to accompany the indulgence of them in imitative representation.

The passions of savages, or of men in the first rude stages of civilization, are ferocious and painful. They *pity*, or they *fear*, either violently, or not at all. With them, there is hardly any medium between ungovernable agitation, and absolute insensibility.—Suppose such a people to have access, like the Athenians, to theatrical representations, and to have their passions kept in frequent and pleasurable exercise by *fictitious* distress; the consequence, I think, would be, that, by degrees, they would come to have more *feeling*, and less *perturbation*. Instead of sympathetic emotions rarely excited, painfully felt, and soon extinguished, they would gradually acquire a calm, lasting, and useful habit of general tenderness and sensibility. In polished society, where the passions are accustomed to be indulged in *fiction*, either in the theatre, or by reading, and the pain is converted, on the whole, into one strong and delightful feeling, by the charms of imitation, Poetry, Music, aided by the indistinct consciousness of fiction—these passions, even when excited by *real* objects, seem to retain, (at least, in cases where we are not *too closely* touched,) some tincture of the same pleasurable emotion, which attended them, when raised by works of imagination; they are more moderately and

agreeably felt, more easily governed, and more gentle and polished in their expressions.

Such appears to me, on the whole, to be the most probable explanation of Aristotle's meaning: I must, at least, confess it to be the only reasonable meaning, that I am able to discover. How far it is *true*, and founded on solid observation, is another question, which I willingly submit to the philosophical and thinking part of my readers.

I cannot omit to observe, that the short explanation given by MILTON, in the introduction to his *Samson Agonistes*, appears to coincide exactly, *as far as it goes*, with my idea of the passage.—

“ Tragedy, as it was anciently composed, hath
 “ been ever held the gravest, moralest, and most
 “ profitable of all other Poems: therefore said
 “ by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity,
 “ and fear or terror, to purge the mind of those
 “ and such like passions; *that is, to temper and*
 “ *reduce them to just measure, with a kind of*
 “ *delight, stirred up by reading or seeing those*
 “ *passions well imitated.*”

One thing should be added. Aristotle's assertion must be considered relatively to his own times, and nation. He speaks of the effects of Tragedy on the *people of Athens*, who, as *reading* was then no popular occupation, had scarce any opportunity of indulging *fictitious* emotion, but at the Theatre, and who, we know, were *there* accustomed

† See Diss. I. vol. i. p. 62, &c.

accustomed to indulge it perpetually. With us, the case is widely different. The doctrine, therefore, of Aristotle, that "*Tragedy purges the passions,*" translated, if I may so speak, into *modern truth*, would perhaps amount only to this—that the habitual exercise of the passions by *works of imagination in general*, of the serious and pathetic kind, (such as Tragedies, Novels, &c.) has a tendency to soften and refine those passions, when excited by real objects in common life.

NOTE 46.

P. 116. IN SOME PARTS METRE ALONE IS EMPLOYED, IN OTHERS MELODY.

A passage of very tantalizing brevity. By *disparquer* MONON, are we to understand, according to the obvious and literal meaning of the expression, that in *some* parts of Tragedy the verse was merely recited, *spoken*, as in modern Tragedy?—This contradicts what, by many writers, has been considered as a fact thoroughly established, that the Greek Tragedy was accompanied by musical instruments, and was therefore strictly *musical, throughout*:—for as to the dreams of the Abbé Du Bos, Rousseau, and others, about a *noted declamation*, a declamation accompanied by *Music*, yet not *sung*—this is too manifest an absurdity to stand in need of confutation. If, as Rousseau says, it is "impossible to understand

“ what the antients have said about their theatrical declamation, without supposing this *,” would it not be better to say, at once, that we do *not* understand it, than to explain it into impossibilities? As for the systematic Abbé Du Bos, he was set upon proving his point; and he proves it like a man resolved to prove it, by wresting all sorts of authors to his purpose, and translating them as he pleased^b. All we know clearly, is, that the antient drama *was* accompanied, (in *part*, at least,) by musical instruments. I conclude, confidently, that since the instruments could not *speak*, the actors must *sing*: that their declamation must certainly have been, strictly speaking, *musical*, however simple; the chanting of the simplest *plain chant*, being as truly *Music*, i.e. as essentially distinct from *speech*, as the most refined melody of a modern opera^c.

If, then, the Greek Tragedy had a *musical accompaniment* throughout, it must have been *sung* throughout. But here, Aristotle says, as plainly as words can say it, that in *some* parts of Tragedy, “ *metre only*” was employed:—διὰ ΜΕΤΡΩΝ ἢ μὴ ΜΟΝΟΝ: that is, as it is necessarily implied, *without* the two other ἡδυσμᾶτα,
or

* Dict. de Musique, Art. OPERA.

^b For a refutation of Du Bos, the reader may see Condillac's *Essai sur l'orig. des connoiss. humaines*—tome iii. ch. 3.

^c See Diss. II. vol. i. p. 78. note *.

or *seasonings*, of Tragic language, just mentioned, melody and rhythm⁴.

Some commentators, I know, endeavour to evade the force of this expression, by saying, that Aristotle means, by *δια μετρων μονον*, only the *noted declamation*, which, being a sort of recitative, was not regarded as strictly musical, nor denominated *μελος*⁵. And in support of this, it is alleged, that the word *λεξις*, *speech*, is applied by him afterwards in a similar manner⁶; as *λεγεσθαι* is also by Plutarch, who talks of “ some of the “ Iambics being *spoken with an accompaniment*, “ and others *sung*”⁷:” as we sometimes say of a singer, that he *speaks* recitative well. But all this, I confess, does not satisfy me. It is one thing, to apply occasionally the word *λεξις* or *λεγεσθαι*, in this *comparative* way, to such kind of singing as most *resembles* speech, and another, to say roundly, that some parts of Tragedy made use of *metre*, or *verse*, *only*; and that too, immediately after having *fixed* the exclusive sense of *μονον*, by enumerating the three *ἡδυσματα* of Tragic diction, which he asserts to be *separately* used in different parts,

⁴ Λαγω δε ἡδυσμενον μεν λογον, τον ἔχοντα ρυθμον, και ἁρμονικον, και μετρον. Το δε, χωρις των ειδων, το δια ΜΕΤΡΩΝ ENIA MONON περαινεσθαι——.

⁵ So M. Batteux.

⁶ See *ch. xii.*—ΛΕΞΙΣ ὅλη ΧΟΡΟΥ.

⁷ Dial. de Mus. p. 2090. *ed.* H. S.—Τα μεν λεγεσθαι παρὰ την κρησιν, τα δε ᾄδισθαι.

parts, i. e. ῥυθμός, ἀρμονία, μέτρον^a,— RHYTHM, MELODY, and METRE. They who dispute this meaning, must at least, I think, allow that if it *had* been the meaning, Aristotle could not well have expressed it with more precision. How can μέτρον here be taken in the loose and comparative sense contended for, when, in the very words immediately preceding, it is carefully limited to its strict and proper sense, by being expressly discriminated from *melody*, as well as from *rhythm*?

But after all, the fact, that the Greek Tragedy was *sung throughout*, though often asserted, has not yet been *proved*; nor do I think that it can be proved; at least, by any passage of antient authors, that I have seen adduced to prove it. The Abbé Vatry, in a dissertation, *Sur la recitation des Tragedies anciennes*, undertook to prove, in form, that the Greek Tragedies were *sung*, “*d’un bout à l’autre*,” like our operas. But how does he prove this?—by proving, what indeed is

^a The reading in *all* the MSS. is, ῥυθμός, καὶ ἀρμονία, καὶ ΜΕΛΟΣ. On comparing this passage with Aristotle’s other enumerations of the three *means* of imitation in cap. i. especially at the end of it, where *Tragedy* is mentioned as using *all* those means, κατὰ μέτρον, i. e. ῥυθμός, καὶ μέλι (which is synonymous to ἀρμονία elsewhere,) καὶ ΜΕΤΡΟΝ, no one, I think, can entertain any degree of doubt, as to the truth of Victorius’s emendation, καὶ ΜΕΤΡΟΝ.

is easily proved¹, that a *part* of the Iambics, or the dialogue, was sung, and then by taking it for granted, that the antients could not possibly have endured so barbarous a custom, as the mixture of speech and singing in the same piece. “ Il ne
 “ paroît pas qu’on puisse douter que ces *cantiques*
 “ ne se chantassent; mais de cela même je crois
 “ pouvoir conclurre, que tout le reste se chantoit,
 “ quoique différemment; car le bon sens, et ce
 “ que les anciens nous disent, nous conduit à
 “ penser que leur recitation étoit partout de
 “ même nature, et qu’elle ne se bigarroit point,
 “ tantôt d’une simple declamation, et tantôt d’un
 “ chant musical².”

By the same presumptive mode of arguing, the Abbé might also have proved, *à priori*, that the Greeks could not possibly have been guilty of the modern barbarous *bigarrure* of serious and ludicrous, in their Tragic drama. But the first Greek Tragedy he had opened would probably have overturned his reasoning¹.

A thorough discussion of all the passages of antient authors, that throw any light upon this question, relative to the dramatic representations of the Greeks, would draw me much too far beyond

¹ The 30th and 49th of Aristotle’s *Harmonic Prob.* Sect. 19. are, alone, sufficient proofs of this point.

² Mem. de l’Acad. Roy. des Inscriptions, &c. tome II. p. 343, *octavo*.

¹ See NOTE 33—in the 1st vol.

beyond my bounds. - I must content myself with pointing out (for I think it has not been observed) the stubborn difficulty which this passage of Aristotle appears to me to throw in the way of the common opinion upon this subject; and with hazarding a merely *hypothetical* conjecture, that, *if*, as Aristotle *seems* plainly to say, *some* part of the Greek Tragedy was spoken, like our Tragic declamation, without any musical accompaniment, it was, most probably, that part of the dialogue, which, as I have before observed, in NOTE 33, is, in every Tragedy, easily distinguished from the rest, by its being carried on in a sort of quick repartee of verse to verse. As, in this part of the dialogue, we almost constantly find the Tragic tone lowered to a more colloquial pitch, and even approaching frequently to the jocular and burlesque, it seems reasonable to think, that here, *if anywhere*, the musical accompaniment, and the elevation of lengthened and chanting tones, were withdrawn, and common *conversation* left to common *speech*.

But what, again, are we to understand by—
 και παλιν ἑτερα δια μελεις?—Are we to repeat *μνον*, and understand Melody *alone*, without the two other ἱδυσματα, Rhythm and Metre? This cannot be. For though we may strip the Tragic language of melody and of rhythm, or, in other words, of *Music*, we cannot strip it of metre. The antients most certainly did not admit *prose*
 into

into their Tragedies ; and as little can we conceive them to have set prose to *Music* ^m.

Dacier, and some other commentators, understand by *μελ* here, *Music*, including rhythm. This sense of the word is certainly warrantable ; but it can hardly be the sense here ; for, surely, an instance, in which *all the three ἡδυσματα* were used, (as they must be, if *metre* be indispensable, and *μελ* imply *rhythm* and *melody*,) would be but a strange illustration of the *ΧΟΡΙΣ ἡμετερον των ειδων κ. τ. αλ.*

I do not see what remains, but, that we take *μελ* here in its most restrained sense, as distinct from *rhythm*, or *time*, and synonymous to *ἁρμονία* ; that sense, in which Aristotle had used it before, in his first chapter^a. And if we do this, we must necessarily,

^m The reader will observe that Aristotle is expressly speaking of the *ἡδυσματα* of Tragic *speech* or *language* : *λογον δε ἡδυσμενον μεν ΛΟΓΟΝ τον ἔχοντα ῥυθμον, &c.*—*Words*, therefore, are equally implied in all these *ἡδυσματα*, and, consequently, *Music alone*—i.e. *instrumental Music*, is here entirely out of the question.

^a — *ῥυθμῳ και ΜΕΛΕΙ και μετρῳ*, answering to his first division, *ῥυθμῳ και λογῳ και ΑΡΜΟΝΙΑΙ*.

The word *ΜΕΛΟΣ*, it may be useful to observe, occurs in three different *musical* senses. 1. Sometimes, as here, and in the Greek writers on *Music*, in the same sense as *ἁρμονία*—i.e. *melody*, abstracted from rhythm, or time. Thus, Aristides Quintilianus, p. 32, and see p. 7, his account of *μελωδία*, &c. 2. Sometimes, for *air*, or *measured melody* ; as in the definition of Bacchius, p. 19. (*Ed. Méib.*) 3. Sometimes it is used as equivalent to *song*, including melody,

necessarily, I think, understand, that some parts of the dialogue were *sung* without *rhythm*: I mean, without *musical* rhythm, or *time*, though certainly not without that poetical or prosodic rhythm, by which in *reciting* verse, and, indeed, even in the most familiar conversation, the syllabic quantity must have been *relatively*, at least, observed, though not, I presume, with the inflexibility of musical measure, nor with such a rigorous equality of *long* to *long*, and *short* to *short*, as is essential to the execution of what is properly called *Music*, and as I suppose to have been observed in the choral odes*. Thus the dialogue of the Greek Tragedy will appear to have been not improperly compared

melody, rhythm, and words. Thus Plato—το ΜΕΛΟΣ ἐκ τριῶν ἐστὶ συγκεκμημένον, λόγῳ τε, καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ, καὶ ῥυθμῷ. *Rep.* iii. p. 398. D. In another place, however, he uses it in the first and narrowest sense, for mere melody: ΜΕΛΟΣ ὅσαυ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἀνευ ῥημάτων. *De Leg.* ii. p. 669.—This third, and fullest sense of the word is what A. Quintil. expresses by *melos* τέλειον. p. 28.

* This has been well remarked by Dr. Burney, *Hist. of Mus.* vol. i. p. 161. "The melody of ancient declamation," &c.—M. Burette goes so far as to suppose, that no strict rhythm was admitted even in the *choral* part of the ancient Tragedy. His authority is the following passage of Plutarch's *Dial. de Mus.*—τῶν μὲν χρωματικῶν γένει, καὶ ΡΥΘΜΩ, τραγῳδίαι μὲν ὕδατος καὶ τῆμερον κεχρηται. p. 2084. ed. H. S. But the text here is evidently corrupt. The name of some particular species of rhythm is probably omitted. See *Mem. de l'Acad. des Inscript.* tome xix. p. 427, octavo.

compared to our recitative; differing from the chorus, as our recitative differs from the *airs*, both in the absence of strict time, and in the *kind* of melody, which was also, as mere *melody*, less *musical* than the *choral* melody, and more imitative of *speech*, as well as of action¹. Whether the monologues, or *long speeches*—the *μακρὰ ῥήματα*, as Plato calls them²—were performed in the same way, as the rest of the dialogue, or, as it has been imagined, were distinguished by being more measured and musical, is a point not easily cleared up. The passages commonly appealed to for this purpose, from the grammarians Diomedes and Donatus, about the *Cantica* of the *Roman Comedy*, I look upon as a very frail foundation of any conclusion with respect to the *Greek Tragedy*³. The passage of Plutarch above quoted, *note*⁴, furnishes the strongest support I know of for such a distinction. For, if by “*spoken or recited to an instrumental accompaniment*,” (τα μὲν [sc. τῶν ἰαμβῶων] Αἰετῆσθαι παρὰ τὴν κρυσιν) Plutarch meant, as I think he must mean, *sung in recitative*, not literally *spoken*, (for how could that admit of a musical accompaniment?) then, ἀδισθαί, which is

opposed

¹ See Aristotle's *Problems*, Sect. 19. *Prob.* xlv. and xlix.

² *De Rep.* x. p. 605.

³ See the Abbé Du Bos, *Reflex. sur la Poes.* &c. vol. iii. Sect. 11, &c.—This writer's explanation of the passage of Aristotle that we have been considering, is worth the reader's inspection, as a perfect model of misrepresentation, absurdity, and blundering.

opposed to it, must of course imply, not mere *singing* as opposed to *speech*, but a more *musical* and *measured* melody.

NOTE 47.

P. 117. THE MEANING OF MELOPOEIA IS OBVIOUS - - - .

I have ventured to depart from the common interpretation, by understanding the word *δυναμις*, here, to mean, not the power, and *effect*, of the Melopœia itself, but the power, i. e. the *meaning* of the *term*. Aristotle is here, as usual, explaining the terms he had made use of. It was directly to his purpose to say, as a reason for omitting a definition in this instance, that the *meaning* of the word was well known; but not at all to his purpose, to say—"I need not explain the *word*, because the "*power* and *effect* of the *thing* signified by it, "*(that is, of Music,) is well known.*"

Dacier is amusing here. He wonders what could induce the Greeks to make Music a part of their drama; and at last, "*après bien des recherches,*" he discovers one principal cause to have been this—that they had very musical ears; but he does not discover the cause of his own wonder, which, in all probability, was, that *he* had not.

NOTE 48.

P. 118. OR DELIVERING A GENERAL SENTIMENT.

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle defines *γνῶμη* by *καθολὴ ἀποφανσις*. [Lib. ii. cap. xxi. p. 572.] Thus below, in this chapter, for *ἀποφαινεται γνῶμην*, his *first* expression, we have, *καθολὴ ἀποφαινεται*.—This has been loosely and inaccurately rendered in all the translations I have seen, except those of Castelvetro and Goulston.

NOTE 49.

P. 118. THESE PARTS --- HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED BY MOST POETS.

Locus, as the critics say, *conclamatus*. Time is too precious to be wasted in the support, or refutation, of random conjectures upon a passage of such desperate corruption.—How can *ἐν ὀλίγοις*, “*not a few*,” be tortured into, “*all*,” or, “*almost all*?” Yet so Dacier, Batteux, Goulston, &c. On the other hand, if fairly translated, “*not a few*” “*Poets* have made use of these parts,” how strangely it will follow—“*for EVERY Tragedy* has “*them all*!”—And how is the *ὡς ἴπῳ*, to be applied? to *ἐν ὀλίγοις*, or, to *ἰδίῃ*?

In the midst of these difficulties, all I could do was to make my version consistent with *itself*;
faithful

faithful to the *original*, I could not make it, without making it nonsensical.

Those commentators, who apply the *ὡς ἴππον* to the word *ἰδέσθαι*, seem favoured by *ch. xli.* where, speaking of the same essential parts of Tragedy, Aristotle says—*ὡς μὲν ὅτι εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴσθαι.*

NOTE 50.

P. 119. THE SUPREME GOOD ITSELF --- IS ACTION, NOT QUALITY.

See *Ethic. Nicom.* I. 5, 7, 8. *ed. Wilk. & Mag. Moral.* I. 4. p. 149, 150. *ed. Duval.*

NOTE 51.

P. 119. THE TRAGEDIES OF MOST MODERN POETS HAVE THIS DEFECT.

This receives illustration from what Aristotle presently after says, of “the *rhetorical manner* “prevailing in the Poets of his time:” *οἱ δὲ νῦν, ῥητορικῶς. cap. vi:* and from his observation, at the close of *cap. xxiv.* [*Transl. Part III. Sect. 6.*] that “the *manners* and sentiments are only obscured by *too splendid a diction.*”

What he has here said of the recent Tragedies of his time, may perhaps be said, in general, of our modern Tragedies, compared with those of Shakspeare. The truth, I believe, is, that the Tragedy of a refined and polished age will always have less

than that of ruder times, because it will have more dignity; more of that uniform and level elevation, which excludes strong *traits* of character, and the simple, unvarnished delineation of the manners. Indeed, what the Greeks denominated *ῥῆμα*, is the peculiar province of *Comedy*^a, and is seldom to be found in Tragedy, except in that stage of its progress, when it is not yet thoroughly and distinctly separated from Comedy; from the imitation of *common* life, and *natural* manners^b. Such are the Tragedies of Shakspeare; and such, as I have before ventured to suggest, are those of Euripides in particular, which, in proportion as they have less dignity, have more *ῥῆμα*, than the Tragedies of Sophocles. But in neither of them, nor, probably, even in those very Poets here censured by Aristotle, was the “language of *Poets*,” substituted for “the language of *men*,” as it is almost constantly in the French Tragedy, and, too often, in our own Tragedies of the *French school*.

^a Illud (*ῥῆμα*) *Comædiæ*, hoc (*πᾶσι*) *Tragædiæ*, simile.—*Quintil.* p. 302, *ed. Gib.*

^b — ἀπλῶς, says *Demetrius*, καὶ ἀποκτείνον, το *ῥῆμα*. *Sect.* 28.—And see *Longinus*, *Sect.* 9, where he very justly calls the *Odyssey*, κωμῶδα τις ἡθρολογουμένη.

^c “Addison,” says Dr. Johnson in his admirable preface to Shakspeare, “speaks the language of Poets, and Shakspeare, of men.—The composition refers us only to the writer; we pronounce the name of *Cato*, but “we think on *Addison*.”

NOTE 52.

P. 119. POLYGNOTUS EXCELS IN THE EXPRESSION OF THE MANNERS.

I see not the smallest reason for the substitution of ἀγαθῶν, for ἀγαθῶ, which is the reading, we are told, of all the MSS. What Aristotle had said before of Polygnotus, *cap.* ii.—ὅτι κατὰ τὴν εἰκότι—seems not to afford the slightest ground for alteration here. [See Mr. Winstanley's *ed.* p. 281.] Painters are compared in very different points of view, in these two passages: *there*, as imitating good or bad, serious or ridiculous, elevated or low, objects: *here*, only as expressing, or not expressing, manners. It was directly to Aristotle's purpose to say, that Polygnotus was a "*good manner-painter*;" (ἀγαθῶ ἡθογγαφῶ)—not at all to his purpose, (besides the awkwardness of the expression itself,) to say, that he was "*a manner-painter of good men*:" (ἀγαθῶν ἡθογγαφῶ).

NOTE 53.

P. 120. JUST AS IN PAINTING, &c.

I hope I shall not much shock even the most conscientious adherents to the established inaccuracy and authentic blunders of ancient manuscripts, by having ventured to adopt here the transposition first proposed, I believe, by Castelvetro.

Castelvetro *. I can only desire those readers, who may be alarmed at my temerity, to read the passage—*παραπλησιον γαρ εστι—κ.τ.αλλ.—το, εικονα*,—first, where it stands in all the editions, and then, where I have placed it, immediately after the words—*εχουσα δε μυθον και συγασιν πραγματων*.—If this experiment alone be not sufficient to convince them of the propriety, or, rather, the necessity, of the transposition, I despair of the success of any arguments I am able to produce in the support of it. To me, I confess, it is among those things that are too evident for proof.

NOTE 54.

P. 120. ADVENTURERS IN TRAGIC WRITING
ARE SOONER ABLE, &c. - - -

Aristotle argues here upon a principle rather rhetorical and popular, than philosophical—that, which infers superior *worth* from superior *difficulty* and *rarity*:—*το χαλιπωτερον και σπανιωτερον, μειζον*, (sc. *αγαθον*,) as he lays it down in his *Rhetoric*, *lib. i. cap. vii. p. 529*.

Lord

* *Poetica d' Aristotele*, &c. p. 142. Ed é da sapere, che di sotto si truovano in luogo non convenevole queste parole, *παραπλησιον—εικονα*. Le quali parole debbono seguitare prossimamente dopo *πραγματων*, &c. Heinsius, too, saw the necessity of the transposition, but appears to me to have, in a great measure, destroyed the propriety of it, by inserting the passage, not immediately after *πραγματων*, but after *απαγγελσεις*, in the next sentence. See his note, in Goulston's ed. or the Ox. ed. 1780.

Lord Bacon, in his *Essay On Gardens*, uses the same argument, and almost in Aristotle's words, with respect to the superiority of gardening to architecture: "A man shall ever see, that when
 "ages grow to civility and elegancy, *men come to*
 "build stately sooner than to garden finely; as
 "if gardening were the greater perfection."

The truth, however, of the fact here asserted by Aristotle, appears, not only from the earlier dramatic Poets of every nation, but from the defects of plots in general, whether Dramatic or Epic; and from the rarity of those dramatic fables, for which the Poet has trusted entirely to his own invention, without recourse to history, or novels, or the productions of other dramatists*.—"En general, il y
 "a plus de pieces bien dialoguées, que de pieces
 "bien conduites. Le Génie qui dispose les in-
 "cidens, paroît plus rare que celui qui trouve les
 "vrais discours. Combien de belles scenes dans
 "Moliere!—On compte ses dénouemens heurcux.—
 "On seroit tenté de croire qu'une drame devroit
 "être l'ouvrage de deux hommes de génie, l'un qui
 "arrangeât, et l'autre qui fit parler."—Diderot, *de la Poes. Dram.* p. 288.

NOTE 55.

P. 120. TO THIS PART BELONGS, &c. - - -

Aristotle is not here *defining* Διαβολα, as his expression, ταυτο δε ΕΣΤΙ, seems, at first view, to imply :

* See Harris's *Philol. Inq.* p. 160.

imply: he is only explaining the subservience of the sentiments to the manners; he is shewing *why* they are *next* in rank and importance to the *manners*; namely, because manners or characters, are, in great part at least, manifested by the sentiments. Dacier's note here is good. "Aristote suit ici l'ordre naturel. Les sentimens sont pour les mœurs, ce que les mœurs sont pour l'action. Comme un Poete tragique ne peut bien imiter une action, qu'en employant les mœurs, il ne peut non plus bien marquer les mœurs, que par le moyen des sentimens; & par consequent les sentimens tiennent le troisieme rang dans la Tragedie."

NOTE 56.

P. 120. WHICH, IN THE DIALOGUE, DEPENDS ON THE POLITICAL AND RHETORICAL ARTS.

—'Οπερ, ἐπὶ των λογων, της πολιτικης και ρητορικης ἔργων εἰν.—I have not seen the words, ἐπὶ των λογων, satisfactorily explained. I cannot agree with those commentators, who by *λογοι*, here, understand, *oratory*, *prose eloquence*, as opposed to Poetry: a sense, indeed, very common, in Aristotle and other writers; but if we adopt it here, how follows—οἱ ΓΑΡ ἀρχαιοι πολιτικως ΕΠΟΙΟΥΝ λεγοντας? for here, Aristotle evidently speaks of *Poets*; not of *orators*, as Dacier renders it. The passage,

then, fairly translated, would stand thus:—"which, (i. e. the choice of proper sentiments,) in "ORATORY, is the business of the political and "rhetorical arts: FOR the antient Tragic Poets "made their characters speak politically," &c. Nothing can well be more incoherent.

ΕΠΙ ΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ, means, I think,—in the *speeches*, *discourse*, or *dialogue part* of the drama, as distinguished from the *choral* or *lyric* part, which had nothing, or comparatively nothing, to do with ἦθος or *character*, and in which the Poet was, of course, to draw his διανοια, or *thoughts*, principally at least, from different sources; not from the stores of civil wisdom, or rhetorical art, but from those of Religion, Ethics, Mythology, and Poetry. The word λόγοι, is *clearly* used in the same sense, in a passage that presently follows:—διοπερ ἐκ ἔχουσιν ἦθος ἐνίοι τῶν ΛΟΓΩΝ—"some of the "*speeches*, or the *dialogue*."

NOTE 57.

P. 120-1. FOR THE ANTIENTS MADE THEIR CHARACTERS SPEAK IN THE STYLE OF POLITICAL AND POPULAR ELOQUENCE; BUT NOW, THE RHETORICAL MANNER PREVAILS.

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΣ ἐποίουν λεγοντας, οἱ δὲ νυν, ῥητορικῶς.—So *Rhet. lib. ii. cap. xxii. p. 573*, ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩ. συλλογισμῷ—a *Civil* or *Oratorical* syllogism, as opposed to the *strict dialectic*

syllogism : a distinction which he presently after expresses by, ἀκριβεστερον, and ΜΑΛΑΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ, συλλογισθαι [ibid.] And thus, here, the same term, πολιτικως, is used, to distinguish the popular, and less laboured, though more solid, eloquence of the Senate or the Forum, from the studied and declamatory composition of the professed rhetoricians. A similar use of the word occurs in the passage quoted in NOTE 229, from the *Euagoras* of Isocrates, where, ὀνομασι ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΙΣ, is plainly synonymous with ὀνομασι ΚΥΡΤΙΟΙΣ. See also Dion. Halicarn. *De Struct. Orat.* p. 4. ed. Upton, and Faber's note.

That Aristotle, however, by *Politics* (ἡ πολιτική), means *only*, as Dacier asserts, "l'usage commun, *le langage ordinaire des peuples*," cannot, surely, be admitted. The force and extent of the term is well known*. "CIVILIS SCIENTIA," says Quintilian, "idem quod SAPIENTIA est". It comprehended all the necessary knowledge of the πολιτικός, the *vir civilis*, the *public man*. It included, of course, eloquence, or the faculty of public speaking, but that, of a kind very different from the "*umbratile genus*," as Cicero calls it, of the rhetorical schools. What Aristotle says of the

* See *Eth. Nicom.* lib. i. cap. ii. and iii. and *Mag. Metal.* lib. i. cap. i.

^b *Lib.* ii. cap. xv. p. 106. ed. *Gibbs*.

^c *Cic. de Or.* ii. 15 to 19. where he traces the separation of *eloquence* from *philosophy*. The difference of the

the old Tragic Poets, that they made their personages speak like such a man, not like a *Rhetorician*, cannot be better illustrated than by Quintilian's character of *Euripides*. "Illud quidem nemo non fateatur necesse est, iis qui se ad agendum comparent, utiliorem longè Euripidem fore. Namque is, et in sermone——magis accedit oratorio generi, et sententiis densus; et in iis quæ à sapientibus tradita sunt, penè ipsis par, et in dicendo ac respondendo cuilibet eorum qui fuerunt IN FORO DISERTI comparandus." [lib. x. cap. i.]

That Dacier, with so precise and clear an expression before his eyes, as, ΕΠΟΙΟΥΝ λεγοντας, should understand this of the antient *orators*, and roundly pronounce Victorius to be mistaken in applying it to the *Poets*, seems perfectly unaccountable.

I do not see in this passage any foundation for the refinement of Castelvetro, Dacier, and other commentators, who refer the *ivotta* to the political science, and the *ἀρμολογία* to rhetoric. The word *ἀρμολογία*, has, I think, the same sense as in cap. xv. and means, such sentiments, or thoughts, as, being adapted to the person speaking, are expressive

political and rhetorical styles may be well illustrated, I think, by a comparison of the style of Cicero, (in his *Orations*,) with that of Demosthenes: for on this subject, I cannot but agree with the remarks of Lord Monboddo, *Orig. and Prog. of Lang.* vol. iii. p. 184, and vol. ii. *Diss.* III.

pressive of the *manners*: for it is in this view, as I before remarked, that Aristotle is here considering the *sentiments*, or Διανοία. Τα ἔνόντα, as Victorius has observed, is equivalent to τα ὑπαρχόντα; and it was clearly the business of rhetoric (ῥητορικῆς ἔργον,) to teach both the ὑπαρχόντα and the ἀρμοττοντα. See *Rhet. lib. ii. cap. xxii. p. 573, E.* and *lib. iii. cap. vii. p. 590, D. ed. Duval.*

NOTE 58.

P. 121. THERE ARE SPEECHES, THEREFORE, WHICH ARE WITHOUT MANNERS - - - AS NOT CONTAINING, &c.

The reading I have followed is, I think, fully authorised, by MSS. and by common sense.—See Mr. Winstanley's note, p. 282.—The Abbé Batteux has given the passage thus, from a MS. (N° 2117,) in the King of France's library. Εἰς δὲ ἡθὺς μὲν το τοῖστον, ὁ δὲλοι τὴν προαῖρεσιν, ὅποια τις ἐστίν· διόπερ ἂν ἔχουσιν ἡθὺς ἐνίοι τῶν λόγων, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐστὶ δὲλον ὅτι προαῖρεται ἢ φευγεὶ ὁ λεγών.

The common reading stands thus :—Εἰς δὲ ἡθὺς μὲν το τοῖστον, ὁ δὲλοι τὴν προαῖρεσιν, ὅποια τις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐστὶ δὲλον, ἢ προαῖρεται, ἢ φευγεὶ ὁ λεγών· διόπερ ἂν ἔχουσιν ἡθὺς ἐνίοι τῶν λόγων.—Which is thus rendered by Mr. Harris: "MANNERS OR CHARACTER is *that which discovers* WHAT THE " DETERMINATION [of a speaker] *will be, in* " *matters, where IT IS NOT YET MANIFEST,*

" *whether he chuses to do a thing, or to avoid it* ^a."

Now if this were true, I do not see how there could be any $\pi\omicron\sigma$, in any play, after the first discovery of the speaker's character. In the *Avare* of Moliere, for instance, it is sufficiently *manifest* from the very first scene in which Harpagon appears, what his avarice will lead him *to chuse or to avoid*, in any circumstance of the drama. Is there, for that reason, no $\pi\omicron\sigma$, no sentiments that mark his character, in any thing he says during the rest of the play?—Nay, more; according to this reading, there can be no $\pi\omicron\sigma$ at all in any part of that drama: for the *προαιρεσις* or propensity of *the Miser* is completely known to every reader or spectator from the very title of the piece.

I know, indeed, that Le Bossu, and others, have *given* a meaning to this passage, by *making* Aristotle say, what he certainly does *not* say—viz. when it is not yet manifest "*ex indicio dicentis*," what the will, or chöice, of the speaker is^b. But if the common reading were right, we might, surely, expect to find the words, *ἐν οἷς ἐκ ἐστὶ δῆλον*, &c. subjoined in other places where he defines the $\pi\omicron\sigma$.

^a The words—*τὴν προαιρεσιν ὅποια τις ἐστίν*, are not, I think, rendered with Mr. Harris's usual accuracy,—"*what the determination of a speaker will be*." *Προαιρεσις*, here, is not *particular determination*, but that habitual and *general propensity* which is the *cause* of particular determinations.

^b Heinsius *De Trag. Const.* cap. xiv. Le Bossu, *Du Poeme Epique*, livre iv. ch. 4.

110. Yet we have nothing like it in cap. xv. *initio*; nor in the second book of his *Rhetoric*, where he says only, ἡ δ' ἔχουσι λόγοι, ἐν ὅσοις δηλαῖ ἡ προαιρεσις^c: nor in other passages of the same work, relative to the same subject.

Piccolomini's translation agrees with mine, and is expressed with his usual accuracy.—“Ma il costume nel parlar' é quello, il quale mostra fuora, è apparir fà il volere, e l'election di chi parla. Peroche alcuni parlari si truovano, li quali non hanno costume; come ch' in essi non appaia, e non si manifesti, quello, che ò elegga, ò fugga, con la sua volontà, chi parla.”

NOTE 59.

P. 122. A BEGINNING, IS THAT, &c.

See Harris, *Philol. Inq. Part. II. ch. v.* These definitions must be understood wholly to refer to the wants, and expectations, of the spectator. He must *want* nothing before the beginning, nor *expect* any thing after the end. Nothing, however, is more common than both these defects; than perplexed beginnings, and unsatisfactory conclusions. Henry Fielding, we are told, used “to execrate the man who invented fifth acts^a.” The inventor of *first* acts has not given dramatic Poets much less trouble. Most modern plays have, I think, more or less of this intricacy in their beginnings; but

^c Cap. xxi. p. 572. E. ^a Harris, *Phil. Inq.* p. 161.

but it is especially the case with Comedy. It seems, indeed, by no means easy for a modern comic writer, of whom invention, novelty, variety of incidents, and ingenuity of contrivance, are required, *δαναι*, as Aristotle well expresses it, *ὥσπερ εἰς τὴν χεῖρα, τὴν ἀρχὴν*—i. e. *to put the beginning fairly into the spectator's hand*^b. The spectator, and even the reader, of a new Comedy, is generally employed, during the first scenes, in guessing an ænigma; and when, at length, he comprehends what is going forward, his attention, interest, and sympathy, are disturbed and distracted, by looking back, to understand what he *should* have understood at first. Hence the advantage which the *Tragic* Poet, from the notoriety of his subjects, generally possesses over the *Comic*; and which is so pleasantly described in the fragment preserved by Athenæus from Antiphanes or Aristophanes^c, that I shall save the reader the trouble of turning to it.

- - - Μακαριον ἐστὶν ἡ Τραγωδία
 Ποιῆμα κατὰ παντ' εἶγε πρῶτον οἱ λόγοι
 Ὑπὸ τῶν θεατῶν εἰσὶν ἐγνωρισμένοι
 Πρὶν καὶ τιν' εἶπειν, ὥς ὑπομνησθαι μόνον
 Δὲ τὸν ποιητὴν. Οἰδίπεν γὰρ ἂν γε φῶ,
 Τα δ' ἄλλα παντ' ἴσασιν—ὁ πατὴρ Λαῖῳ,
 Μητὴρ Ἰοκαστῇ—θυγατέρες, παῖδες, τινες—
 Τὶ πείσειθ' ἔτι, τί πεποίηκεν—ἂν πάλιν

Εἰπη

^b See NOTE 40. ^c Athen. lib. vi. See *Casaub.* in loc.

Εἶπη τις Ἀλκμαιωνά, καὶ τὰ παῖδιά
 Παντ' εὐθύς εἶρηκεν—ὅτι μανεῖς ἀπέκτονε
 Τὴν μητέρα.— - - - -

 Ἡμῖν δὲ ταυτ' ἐκ ἑσιν· ἄλλα πάντα δεῖ
 Εὐρεῖν, ὀνόματα καὶνὰ, τὰ διωκόμενα
 Πρῶτον, τὰ νυν παρόντα, τὴν καταστροφὴν,
 Τὴν ἐσβολὴν· ἂν ἐν τῇ τετῶν παραλίπη
 Χρέμης τις, ἢ Φειδῶν τις, ἐκσυριττεται,
 ΠΗΛΕΙ δὲ ταυτ' ἐξέστι καὶ ΤΕΥΚΡΩΙ ποιεῖν.

Thus rendered by Grotius^d—

- - - - Scilicet Tragœdia

Felix poema est : nam principio cognitum
 Argumentum omne spectatori est, antequam
 Verbum hiscat aliquis : nomen tantum dicere
 Poetæ satis est. Oedipum præscripsero,
 Jam reliqua per se norunt ; pater est Laius,
 Jocasta mater ; tum qui nati et filiæ,
 Quid fecit, quid patietur. Si promiserit
 Alcmaëona alius, ipsi dicent pueruli,
 “ Hic ille est qui interfecit matrem insaniens.”—

— — — — —

At nobis ista non licent, sed omnia
 Sunt invenienda, nomina imprimis nova,
 Res antegestæ, res præsentēs, exitus,
 Initia. Ex illis siqua pars defecerit,
 Exsibilatur Phïdo, sive ille est Chremes ;
 Illa alia facere Peleo et Teucro licet.

When

^d *Excerpta ex Trag. et Com. Græcis*, p. 622.

When the *middle* of a drama is not sufficiently connected with what precedes,—that is, in Aristotle's language, when it is not, αὐτο μετ' ἄλλο,—a new plot seems to begin: a fault not uncommon in double and complicated fables*. If, on the other hand, it wants the μετ' ἑκκινυ ἴτερον, the piece seems finished before its time. The *Sampson Agonistes* of Milton, according to Dr. Johnson, is deficient in both requisites of a true, Aristotelic *middle*. Its “*intermediate* parts have neither “*cause* nor *consequence*, neither hasten nor retard “the catastrophe†.” The criticism appears to be just. It is seldom, however, that a beginning, a middle, or an end, is defective in both the conditions required. A beginning, which, strictly speaking, *did not naturally require any thing to follow it*, (μετ' ἑκκινυ ἴτερον πεφυκεν εἶναι,) would put even the most attentive spectator into the situation of Shakspeare's drowsy tinker:

Sly. A goodly matter, surely.—*Comes there any more of it?*

Page. My Lord, 'tis but begun‡.

The most usual defects, and which, I suppose, Aristotle had principally in view, are those of
beginnings

* Qu'y a-t-il de plus adroit que la maniere dont Terrence a entrelacé les amours de *Pamphile* et de *Charinus* dans l'*Andrienne*? Cependant l'a-t-il fait sans inconvénient?—Au commencement du second acte, *ne croiroit-on pas entrer dans une autre pièce?* Diderot, *De la Poés. Dram.* p. 283.

† *Life of Milton.*

‡ *Taming of the Shrew.*

beginnings which do not properly, in his sense, *begin*, and of *endings* which do not *end*. The first perplex us, by supposing something to have preceded, without clearly telling us what; the other leave us dissatisfied, by disappointing our natural expectations of something more to follow. Of this last fault, instances may be found in abundance; particularly in the conclusions of Shakspeare^b. In *Plautus*, and even in *Terence*, we find this imperfection supplied by a very simple and clumsy contrivance, that, of informing the audience that the play was over, and telling them in what manner they were to *suppose* the catastrophe completed.

Spectatores, *Fabula hæc est acta*: vos plausum date.

Plaut. Mostel.

Spectatores, quod futurum est *intus*, hic memorabimur.

Hæc Casina hujus reperietur filia esse è proxumo;
Eaque nubet Euthynico nostro herili filio.

Id. in fine Casinæ.

Ne expectetis dum exeant huc: *intus* despondetur;

Intus transigetur, *si quid est quod restat*.

Ter. And.

^b See Dr. Johnson's Preface to Shakspeare, p. 16. There cannot be a stronger proof of Shakspeare's haste in the conclusion of his plays, than his passing over in total silence the interesting character of old Adam, at the end of *As you like it*; a defect felt, I believe, by every spectator and every reader of that charming comedy.

The fault opposite to this—that, of prolonging the piece beyond the point of satisfactory conclusion—has been attributed to the *Oedipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles. The criticism is tasteless, on every account. The reader may see it well confuted by Brumoy. But *one* of his answers is alone sufficient, on the principles of Aristotle: “*Le spectateur en effet seroit-il content s’il ignoroit le sort de Jocaste, d’Oedipe, et de sa famille?*” &c.¹ “Oedipus,” says Voltaire, “is fully acquainted with his fate at the end of the fourth act. *Voilà donc la piece finie*.”—He might have learned better criticism from a writer of far inferior abilities. “Il faut aussi prendre garde que la catastrophe achève pleinement le Poeme dramatique; c’est à dire, qu’il ne reste rien après, ou de ce que les spectateurs doivent sçavoir, ou qu’ils *veulent* entendre; car s’ils ont raison de demander, *Qu’est devenu quelque personnage intéressé dans les grandes intrigues du Theatre*, ou s’ils ont juste sujet de sçavoir, *Quels sont les sentimens de quelq’un des principaux acteurs après le dernier evenement qui fait cette catastrophe*,—la piece *n’est pas finie*, il y manque encore un dernier trait¹.” That

is

¹ Theatre des Grecs, i. 376.

² Critique sur l’Oedipe de Sophocle.

¹ D’Aubignac, Pratique du Theatre, tom. i. p. 126.
This author, though neither a good writer, nor a deep scholar,

is to say, in *Aristotle's* language, a drama so concluded, (as the *Oedipus Tyrannus* would be, if it ended with the *fourth* act,) would want the *true* τελευτη, or *end*—that, after which, ἄλλο ἔτιν ΠΕΦΤΚΕΝ εἶναι.

NOTE 60.

P. 123. WHETHER IT BE AN ANIMAL, &c.

Ἀλλὰ τοῦδε γε οἶμαι σε φαναι ἂν δεῖν, παντὰ λογὸν ὩΣΠΕΡ ΖΩΩΝ συνεχῶσαι, σῶμα τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτῶ ὥς μὴτε ΑΚΕΦΑΛΩΝ εἶναι μὴτε ΑΠΟΤΝ, ἀλλὰ ΜΕΣΑ τε ἔχειν, καὶ ΑΚΡΑ, πρεποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὈΛΩ.—

Plato, in *Phædro*, p. 264, ed. Scr.

NOTE 61.

P. 123. BEAUTY CONSISTS IN MAGNITUDE AND ORDER.

There is something singular, something, at least, not quite consonant to modern ideas, in the great stress which the antients appear to have laid upon

scholar, has collected in this book a good deal of curious *theatrical* erudition, and made some acute and judicious observations on the rules of dramatic writing. He was unfortunate when he attempted to put his theory into practice by writing a Tragedy. "Je sçais bon gré," said the great Condé, "à l'Abbé D'Aubignac d'avoir suivi les règles d'Aristote, mais je ne pardonne pas aux règles d'Aristote, d'avoir fait faire une si mauvaise Tragedie à l'Abbé D'Aubignac."

upon *size*, as a necessary constituent of beauty in the human form. They seem, indeed, to have despised every thing that was not *large*; and to have estimated beauty, not by measure only, but by *weight* also. "Magnanimity," says the Philosopher in his Ethics, "consists in greatness of soul, as *beauty* also consists in *greatness of body*." Little men may be called *αἰετοί*, and *συμμετροί*, "*pretty*, and *well-shaped*," but not *ΚΑΛΟΙ*, "*handsome*, or *beautiful*."

That magnitude should have entered, as essential, into their idea of a handsome *man*, is not surprising. The utility of strength, and the connection between strength and size, is sufficient to account for this. But what appears most singular is, that they insist no less upon the importance of magnitude to *female* beauty.—ΘΗΛΕΙΩΝ δὲ ἀρετῇ, σωματὶ μὲν, καλλῷ καὶ ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ¹. HOMER seldom omits size in his descriptions of this kind.

Ἔσκε δὲ πατρίῳ ἑμοῖο γυνὴ Φοινίσσ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ,
Καλὴ τε ΜΕΓΑΛΗ τε, καὶ ἀγλαὰ ἔργ' εἰδυῖα.
Od. O. 416.

Nor let it be objected, that this praise comes from a swine-herd; for Eurymachus, a suitor, and a courtier, compliments Penelope, by telling her, that

¹ *Ethic. Nicom. lib. iv. cap. 3.*

² *Rhet. i. cap. v.*—Xenophon, describing *Panthea*, says—*ἀπερχομένη*—πρῶτον μὲν, τῷ ΜΕΓΕΘΕΙ, ἔπειτα δὲ, τῇ ὈΜΗῃ, &c. *Cyropæd. lib. v. initio.*

that she was more *accomplished in mind, handsomer, and LARGER*, than other women :

- - - ἔπει περὶ σσι γυναικῶν

Εἶδ' ὧς τε, ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ τε, ἰδὲ φρενας ἔνδον εἰσας.

Od. Σ. 248.

And, indeed, when Minerva, that Penelope might fascinate the suitors, anointed her with the cosmetic wash of Venus, and gave a supernatural brightening to all her charms, at the same time that she made her skin "*whiter than ivory*," she made her also "*taller and stouter*."

Ἀμβροτα δῶρα δίδε, ἵνα μιν θησάιατ' Ἀχαιοί·

Καλλεῖ μιν οἱ πρῶτα πρόσωπα τε καλά καθήρην

Ἀμβροσίῳ, οἷον περ' εὖς τε φαν' Κυβερείᾳ

Χρίεται, εὐτ' αἶν' ἰὴ Χαρίτων χορόν ἱμεροεντα·

Καὶ μιν ΜΑΚΡΟΤΕΡΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΣΣΟΝΑ

θήκεν ἰδεσθαι,

Λευκοτέρην δ' ἀρὰ μιν θήκεν πρὶς τε ἑλεφαντ'.

Ibid. 190.

Thus, too, of the daughters of Pandarus :

Ἦρ' ὃ' αὐτῇσιν περὶ πασσῶν δῶκε γυναικῶν

Εἶδ' ὧς καὶ πινυτήν, ΜΗΚΟΣ δ' ἔπορ' Ἀρτεμίδος

ἀγνῇ.

Od. Φ. 6.

When Penelope, in the beginning of the twenty-first book. goes to fetch the key of the repository, where the bow of Ulysses was kept, Homer describes her as taking hold of the key with her "*stout hand*:"

Ἐίλετο δὲ κληῖδ' εὐκαμπέα ΧΕΙΡΙ ΠΑΧΕΙῃ.

Od. Φ. 6.

—which Ernestus, who allows, that, “*manu crassâ, non benè convenit femina pulchrâ et reginâ,*” would fain soften down into the *main potelée* of the French.

Quintilian observes of *Zeuxis*, who drew the heads and limbs of his figures very large, that, in this, he followed HOMER, “*cui validissima quaque forma, etiam in fœminis, placet;*” and, that he did this, “*id amplius atque augustius ratus:*” and, indeed, these ideas of the antients relative to beauty, both male and female, seem to have been owing, in part, at least, to their ideas of that *majesty* and *dignity*, which they considered as essential attributes of their divinities, and which imply superior size and strength. To tell a lady that she was taller and stouter than most of her sex, was a great compliment: it was comparing her to a goddess.

It seems, then, that Shakspeare, in the quarrel between Helena and Hermia in his *Midsummer Night's Dream*, has, without knowing it, made Hermia perfectly *classical* in her resentment, and Lysander, in his reproaches:

Her. Puppet! Why so?—Ay, that way goes the game.

Now I perceive that she hath made compare
Between our *statures*; she hath urged her *height*,
And with her personage, her *tall* personage,

Her

Her *height*, forsooth, she hath prevailed with him.

- - - - -

Her. Little again?—nothing but *low* and
little?

Why will you suffer her to flout me thus?

Let me come to her. - - -

Lys. Get you gone, you *dwarf*,
You minimus of hind'ring knot-grass made,
You bead, you acorn! - - - *Act iii. Scene 8.*

NOTE 62.

P. 123. NO VERY MINUTE ANIMAL CAN
BE BEAUTIFUL - - - NOR ONE OF A PRODI-
GIOUS SIZE.

I am by no means perfectly satisfied of the
integrity of this passage; but no better com-
ment can, I think, be given upon it, as it stands,
than that of Beni. — “ Non *priora* [i. e. quæ
“ valdè pusilla,] quia eorum spectatio [*θωπρία*]
“ momento penè temporis fiat, ac propterea spec-
“ tatio ipsa confundatur;—quod est, tantâ celeri-
“ tate comprehendantur ac *vcluti absorbeantur*
“ *partes omnes*, ut non liceat partem à parte, ut
“ caput à thorace, internoscere, atque adeo partes
“ *conferre mutud, symmetriamque et proportio-*
“ *nem agnoscere et æstimare.*—Non *posteriora*,
“ [i. e. valdè magna,] quia, è contrario, in tam
“ ingenti mole ac magnitudine, partium multitudine
“ cognitionem

" cognitionem impediat, quæ non possit simul
 " [ἀμα] haberi: *dum enim spectatur una, prop-*
 " *ter distantiam deperit et evanescit* [οἰχεται]
 " *cognitio alterius; ita ut unum et totum non*
 " *appareat animal.*" [Benii Comm. in Aristot.
Poet. p. 205.]

The reader may, after this, be amused with seeing what strange work Lord Shaftsbury has made with this passage in his *explanatory translation* of it. *Essay on the freedom of Wit and Humour. Part IV. Sect. 3.*

NOTE 63.

P. 123. EASILY COMPREHENDED BY THE EYE, &c.

ΕΥΣΤΗΝΟΠΤΟΝ — No words furnish a more striking proof of the richness, compression, force, and *convenience*, of the Greek language, than those which Aristotle here uses; — εὐστυροπτον, εὐμνημονευτον, συνδηλόν. The reader needs only see to what a feeble length of periphrastic wire-drawing a translator is reduced, if he would give their full value: *Easily comprehended by the eye.* — " *Que l'œil puisse comprendre et mesurer aisement et tout d'un coup.*" [Dacier.] " *Qui puisse être saisi d'un même coup d'œil.*" [Batteux; the most compressed of all Aristotle's translators.] " *Un tout ensemble où la vue ne s'égare point.*" [Marmontel, *Poétique Fr. Pref.*]

Of

Of the same kind are the words, *εὐπακολαβητόν* —“ such as the understanding can easily follow” —“ and keep up with” : *ἐνανανίους* —of a period, “ that does not put one out of breath”.

NOTE 64.

P. 124. IF A HUNDRED TRAGEDIES, &c.

The supposition of a *hundred* Tragedies performed in concurrence seems merely to be a sort of hyperbolical *fling* at the known intemperance of the Athenian people with respect to theatrical exhibitions; and Dacier has rightly, I think, accounted for this “ *exuberantia orationis*,” as Victorius calls it^c.

But Dacier, and the Abbé Batteux after him, make Aristotle’s expression too hyperbolical for hyperbole itself, when they translate, “ S’il falloît “ jouer cent Tragédies *en un jour*.” For if the Tragedies were only half an hour long, and played without intermission, they would have required a day of *fifty hours*. We must understand, surely, with Beni, “ Si centum Tragœdiæ, verbi gratiâ, “ *totis illis spectaculorum diebus* recitandæ pro-
“ ponerentur^d,” which will still leave hyperbole enough.

Dacier

^a Rhet. I. ii, p. 517. ^b *Ibid.* III. ix. p. 592.

^c Quis enim non intelligit hanc (i. e. *ἐκατον Τραγωδίας*) *exuberantiam orationis* esse? *Vict. in locum.*

^d *Comment.* p. 211.

Dacier is also mistaken, I believe, in concluding, from what Aristotle says, that it was once an *established custom* with the Greeks to regulate the length of Tragedies by the *clepsydra*, or hour-glass. His expression seems to imply at *least*, that it had been *rarely* practised, if it does not, as M. Batteux thinks, imply some doubt; whether it had been done at all:—ὥσπερ ποτε καὶ ἄλλοτε ΦΑΣΙ.

Thus much, however, as to the limited length of these performances, we may easily conceive; that when, to gratify the immoderate fondness of the Athenians for the drama, an uncommon number of Tragedies were exhibited in concurrence, and the contending Poets were apt to encroach upon the patience of the audience, by lengthening out their pieces in order to *shew off* themselves, or their *actors**, the *Lord Chamberlain* of these exhibitions might be obliged, in compliance with the clamours of the people, to confine the representation of each drama to *some* limited time.

NOTE 65.

P. 124. A FABLE IS NOT ONE - - - MERELY BECAUSE THE HERO OF IT IS ONE.

Mr. Hume, in his *Essay on the association of ideas*, represents this passage of Aristotle as *contrary* to the doctrine he there lays down, and which is unquestionably true—that “in all productions,

* See *cap. ix. Transl. Part II. Sect. 7.*

“ductions, as well as in the Epic and Tragic, a *certain unity* is required,” &c.—and, “that the unity of action which is to be found in biography or history, differs from that of Epic Poetry, *not in kind, but in degree.*” I see here no *contrariety* at all. Aristotle certainly did not mean to say, that a biographical Poem, if I may so term it, (a Poem *περί ἑνός*,) has *no* unity, *no* relation of cause and effect, &c. to connect the incidents; but only, that it has not *that degree* of unity, which is requisite for the purpose of Tragic, or even Epic, Poetry. Mr. Hume himself allows, that Poetry “requires a stricter and closer unity in the fable;” and this is all that Aristotle appears to mean. The persons censured by him for concluding, that, “because Hercules was one, so also “must be the fable, of which he was the subject,” were right enough, as philosophers, but as poets, certainly wrong.

This chapter, in which Aristotle considers so particularly the *unity* of fable, as distinct from its *totality*, led me once to think it probable, that the word *μίας* was originally in the definition of Tragedy, *cap. vi.* as we find it afterwards in *cap. xxiii.*—*περί μίαν πρᾶξιν ὅλην καὶ τελείαν*. But perhaps the supposition is unnecessary, and *unity* may be sufficiently implied in the words *τελείας καὶ ὅλης*: ὉΛΟΤΗΤΟΣ, as he elsewhere says, ἘΝΟΤΗΤΟΣ ΤΙΝΟΣ ὈΥΣΗΣ. *Metaph. lib. v. cap. 26.*

NOTE 66.

P. 125. EITHER FROM ART, OR GENIUS.

Ἡτοι δια τεχνην, ἢ ΔΙΑ ΦΤΣΙΝ.—It appears from this, as well as from other passages of Aristotle's treatise, that in the midst of all the coldness of philosophical investigation and analysis, he never lost sight of the difference between that spontaneous operation of genius and feeling in the Poet, which *produces* poetic beauty, and the slow and cautious process of calm examination and inquiry in the Critic, whose business it is to discover its *principles*. It is not every philosophical critic that avoids this error. Nothing is more common, than to suppose that to have been *produced* by art and reflection, *about which*, when produced, art and reflection have been employed^a. Thus languages, we are told, must have been originally *formed* by art, because they cannot be *analysed* without art: Grammarians and Philosophers must have formed language, because language has formed Grammarians and Philosophers.

NOTE 67.

P. 125. BUT HE COMPREHENDED THOSE ONLY WHICH HAVE RELATION TO ONE ACTION, &c.

Οδυσσειαν γὰρ ποιῶν, ἢ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη—ἈΛΛ' Ἄ περὶ μίαν πράξιν, ὅταν λεγομένη τῇ Οδυσσειᾳ,

^a See Diss. I. vol. i. p. 8. note^b.

Οδυσσεῖαν, ΣΤΝΕΣΤΗΣΑΝ. So the text stands.
 “Non cecinit omnia - - - *sed quæ circa unam*
 “solam actionem, *qualem Odysseam dicimus, con-*
 “*stiterunt.*” [Goulston.] Victorius reads, ΑΛΛΑ,
 and ΣΤΝΕΣΤΗΣΕΝ; but does injustice, I think,
 to his own reading, by his construction and his
 version: *περι μίαν πράξιν—συνεῖησεν*: “*circa unam*
 “*actionem—MANSIT.*” This is, surely, very
 harsh. I should punctuate, and translate, thus:—
ἀλλὰ περι μίαν πράξιν, ὅαν λεγομιν, τὴν Οδυσσεῖαν
συνεῖησεν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιάδα. [sc. *συνεῖησεν*].
 “Sed circa unam actionem, *qualem dicimus, Odys-*
 “*seam constituit; pariterque Iliadem.*”—“But he
 “planned his Odyssey, as he also did his Iliad,
 “upon an action, that is *one*, in the sense here
 “explained.”—And that this is the true reading,
 and the true sense, of the passage, I was once tho-
 roughly persuaded. The construction of the whole
 is, thus, clear and natural. The circumstance of
 the plural verb *συνεῖησαν* with the plural neuter, *ᾧ*,
 is avoided; and the word *συνεῖησεν* retains its
 proper and usual sense, as applied, throughout, by
 Aristotle, to the composition, or construction, of the
 Fable.—So, *cap. ix. συνεσαντες τὸν μῦθον. cap. xvii.*
and xxiii.—τὰς μῦθους συνεσαναι—et passim. I will
 not, however, dissemble what is against me. The
 reading *ἀλλ’ ᾧ*, besides its support from MSS.
 answers better to the *ἅπαντα ὅσα*, which precedes:—
οὐκ ἵποιησεν Αἴαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνεῖη—ΑΛΛ’ Ἀ
περι μ. π. &c. But, if *ἀλλ’ ᾧ* be retained, the pas-
 sage,

sage, I think, should stand thus :—ἀλλ' αἱ περι μίαν πρᾶξιν, [sc. ἱστ.,] οἷαν λεγομένην τὴν Ὀδυσσειαν, ΣΤΝΕΣΤΗΣΕΝ^a. According to the construction of Piccolomini :—*quelle cose accolse*, ch' al corpo d'una attione, la qual chiamiamo Odissea, servissero :—and the Abbé Batteux—"Il a rapproché tout ce qui tenoit à une seule action."—συνεστησεν αἱ περι μίαν πρᾶξιν : i. e. *composed his fable of those circumstances* only, which relate to *one* action. Thus, immediately after—τα ΜΕΡΗ ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ τῶν πραγμάτων.

Unwilling to make alterations that do not appear absolutely necessary, I have followed this last reading; though with some remaining partiality to my first conjecture. That the sense would be clearer, and the construction less elliptical and embarrassed, is certain. But I am afraid this is but a questionable

^a I cannot reconcile the commentary of Victorius on this passage with his *text* and his *version*. His *text* stands thus: ἄλλα περι μίαν πρᾶξιν, οἷαν λεγομένην τὴν Ὀδυσσειαν, συνεστησεν. His *version* is—"Verum circa unam actionem, qualem dicimus Odysseam mansit."—But, in his remarks, he translates *exactly* as if he had read and understood the passage in the way here proposed. "Verum quæ circa unam actionem, qualem Odysseam vocamus, constituit."—And, "Quæ circa unam, autem, actionem coagmentasse inquit Homerum."—Again—"Quare verè dici potest, ipsum complexum fuisse, quæ circa illam actionem." Nor does he give, in his commentary, any other version, or explanation, or mention a word about the change of ἀλλ' αἱ into ἄλλα, which he had adopted in his *text*.

a questionable proof of corruption in the writings of Aristotle.

NOTE 68.

P. 126. THE WHOLE WILL BE DESTROYED, OR CHANGED.

Destroyed, if any part be *taken away*, (ἀφαιρέμενος)—disturbed or *changed*, if it be *transposed* (μετατιθεμένος). In the first case it will be no longer a *whole*; in the last, not the *same whole*. This seems the meaning, as it is well rendered by M. Batteux : “ Que les parties en soient tellement “ liées entre elles, qu’une seule transposée, ou “ retranchée, ce ne soit plus un tout, ou le même “ tout.”—But I cannot think διαφερισθαι right. It is rendered by Goulston, “ *diversum reddatur*, et “ *moveatur*, totum.” So Piccolomini, “ *diverso* . . . “ *e mutato*,” &c. But, besides the manifest tautology, I doubt whether there be any good authority for this sense of the verb διαφερισθαι—i. e. to be *made different*, or *changed*. At least I have not found any instance of it in Aristotle’s writings. If we retain διαφερισθαι, it must, I think, be taken in the sense of *discerpi*, *distrahi*, &c. But I am almost persuaded, that Aristotle wrote ΔΙΑΦΘΕΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ, *spoiled*, or *destroyed*. So in his *Topics*, ΦΘΕΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ το ὅλον. vol. i. p. 258. B. ed. Duval.

NOTE 69.

P. 127. POSSIBLE, ACCORDING TO PROBABLE, OR NECESSARY, CONSEQUENCE.

Compare *cap.* xv. *Χρη δε και εν τοις ηθεσιν. κ.τ.αλ.*— [Transl. Part II. Sect. 15. p. 144*.] The expression, *δυνατα κατα*—*το αναγκαιον*, “possible --- according to necessity,” appears strange at the first glance: but in fiction, events may be *supposed* to happen, as in real life they *do* happen, not only probably, but necessarily; that is, not only as they were *likely* to happen, but as, morally speaking, they could not *but* happen.—“Puisque la fonction “du vraisemblable dans la Tragedie, est d’empêcher l’esprit de s’apercevoir de la feinte, le “*vraisemblable* qui le trompe le mieux est le plus “parfait, et c’est celui qui devient *necessaire*. Un “caractere etant *supposé*, il y a des effets qu’il doit “necessairement produire, et d’autres qu’il peut “produire, ou ne produire pas.” Again —“La “perfection est de faire agir les personnages, de “maniere qu’ils *n’ayent pas pu agir autrement*, “leur caractere supposé,” &c. Thus Fontenelle, in his excellent *Reflexions sur la Poetique*; in several parts of which, that clear and philosophical writer has, I believe without any such intention, coincided with, and illustrated, the positions of Aristotle.—See particularly, *Sect.* 58, to 65, inclusively.

NOTE 70.

P. 127. A SPECIES OF HISTORY—.

Ἱστορία ΤΙΣ—"a sort of history." It is singular, that almost all the translators should have neglected a word so important as the pronoun is in this passage. May we not infer from this expression, that if Aristotle had been asked, whether an Epic imitation in prose would be a *Poem*, or not, he would have allowed it to be, ποῖημα ΤΙ, a kind of Poem, as having the essence of Poetry, *invention* and *imitation*? See NOTE 5. p. 232, &c. of the 1st volume.

NOTE 71.

P. 127. A MORE EXCELLENT THING THAN HISTORY.

Σπουδαιότερον. It means no more than, in plain English, a *better* thing. The word occurs frequently in Aristotle's works, in this general sense. So, *Rhet.* I. vii. p. 528, B. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπισημαι καλλίαι ἢ σπουδαιότεραι, καὶ τὰ πράγματα καλλίω καὶ σπουδαιότερα. And, *ibid.* I. ix. p. 531, E. Καὶ αἱ τῶν φύσει σπουδαιότερων (*superior* by nature) ἀρεταὶ καλλίαι, καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οἷον ἀνδρῶν [sc. σπουδαιότεραι αἱ ἀρεταί, &c.] ἢ γυναικῶν.—See, also, *Ethic. Nicom.* lib. vi. cap. vii. p. 78, C. ἀτοπον γὰρ εἰ τις τὴν ἐπισήμην πολιτικὴν — ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΤΑΤΗΝ οἶσται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ΑΡΙΣΤΟΝ τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀνθρώπων εἴη.

Dacier

Dacier translates the word, "*morale*;" Batteux, "*instructive*;" but this is rather giving the reason *why* it is *σπουδαιότερον*, or, a superior thing.

NOTE 72.

P. 127. IS NOT, LIKE THE IAMBIC POETS, PARTICULAR AND PERSONAL.

Ιαμβοποιοί.—Strictly, the writers of the *ψογοί* or satirical invectives that preceded Comedy. [See *cap. iv. Transl. Part I. Sect. 6.*] But I believe Aristotle meant here to *include*, at least, the authors of the first rude Comedy, "*of the Iambic form*—" *της ιαμβικης ιδίας*. See *cap. v. Transl. Part I. Sect. 8.*

It appears, that the *Poem* called *Ιαμβός*, whatever it was, was *represented*, or *acted*, as well as Tragedy and the Epic: for, in his seventh book *De Rep. cap. xvii.* the philosopher forbids boys to be *spectators* of *Iambi* and Comedies:—*τις δὲ νεώτερος εἴτ' ΙΑΜΒΩΝ, εἴτε κωμῳδίας ΘΕΑΤΑΙ νομοθετητίου, πρὶν ἢ*—*κ. τ. ἀλ. p. 448, E.*

NOTE 73.

P. 128. WHAT HAS NEVER ACTUALLY HAPPENED, WE ARE NOT APT TO REGARD AS POSSIBLE.

This must be restricted to those *extraordinary* actions and events, of *public* and *elevated* personages, which usually make the subject of

Tragedy. The best comment I have seen, or that, I think, can be given, on this passage, is that of Piccolomini; but it is so long, that I can only refer to it*. We have, however, the substance of it in the following observation of Brumoy.—“ La “ Tragedie ne s’est point sous-divisée” (as Comedy, he observes, had been,) “ en Tragedie réelle, et “ Tragedie de pure imagination. Je crois en trouver la raison dans la nature de l’esprit humain. “ Il n’y a que la vraisemblance dont il puisse “ être touché. Or il n’est pas vraisemblable que “ des faits aussi *grands* que ceux de la Tragedie, “ des faits qui n’arrivent que dans les maisons des “ *rois*, ou dans le sein des *empires*, soient absolument inconnus. Si donc le Poete invente “ tout son sujet, jusqu’ aux noms, l’esprit du “ spectateur se revolte; tout lui paroît incroyable, “ et la piece manque son effet, faute de vraisemblance. Mais comme la Comedie ne “ touche que la vie commune et ses ridicules, le “ spectateur peut supposer et suppose en effet, “ en se laissant aller à l’enchantement du spectacle, que le sujet qu’on lui présente est un fait “ réel, quoiqu’ il ne le connoisse pas. *Il n’en seroit pas de même, si le sujet comique avoit du “ merveilleux* ^b.”

* *Annotationi*, &c. p. 141, &c.

^b *Theatre des Grecs*, i. p. 207.

NOTE 74.

P. 128. A POET SHOULD BE A POET OR
MAKER OF FABLES, RATHER THAN OF VERSES.

So Plato, almost in the same words:—*ἐννοήσας
ὅτι τον ποιητὴν δεῖσι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητῆς εἶναι, ποιᾶν
ΜΥΘΟΥΣ, ἀλλ' ἔ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ.*—*Phædon*, p. 61,
ed. Serr.

NOTE 75.

P. 128-9. NOR IS HE THE LESS A POET,
THOUGH THE INCIDENTS OF HIS FABLE SHOULD
CHANCE TO BE SUCH AS HAVE REALLY HAP-
PENED, &c.

The original, as it stands, (for I doubt of its integrity,) is very ambiguous and obscure. The sense I *wished* to give it, is this: "Nor will he
" be the less a Poet, though he should *found* his
" Poem upon fact: for nothing hinders, but that
" some *real* events may be such, as to *admit* of
" *Poetic* probability; and he who *gives* them
" this probability, and *makes* them such, as
" Poetry requires, is so far entitled to the name
" of *Poet*, or *Inventor*."

And thus, indeed, the passage is explained by
Robortelli and some other commentators: and
Casaubon seems to have so understood it; for,
quoting the words καὶ ἂν ἄρα συμβῇ γενομένα ποιεῖν,
κ.τ.αλ.—he says, "ad ea solùm dramata refe-
rendum, .

“rendum, quorum hypothesis ab historiâ est; ut
 “Persarum Æschyli: fabulæ verò totius συνθεσις;
 “ab ingenio Poetæ*.” I do not, however, see
 how this sense can be fairly extracted from the
 words, as they now stand. That which I have
 given in my translation, and which was first sug-
 gested to me by the word συμβη, I was afterwards
 glad to find supported by the opinion of Vic-
 torius.

The expression—ἀν ΣΤΜΒΗ, γενομένα ποιῆν,—
 “if he should *happen*,” &c. is very strong, and
 hardly applicable to a Poet *chusing* a true story
 for the outline of his fable. It indicates acci-
 dental coincidence with truth. The word εἶναι,
 also, is on the same side:—“may *be*,” does not
 suit the sense above given, which requires, “may
 “*become*”—may be *made* such by the Poet; not,
 “may *be* such,” in themselves, which is the ob-
 vious meaning of τοιαυτὰ ΕΙΝΑΙ. Farther; Aris-
 totle has just told us, that *probability* is the Poet’s
 province, and yet, at the same time, that Trage-
 dies were usually founded, and *should*, in general,
 be founded, on historical *fact*, Now it would,
 surely, be rather strange, after all this, to say,
 “*nothing hinders*, but that some real events *may*
 “be made to have poetic probability:”—ἐδὲν
 ΚΩΛΕΙ τοιαυτὰ εἶναι ὅσα ἀν εἰς⊙ γενεσθαι,
 κ. τ. αλ.——

But,

* *De Satyricâ*, &c. p. 345.

But, to the interpretation which I have preferred, these expressions are all exactly suitable, and the meaning and connection of the whole seems to be this:—Aristotle had been opposing *Poetry* to *fact*: he had said expressly, that the *γενομενα* were the peculiar province of the historian; the *δια αὐ γενοίτο*, and the *εἰς* ☉, of the Poet. An objector, misapprehending, or misrepresenting, his meaning, might have urged—“ the incidents “ of this or that Poet have actually happened ; “ they are *γενομενα* ; and therefore, according to “ your *own* doctrine, not proper for Poetry, nor “ the work of a *Poet*.”—To this Aristotle answers, that, though the object of the Poet be not *truth*, yet his invented probabilities may coincide with truth: and real events, even of the Tragic and extraordinary kind, *may* have happened as probably and naturally as he has supposed them to happen. He is still, therefore, no less a *Poet*; not only as having actually *invented* the incidents, but as having invented them with true Poetic probability.—And thus Victorius:—“ Non omnes “ eos—qui *fortuito incident* in res quæ exitum “ jam habuerint, in culpâ esse; quia fieri possit, “ ut res aliquæ *factæ*, ita *factæ* sint, ut verisimile sit illas factas esse; et esse denique ejusmodi, ut effici potuerint; *quo nomine* (inquit,) “ ille *Poeta* eorum aliquo modo est: officium “ enim Poetæ est, verisimile sectari, et ea quæ “ effici possunt sumere: quod in illis rebus illo “ modo

“ modo *factis* non desideratur. Retinet igitur, “ hâc de causâ, nomen Poetæ.” I confess, indeed, that the passage is, in this way, nothing more than an answer to a senseless cavil. But such cavils, we know, the sophists of those times^b did not disdain to make, nor Aristotle always disdain to answer. See *cap.* xxv. *Transl.* Part IV.

NOTE 76.

P. 129. OF SIMPLE FABLES; THE EPISODIC ARE THE WORST.

Why, of *simple* fables—ἀπλῶν μυθῶν? as if the fault here noticed were *peculiar* to the *simple* fable; that is, as the term is defined in the following chapter, the fable that is without *revolution* or *discovery*. But surely this could not be Aristotle's meaning. Something, I am persuaded, is wrong; but I have no probable conjecture to offer; unless it may be thought probable, that ΑΠΑΝΤΩΝ, abbreviated perhaps by the transcriber, might be mistaken for ΑΠΛΩΝ. What Dacier says in his note is ingenious and true; but by no means, I think, fully accounts for Aristotle's expression, which implies more, than that these unconnected Episodes, “ se rencontrent *plus* “ *ordinairement* dans les fables simples.”

Victorius

^b Such as *Protagoras*, *Euclid*, *Aripbrades*, mentioned hereafter in this treatise.

Victorius states the difficulty fairly, and only asks, with a modesty which inferior critics often want, “*An valet quicquam ad eum (scrupulum) evellendum, quod Tragoedia simplex suâ sponte non valdè elegans est; cui si accesserit hoc vitium, meritò deterrima vocari potest?*”—For my own part, I must answer in the negative. This idea has been adopted by Goulston, and Le Bossu. They make Aristotle say—“*Simple fables are not so good as complex, and simple fables that are Episodic, are the worst of all.*”—This is to supply a meaning, not to find one.

For the sense of *Episodes* here, see NOTE 37, in the 1st volume.

NOTE 77.

P. 129. IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THEIR PIECES TO THE PURPOSES OF RIVAL PERFORMERS, &c.

That actors, as well as Poets, contended for the prize in these Tragic games, or *ἀγῶνες*, might be sufficiently proved by a single passage in the *Ethics* of Aristotle, where, explaining the difference between *προαίρεσις*, and *βελησις*, he says, “we may will, or desire, things not at all in our own power to effect; as, that such a particular actor may gain the prize:”—*ὑποκριτην τινα νικᾶν, ἢ ἀθλητην*.*

The

* *Ethic. Nicom. III. iv. ed. Duval. p. 30.*

Αγωνισται—Οἱ ὑποκριται. Hesych.

The reader may also see a passage in the *Rhetoric*, *lib. iii. cap. i.* which throws some illustration upon *this* passage, by shewing the great importance of the players at that time, and the dependance of the Poets upon them: for Aristotle there says of these dramatic contests, that, *ἡ καὶ μᾶλλον δυνάμει* NTN των ποιητων αἱ ὑποκριται: “the actors, now, “have greater power—are more regarded, and “of more importance to the success of the “dramas—than the *Poets*.” A revolution somewhat similar is recorded by Plutarch to have happened between the later Dithyrambic Poets and their αὐληται, or flute-players: — το γὰρ παλαιον, ἕως εἰς Μελανιπιδην τον των διθυραμβων ποιητην, συμβεβηκει, τες ΑΤΛΗΤΑΣ παρὰ των ποιητων λαμβανειν τεςμισθας, ΠΡΩΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΤΟΥΣΗΣ δηλονοτι ΤΗΣ ΠΟΙΗΣΕΩΣ, των δ’ αὐλητων ΤΠΗΡΕ-ΤΟΥΝΤΩΝ τοις διδασκαλοις· ὕγερων δε [i. e. when, as he says, the music of the flute became more complicated, refined, and difficult,] και τατο διεφθαρη^b. But all this is nothing, to what we have heard of the modern despotism sometimes exercised by great opera singers over the composers.

The effect which this influence of the players might have, in *lengthening* and *disuniting* the action, according to Aristotle’s complaint here, may be easily imagined. Castelvetro observes, with great probability, of these ill-connected *ἰσασοδια*,—
“E, per-

^b *De Musicá. ed. H. St. p. 2091.*

“ E, peravventura, queste digressioni fatte per
 “ compiacere i rappresentanti, riguardavano più
 “ à *quello che i rappresentanti sapevano bene*
 “ *contrafare*, che alla *materia naturale della*
 “ *favola*; accioche essi mostrassero quello che
 “ valessero, in quello dove erano piu essercitati,
 “ e percio piu agevolmente ottenessero la vit-
 “ toria.” Here, too, the *musical* reader, will be
 again reminded of the privilege so intemperately
 exercised by modern Italian singers—the lineal
 descendants, according to some, of the *ὑποκριταί*
 of the *Greek Opera*—that of setting aside, when-
 ever they please, both the *Poet*, and the *composer*,
 by the introduction of such songs, from other
 operas, as they think most favourable to the display
 of their peculiar talents.

The influence of *modern* actors upon the pro-
 ductions of the Poet, is, perhaps, not less than
 that of the antient; but it seems to be exerted
 most frequently in a contrary way, though one
 full as likely to spoil the *ἰδέεα* of the piece—that
 of

“ *Poet. d' Arist.* p. 220.—“ *Suum igitur quisque,*” says
 Cicero, “ *noscat ingenium, acremque se et bonorum et*
 “ *vitiorum suorum judicem præbeat; ne scanici plus*
 “ *quàm nos videantur habere prudentiæ: illi enim, non*
 “ *optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt;*
 “ *qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos, Medumque; qui gestu,*
 “ *Menalippam, Clytæmnestram; semper Rutilius, quem*
 “ *ego memini, Antiopam; non sæpe Æsopus Ajacem.*
 “ *Ergo histrio hæc videbit in scænâ, non videbit vir sa-*
 “ *piens in vitâ?*”—*De Offic.* I. 31.

N O T E S.

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of *lopping*. The distress of a Poet on such occasions is represented with true comic force by Mr. Sheridan in his *Critic*:

UND. PROMPTER.

Sir, the carpenter says it is impossible you can go to the park scene yet.

PUFF.

The park scene! no—I mean the description scene here, in the wood.

UND. PROMPT.

Sir, *the performers have cut it out, &c.*

End of Act II.

NOTE 78.

P. 129. BEYOND THEIR POWERS - - -.

I cannot agree with the commentators, who render *παρα την δύναμιν*, “supra id quod *ferat*?”—referring *δυναμιν* to the fable itself. I think it means *ultra vires*, beyond the powers of the *Poets*. And so the Abbé Batteux—“*au-delà de sa portée*.”

The greater the *length* of the fable, the greater, evidently, is the difficulty of filling it up with consistent probability; without violating that close connection of incidents, and unity of action, which the rules of Aristotle, and the nature of the drama, require.

NOTE 79.

P. 130. THAT PURPOSE IS BEST ANSWERED BY SUCH EVENTS AS ARE NOT ONLY UNEXPECTED, BUT UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES OF EACH OTHER.

Ταυτα δε γινεται μαλιστα τοιαυτα, και μαλλον οταν γινηται παρα την δοξαν δι' αλληλα.—This is certainly corrupt; nor does it seem easy to form any probable conjecture, how it stood, as Aristotle left it. Whether the words, και μαλλον, be right or not, they serve, as the text at present stands, only to embarrass a passage, which, if we omit them, seems clear enough, both in construction and meaning. In this I perfectly agree with the last Oxford editor; though I think they should not be hastily ejected from the text¹.

The connection and drift of the whole passage seems to me to be this. Aristotle is here recommending the close connection of incidents, arising *probably* or *necessarily* from each other, in a new point of view—as being of great importance, not only to the *unity* of fable, but to the principal object of Tragedy, the production of *terror* and *pity*. For events are best adapted to this purpose, most *striking* and affecting, when they happen, not only παρα την δοξαν, but παρα την δοξαν ΔΙ' ΑΛΛΗΛΑ: when the wonder arises, not only

¹ Mr. Winstanley's edit. p. 287.

only from their happening unexpectedly, but from their being the *consequences* of events from which no one could have expected them to follow. Thus connected, as cause and effect, they will be more surprising, and consequently more affecting, more *terrible* or *piteous* *, than if they appear to happen by chance—ἀπο τῶν αὐτοματῶν καὶ τῆς τύχης—εἰκὴ—MET' ἄλληλα only, not ΔΙ' ἄλληλα, according to the distinction in the next chapter ^b. To illustrate this, Aristotle observes; that even events merely fortuitous, are more wonderful and striking, when they are such, as in any degree suggest to the spectator an idea of purpose and design; like the accident he mentions of the statue that fell upon the murderer of the person represented by it.—And all this is connected with what follows, as well as with what precedes; evidently pointing to his doctrine about the περιπετεια in the next chapters.

NOTE 80.

P. 130. THE STATUE OF MITYS, &c.

In Plutarch, thus :—καὶ τὸ Μίτις τῆς Ἀργεῖας, κατὰ γαστρίαν ἀναιρεθέντῳ, ἀνδριάντα χαλκῆν ἐν ἀγορᾷ, θεᾶς εἰσῆς, ἐμπισσεῖν τῷ κτείναντι τὸν Μίτιον, καὶ ἀνελκεῖν. [Περὶ τῶν βραδείων, &c. p. 980. ed. H. St.]

* The effect of *surprise*, when combined with *pity* or *terror*, is, to add force to these latter passions, which necessarily predominate in the combination, and to raise the *whole* feeling to 'a higher pitch. See Hume's Essay on Tragedy. ^b Corp. x. Διαφέρει πολὺ κ.τ.αλ.

NOTE 81.

P. 130. FABLES — SIMPLE, AND COMPLICATED.

It is high time to discard the technical jargon of *implex* fables, used by Addison *, and others, after the French writers. If any authority were requisite for speaking English, I have that of Mr. Harris, who renders Aristotle's ἀπλοι, and πεπλεγμένοι, by *simple*, and *complicated*.—*Phil. Inq.* p. 146.

NOTE 82.

P. 130. WHEN ITS CATASTROPHE IS PRODUCED WITHOUT EITHER REVOLUTION OR DISCOVERY.

Ανευ περιπετειας ἡ ἀπαγνωρισμὸς ἡ μεταβασις γίνεταί.—Μεταβασις, is the *change* of fortune which constitutes the catastrophe of the piece. This, which is common to *all* Tragedy, must not be confounded with the Περιπετεία, which, however important, is not essential. Le Bossu, Dacier, and others, by not attending to this distinction, have introduced much confusion into one of the clearest parts of Aristotle's work. Thus, Dacier says—
 “ Il appelle fable *simple*, celle ou il n'y a *ni change-ment d'état*, ni reconnoissance, et dont le denouement n'est qu'un simple *passage de l'agitation et du trouble au repos et à la tranquillité*.”

—He

* Spectator, N° 297.

—He adopts the language of Le Bossu ^a.—Undoubtedly, there are Tragedies without a *sudden* and *unexpected reverse* of fortune; but where is the Tragedy, antient or modern, in which there is no “*changement d’etat*?” This would be no other than a Tragedy without a catastrophe. Thus, these writers take *μεταβασις* to signify the mere passage, progress, or *suite*, of the piece ^b: whereas it clearly signifies a *change*; a transition from prosperous to adverse, or at least from adverse to *more* adverse, fortune, or the contrary; as Beni has well observed ^c. The sense of the word is clearly fixed by other passages; and in *cap.* xviii. he expressly makes the *μεταβασις*, such a change of fortune as is common to *every Tragedy*. Εἰς δὲ ΠΑΣΗΣ τραγωδίας, το μὲν, δισις, το δε, λυσις.—Λιγω δὲ δισιν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέτε τε μέρους ὁ ἰσχατον ἴσιν, ἐξ ἧς ΜΕΤΑΒΑΙΝΕΙ εἰς εὐτυχίαν λυσις δὲ, τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ΤΗΣ ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΕΩΣ μέχρι τέλεος.

Mr. Harris, in his *Philol. Inquiries*, p. 145, &c. seems to have deserted Aristotle for Le Bossu, who, with little reason, in my opinion, passed with him, as well as with Lord Shaftsbury, for “*Aristotle’s best interpreter* ^d.” Throughout his chapter on
this

^a *Du Poeme*, Ep. II. 16.

^b “Non si prende *μεταβασις* in questo luogo per *mutazione*, come credono alcuni, ma per *lo processo dell’azione dal principio al fine*.” Castelvetro, p. 242.

^c *Comment.* p. 255.

^d *Treatise On Music, Painting, &c.* p. 83, *Note*.

this subject, above referred to, he appears to me to confound the μεταβασις, or *change*, which Aristotle makes essential to *all* Tragedy, with that particular *kind* of change which he denominates περιπτεια : for he uses, repeatedly, the word *revolution*, (his translation of περιπτεια,) to express what Aristotle means by μεταβασις, μεταβαινειν, μεταβαλλειν. He speaks of *Othello*, and *Lear*, as *complicated* fables, and having *revolutions*. And so, indeed, they have, if we take the word in Aristotle's sense of μεταβασις ; I do not see that they have, in his sense of περιπτεια. In neither of those Tragedies can it, I think, be said, that the *catastrophe* is produced by a *sudden change, to the reverse of what is expected, by the spectator, from the circumstances of the action*. At least, with respect to *Othello*, this seems to admit of no dispute. [See the next NOTE.]

The Abbé Batteux gives, I think very properly, the *Polieucte* of Corneille, as an example of the *simple* fable. “ La fable *simple*, qui n' a ni revolution *subite*, ni reconnoissance ; qui commence, “ continue, s'acheve, *sans secousses*, ni *retours inattendus*. Ainsi Polieucte reçoit le baptême, “ son zele lui fait renverser les autels des payens, “ il est arrêté, jugé, mis à mort : c'est une fable “ simple “.

Victorius, Beni, Piccolomini, and Goulston, agree with me in my idea of this passage, where the
words,

words, *συνεχες και μιας*, are not put to characterize the *simple* fable, as Victorius well observes, but refer merely to that unity and continuity of action, which had been established as necessary to Tragedy in general.

NOTE 83.

P. 131. A REVOLUTION IS - - - A CHANGE INTO THE REVERSE OF WHAT IS EXPECTED FROM THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACTION.

Εἰς δὲ περιπετεία μὲν, ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή, καθάπερ εἴρηται.

The sense of these words has not, I think, been exactly given in any translation I have yet seen, except that of the accurate and judicious Piccolomini: "La Peripetia intendo io essere una "mutation di fortuna, che (fatta nel modo che "si é detto,) accaschi *al contrario di quello che "dalle cose ordite aspettar si potesse.*" In literal English—"When *the things that are doing* (τὰ "πραττομένα) have an effect the very reverse of "what is expected from them." That this is the meaning, appears plainly from the instance immediately subjoined: ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Οἰδιποδὶ, ἔλθων ΩΣ ΕΥΦΡΑΝΩΝ τον Ὀιδίπουν, καὶ ἀπαλλάξων τε πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φεβῆ, δηλώσας ὅστις ἦν Τ'ΟΥΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΕΠΟΙΗΣΕ. As the words—ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πρατ. μιν. are rendered by Dacier, and others—" *changement de fortune en une fortune con- "traire*"—they express nothing but what is com-
mon

mon to Tragedy in general; and περιπετεια is confounded with μεταβασις. [See last NOTE.] But, it is well observed by Piccolomini, "Non s' hà, "parimente, da intendere, quando diciamo la pe-
 "peripetia esser mutation di fortuna, ogni sorte di
 "mutatione da una conditione e stato di fortuna
 "ad un' altro; non potendo esser Tragedia alcuna
 "in cui qualche così fatta mutatione non si ri-
 "trovi." [p. 167.] In the usual way of translating the passage, a circumstance essential to the περιπετεια is entirely omitted in the definition; its being *surprising*, and *contrary to expectation* *. This, it is true, Dacier has expressed in his version, by the words, "*contre ce qu'on avoit attendu*." But this is, professedly, his own supplement of Aristotle's text. And indeed I once thought the text defective, and that Aristotle had probably written it—μεταβολη, ΠΑΡΑ ΤΗΝ ΔΟΞΑΝ, καθαρῶς εἰρηται: alluding to the latter part of cap. ix. But, as I now understand the passage, this idea is sufficiently implied. The words, καθαρῶς εἰρηται, have puzzled and divided the commentators, by their obscurity of reference. Upon the whole I am inclined to think, they point to what he had said cap. ix. [Transl. Part II. Sect. 7.] which, as I before observed, [NOTE 80.] seems manifestly to be a preparation for *this* chapter; and in which
 the

* Περιπετειαυ δε λεγονται τα ΠΑΡ' ΕΛΠΙΔΑ συμβεβηκτα παρτα, και οὕτω; παρα ΤΡΑΓΙΚΟΙΣ ἐτι καλενται.—Schol. Nicand. quoted by Robertelli, p. 106.

the words, *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἀλλήλα*—events that are “*unexpected consequences of each other*”—answer to the definition of *περιπετεια*, as here explained.

That this is the *meaning* of Aristotle's words, I have no doubt. But, perhaps, even the words themselves have been inaccurately rendered, and *πραττομένων* should be constructed, not with *μεταβολή*, but with *ἐναντίον*:—*εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων*: i. e. *in contrarium eorum quæ aguntur*. This was suggested to me by the literal version which the accurate Mr. Harris has given of the words in his *Philol. Inq.* p. 148.—“A REVO-
“LUTION is, as has been already said, a change
“into the reverse of what is doing.” The definition, I think, though its *sense* be the same in either way, would thus be more clear, and would answer more exactly to what follows.

NOTE 84.

P. 131. THUS IN THE OEDIPUS, THE MESSENGER, &c.

—*Ἐλθὼν ὡς εὐφρανὼν τῶν Οἰδῖπεν, καὶ ἀπαλλαξὼν τε πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φόβον.* Alluding, probably, to the very words of the messenger in Sophocles :

Τι δὴτ' ἐγὼ γ' ἔ ΤΟΥΔΕ ΤΟΥ ΦΟΒΟΥ σ',
ἀναξ;

Ἐπειτα γὰρ ΕΥΝΟΤΕ ΗΛΘΟΝ, ΕΞΕΛΤΣΑΜΗΝ,

v. 1012.

NOTE 85.

P. 133. THESE THEN ARE TWO PARTS OF THE FABLE—REVOLUTION AND DISCOVERY.

Δυο μὲν ἐν τῇ μυθῷ μέρη ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΥΤΑ ἔστι, περι-
 πτεία καὶ ἀναγνωρισις. “*Circa hæc.*” About
 what? What are we to understand by ταυτᾶ?—
 Victorius says, τὰ πραττομένα; and Dacier, after
 him, “Qui regardent le sujet.” I cannot be sa-
 tisfied with this. Τα πραττομένα, the *subject*, the
action, are sufficiently expressed by the word μυθῷ.
 Would Aristotle have said, “These are two parts
 “of the *fable* relative to the *fable*?” I have,
 therefore, neglected the word περι in my trans-
 lation, in conformity to the probable conjecture of
 Madius. Every reader sees how easily it might
 get into the text from the word περιπετεία which
 presently follows. I rather think, however, that,
 retaining περι, we should read, περι Τ’ ΑΥΤΑ :—
 “circa *easdem res* ;”—to point out the close con-
 nection of these two parts of the fable, as things
 of the *same kind*, and counterparts, as it were, to
 each other, co-operating to the same effect—the
 production of terror, pity, surprise, &c. And
 thus they are afterwards mentioned together, as
 constituting *one species* of Tragedy: ἡ μὲν γὰρ,
 πεπλεγμένη, ἥς το ὅλον ἐστὶ ΠΕΡΙΠΕΤΕΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΑΓ-
 ΝΩΡΙΣΙΣ. [cap. xviii. Transl. Part II. Sect. 19.]
 The same mode of expression occurs in the *Ethics*
ad Nicom. lib. iv. cap. 13. ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΑΥΤΑ δε
 σχέδον

σχίδον ΕΣΤΙ και ἡ ἀλαζονείας μεσοτης: “ *in eisdem vertitur.*” That is, as appears from the context, the virtue, of which he is there speaking, was of the *same kind*, or *class*, with that, which was the subject of the foregoing chapter. Both were among the ἀρεται ὁμιλητικαι. So, in the conclusion of the subsequent chapter—τρεις ἐν αἰ εἰρημεναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσοτητες· ΕΙΣΙ δὲ πασαι ΠΕΡΙ λόγων τινων και πραξεων κοινωνιαν.

NOTE 86.

P. 133. DISASTERS, COMPREHEND ALL PAINFUL OR DESTRUCTIVE ACTIONS, &c.

It seems hardly reconcilable with philosophical accuracy, to use such an expression as ΠΑΘΟΣ ἐστὶ ΠΡΑΞΙΣ—defining the *suffering* to BE the *action* that causes the suffering.

In his *Metaphysics* he puts it thus :—τα μεγιστα των συμφορων και λυπηρων ΠΑΘΗ λεγεται.

This word, παθεῖν, in the sense here used, is very embarrassing to a translator. The word *passion*, in this sense, of *suffering*, is, with us, appropriated to a subject, from which it cannot, without a sort of profanation, be transferred to any other. The French, however, have done this without scruple, though the word, when so applied, must be explained before it can be understood. Upon the whole, I could find no *single* words that
seemed

seemed to me to answer so nearly to *καταστροφή*, and its adjective, *καταστροφικόν*, in the sense in which they are used here, and in *cap.* xviii. as *disaster*, and its correspondent adjective, *disastrous*. Their original, *desastre*, is explained in the Dict. of the French Academy, by "*accident funeste*."

"Wherein I spoke of most *disastrous* chances,
Of *moving accidents* [*καταστροφῶν*] by flood, and field."

Othello, *Act* I. *Sc.* III.

NOTE 87.

P. 133. THE EXHIBITION OF DEATH, &c.

Εν τῷ φανερῷ θανάτῳ.—A plain passage, which the commentators seem to have taken great pains to perplex with difficulties of their own invention. The plain meaning of the expression is, *exhibited on the stage*: *ἰν ὀφθαλμοῖς φαινόμενα* ΤΟΤ ΠΑΘΟΥΣ, as it is expressed in the Rhetoric, *lib.* ii. *cap.* viii. p. 560.

Aristotle is here only explaining the term *καταστροφή*; not laying down a *rule*, nor deciding concerning the propriety, or impropriety, of such exhibitions. Nothing is more evidently absurd, than the attempts of Dacier and other French critics to transfer the delicacy of *their* theatre to that of the antients. The scrupulous *delicacy* of French Tragedy was, I believe, as unknown to the Athenian stage, as its rigid and strutting *dignity*. A single passage, and that, from the most polished of the three Greek Tragic Poets whose works are

extant, may sufficiently prove this; I mean the description of Oedipus tearing out his own eyes, in Sophocles.

Ταυτ' ἔφηνεν, πάλαις τε κ' αὖχ' ἀπαῖ
 ἤρασε, ἔπαισαν βλοφαρὰ· φοινίαι δ' ὄμμι
 Γλαυαί γινυ' ἔτεγγον· ἐδ' ἀνέσσω
 Φαν μύδους σάγονας ἀλλ' ὄμμι μέλας
 Ομβροῖα χαλαζὺς αἵματος ἔτεγγετο*.

Oed. Tyr. v. 1284.

" Thus oft exclaiming, he his eyelids raised,
 " And rent the orbs of sight; the bleeding balls
 " Imbath'd his cheeks, nor ceased the gushing
 " drops,
 " But rain'd a shower of black and streaming
 " gore."

Potter's Translation.

But Sophocles did not confine himself to *description*. Oedipus himself immediately appears upon the stage, and exhibits the shocking spectacle of his bloody eyes to the audience. Certainly, the French rule, " de ne pas ensanglanter le Theatre," was not *much* more strictly observed here by Sophocles, than it was by Shakspeare in his *LEAR*, where Gloster's eyes are *trodden out*, *in private*, upon the stage.

I cannot quit this instance from Sophocles, without diverting the reader, (for I am persuaded it

* This line is, undoubtedly, faulty. The best emendation I have seen proposed appears to me to be that of Mr. Heath, who would read, αἵματος—i. e. contracted, αἵματος.

it will divert him,) with Pere Brumoy's apology, or, rather, with the joint apology of him, M. Dacier, and Boileau. "Le grand CORNEILLE et ses successeurs Tragiques, *ont cru* que ce seroit une chose horrible d'exposer Oedipe aveugle et sanglant aux yeux des spectateurs. M. Dacier leur repond *très-bien* par ces vers de DES-PREAUX, Art Poet. chant ii.

"Il n'est point de serpent, ni de monstre odieux,

"Qui par l'art imité ne puisse plaire aux yeux.

"D'un pinceau *delicat* l'*artifice* agréable

"Du plus affreux objet fait un *objet* AIMABLE!

"Ainsi *pour nous* CHARMER, la Tragédie en pleurs

"*D'Oedipe tout sanglant* fit parler les douleurs *."

This is pushing Aristotle's principle, of the pleasure we receive from the imitation even of disagreeable objects^b, rather farther than, I believe, he thought of. A critic of much more taste and much less prejudice, speaking of the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles^c, has observed, "that the antients thought *bodily pains* and *wounds*, &c. (*πρωδυναι και τραυσεις*) proper objects to be presented on the stage. See also the *Trachiniae* " of

* ^a *Theatre des Grecs*, i. 345.

^b Above, cap. iv. Transl. Part I. Sect. 5.

^c See v. 749, &c. particularly, 796, 7: and the description of the bleeding wound, v. 845.

Μελανα τ' αἷμα τις παρέρωγεν ποδῶ

Ἀιμαρραγῆς φλεψ. ----

“ of Sophocles, and the lamentations of Hercules
“ in it.”

Hippolytus, after having been dragged over the rocks, and almost torn to pieces, by his fiery coursers, appears upon the stage with his mangled and bleeding limbs.—But, according to Boileau, Dacier, &c. these are all “ *objets aimables*.”

NOTE 88.

P. 133. THE COMMOTI ARE FOUND IN SOME ONLY.

The Greek says—*ἰδία δὲ, τὰ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς ΚΑΙ χορμῶν*. Here, the *κορμῶν*, and the *τὰ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς*, are represented as distinct things. But in the definition afterwards, *Κορμῶν* appears to be the name given to the *joint* lamentation of the chorus and the actors. *Κορμῶν δὲ, θρηνητῶν κοινῶν χορῶν καὶ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς*. Victorius states this difficulty, but without giving any satisfactory solution. And indeed I see no way of reconciling these passages, unless we suppose Aristotle to have expressed himself very loosely and inaccurately, and to have meant, that *κορμῶν* was the name appropriated to *that part of the Χορικόν* which joined or alternated with one or more of the *ἀπὸ σκηνῆς*—i. e. the *actors*; so that by, *Κορμῶν δὲ, θρηνητῶν κοινῶν χορῶν καὶ*

* Dr. Warton's Essay on Pope, vol. i. 73, *Note*.

* *Hippol.* Eurip. v. 1236, &c.—and 1348. In Mr. Potter's translation, v. 1318, 19, 20; and 1438, &c.

καὶ αὐτὸ σκηνῆς, we are to understand only, that Κομμοῦ was that θρηνηῦ or lamentation *of the chorus*, in which the *actors*, alternately, took part; as if the Greek had been thus:—θρηνηῦ χοροῦ ὅτ κοινοῦντο εἰς αὐτὸ σκηνῆς. And so, τα αὐτὸ σκηνῆς καὶ κομμοὶ would only mean, the κομμοὶ of the chorus *with* the αὐτὸ σκηνῆς—that is, mixed with the lamentation of the actors, or persons of the drama.

But it seems more for the credit of our philosophical critic, to give up the *first* of these passages as corrupt, and to adhere to the plain sense of the *definition*. I have, therefore, taken no notice of the words, τα αὐτὸ σκηνῆς, in my version. Nothing is lost by the suppression. The sense of the word κομμοῦ is left, like that of the other terms, to be fixed by its definition.

NOTE 89.

P. 134. BETWEEN ENTIRE CHORAL ODES.

I confess myself not satisfied as to the meaning of this expression, ὅλων χορικῶν μελῶν. I have therefore adhered to the fair and literal translation of the *words*.—But what is an *entire* choral ode or song? Is it that, which is in the regular lyric form, in strophe and antistrophe? So it seems most natural to understand it. But a difficulty meets us. For when the Παράδειγμα, as it often, and indeed almost always, happens, is not such a regular

gular Antistrophic Ode, what *name* is to be given to that part of the Tragedy, which lies between the *παρῶδ* and the first Antistrophic Ode? It cannot make a part of the *Πρόλογ*, for that ends with the *Παρόδ*. The *Erode* is out of the question. There remains only the *Episode*; and to that it cannot belong, consistently with Aristotle's definition of *Ἐπεισόδιον*, because it will not be, according to this sense of *ἵλην*, "*between entire choral Odes.*" If we take *entire* to mean, *all choral*, i.e. not broken and interrupted by the *ἀπὸ σκηνῆς*, or the persons of the drama, we shall still be embarrassed with the same difficulty: for, whenever the *παρῶδ* is not, in this sense, *entire*, which is frequently the case^a, the part between that and the first *entire* Ode, will be without a name.

Shall we, then, with some commentators, suppose Aristotle by *ἵλην χορικῶν μελῶν*, to have meant only, *ἵλην χορῶν μελῶν*—i.e. melodies sung by the *whole chorus*^b? This removes the difficulty. Yet I can hardly conceive, that he would have expressed himself in a manner so wantonly ambiguous, when

^a As in the *Παρόδ* of the *Orestes* of Euripides, the *Electra* of Sophocles, &c.

^b So Goulston—"Inter *plenos* choricos cantus; qui scil. ab universo fiebant choro." Vict. "*Pleni integrique cantus.*" So Piccol. "*Intieri canti.*" Heinsius, Dacier, and Bateux, avoid the difficulty by omitting the word *ἵλην* in their translations.

when the clear and decisive expression—*ὡς χορῶν*, which he presently after uses, was so obvious.

From an accurate and philosophical writer, one would naturally expect a chapter of *definitions* to be clear. But whoever expects it here will certainly be disappointed. Almost every definition, to be perfectly intelligible, wants *other* definitions, which are not given, and which the obscure and imperfect information to be found in other ancient authors will not enable us to supply.

NOTE 90.

P. 134. THE PARODE IS THE FIRST SPEECH OF THE WHOLE CHORUS.

Παρόδος μὲν ἡ πρώτη ΛΕΞΙΣ ὡς χορῶν.—Though *λεξίς*, in its proper signification, is mere *speech*, yet it appears to have been occasionally extended to such *melody* as imitated speech, and to have answered nearly to the modern term *recitative*. [See NOTE 46, and particularly the passage from Plutarch at the end of it.] And such, I have no doubt, is the sense in which it is here used, to distinguish the melody of the *Parodos* from that of the regular choral odes; which I suppose to have been a more varied, measured, and, as we may, not improperly, term it, a more *musical* melody. For want of understanding this distinction, the commentators have made strange confusion, by taking *λεξίς*, either in its literal sense
of

of mere *speaking*, or in a sense absolutely synonymous with *μελῶ*, as Dacier does. But it is hardly to be imagined, that Aristotle would use the word *λεξίς* without any reason; and, that the *Παροῶν* could not be mere speech, or declamation, such as that of our stage, seems evident enough from the expression, *λεξίς ὈΑΟΤ χορῶν*. A number may *sing* together, in a kind of measured recitative, or simple chanting; but they cannot well *speak* together, without intolerable confusion. This would be that very *χορὸς διαλεκτικῶς*, which Demetrius mentions as a thing absurd and unheard of^a.

There is a singular passage in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which affords, I think, a strong confirmation, both of the sense which I have here given to the word *λεξίς*, and of the propriety of its

^a Demet. *περὶ Ερμ.* Sect. 168, where speaking of some poems of Sappho, that descended beneath the Lyric dignity and elegance, both in subject and style, he says, "they were fitter to be recited, than sung, and were ill adapted to be performed by a chorus, or accompanied by the lyre; unless," says he, "there were such a thing as a speaking chorus:"—*εἰ μὴ τις εἴη χορὸς διαλεκτικῶς*.

Choral *recitative*, indeed, judiciously introduced, and not continued too long, I have often thought, might occasionally be so managed as to produce a striking effect. An example of it, and a very fine one, is to be found in an Oratorio of that admirable composer, Eman. Bach, of which the title, in English, is, *The Israelites in the Wilderness*.


its application in that sense to the choral *Παροῖ*. In the 11th section of his treatise *De Struct. Orat.* in order to shew, how little prosody was regarded by the composers of the Tragic melodies, he criticises the melody of the following lines from the *Orestes* of Euripides :

Σιγα, σιγα, λευκον ἰχρος ἀρβυλης

Τίθατε, μη κτυπεῖτε—

Ἀποπροβατ' ἱκισ', ἀποπροθι καίτας. v. 140.

Now it is remarkable, 1. that he calls this, ΜΕΛΟΣ, and yet represents it as *said* by Electra : Εὐριπίδης ΜΕΛΩΝ, ἃ πεποιήκει τὴν Ἥλεκτραν ΛΕΓΟΥΣΑΝ—πρὸς τὸν χορὸν.—2. That the melody, to which these words were set, was the simplest possible; a kind of *chanting recitative*. The three first words, for instance, were set to one note^b.



Σιγα,^b σιγα, λευκον—

—and in other words too, the same tone, as this author clearly informs us, was frequently repeated. This may be regarded as somewhat of a musical curiosity. For it is an authentic, though indeed a very scanty and imperfect specimen, of one part of the dramatic choral music of the Greeks. 3dly, This very melody was probably that of the *Παροῖ* of this Tragedy. Dionysius, indeed, gives

^b Ἐν γὰρ δι τούτοις, το, Σιγα, σιγα, λευκον, ἐφ' ἑΝΟΣ ΦΘΟΓΓΟΥ ΜΕΛΩΔΕΙΤΑΙ.

gives these words to Electra^c; but in all the editions of Euripides which I have seen, the two first lines are given to the chorus; with more propriety, I think, if we attend to what goes before. Electra had just said to the chorus, on their coming in while Orestes was sleeping;

Ω φιλταται γυναικες, ἡσυχῇ ποδῖ.

Καρεῖτε, μὴ ψαφεῖτε, μὴδ' ἴσω κτυπεῖτε.—

v. 134.

The words, therefore, which Dionysius, quoting probably by memory, attributes to Electra, would seem to come more naturally from the mouths of the choral virgins, repeating to each other the caution she had given them. But whether this be so or not, yet, that this was the *first entry* of the chorus upon the stage, is clear from the preceding speech of Electra: and the Lyric part, which follows that speech, if it does not *begin* with, probably *contains*, at least, the *πρωτην λεξιν ὅλα χορεῖ*; being all in the regular choral form of Strophe and Antistrophe, and, in all probability, set throughout to melody of the same kind. Perhaps the *whole* chorus might not begin to sing, till the third Strophe, Ποτνια, ποτνια νυξ.—If, as Victorius contends, *this* be not the *Parodos*, it cannot begin before, v. 316.

Αἱ, Αἱ,

Δρομαδεις ὡς—κ.τ.αλ.—

But, the very application of the word *παροδῶς*,
which

^c So does the author of one of the arguments prefixed to the Tragedy: ὡς φησιν Ἑλετρα τῇ χορῇ.

which properly signifies the *entry*, or *arrival* of the chorus^d, to the *πρωτη λεξις*, or first *speech* of the whole chorus, shews, I think, sufficiently, the close connection of the two things; and that we are never to look for that *first speech*, at such a distance from the *first entrance*, of the chorus.

But, it may, perhaps, be objected to the distinction I understand here between *λεξις* and *μελῳ*, that it will expose us to the very difficulty mentioned in the last Note: it will make Aristotle's enumeration of the parts into which Tragedy is divided, incomplete; because, if we admit it, the part between the *Παροδῳ* and the first *Στασιμον* or regular Ode, will want a name. For, if any thing, it must be *Επισοδιον*; but this, it may be said, it cannot be, because it will not be, according to Aristotle's definition, *μεταξυ χορικων ΜΕΛΩΝ*; the *Parode* being not *μελῳ*, but *λεξις*. —It seems a sufficient answer to this objection, to observe, that *λεξις*, here, is not opposed to *μελῳ* in general, but only to a particular species of *μελῳ*. Strictly speaking, the simplest chant, or even such recitative, as approaches the nearest to common speech, is yet as much *μελῳ*, melody, music, as the most refined Opera song*. It is called

^d — ἡ μὲν ΕΙΣΟΔΟΣ τῆ χορῆς, ΠΑΡΟΔΟΣ. *Jul. Poll.*— And so the scholiast on Hephæstion: ἔτι καλεῖται ἡ πρώτη των χορων ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν εἰσοδῳ. *Ed. de Pauw.* p. 74.

* See the 1st vol. Diss. II. p. 78, note ², and the passage of Aristoxenus, concerning the essential distinction between

called λεξις, only comparatively. Nay, the word μᾶλλον is sometimes, in a wider sense, applied even to *speech* itself¹. And so, above, we have λεκτικὴ ἁρμονία². Aristotle, therefore, in the expression χορηγεῖν μέτραν, may be supposed, without any inconsistency; to *include*, what, afterwards, in the particular definition of παρασκευῆς, where distinction was necessary, he denominates λεξις.

It must be owned, that Aristotle's parsimonious brevity has left some confusion in this subject; but, in the illustrations of his commentators, it is "*confusion worse confounded*." And this has arisen from their applying to the Greek drama, without the slightest foundation, the Roman division into *five acts*. It is now, I believe, pretty well understood, that such an idea is totally inapplicable to the Greek Tragedy³. If we *must* talk of acts, it would be more proper to say they had *three*; forming our division upon the three parts, which, according to Aristotle, were essential to every drama, the Προλογος, the Επισκεψιον, and the Εξοδος;

between *all speech*, and *all singing*; i.e. that in the one, the voice moves by *slides*, in the other, by *intervals*, or *skips*.

¹ Vol. i. Dissert. II. p. 77. note^a; and Dion. Hal. Sect. XI.

² Cap. 4.

³ This was proved long ago in a dissertation by the Abbé Vatry, in the 11th vol. of the *Mem. de l'Acad. Roy*, &c.—See also the preface to Franklin's *Sophocles*.—Yet Lord Kaimes says, positively, of the Greek Tragedies—"there are five acts in each."—El of Crit. ii. 414.

ἔξω; not upon the number of choral odes, which is different in different dramas. In the *Trachiniae*, for example, there are not fewer than six choral odes. If these are to determine the number of acts, as Dacier contends, this Tragedy will consist of *seven*. Brumoy, to divide this piece into five acts, is reduced to admit an entire ode in the middle of his first act; so that the *Episode*, which Aristotle defines to be that part which is μετὰ τὸν ὅλον χορικὸν μῶλον, begins in the Προλογος, and before the Παροδος, which, according to Brumoy, must be the *second ode*. Another ode he is obliged to admit in the middle of his last act; contrary to Aristotle's definition of ἔξω.—Dacier makes the prologue of the *Oedipus Coloneus* consist of 700 verses¹. Nothing can be more improbable, or more inconsistent with Aristotle's idea of its purpose. [See NOTE 40 *.] But he was forced into this absurdity, only by the supposed necessity of reducing the intervals between the odes to three, and, consequently, the acts, (adding the *prologue* and *exode*,) to *five*. For if the true *parode* be at v. 118, (Ὁρα· τίς ἀρ' ἐν; κ. τ. αλ.) as I doubt not it is, there will then be four such *intervals*, and, consequently, *six* acts. He repeats the same mistakes in dividing the *Phænissæ*, in which there are five regular odes, as in many other of the Greek Tragedies. In the *Oedipus Tyrannus* he makes the ode, Εἰπαρ' ἰγὼ
μαρτίς

¹ Note on Aristot. p. 177.

* In the 1st volume.

μαρτυρεῖ σίμα, (v. 1096,) come in the middle of an act; and then, *because* he chose to place it so, is forced to deny that it was *sung*, though it is in the most regular Lyric form¹.

The expression, ΠΑΡΩΤΗ ΛΕΞΙΣ ὅλα χορῶν, seems to imply, that *other* choral parts, beside the *Parode*, were also λεξις; i.e. were sung by the whole chorus in the same sort of chanting and simple melody. But who will undertake to distinguish these parts, and to tell us, exactly, what was *Air*, and what *Recitative*? what was sung by the whole choir, and what was, *à voce sola*?—I will not bewilder my reader and myself in a labyrinth without a clue.

The scholiast upon the *Phænissæ* (v. 212.) says, that the Παρῶδ² was sung by the chorus, "*as they entered upon the stage.*"—Παρῶδ² δὲ, ἵστω ἂν χορῶν βαδίζοντ², εἰδόμενα ἅμα τῇ ᾠδῇ, ὡς τοῦ Σόφ², εἰσὶν, &c. And, indeed, in the example he here gives from the *Orestes*, the *entrance* of the choral

² *Remarques sur l'Oedipe*, at the end of his translation of that Tragedy.

¹ The learned reader knows that this cannot be determined by their speaking of themselves in the *singular number*, for this they do almost constantly, in all the *Odes*. So, Εἴπα ΕΓΩ μαρτυρεῖ σίμα, just referred to, &c.—Neither can we say, what at first view, indeed, seems probable, that *whatever* appears in the regular *Lyric* form of *Strophe* and *Antistrophe*, was *air*, as opposed to recitative, or mere chant: for in some Tragedies the Παρῶδ² itself is in this regular *Lyric* form; as, in the *Trachinæ* and *Electra* of Sophocles; *Iphig. in Aul.* of Euripides, &c.

choral troop is clearly marked by what precedes. Electra says - - -

Αἰδ' αὖ ΠΑΡΕΙΣΙ τοῖς ἱμοῖς θρηνημασι

Φίλαι συνῶδοι. - - -

v. 132.

And this is frequently the case. Thus, in the *Phænissæ*, that the *Τυρίον οἶδμα λιππε*—v. 212, (not *Καδμῶ* ἱμοῖς—v. 651, as Dacier makes it,) is the true *Parode*, as, indeed, it is expressly called by the author of the Greek argument prefixed to the *Persæ* of Æschylus, is confirmed by this passage, announcing the entry of the choral virgins, in the preceding Iambics, where the old attendant desires Antigone to retire:—

Ὅχλῳ γὰρ, ὡς ταραγμῳ εἰσηλθεν πόλιν,

ΧΩΠΕΙ [*is coming*] γυναικῶν πρὸς δόμους τυ-
ραννικῆς.

v. 206.

Thus too, in the *Oedipus Coloneus*, the first appearance of the chorus is thus announced by Antigone:

Σίγα ΠΟΡΕΥΟΝΤΑΙ γὰρ ὈΔΕ δὴ τινες

Χρὸν παλαιοὶ - - -

v. 111.

And the *Parode* immediately follows, v. 117.

In the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, the arrival of the choral women is marked by themselves:

Χο.—ΕΜΟΛΟΝ· τί νεον; &c.

v. 137.

See also, v. 65. Ὅυπω - - - παρῆσιν - - -

The *Parode* is not less distinctly marked in the *Medea*, v. 131. Χο. Ἐκλυον φωνῶν—κ. τ. ἀλ.—in the

the *Heracidae*, where the chorus is called in by Iolaus, v. 69:—in the *Helena*, v. 179:—in the *Hercules*, v. 107, &c.

When the attendant spirit, in *Comus*, “opens the business of the drama to a solitary forest, “without an audience,” he does no more than Venus^m, and the ghost of Polydorusⁿ, and Iphigenia^p, and many others, in the Tragedies of Euripides, had done before him. The learned and ingenious editor of Milton’s Occasional Poems says, that, “in a Greek Tragedy, this “objection would have been obviated by the “chorus, which *was always present* ;” but I am afraid the want of “*recollection*” must be transferred from Milton to himself^q. There are not, I think, more than three or four Greek Tragedies, in which the chorus is present from the beginning^r.

This *ἵσχυρος*, or *entry of the chorus*, probably made one of the most splendid and popular parts of the *ὄψις*, or *shew*, of the antient Tragedy. It is mentioned by Aristotle, in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, as a custom of the Megarians, who were a luxurious and ostentatious people, to be at the expence

^m In the *Hippolytus*. ⁿ *Hecuba*. ^o *Iphig. in Aul.*

^p Mr. Warton’s edit. of Milton’s Occ. Poems, p. 129.
^q Milton did not recollect, that the Spirit was opening the business of the drama to a solitary forest, without an audience.”

^r See Dacier, p. 170, note 5.

expende of furnishing *purple* dresses for the Παροδῶν even of their *comic* stage[†]. It appears, however, from a curious fragment of Menander, to have been a practice, not uncommon with the Greek *Managers*, to place mutes among their choral singers, in order to complete the *visible* number requisite :

- - - - - ὥσπερ τῶν χορῶν
Οὐ πάντες ἀδουσ', ἀλλ' ἀφῶνοι δυο τινες
Ἦ τρεῖς παρεσηκασι, ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΕΣΧΑΤΟΙ,
Εἰς τὸν ἀριθμὸν—καὶ τεθ' ὁμοίως πῶς ἔχει
Χῶραν κατεχομεν, ζῶσι δ' οἷς ἐστὶν βίῃ[‡].

- - - - - As in a chorus
All do not sing, but, *in the hindmost ranks*,
Some two or three stand mute to make a num-
So is it here;—*we* serve to fill a place; [ber,
They only *live*, who have the *means* of living.

NOTE 91.

P. 134. THE STASIMON INCLUDES ALL THOSE CHORAL ODES THAT ARE WITHOUT ANAPÆSTS AND TROCHEES.

Στασιμον δέ, μελῶν χορῶν το ἄνευ ἀναπαισε καὶ τροχαιε.—If we are to understand this strictly, as expressing the *exclusion* of those feet from the regular

[†] καὶ κωμικοῖς χοροῖων, ἐν τῇ ΠΑΡΟΔΩΙ πορφύραν εἰσφεραν, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. IV. 2. ed. Ox. Wilk.

[‡] Menand. and Philem. Reliq. ed. Clerici, p. 221.

gular odes, I cannot perceive it to be true. Dacier, therefore, understands only, that those feet were *very rarely* used in those Odes, compared with the Παρόδος, which he calls, “*premier chant du chœur*,” in which, he says, and very truly, that they *prevail*.—“*Ces deux pieds - - - regnent*,” &c. p. 179.—It is possible that Aristotle might *mean* this; but it is not what he *says*. He says, “*that*—“*μολ*—that lyric part, of the chorus, which is “*without anapæsts and trochees*.” I rather think, he means only those Odes, the regular *stanzas* of which are not broken and interrupted by an intermixture of anapæstic or trochaic *verses* *κατα συνημα*, (according to the metrical language,) like the *Parodos*, as I take it to be, of the *Antigone*,—*Ακτις αἰλις*—v. 100.—that of the *Philoctetes*—*Τι χρεη*—v. 136, and of the *Prometheus* of Æschylus. And this, I believe, will, *in general*, be found true of the regular Odes subsequent to the Παρόδος. For, in the Παρόδος itself; the general prevalence of the anapæstic measure must be evident to every one who turns over the Greek Tragedians.

NOTE 92.

P. 134. THE COMMOS, &c.

Κομμός——“*Ἦγατο γυναικῶν μυρία πλῆθος, μετα KOMMOY KAI 'ΟΛΟΛΥΓΗΣ*” *τατις, γου και οδυρμυ.*—*Suidas*.

H 2.

The

The phrase, ἀπο σκηνῆς, is commonly used by Aristotle to denote the *actors*, as distinguished from the chorus; because, as Jul. Pollux tells us, ΣΚΗΝΗ μὲν ΤΠΟΚΡΙΤΩΝ ἰδίου, ἡ δὲ ὄρχηστρα τῆς χορῆς^a. Thus, *Prob.* xlix. of *Sect.* 19, speaking of the *Dorian* and *Hypophrygian* modes, he says, they were both, χορῶ μὲν ἀναρμωσα, τοῖς δὲ ἀπο σκηνῆς οἰκειότερα —So, *Prob.* xxx. and *Prob.* xv. τὰ ἀπο σκηνῆς, (the *dialogue*,) is opposed to τὰ τῆς χορῆς—the *chorus*. I was much surprised, therefore, to find the meaning of this phrase so widely mistaken, in the late Camb. edit. where ἀπο σκηνῆς is thus explained: “id est, ἀτεχνῶ—*ad choragi munus, non Poetæ, pertinens*”^b.

An example of the Κομμῶ, pointed out by Victorius, may be found in the *Andromache* of Euripides, v. 1197.

I know not why some of the commentators confine these joint lamentations of chorus and actors to the *Exode*, or what *they* call the last *act*. They are often, I think, to be found in other parts of the drama; “dans le *cours des actes*,” as Dacier rightly observes. We have an example of this between Tecmessa and the chorus, in the *Ajax*, v. 901. Ἰω, μοι μοι - - . Another occurs very early in the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, v. 143, &c. where Iphigenia, assisted by the choral virgins, her attendants, performs the funereal libation to the

manes

^a IV. 19. ^b *Ed. Cantab.* 1785, p. 125.

manes of her brother, whom she supposes to be dead, and sings a funereal dirge. The *chorus*, indeed, have so small a part in this lamentation, that it may be thought hardly to answer Aristotle's definition of *θρηνος* *κοινος* &c. But this, in fact, seems no objection, because the lamentation of Iphigenia is broken off abruptly, as Mr. Markland has well observed, at v. 235, by the arrival of the shepherd. I consider it, therefore, only as an unfinished *Κομμος*. But, that it answers to that idea, appears, I think, from the whole cast of it; from the frequent occurrence of the interjections, *φευ*, *φευ*—*ι*, *ι*—*αι*, *αι*—*οι* *μοι*, &c.—and of the very word, *θρηνος*, throughout^c, and, from the answer of the chorus:

Χορ.—ΑΝΤΙΨΑΛΜΟΥΣ ᾠδ'ας

Ὑμνον τ' Ἀσηταὺν σοι

Βαρβαρον ἰαχὰν

Δεσποινὰ γ' ἐξαυδάσω,

Τὰν ἐν ΘΡΗΝΟΙΣΙ μέσαν

Νέκυσι μέλεον^d.

v. 178.

To thee thy faithful train

The Asiatic hymn will raise,

A doleful, a barbaric strain,

Responsive to thy laments,

And

^c Ω δμῶμαι, δυσθρήνητοις

Ως θρήνοις ἐγκέμαι.

v. 143.

^d "Mortuis miseram." "Quid hoc sit, nescio," says Mr. Markland. But, perhaps, it should be rendered,

And steep in tears the mournful song,
 Notes which to the *dead* belong;
 Dismal notes attun'd to woe
 By Pluto in the realms below.—

Potter's *Eurip.* v. 206.

NOTE 93.

P. 135. THIS RAISES DISGUST, RATHER
 THAN TERROR OR COMPASSION.

Literally,—“for this is *neither terrible, nor piteous, but shocking.*” ἡ γὰρ φοβερόν, ἔδε ἱλαεινόν τῆτο, ἀλλὰ μίαιρον ἴσιν.—But we certainly must not understand Aristotle to assert, that *no* pity is excited by the sufferings of an exemplary character. This would be directly contrary to his own account of pity: Ελεῖν μὲν, περὶ τὸν ἀναξίον². He must mean only, that they are *rather* shocking, than affecting; as it is well rendered by Piccolomini; “un cost fatto caso non hà, nè del terribile, (*per dir cost,*)” “nè del compassionevole; ma *più tosto* hà dell’ “abominevole, e dello scellerato.” That is, as
 this

“Mortuis *vanam, inutilem,*” in the Homeric sense of μελεῖν. See Il. Ψ. 795—μελεῖν αἰνέειν—*useless, unavailing* praise. So, in Virgil—“*inani munere.*” *Æn.* vi. 886.—And, *Æn.* xi. 51.

Nos juvenem *exanimum* - - -

- - - *et* mœsti comitamur honore.

Μελεῖν—ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ. *Suid.* and *Hezych.*—So, Apoll. Rhod. i. 1249. ΜΕΛΕΗ δὲ οἱ ἐπλετο φωνή.—“*Vanus ei erat clamor.*”

² And see *Rhet.* II. 8.

this clear and exact, though prolix, writer has explained it in his subsequent *annotation*, — “ quello affetto dell’ odio e dell’ abominazione, “ *sopravanza* in modo l’ affetto del timore, e quel “ della compassione, che gli *ricuopre*, e *gli asconde*, “ *e supera*, in modo che *quasi* non si fan sentire.”

Milpov—*shocking, disgusting*, &c. because contrary to our established ideas of justice, and to every moral sentiment of our nature. History, indeed, must represent facts as they are; without any regard to the sentiments they may excite. But the case is far otherwise with the fictions of the Poet. We think he ought not to make such a representation of things^b. We consider it as discouraging to virtue, as immoral,—even, in some degree, as irreligious. What reader of CLARISSA does not find the pity, the *pleasurable* pity, at least, which it is the object of such a work to excite, frequently counteracted, and diminished, to say no more, by some indignant feelings of this kind? The story of *Sidney Biddulph*, though a work of considerable merit in the execution, is liable to the same objection. The mind of a reader is harrassed and revolted throughout by the most improbable and *determined* perverseness of
unfortunate

^b “ Cum historia vera successus rerum migime pro “ meritis virtutum et scelerum narret; corrigit eam “ *Poesis*, et exitus et fortunas, secundum merita, et ex “ lege Nemeseos, exhibet.”

Bacon, *De Aug. Sc. lib. ii. c. 13.*

unfortunate combinations; and shocked, at last, by the wanton production of misery, neither deserved, nor likely.—Ου φοβερὸν, εἴτε ἱλαστικὸν τέτο, ἀλλὰ μισερὸν. Fontenelle says, in perfect conformity with Aristotle, “Plus le heros est aimé, plus “ il est convenable de le rendre heureux à la fin. “ Il ne faut point renvoyer le spectateur avec la “ douleur de plaindre la destinée d’un homme “ vertueux.” Reflex. sur la Poet. Sect. 52.

To do justice to the author’s meaning, two other things should be kept in mind: 1. That, by his ἐπιεικής, he here means a character of consummate virtue, whose misfortunes were not drawn upon him by *any fault* of his own. This is evident from what follows. The sense of the word is sufficiently fixed by its opposite, ΣΦΟΔΡΑ πονηρὸν, as well as by the equivalent expression, ἀρετὴ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩΝ καὶ δικαιοσύνη, in his description of the *proper* character for Tragedy^c. 2. That he presently afterwards softens a little the rigour of his precept as *here* delivered, by saying, that the character should be *either* such as he had prescribed, “or *better rather than worse*.” βελτίον[⊕] μᾶλλον ἢ χερον[⊕].

NOTE 94.

P. 135. FOR IT IS NEITHER GRATIFYING IN A MORAL VIEW, &c.

Οὔτε γὰρ ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΟΝ — Without entering into a long discussion of all that has been urged by

^c For Aristotle’s account of ἐπιεικεία, the reader may consult *Eth. Nicom.* V. 10. *ed. Wilk.*

by the commentators in favour of the different senses they have assigned to the word *φιλανθρωπον* here, I shall only say, that, upon the most attentive comparison of this passage with another, in cap. xviii. where the term again occurs, it appears to me, that the *full* meaning of it is, *gratifying to philanthropy*; pleasing by its conformity to our natural sense of justice, by its *moral tendency*. Indeed this seems to follow from the word *μιαρον*, to which *φιλανθρωπον* is opposed. The representation of a good man (*επιεικής*) made miserable is *μιαρον*—*disgusting, shocking*. Why? Plainly, on account of its evident injustice, and immoral tendency. The representation of a *very bad* man (*σφοδρα πονηρος*) punished by calamity, is *φιλανθρωπον*;—that is, pleasing to the spectator, on the same principle, from its opposite tendency.

A singular, but somewhat similar, use is made of the same word in Plutarch's dialogue *περι Μουσικης*; where, speaking of the wicked innovations of the more modern musicians, Timotheus, Philoxenus, &c. he says of them—*φιλοκαινοι γεγονασι, τον ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ και θεματικον ΝΥΝ ΟΝΟΜΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ διωξαντες*. M. Burette's note upon this is perfectly unsatisfactory*. I believe we should read—*ΤΟ φιλανθρωπον και ΘΕΑΤΡΙΚΟΝ*—*κ. τ. αλ.*—i. e. "being lovers of novelty, they affect what is now termed the *pleasing and theatrical style*."

The

* Mem. de l'Acad. des Inscript. vol. xix. p. 325, oct. ed.
—In H. Stephens's ed. of Plut. p. 2080.

The *Theatre*, we know, was considered by the *purists* of that time, as the great source of corruption in Music. The reader may see how Plutarch rails, on this subject, p. 2081, and 2089; where he laments—*παντας τας μουσικης ἀπτομενους προς την ΘΕΑΤΡΙΚΗΝ προσεχωρηκεναι μυσαν*.—It appears, from his expression, *ΝΤΝ ὀνομαζομενον*, that this was a new and fashionable use of the word *φιανθρωπον*; which, from the sense of *pleasing to natural benevolence*, (as in the passage of Aristotle), seems to have been extended to signify, what was *pleasing*, and grateful, to the popular taste, in *general*; in opposition to those more chaste and severe productions of the artist, which aimed only at the gratification of the critical, and the learned. And, indeed, no sort of *philanthropy* is more common, in all times, and in every art, than that of accommodation to the public taste.

NOTE 95.

P. 136. OUR TERROR, BY SOME RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN THE SUFFERER AND OURSELVES.

Thus, in the *Rhetoric*, it is recommended to the Orator, as one method of exciting terror in his hearers, *τας ὁμοιοιους δεικνυναι πασχοντας, ἢ πεπονθοτας* *. Aristotle's doctrine concerning the importance of this *resemblance to ourselves* in the object

* II. 5.

object of the passion to be excited, and the extent he gives to the word *ὁμοιος*, may be seen in the passages of his Rhetoric referred to in the margin. The resemblance, however, *here* particularly meant, is undoubtedly resemblance of *character*. This is well explained by M. Batteux in few words: "Un crime atroce, un horreur de *scelerat*, revolte le spectateur, et par cette revolte même, le rassure contre la crainte; parcequ'il se sent aussi éloigné du malheur, qu'il l'est du crime." [*Quatre Poétiques*, tom. i. p. 307.] Or, as it is more fully developed by Piccolomini, "Riputando, per il più, gl' uomini se stessi buoni, o almeno non cattivi, ed in somma, non degni di male; e, per conseguente, *dissimili à quelle persone inique, in cui veggon' il male*, e in questo differenti da esse, che elle lo meritano, ed essi non lo meritano: non vengon' à dubitar di cadere in tai mali, e, conseguentemente, non ne nasce timore in loro." p. 194.

NOTE 96.

P. 136. NOR YET INVOLVED IN MISFORTUNE BY DELIBERATE VICE, OR VILLANY; BUT BY SOME ERROR OF HUMAN FRAILTY.

Μητε δια κακίαν και μοχθηρίαν μεταβαλλων εις την δυστυχίαν, άλλα δι' ἁμαρτιαν τιμα - - - . Thus, in the *Ethic. Nicom.* V. 10. p. 69. he uses *μοχθηρία*, and

κακία,

Ubi *supra*. Cap. viii. p. 559, E.—Cap. x. *init.*

κακία, as synonymous : and, VII. 9 ; where he says of μοχθηρία, that it is ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ πονηρία—a vicious *character, disposition, habit, &c.*—It also implies *deliberate choice* and intention, (— ὅταν δὲ ἐκ προαίρεσιως, μοχθηρία, V. 8.) in opposition to ἀμαρτία, which excludes προαίρεσις, and is ἀντὶ ΚΑΚΙΑΣ. (*ibid.*)

To understand rightly what the philosopher says in this part of his work on Poetry, and especially his application of his doctrine to such characters as Oedipus and Thyestes, we ought carefully to take his own sense of his own words. For want of this, Dacier * confounds himself and his readers in his note about *Thyestes*. He mistakes Aristotle's sense of ἀμαρτία. Dacier's "*involontaire*" includes

* A fine writer, M. Marmontel, has fallen into this and several other mistakes, by following Dacier and other translators, (for we are none of us to be depended on,) instead of taking the meaning of Aristotle from Aristotle himself.—See his *Poétique Française*, tom. ii. p. 109, where he adopts Dacier's "*involontaire*." In another place he says, " Dans *Sophocle*, Oedipe voyant arriver les " enfans qu'il a eu de sa mere, il leur tend les bras et leur " dit : *approchez, embrassez votre — Il n'acheve pas, et " le sublime est dans la reticence.*" Now the fact is, that this *reticence* is solely the property of the good father Brumoy, with respect to whom we may apply to M. Marmontel the words of Aristotle, quoted below,—ἀδικοῦ μὲν ἐκ ἐγὼ, ἀδικεῖ δὲ. Brumoy translates—"approchez, et embrassez votre - - - frere," &c.—*Sophocles* wrote—

- - - - - δεῦρ' ἰν', ἐλθετε
Ὡς τὰς ἀδελφὰς ταύδ' ἐμὰς χεῖρας.

cludes *both* ἀκυσιον, and ἀπροβλεπτον, which Aristotle distinguishes; *his* ἀμαρτηματα being not involuntary, but only, not ἐκ προαιρεσεως. See the whole cap. x. of lib. 5, as above. One passage, in cap. ix. of lib. 7, will particularly illustrate Aristotle's examples. 'ΟΙ ΑΚΡΑΤΕΙΣ (such were Oedipus and Thyestes, men of ungovernable passion,) ΑΔΙΚΟΙ ΜΕΝ ἔκ εἰσι, (i. e. are not *unjust men*—not κακοι, μοχθηροι, of bad *dispositions*, &c.) ΑΔΙΚΟΥΣΙ δὲ—yet they commit transient and occasional wrong, δια παθῶ, as he says elsewhere ^b.

The objections made by Corneille, Fontenelle, and other critics, to such subjects as that of the Oedipus, which they hold to be improper for Tragedy on account of the supposed fatality of the crimes committed, are well and solidly answered in an excellent note of the Abbé Batteux upon this passage.

NOTE 97.

P. 137. UPON THE STAGE AND IN THE DRAMATIC CONTESTS.

—Ἐπὶ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγῶνων—i. e. merely, in the *representation*. There seems to be no more foundation for the distinction which Dacier here supposes, between σκηνη, and ἀγων, than for the same distinction between ἀγων, and ὑποκριται, in the similar expression, ἀγωνῶ καὶ ὑποκριτῶν, in cap. vi.

^b 'Ο μὲν ἀκρατής, εἰδώς ὅτι φαῦλα, πράττει δια παθῶ.
VIL. 2. p. 86.

NOTE 98.

P. 137. EURIPIDES - - - THE MOST TRAGIC OF ALL POETS.

—More, however, it has been observed, with respect to the emotion of *pity*, than that of *terror*. And so, Quintilian: “In affectibus cum omnibus mirus, tum in iis qui MISERATIONE constant, facile præcipuus.” [*lib. x. c. 1.*] Yet the powers of this admirable, though unequal, genius, were by no means confined to emotions of tenderness and pity. *He*, too, as one of “*Nature’s darlings*,” possessed that “*golden key*,” which can not only “*ope the sacred source of sympathetic tears*,” but can “*unlock*” also, and at the same time, the “*gates of horror*,” and of “*thrilling fears*.” As proofs of this, I am tempted to produce two passages of this Poet, which I could never read without shuddering.

In that scene between Medea and Jason, in which, previous to the execution of her horrid vengeance, she deludes him with feigned reconciliation and submission, when Jason, addressing the children, says,

Ἰδοίμι δ’ ὑμᾶς εὐτραφῆς ἡβῆς τελευ-
 Μολοντάς, ἐχθρῶν τῶν ἐμῶν ὑπερτερὰς*.

—Medea

-
- * “O may I see you blooming in the prime
 “Of manhood, and to every virtue train’d,
 “Superior to my foes!”

[Mr. Potter’s Transl. v. 989.]

—Medea turns away her face and weeps: and when Jason asks the reason of her tears, she answers,

Οὐδεν·—ΤΕΚΝΩΝ ΤΩΝΔ' ἔννοσμενῃ περι^b.

“ And why,” says Jason again, “ lament thus “ over these children?”—Medea, then, knowing, but veiling in ambiguity, her dreadful purpose of destroying them, replies,

Ετικτον αὐτας·—ΖΗΝ Δ' ὅτ' ἔΞΗΤΧΟΥ
ΤΕΚΝΑ,
ΕΙΣΗΛΘΕ Μ' ΟΙΚΤΟΣ, ΕΙ ΓΕΝΗΣΕΤΑΙ
ΤΑΔΕ!

v. 930.

“ I am their mother:—when thy wish was breath'd
“ That they might live, a piteous thought arose,
“ *If that might be!*” - - -

Potter's Eurip. v. 1000.

The other passage is in the *Electra*. In the fine scene between Orestes and Electra, immediately after the murder of their mother, Orestes asks his sister,

Κατειδες οἶον αἱ ταλαιν' ἔων πεπλων
Εβαλεν, ἐδειξε, μασον ἐν φοναίς;— v. 1206.

Mark'd you not, how my mother, ere I struck her,
Withdrew her robe, and to our view expos'd
The breast that nourish'd us^c! - - -

I know

^b “ Nothing:—I was but thinking of my sons.”

^c The excellent translator of Euripides will pardon my having recourse here to a version of my own, merely
for

I know not what more can be said to the praise of Euripides, than, that no one, I believe, can read this scene without being reminded of the *MACBETH* of SHAKSPEARE.

NOTE 99.

P. 137. THAT WHICH IS OF A DOUBLE CONSTRUCTION, AND ALSO ENDS IN TWO OPPOSITE EVENTS, TO THE GOOD, AND TO THE BAD, CHARACTERS.

ΣΤΕΤΑΣΙΣ, ἡ --- ΣΤΕΤΑΣΙΝ ἰχθῦσα—i. e. "That construction which has a double construction."—Can this bē as the author left it? I cannot but suspect the *first* συζασις to be an interpolation. Without it, all will go on well.—Ἡ μὲν ἐν—καλλιῆ Τραγωδίᾳ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς συστάσεως ἐστὶ. --- Δευτέρα δέ, [sc. Τραγωδίᾳ,] ἡ πρώτη λεγόμενη ὑπο τινῶν ἐστὶ· ἡ διπλὴν τε τὴν συζασιν ἰχθῦσα,—καὶ τελευτῶσα, &c.

The particle, TE, here, is neglected by most of the commentators and translators, who, accordingly, of *two* distinct things make *one* only; understanding Aristotle, by his διπλὴ συζασις, to mean only a fable that has a *double catastrophe*, ending oppositely to opposite characters. But the expression

for the sake of pointing out more distinctly to the *English* reader that *particular circumstance* of the original, which strikes me most. Mr. Potter's lines are,

" Didst thou see her, when she drew

" Her vests aside, and bared her breasts— v. 1338.

pression is, "that has *both* a double construction, " and a double *catastrophe*." διπλην τε την συγασιν. ΚΑΙ τελευτωσα—κ.τ.αλ. We must not, however, confound this *double construction* with duplicity of *action*, and what we call *double plots*. I believe Castelvetro, who did not let the *τε* escape him, has explained it rightly. "Dice, che questa " constitutione di favola è doppia, percioche ha " *due maniere di persone*, l'una di buone, o di " *mezzane*, e l'altra di *scelerate*." (p. 293.) An explanation that will come still better recommended to the reader by the coincident opinion of the learned and accurate author of *Critical Observations on Books, antient and modern*; who has given the following explanatory version of this passage^a: "That constitution of an Epic tale^b, " which is reckoned the first by some, is in reality " but the second in point of excellence, namely, " that which, like the *Odyssey*, has a *double set of* " *characters*, one virtuous, and one vitious, and " wherein the action *also* ends contrarywise to the " virtuous and vitious agents, so that the former " terminate in prosperity, and the latter in adversity."—These two things, though closely connected, are evidently distinct. There may be a double

^a Number I. p. 3.

^b I do not see the learned writer's reason for inserting the word *Epic*. Aristotle is here plainly speaking of the *Tragic* fable, though he draws his illustration, indeed, from an Epic Poem.

double set of characters, where yet there is no contrariety of catastrophe, but all ends well to all. —Such a fable, as Aristotle describes, though a very different thing from our *plot* and *under-plot*, yet, as it consists of opposite characters, opposite interests, and opposite events, may well enough be considered as of a double construction—διπλῆς συστάσεως. Unity of *action*, indeed, upon Aristotle's principles, was essential both to the *single* and to the *double* fable; yet that unity admits of degrees, and the double fable was *less strictly one* action than the single. The *single* fable might be compared to a single stream: the *plot* and *under-plot*, to two separate, though contiguous, and now and then intermingling, streams: Aristotle's fable of *double construction*, to two opposite collateral currents, (if such a thing may be imagined,) in the same channel.

NOTE 100.

P. 138. THIS KIND OF PLEASURE IS NOT THE PROPER PLEASURE OF TRAGEDY, BUT BELONGS RATHER TO COMEDY, &c.

What is the proper pleasure to be expected from Tragedy, we have already been told, and we are told again, more plainly, if possible, in the next chapter. It is—ἡ ἀπὸ εἰς καὶ φόβου ἡδονή: “the pleasure that arises from pity and terror.”

The

The double fable Aristotle seems to have considered as not giving this pleasure, or at least, as giving it weakly and imperfectly, because all the unhappiness of the *catastrophe* falls on the odious characters, the *σφοδρα πονηρας*. In the room of this pleasure, which Tragedy *ought* to give, the double fable substitutes that of a satisfactory conclusion; a catastrophe accommodated to the wishes of the spectator. But this, says Aristotle, is a pleasure that *rather* belongs to Comedy than to Tragedy: ΜΑΛΛΟΝ της κωμωδιας οικουα. For he is not here rejecting this double plan, but only shewing why it is not, as some held it to be, the *best*, *σφωτα*. Such Tragedies, he says, afford a pleasure of the same *kind*, at least, with that which Comedy affords; though Comedy indeed goes farther; for there, all must end well; enemies, as inveterate as Orestes and Ægisthus, must shake hands at last, and the spectator must be dismissed with no impression upon his mind, but that of pure and unmixed pleasure.

If we understand the passage in this way, it will not, I think, be necessary to suppose, what, I own, I was once much inclined to suppose with Heinsius, that the text is defective; and that, after the word *θιαται*, Aristotle had, originally, mentioned the *third* and *worst* kind of fable, terminating in a happy event to *all* the characters; to which, and not to the *second* species, what follows about Comedy was meant to be applied. Very

specious reasons might certainly be produced in support of such a conjecture, if it were necessary. But we have no encouragement from MSS. to suspect any omission, and the passage, as here explained, seems to have little, or no, difficulty. The chief objection is, that what is here said of Comedy is not applicable to the double Tragic fable, in which there is no reconciliation of enemies^b, &c. But it was not, I think, intended to be so closely applicable. All that Aristotle meant must have been, to shew, that the pleasure arising from his *second* species of fable, differed only in *degree* from that of Comedy; that the circumstance of *ending satisfactorily* was common to both*.

Chaucer's Monk had the true Aristotelic idea of Tragedy:—

Tragedie is to sayn a certain storie,
As olde bookes maken us memorie,
Of him that stood in gret prosperitee,
And is yfallen out of high degree
In to miserie, and endeth wretchedly^c. But.

^b See the note of Heinsius.—Castelvetro supposes Aristotle to be answering a *tacit* objection—"Why not a happy termination for *all* the characters, good and bad?" p. 294.

* The author of one of the arguments to the *Orestes* of Euripides, says, το δὲ δράμα ΚΩΜΙΚΩΤΕΡΑΝ ἔχει τὴν καταστροφὴν.

^c Canterbury Tales, v. 13979. Mr. Tyrwhitt's ed.—Chaucer, however, uses the word *Tragedy* in a loose sense

But the knight, and the host, were among the

ΒΕΑΤΑΙ, ΑΣΘΕΝΕΙΣ :

Ho ! quod the knight, good sire, no more of this :

That ye han said is right *ynough* ywis,

And mochel more ; for litel hevinesse

Is right ynough to mochel folk, I gesse.

I say for me, it is a gret *disee*, [*uneasiness*]

Wher as men have ben in gret welth and ese,

To heren of hir soden fall, alas !

And the contrary is joye and gret solas,

As whan a man hath ben in poure estat,

And climbeth up, and wexeth fortunat,

And ther abideth in prosperitee :

Swiche thing is gladsom, as it thinketh me,

And of swiche thing were goodly for to telle^d.

NOTE 101.

P. 139. WHO MAKE USE OF THE DECORATION TO PRODUCE, NOT THE TERRIBLE, BUT THE MARVELLOUS ONLY—.

One would think, that commentators on Aristotle might find enough in this work to satisfy the keenest

sense, (as Dr. Burney has observed, *Hist. of Mus.* vol. ii. p. 320.) for a *tragical story*. And for this he seems to have Plato's authority :—*τις τε ΤΡΑΓΙΚΗΣ ΠΟΙΗΣΕΩΣ ἀποτομεύς, ἐν ἰαμβείοις, ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΕΠΕΣΙ.* *Rep.* x.—And so presently after,—*ὍΜΗΡΟΥ, ἡ καὶ ἄλλῃ τινῶν ΤΡΑΓΩΔΙΟΠΟΙΩΝ* : and he calls Homer *πρωτον των τραγωδιοποιων*. See, also, p. 152, *E. ed. Serr.* vol. i.

^d v. 14773, &c.

keenest appetite for difficulties, without any assistance from their own invention. Yet here, they have contrived to perplex one of the plainest passages that can be found. Nothing can well be clearer than Aristotle's expression:—ὁ δὲ ΜΗ ΤΟ ΦΟΒΕΡΟΝ, διὰ τῆς ὀψέως, ἀλλὰ ΤΟ ΤΕΡΑΤΩΔΕΣ ΜΟΝΟΝ, παρὰσκευαζόντες.—He is not, as some critics have supposed^a, examining here *three* different ways of raising *terror*, but *two* only;—by the plot itself, which he justly pronounces to be the best way, and by the ὀψις, the spectacle, scenes, dresses, &c. As for *those* Poets, he continues, who make use of the ὀψις, for the purpose of exciting, not *terror*, but *wonder only*, they are out of the question; this “*has nothing to do with Tragedy*,” &c. If Aristotle, by τερατώδεις, had meant only, as has been understood, a *monstrous degree of the terrible*—“*mostruoso*,” “*soprano spavento*,” as Castelvetro calls it^b, he surely would not have used so strong an expression as—ΟΥΔΕΝ Τῇ Τραγῳδίᾳ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΟΥΣΙΝ. He does not here exclude even the τερατώδεις, absolutely, and in *general*; but the *mere* τερατώδεις; τερατώδεις ΜΟΝΟΝ—“*only the wonderful*,” and that, διὰ τῆς ὀψέως. The marvellous and supernatural, may, we know, in the hands of a Poet of genius, be made a powerful instrument of Tragic terror.

^a Robortelli, Castelvetro, Piccolomini, Beni.

^b P. 298. M. Batteux follows this interpretation. He translates τερατώδεις, “*effrayant*.”

terror. Aristotle would hardly, I imagine, have censured a drama like that of Macbeth, as having "*nothing in common with Tragedy.*"

The difficulty, indeed, of managing the *visible* *εἰσαγωγὴς*, so as to produce any *serious* effect, is sufficiently great. We have, I think; but one dramatic Poet who *could* walk, though others may have *dared* to walk, "*within that circle.*" The decoration of the *Eumenides* of Æschylus, and his chorus of *fifty* furies, with their *μυγμοί*, and their *ὤγμοι**, their *snorings*, their screams, and their torches, may very well be conceived to have put women and children in a real fright; but whether it produced any sympathetic, illusive, and pleasurable, terror—the only terror in question^d—I should much doubt. Yet Dacier, very gravely, produces this story of children fainting away, and women miscarrying, with the fright, as an example of *Tragic* terror excited by the *ὀψις*†. According to Dacier's account, the allegorical personage of *Αὔρα*, or Madness, in the *Hercules Furens* of Euripides, appears in her aerial car, "*with a hundred heads, round which hiss a thousand sand serpents**!" It is rather difficult to conceive

* See v. 116, &c.

† See Dr. Campbell's *Philos. of Rhetoric*, book I. ch. ii. p. 323.

* P. 213, and 47, note 36.—The story is told by the anonymous writer of the life of Æschylus:—ὅτε τα μὲν ἡπια ἐκψύχαι, τα δὲ ἑμβρυα ἐξαμβλῶσθαι.

* P. 215.

conceive how this could have been managed. These hundred heads, in the passage of the chorus alluded to, v. 884, certainly belong to the serpents, not to *Λυσσα* herself; and the emendation of Reiske seems probable;—*ἑκατογκεφαλῶν Ὀφείων ἰαχῆμασι*.—“*centicipitibus serpentum sibilis*.” Even so, I can scarce imagine an Athenian audience to have received this exhibition with countenances perfectly Tragic. The arrival of old OCEAN mounted upon his *Griffin*, in the *Prometheus* of Æschylus, must, one would suppose, have had as ridiculous an effect, as I remember the entrance of the Minotaur to have had upon the audience, some years ago, in the opera of *Teseo*.

If such a dramatic entertainment as our *Pantomime* had existed in the days of Aristotle, he would probably have represented the Tragic Poets, whom he here censures, as encroaching on *that* province: for, indeed, the *τερατώδεις μόνον δια τῆς ὀψίως παρασκευαζομένον*, would accurately enough express the *ἡδονῇ οἰκίαν* of the pantomime.—But, what would the philosopher have said to a species of the drama, of which the *Ὀψίς*, which he places at the very bottom of his scale [*cap. vi.*], is the very *soul*—*ἀρχὴ καὶ ὅλον ψυχῇ*: and where the *σκευοποιῶν*, or the carpenter, takes the lead of the Poet?—To do it justice, however, it has its *Μῦθος*, its fable, such as it is, with its *beginning*, its *middle*, and its *end*; though a spectator may be often
puzzled

‡ See the *Ox.* Euripides.

puzzled to make, as we commonly say, head or tail of its plot. It has also its *δισσεις* and its *λυσεις*, its *nœuds* and its *denouemens*, in great abundance; being, indeed, from beginning to end, a continued series of *knots*, tied by love, and cut by magic. Here are also *περιπετυχιαί* and *ἀναγνωρισσεις*, revolutions, and discoveries, in plenty; though the chief revolution, indeed, be in the scenery;—*ἡ εἰς τὸ ἰναρτίον τῶν ὈΡΩΜΕΝΩΝ μεταβολή*. And with respect to *discoveries*, the pantomime may be characterized as Aristotle characterizes the *Odyssey*,—*ἀναγνωρισσεις γὰρ διολε*—“it abounds through-
“out with discoveries^d”; for the poor hero is perpetually discovered, and very seldom *εἰς φιλίαν*^e. Then there are *Παθῆ* too, *disasters*—the *πραξεις ὀδυνηραί*^f at least, which, to the upper gallery, make the merriest part of the entertainment. An essential character, the *clown*, is even appropriated to this purpose of *suffering*, and his clothes well wadded for the reception of blows, kicks, and falls^g. But Aristotle little foresaw, I suppose, when

^d Cap. xxiv. Transl. Part III. Sect. i.

^e Cap. xi. ^f Cap. xii. *init.*

^g The Germans, not many years ago, were, it seems, so fond of this sort of *humour*, that Dr. Burney tells us, “bills were regularly brought in to the managers at the end of each week, in which the comic actors used to charge; “So much for a slap on the face,”—“So much for a broken head,” &c.—See vol. i. of Dr. Burney’s entertaining *Journal of a Tour through Germany*, &c. p. 223.

when he wrote his first chapter, that a species of drama *without words* would one day be invented : still less, probably, could he have imagined, what to the antients would have appeared the strangest part of this business, that, though *accompanied throughout* by MUSIC, yet it would not imitate "by gesticulated *rhythm*" — δια σχηματιζομενων ΠΡΩΜΩΝ ; the gestures of the actors in pantomime, being not at all regulated by the *measures* of the music, or only occasionally, and accidentally, according to the ear, and inclination, of the performer ^a.

NOTE 102.

P. 139. MOST TERRIBLE, OR PITEOUS - - -

After having established, that the terrible and piteous should arise from the circumstances of the action itself, Aristotle proceeds to examine *what* are the circumstances that will produce the highest degree of terror and pity, within the *proper limits* ; that is, so as to avoid what he calls the *μιαρον*, the shocking, and disgusting. And this, perhaps, led him here to use the words *δυνα*, and *οικτρα*, as being, if I mistake not, rather stronger than *φοβερα*, and

^a The pantomimic exhibitions of the Romans, spoken of in NOTE 4, and described pretty fully by Lucian, *De Salt.* were widely different. They were a species of dance, and the gestures of the performers were strictly governed by the rhythm of the music ; the *words*, which it was the business of the dancer to express by those gestures, being *sung*, at the same time, by a chorus.

and *ἱκεῖνα*. For the subject of this chapter seems, in short, to be, *the proper management of the Πάθη or disastrous incidents*: "Comment," as Dacier has rightly observed, "on doit se conduire dans *les actions atroces*," p. 236. Without this leading idea it would be difficult to explain satisfactorily some passages that follow.

NOTE 103.

P. 140. BETWEEN FRIENDS.

Εν ταῖς φιλίαις.—For the wide sense in which Aristotle here uses the word *φιλία*, see *Ethic. Nicom.* VIII. 1, and 7, *ed. Ox.* 1716, and the passage quoted in NOTE 276.

NOTE 104.

P. 140. BUT IT IS HIS PROVINCE TO INVENT OTHER SUBJECTS, AND TO MAKE A SKILFUL USE OF THOSE WHICH HE FINDS ALREADY ESTABLISHED.

Αὐτον δὲ εὐρίσκειν δεῖ, καὶ τοῖς παραδιδόμενοις χρῆσθαι καλῶς. The expression is too short and general to be clear. It is fairly capable of not less than *three* different meanings. *Εὐρίσκειν*, may mean, to *invent* a subject from pure imagination, as Agatho invented his *ΑΝΘΟΣ**: or it may mean only, to *find out* a new historical subject; or, lastly, to *invent*, not a subject, but only *circumstances* and *incidents*, by which the *old* subjects may be varied; which

* Cap. ix. Transl. Part II. Sect. 6.

which is Dacier's idea :—" Le Poete doit inventer
 " lui-même, *en se servant comme il faut* des fables
 " reçues."—I shall only say, that, on the whole,
 I prefer the second of these explanations. Aristotle,
 it is true, had allowed ^b, that a Poet ought not to
 be chained down to the old *traditional stories* ;
 and even, that it would be *ridiculous* (γελοῖον) to
 suppose subjects of pure invention absolutely
 prohibited. But this is delivered as a permission,
 not as a precept ; and he would hardly have en-
 forced a permission by such an expression as he
 here uses—ἐνρίσκειν ΔΕΙ. Again—αὐτὸν ΕΤΡΙΣ-
 ΚΕΙΝ, (against Dacier's explanation,) seems plainly
 opposed to τοῖς παραδιδόμενοις ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ—" to use
 " old subjects properly, and to invent or find out
 " new subjects : not new incidents for an old sub-
 " ject." This may, perhaps, receive some illus-
 tration and support from a similar passage in the
 Rhetoric ^c. In the second chapter of the first
 book, he divides the *proofs* of the orator into two
 kinds—the ἀτεχνοί, and the ἐντεχνοί. The ἀτεχνοί
 are the *external* proofs ; witnesses, the torture,
 writings, and all such proofs as are *ready provided*
to the pleader's hand—ὅσα μὴ δι' ἡμῶν πεπορισται,
 ἀλλὰ προῦπηρχεν. The ἐντεχνοί he defines to be
 those *argumentative proofs* which depend on the
 art and invention of the orator himself. He then
 concludes—ὥς δὲ ταῦτα, τοῖς μὲν ΧΡΗΣΑΣΘΑΙ, τα
 δε

^b Cap. ix. Transl. Part. II. Sect. 6.

^c It is quoted, I see, by Robortelli.

✠ ΕΥΡΕΙΝ :—" of these proofs, the first sort we
" have only to make a proper *use* of; the other
" we must *invent*."

NOTE 105.

P. 142. BUT OF ALL THESE WAYS, &c.

All this is not a little *embrouillé*.—Aristotle describes *three* ways only. Then he says, or seems to say,— " There is *no other* way :"—*παρα ταυτα εν εστιν αλλως*. And to prove this, he enumerates all the ways *possible*; which, at last, turn out to be *four*. Hence the text has been supposed defective. [See Castelvetro; and Goulston's supplemental translation.] Perhaps there is no occasion to suppose this. That, at least, there is no accidental omission of a *fourth* case, (that of *purposing* without *executing*,) seems pretty clear from the expression ΕΤΙ δι τριτον παρα ταυτα : " there is *still* a third way *beside these*." It would have been rather strange, if, immediately after this, he had proceeded to mention a *fourth* way.—Taking then the passage as perfect, we must understand, I think, by εν ΕΣΤΙΝ αλλως, not—there is no other way *possible*—but, there is no other *proper, admissible* way: non *licet* aliter—it *must* not be done in any other way. For, he proceeds, there are but *four* ways possible; but of all *these*, (τεττων ✠—i. e. these four *possible* ways,) that of being " ready to execute, knowingly, and yet not executing," is the worst, and not to be enumerated
by

by a critic among those ways which a Poet may be allowed to use.

Thus Dacier appears to have understood the passage, by his translation, which, I think, is right, as to the sense. But I thought Aristotle's meaning might be clearly enough expressed without periphrasis, or supplement.

NOTE 106.

P. 142. BUT THE BEST OF ALL THESE WAYS IS THE LAST.

In the 13th chapter (Transl. *Sect.* 12.) Aristotle had pronounced *that* to be the best constituted Tragedy, which terminates unhappily; and had represented that species, which gratifies, by its catastrophe, the sympathetic wishes of the audience, as inferior, and affording a kind of pleasure *rather* appropriated to Comedy. Yet here, he *appears* to give the preference to a plan calculated to afford that very pleasure in the highest degree. This seeming inconsistency has given the commentators much trouble. It is rather surprising, that Dacier should have perceived what had escaped the superior acuteness of the Italian annotators, *viz.* that Aristotle is not, in this chapter, inquiring what is the best constitution of a Tragic fable *in general*, but, what is the best method of managing the most disastrous and atrocious incidents of Tragic story, so as to produce the highest possible degree of

5

Tragical

Tragical emotion in the spectator, without producing *horror* and disgust*. With this view of the subject, the reader, perhaps, will not see much difficulty in reconciling Aristotle to himself. He might surely say, without inconsistency, "Tragedy, " to be perfect, should terminate unhappily. " Yet there may be particular exceptions to this " general rule. The *end* of Tragedy is, to excite " terror and pity; and that end is most effectually " answered, when those emotions are not only ex- " cited in the *course* of the drama, (as they un- " doubtedly may be, and to a high degree, even " in such pieces as *end* fortunately,) but are left " impressed upon the mind of the spectator by the " catastrophe itself. Yet this Tragic *terror* is not " to be pushed to absolute *horror*, nor the τραγικόν " to be confounded with the μίαιρα: and I allow, " that where the circumstances of the traditional " story, from which the Poet takes his plot, are " such, as leave him only the alternative, either of " disgusting and shocking the spectator, or of gra- " tifying his wishes, the latter is clearly to be " preferred; and the διπλη συζασις, the *double* " fable, to which I assigned only the *second* " place †, will, in that particular case, deserve the " *first*."

Nothing seems more just, or more accurately expressed, than Aristotle's idea of the end of Tragedy; that it is, " to give that pleasure which
arises

* See NOTE 102.

† Transl. vol. i. p. 137.

arises from pity and terror through imitation :”—
 την ἀπο εἰλεως καὶ φοβῆ δια μιμησεως ἡδονην παρασ-
 κεναζειν—*cap.* xiv. (Transl. Part II. Sect. 13.) But
 the Greek Tragedians will be thought, I believe,
 by most modern readers, to have sometimes pushed
 this principle rather too far, and to have excited a
 degree of horror, which even the charms of imi-
 tation cannot well be conceived to have softened
 into pleasurable emotion; and it appears to me,
 that Aristotle himself inclined to this opinion, and
 that he intended this chapter as a lesson of caution
 to the Poets against this excess. He seems plainly
 to have considered the *actual* murder of a mother,
 a son, a brother, and the like, as incidents rather
 too horrible to be exhibited in *any* way. If the
 deed *must* be done, let it, he says, if possible—
 if the story will permit it—be done ignorantly.
 But it will be still better, if you can avoid doing it,
 entirely; if you can contrive to make the *expecta-*
tion, combined with the *atrociousness* of the event
 expected, answer your purpose, by raising as much
 anxiety, commiseration, and terror in the spec-
 tator, as may consist with that *pleasure* which is
 the end of Tragedy, and then relieving him at last,
 by prevention at the very moment of execution.
 That Aristotle thought the end of Tragedy might
 be sufficiently answered by the mere *expectation*
 of such events, properly managed, appears from
 his expression above :—εἰ ἀδελφόν ἀδελφόν, ἢ υἱόν
 πατέρα, ἢ μητέρα υἱόν, ἢ υἱόν μητέρα, ἀποκτείνῃ,
 H MEA-

Η ΜΕΛΑΗ:—ταυτα ζητησιον. "When a brother kills, or is going to kill," &c.

For this purpose, not only the expectation must be such, that the action shall appear imminent and inevitable, but the action itself expected must be such, as, had it taken place, would have been dreadful, "*intolerable*," &c.—τι των ΑΝΗΚΕΕΤΩΝ^a, as Aristotle expresses himself in describing these prevented παθη. By these means, the emotion of terror is brought as near as possible to that which would arise from the actual perpetration^b.

If the purport of this chapter has been here rightly explained, the reader will see how Aristotle has been misrepresented by many modern critics, who have understood him to recommend the *Cresphontes* of Euripides as a model of the best possible

^a I find the same thing observed by Robortelli, whose short comment is worth transcribing. "Addit verò Aristoteles—τι των ἀνήμερων: grave enim atrocisque factum illud in Tragœdiis esse oportet, quod aliquis patraturus ferme fuerit, quia maximum affert auditoribus terrorem, qui proprius Tragœdiæ est, et admirationem incredibilem. *Διὺντι enim, Quid si mactasset?—quàm parum abfuit à cæde!*" p. 160.

^b This is well observed, and well expressed, by Piccolomini, (p. 215, &c.) who, with Victorius and other commentators, confesses himself embarrassed by the seeming inconsistency of the author in this passage, and gives the *imminence* of the perpetration as the only solution that occurs to him. His comment is excellent, but too long for transcription. I had not seen it when my remarks were written; but I was glad to find them so supported.

possible construction of a Tragic fable in general. Thus Maffei, in the dedication of his *Merope*—
 “ Parla di essa Aristotele nella Poetica, dove
 “ trattando de’ modi di ben comporre la favola, dà
 “ per esempio dell’ ottimo il Cresfonte d’ Euripide,
 “ in cui l’ atrocità veniva dalla ricognizione im-
 “ pedita.”—And Voltaire, in his letter to Maffei,
 prefixed to the French *Merope*: “ Aristote, dans
 “ sa Poétique immortelle, ne balance pas à dire,
 “ que la reconnoissance de Merope et de son fils,
 “ étoit le moment le plus intéressant de toute la
 “ scene Grecque. Il donnoit à ce coup de Thea-
 “ tre la preference sur tous les autres.”

NOTE 107.

P. 142. MEROPE, &c.

Plutarch’s account of the effect of this *coup de Theatre* upon the audience, is worth transcribing, though apparently incorrect.

Σκοπεῖ δε τὴν ἐν τῇ Τραγωδίᾳ ΜΕΡΟΠΗΝ, ἐπὶ
 τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὡς φονεὰ τε υἱε, πέλεκυν ἀραιμένην,
 καὶ λεγούσαν—

Ὅσιωτεράν δὲ τὴνδ’ ἐγὼ δίδωμι σοι

Πληγὴν - - - - -

ὅσον ἐν τῷ θεατρῷ κίνημα ποιεῖ, συνεξορθιάζουσα
 φονεῖ [an, φοβῶ?] καὶ δεῖ μὴ φθασῇ τὸν ἐπιλαμ-
 βανομένον γεροντά, καὶ τρώσῃ τὸ μίρακιον.—
 [Περὶ Σαρκοφ. p. 1837, ed. H. St.]

For other fragments of this Tragedy, the reader
 may see the Ox. Euripides.

NOTE 108.

P. 143. THE MANNERS SHOULD BE GOOD.

Good, in the usual sense of *moral* goodness; the only sense which *χρησά*, applied to *manners*, will bear, and which, even though the word would admit of other senses, would here be fixed, beyond a doubt, by the plain, unequivocal expression of the whole passage. Dacier admires and follows the nonsense of Le Bossu, who makes *χρησά ἀθῆ* mean *poetically good*; that is, *well marked* by the Poet; in which sense, the rule is equally well observed by Milton in his *Satan*, and by Richardson in his *Grandison*. "There are," according to this "*best interpreter of Aristotle*," "*deux sortes de bonté dans les mœurs*; l'une que l'on peut appeler morale, et qui est propre à la vertu: et l'autre est la poetique, à laquelle *les hommes les plus vicieux ont autant de part que les gens de bien*." How could Mr. Harris, with his thorough knowledge of the Greek language, and his clear and exact turn of thinking in general, recommend all this, as "*a fine and copious commentary on this part of Aristotle's Poetics*?" I shall not waste time in confuting, what has been sufficiently

* Harris, On Music, &c. p. 83, *note*.

* *Traité du Poëme Ep. lib. iv. c. 4.*

* See Philol. Inquiries, p. 166; and Le Bossu, lib. iv. c. 4, 5, &c. to which he refers.

sufficiently confuted long ago^d. — Τίς ἄλλη, τὸν θανόντ' ἐπικταίνει; — Dacier's note is a curious specimen of absurd interpretation supported by false translation^e.

The best comment I have seen on this passage is that of Heinsius; which I shall therefore give entire.

“ Cæterum, in moribus, quatuor tenenda esse
 “ docet Aristoteles; quorum primum est, ut sint
 “ *boni*. Quod est exponendum pluribus.—Inter
 “ ea quæ quam maximè in Tragœdiâ reprehē-
 “ debat PLATO^f, vel præcipuum hoc erat;—quod
 “ nimirum varia, non uniformis, sit illius imitatio;
 “ et occasione oblata, *probos juxta improbosque*
 “ *imitetur*; nonnunquam autem improbos tan-
 “ tum: quo facillimè animum, quod supra mo-
 “ nebamus, decipi humanum, qui dum solum
 “ respicit *decorum*, quod propositum est illi, *bono-*
 “ *rum sæpe, et malorum*, discrimen non agnoscit,
 “ et,

^d By Mr. De la Barre. See *Mem. de l'Acad.* &c. his *second Diss. Sur le Poeme Epique*. See also M. Batteux's satisfactory note on this passage.

^e Aristotle says plainly, the ἡθὺς will be χρηστον, if the προαιρεσις is χρηστη, and the contrary:—φαιλον μὲν, [sc. ἡθὺς ἔξει,] εἰαν φαιλον [sc. προαιρεσις ποτὶ φαίνορας,] χρηστον δὲ, εἰαν χρηστον. See, now, Dacier's version of this: “ Il y a des mœurs dans un discours, ou dans une action, lorsque l'un et l'autre font connoître l'inclination ou la resolution telle qu'elle est, *mauvaise si elle est mauvaise, bonne si elle est bonne.*”

^f See *De Rep.* iii. p. 394, 395, &c. (*Ed. Serr.*)—the passages here alluded to.

“ et, ut ipse Poeta, utrosque mores imitatur ; quo
 “ nihil magis in republicâ perniciosum excogitari
 “ potest. Quippe ratione istâ scholam vitiorum,
 “ non virtutum, fieri theatrum ; et quidem quanto
 “ magis hanc in partem inclinamus omnes. Præ-
 “ terea, interpretes Platonis—alium admitti ab eo
 “ negant Poetam, quam qui omni varietate
 “ sublatâ, Deum et *bonorum virorum actiones*
 “ imitetur* ; cætera enim delectare quidem, non
 “ autem docere ; plerumque vero mores vitare ac
 “ corrumpere, ideoque nocere magis quam pro-
 “ desse. *Huic ut occurreret Philosophus, primum*
 “ *hoc de moribus præceptum esse voluit, probi ut*
 “ *essent* ; tales enim esse in Tragœdiâ non modo
 “ posse, quod negabat Plato, sed et, *quantum*
 “ *ratio poematis permetteret, debere.* Confirmant
 “ hoc exempla tragicorum ; qui sine ullâ lege
 “ hanc tamen legem sunt secuti. Etiam poste-
 “ riores critici, qui nonnullas veterum hoc nomine
 “ notârunt, *quod aut omnes, aut plerasque, pessime*
 “ *moratas haberent personas.* Qualis est, ex.
 “ grat. Euripidæ *Orestes* ; in quo, præter Pyladen,
 “ improbi omnium sunt mores*. Neque enim
 “ hæc

* Plato says, the Poets should be obliged, *την τε ἀγαθὴν αἰσίδα ἢδὲ ἱμποιν τοῖς ποιήμασιν, ἢ μὴ παρ’ ἡμῶν ποιῶν*—“ to imitate good characters, or not to imitate at all.”—*Rep.* iii. p. 401. B.

* He alludes, I suppose, to the censure passed upon that Tragedy in one of the arguments prefixed : *το δράμα των ἐπι σκηνῆς εἰδωμένωντων, ΧΕΙΡΙΣΤΟΝ ΔΕ ΤΟΙΣ ΗΘΕΣΙ-πλιν γὰρ Πυλαδῆ, παντὶς φανλοὶ ἦσαν.*

“ hæc mens Aristotelis, aut non alios quam optimè
 “ moratos, esse inducendos, aut, si alii inducantur,
 “ quos fuisse improbos constat, probos iis tribu-
 “ endos esse mores : *sed, ut, quantum ratio per-*
 “ *mittit, plures optimè morati in eodem inducantur*
 “ *dramate.* Quamvis enim et utrique requiruntur,
 “ et tam horum quam illorum ratione constet de-
 “ *corum*, probos tanto esse præferendos, quanto
 “ plus conducunt cum spectantur ^h.”

To do full justice to Aristotle's meaning, it must be observed, 1. That what he says should be understood *chiefly*, though by no means *solely*, as some have explained it¹, of the *principal characters*. 2. That the word $\chi\rho\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ does not imply a character of high and exemplary virtue. It seems to answer to our popular expression, *a good sort of man*; and it excludes *absolutely*, only habitual vice, bad disposition, $\mu\omicron\upsilon\nu\pi\iota\alpha$, $\mu\omicron\chi\theta\eta\pi\iota\alpha$, as it is expressed in a passage that should be compared with this². 3. That the rule, even with respect

^h *De Trag. Constit.* cap. xiv.

¹ So M. Batteux; and Marmontel, *Poet. Française*, ii. 181, who defends the true sense of $\chi\rho\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ἦδη, but says, that “the *interesting personage* of the piece is the *only one* “whom Aristotle had in view.” But, Aristotle instances in *Menelaus*, who certainly is not “*le personnage intéressant*,” in the *Orestes*. His instance of *slaves*, too, shews the precept to be *general*.

² Cap. xxv. at the end, where this fault in the manners is expressed thus— $\text{Ὅρῃ δὲ ἐκτετακέναι} \dots \mu\omicron\chi\theta\eta\pi\iota\alpha \dots \mu\eta \alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma \epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma, \kappa. \tau. \alpha\lambda.$ —See, Transl. Part IV. Sect. 7.

respect to *such* characters, is not absolute; as is evident from Aristotle's expression, when he gives an *example* of the violation of it, παραδειγμα πονηρίας ΜΗ ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΝ: and, again, in cap. xxv. όταν ΜΗ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ ὈΤΣΗΣ, κ.τ.αλ.—4. That what he presently adds, ἐστὶ δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ γινεῖ¹, is a necessary modification of the precept, and shews, that he did not mean, as Heinsius well observes, to exclude *comparative badness* of manners, but meant only—as good as *may* be, consistently with the observance of the *other* requisites mentioned—the ἀρμοττον, and the ὁμοιον.

The *reason* of the precept, Aristotle has not given us. But, it appears, I think, clearly, from his substituting the word ΒΛΑΒΕΡΑ (*hurtful, pernicious,*) for μοχθηρά, or πονηρά, in his enumeration of the greatest faults of Poetry at the end of cap. xxv^m. that, however he might differ from Plato as to the hurtful tendency of Tragedy, and of *imitative* Poetry in general, he so far at least agreed with him, as to admit the danger of those poetical, embellished, and flattering, exhibitions of *vice*, in which, as one of the most eloquent, and I might add, the most *Platonic*ⁿ, of modern writers

¹ What he means by γινεῖ, is explained in the *Rhet.* II. 7.—λέγει δὲ, ΓΕΝΟΣ μὲν, καθ' ἡλικίαν· οἷον παῖς ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ἢ γυνὴ.—καὶ γυνὴ καὶ ἄνθρωπος.—καὶ Λακων, ἢ Θηταλός, &c.

^m Transl. Part IV. Sect. 7.—See, NOTE 260.

ⁿ On this subject especially. See his whole letter to M. D'Alembert against the establishment of a Theatre at Geneva.

writers expresses it,—“ L’auteur, pour faire parler
 “ chacun selon son caractère, est forcé de mettre
 “ dans la bouche des mechants leurs maximes, et
 “ leurs principes, revetus de tout l’éclat des beaux
 “ vers, et débités d’un ton imposant et sententieux,
 “ pour l’instruction du parterre °.” With respect
 to characters of atrocious villany, such as that of
 Glenalvon in *Douglas*, which *can* excite only pure
 detestation, I believe the ideas of Plato, and per-
 haps of Aristotle, were very nearly, if not exactly,
 the same, which this admirable writer has expressed
 in the concluding note of his *Nouvelle Eloise*.—

“ En achevant de relire ce recueil, je crois voir
 “ pourquoi l’interêt, tout foible qu’il est, m’en est
 “ si agréable, et le sera, je pense, à tout lecteur
 “ d’un bon naturel. C’est qu’au moins ce foible
 “ interêt est pur et sans melange de peine ; qu’il
 “ n’est point excité par des *noirceurs*, par des
 “ *crimes*, ni melé du *tourment de hair*. Je ne
 “ sçaurois concevoir quel plaisir on peut prendre
 “ à imaginer et composer le personnage d’un sce-
 “ lerat, à *se mettre à sa place tandis qu’on le*
 “ *représente* †, a lui prêter l’éclat le plus imposant.

“ Je

° Lettre à D’Alembert, p. 54.—Plato, after citing some
 verses of Homer which he conceived to have a pernicious
 tendency, says, that he reprobates them—ἐχὼς ὡς ἃ ποιηταὶ
 καὶ ἡδὲα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅσον ποικιλιώτερα,
 τοιοῦτον ἥττον ἀκούστεον παῖσι καὶ ἀνδράσι,
 &c.—*De Repub.* iii. *circ. init.*

† In Plato’s figurative and expressive language—ἐμπαύειν τε καὶ ἐνίστασθαι εἰς τὴν τῶν κακῶν τύπην. *Rep.* iii.
 p. 396.—And see before, p. 395, C. D.

" Je plains beaucoup les auteurs de tant de *Tragédies* pleines d'horreurs, lesquels passent leur vie à faire agir et parler des gens qu'on ne peut écouter ni voir sans souffrir," &c.

NOTE 109.

P. 143-44. IN GENERAL, WOMEN ARE, PERHAPS, RATHER BAD THAN GOOD.

" Aristote," says M. Batteux, " ne parle pas ici *des femmes en général*, mais seulement de celles que les Poètes ont mises sur le Théâtre, telles que Médée, Clytemnestre," &c. This is polite; but it will not make Aristotle polite. He speaks plainly; and what he says is, I fear, but too conformable to the manner in which the ancients usually speak of the sex *in general*. At least, he is certainly consistent with himself: witness the following very curious character of women in his *History of Animals*, which I give the reader, by no means for his assent, but for his wonder, or his diversion.

Γυνή, ἀνδρὸς ἐλεημονεστέρον καὶ ἀριδακρυ μᾶλλον ἔτι δὲ φθονερωτέρον τε καὶ μεμψιμοιροτέρον, καὶ ΦΙΛΟΛΟΙΔΟΡΟΝ μᾶλλον, καὶ ΠΛΗΚΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ *. ἔτι δὲ καὶ δυσθυμὸν μᾶλλον — καὶ δυσελπί,

* Πληκτικώτερον (i. e.) ΤΒΡΙΣΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ, says Hesychius. I am afraid the word means what it says. Jul. Pollux gives it as one of the epithets of a boxer. We might translate it, with well-bred ambiguity—" more striking."

δυσελπί, και ΑΝΑΙΔΕΣΤΕΡΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΨΕΤΔΕΣ-
ΤΕΡΟΝ, εὐαπατήτοτερον τε, και μνημονικώτερον·
ἔτι δέ, ΑΓΡΥΠΙΝΟΤΕΡΟΝ ^β ΚΑΙ ὈΚΝΗΡΟ-
ΤΕΡΟΝ και ὅλως ἀκίνητοτερον—κ.τ.αλ.—[*De*
Hist. Animal. lib. ix. cap. 1.]

To make the reader amends for the pain which this cool and serious invective of the philosopher and the naturalist may have given him, I cannot resist the temptation of presenting him with a specimen of more sportive satire on this subject, in a very pleasant fragment, preserved by Athenæus, from a Comedy of Eubulus.

Ω Ζευ πολυτιμητ', εἰ κακῶς ἐγὼ ποτε
Ἔρω γυναικας, νη Δι' ἀπολοιμην ἄρα.—
Παντων ἀρισον κτηματων. εἰδ' ἐγενετο
Κακη γυνη Μηδεια, Πηνελοπεια δε
Μεγα πρᾶγμα.—ἔρει τις ὡς Κλυταιμηνεσρα κακη ;—
ΑλκΗΣΙΝ ἀντεθηκεα χρησην.—ἀλλ' ἰσως
Φαιδραν ἔρει κακῶς τις.—ἀλλὰ, νη Δια,
Χρηση τις ἦν μεντοι - - - τις ;—οἶμοι, δειλαι—
Ταχέως γε μ' αἱ ΧΡΗΣΤΑΙ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΕΣ ἐπελιπον.
Τωνδ' αὖ ΠΟΝΗΡΩΝ ἔτι λογεῖν πολλας ἔχω.

If ever against woman-kind I rail,
Great Jupiter confound me!—for of all
The good things of this world, *they* are the best.
Medea, you will say, was bad :—agreed ;
But, what a jewel was *Penelope* !

Urge

^β i. e.—“ more able to *keep late hours*, and, at the same
“ time, more *lax*, than men.”

Urge you the wicked *Clytemnestra*?—I,
Oppose the good *Alcestis*.—If you tell me
Of *Phædra*,—I remind you of the good,
—Stay, let me see—the good——Alas! how soon
My memory fails me there; while, of the *bad*,
Examples in abundance still occur. - - -

See Athen. p. 559, or the *Excerpta ex*
Trag. &c. of Grotius, p. 657.

NOTE 110.

P. 144. RESEMBLANCE - - - A DIFFERENT
THING, &c.

The words, *ὥστε εἰρηται*, are embarrassing; for the *difference* here spoken of had not been mentioned *before*, as the expression, in its most obvious sense, implies. The only meaning I can find is this. The two requisites, the *ἀρμοττον* and the *ὁμοιον*, *propriety*, and *resemblance*, might easily be confounded; the *ὁμοιον* being indeed only the *ἀρμοττον* in another point of view. The violence and fierceness of Medea, for example, which form her *historical* or *traditional* character, and, therefore, the *likeness* of the Poet's picture, may be said to be *ἀρμοττοντα*, *proper* or *suitable*, with respect to the individual, though *ἀκρινη καὶ μὴ ἀρμοττοντα*, *improper* and *unsuitable*, to the *general* character of the sex.—And thus Piccolomini:—"la terza condizione che assegna Aristotele à i costumi, la qual consiste in esser *simile*, non differisce della
" seconda,

“ seconda, posta nell’ esser *convencooli*, in altro,
 “ se non che la conditione del convenevole ri-
 “ guarda *l’universale*; com’ à dire, che quel
 “ costume *convenga* ad un principe, quello ad un
 “ suddito, quello à l’uomo, &c.—senza considerar
 “ questa particolar persona, ò quella: e la con-
 “ ditione del *simile* riguarda il *particolare*; come
 “ à dire, qual costume *convenga* di porre in uno
 “ che habbia da rappresentar’ *Achille*; qual in
 “ quello che habbia da representare *Oreste*,” &c.
 (p. 220.)

Indeed, Aristotle would hardly have thought of admonishing the reader not to confound the two things, had he not seen that they were *liable* to be confounded. He would not have remarked, that they were *different*, had they been perfectly, and obviously, *distinct*. I think then, that the words, ὡςπερ εἶρηται, must refer only to the ἀρετῶν, and the meaning must be, that, to make the manners *like*, is a different thing *not only* from making them *good*, but even from making them *proper*, in *such a way as had been said*—in *that* sense, in which the word ἀρετῶν had just been used, and explained by his instance. But if we understand the passage thus, there should be no stop after ποιεῖν^a.

But,

^a By Piccolomini’s version, (for he says nothing about this difficulty in his commentary,) it appears that he understood

But, why does Aristotle mention *at all*, a difference so very obvious as that between *resemblance*, and *goodness*, of manners?—These two requisites could not easily be confounded, any more than *likeness* and *beauty* in a portrait. There was more danger of a reader's thinking the *ὁμοιον* too different from the *χρησιν*, and, as a *general* precept, incompatible with it. And so indeed he seems to have apprehended himself, by what he presently after says^b about the *μιμησις βελτιονων*, and his rule, that the Poet, in imitation of the painter, should exhibit his characters as much *better* than they were, or are supposed to have been, as is consistent with the preservation of the *likeness*.

NOTE 111.

P. 144. THOUGH THE MODEL OF THE POET'S IMITATION BE SOME PERSON OF UNUNIFORM MANNERS, STILL THAT PERSON MUST BE REPRESENTED AS UNIFORMLY UNUNIFORM.

Τεταρτον δε, το ὁμαλον· κ'αν γαρ ἀνωμαλῶς τις ᾖ, ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρίχων καὶ τοῖστον ἢ ὅτι ὑποτίθας, ὁμοῦς ὁμαλῶς ἀνωμαλον δεῖ εἶναι. - - - "which last words," says an eminent writer, "having been not at all
" understood,

understood the passage as I do: "—essendo così fatta
" conditione diversa dall' esser' i costumi formati buoni,
" e ancora convenevoli nel modo che già si è detto."

^b At the end of this Sect. of the translation; and of cap. xv. of the original.

“ understood, have kept his interpreters from
 “ seeing the true sense and scope of the precept.
 “ For they have been explained of such characters
 “ as that of *Tigellius* in Horace; which, how-
 “ ever proper for satyr, or for farcical Comedy,
 “ are of too fantastic and whimsical a nature to
 “ be admitted into Tragedy; of which Aristotle
 “ must there be chiefly understood to speak, and
 “ to which Horace, in this place, alone confines
 “ himself. ’Tis true, indeed, it may be said,
 “ that ‘ though a *whimsical* or *fantastic* character
 “ be improper for Tragedy, an *irresolute* one is
 “ not. Nothing is finer than a struggle between
 “ different passions; and it is perfectly natural,
 “ that in such a circumstance, each should prevail
 “ by turns.’—But then there is the widest differ-
 “ ence between the two cases. *Tigellius*, with
 “ all his fantastic irresolution, is as *uniform* a
 “ character, as that of *Mitio*. If the expression
 “ may be allowed, its very *inconsistency* is of the
 “ essence of its *uniformity*. On the other hand,
 “ *Electra*, torn with sundry conflicting passions,
 “ is most apparently, and in the properest notion
 “ of the word, *ununiform*. One of the strongest
 “ touches in her character is that of a high, heroic
 “ spirit, sensible to her own, and her family’s
 “ injuries, and determined, at any rate, to revenge
 “ them. Yet no sooner is this revenge perpe-
 “ trated, than she softens, relents, and pities.
 “ Here is a manifest *ununiformity*, which can, in

“ no proper sense of the expression, lay claim to
 “ the critic’s ὁμαλον, but may be so managed, by
 “ the Poet’s skill, as to become consistent with
 “ the basis or foundation of her character, that
 “ is, to be ὁμαλως ἀνωμαλον. And that this, in
 “ fact, was the meaning of the critic, is plain
 “ from the similar example to his own rule, given
 “ in the case of *Iphigenia*: which he specifies
 “ (how justly, will be considered hereafter) as an
 “ instance of the ἀνωμαλε, *irregular*, or *ununi-*
 “ *form*, character, ill-expressed, or made *incon-*
 “ *sistent*. So that the genuine sense of the
 “ precept is, ‘ Let the manners be uniform; or,
 “ if ununiform, yet consistently so, or uniformly
 “ ununiform:’ exactly copied, according to the
 “ reading here given, by Horace. Whereas in the
 “ other way, it stands thus: ‘ Let your characters
 “ be uniform, or unchanged; or, if you paint an
 “ ununiform character (such as Tigellius) let it be
 “ ununiform all the way; *i.e.* such an irregular
 “ character to the end of the play, as it was at
 “ the beginning; which is, in effect, to say, let it
 “ be *uniform*:’ which apparently destroys the
 “ latter part of the precept, and makes it an un-
 “ meaning tautology with the former *.”

I have given this passage entire, that the reader
 may have it fully in his power to judge, for him-
 self, whether I mistake or misrepresent the mean-
 ing

* Comment. on the Ep. to the Pisos, &c. *vol. i.*
p. 104, &c.

ing of any part of it. I should be sorry to be thought capable of a perfect confidence in my own opinion, however carefully and deliberately formed, when it is opposed by that of such a writer. But, after having repeatedly considered this comment, as it certainly deserves to be considered, with all the attention in my power, I am obliged to confess, that it does not satisfy me, and that the common interpretation still appears to me to stand its ground.—My reasons are these :

1. I cannot think, that *such* change, irresolution, and *temporary* inconsistency as arises from “ conflicting *passions*,” comes under the meaning of Aristotle’s ἩΘΟΣ ἀνωμαλόν.—ἩΘΟΣ, is the prevailing *disposition*, the habitual προαιρεσις, or settled *character*. “ Electra,” it is said, “ torn with “ sundry conflicting *passions*, is most apparently, “ and in the *properest* sense of the word, *ununiform* “ form.” Not so, I think, in Aristotle’s sense of the word ἀνωμαλόν, as expressly applied by him here to ἦθος, or *manners*. The irregularities of *conduct*, or of sentiment and speech, arising from *passion*, seem to be a distinct thing from such as imply a change of the fixed, prevailing ἦθος, or characteristic *manners* of the person. When such *passionate ununiformity* as that above described in Electra, is so managed by the Poet’s skill, “ as “ to become consistent with the basis or foundation of her character,” that character is not, then, I think, as the ingenious critic considers it to

to be, ὁμαλως ἀνωμαλον, i.e. (as it is expressed in the beginning of the following note, p. 127.) “an ununiform *character* justly sustained, or, uniformly ununiform:” it is not, if I understand Aristotle rightly, ἀνωμαλον *at all*, in *his* sense; for he speaks only of anomalous *manners*; and anomalous *manners*, plainly, cannot be made “consistent with the basis or foundation of a character,” in any other sense, than as that very anomaly itself *constitutes* the character. And this I take to be Aristotle’s meaning: for he is speaking of that anomaly, in which different *characters*, not, in which “different *passions*, prevail by turns.”

2. The very expression,—ἐὰν γὰρ ΑΝΩΜΑΛΟΣ ΤΙΣ ἢ ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρεχων, καὶ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ ΗΘΟΣ ὑποτιθῆις, seems plainly to indicate an ununiform *character*, such as he explains by the ὁμαλως ἀνωμαλον that follows.—ἀνωμαλὸς ΤΙΣ—an *anomalous PERSON*: i.e. a person of inconsistent *manners*; or *character*. This expression seems hardly applicable, without violence, to such casual and merely *apparent* inconsistency, as arises from conflicting passions, and is reconcilable with “the basis or foundation of a character.”

3. “The genuine sense of the precept,” we are told, “is, Let the manners be uniform; or, if “ununiform, yet *consistently* so, or *uniformly* “ununiform.” But, *consistently*, and *uniformly*, seem to present different ideas. Aristotle’s word,

ὁμαλως, presents only the latter of these:—*uniformly*—that is, more literally, *equally**, *evenly*, &c. it does not, I think, answer at all to *consistently*, in the sense in which it is evidently applied, in this explanation, to what is *not incongruous*—*not unaccountable*, &c.^b. Had this, therefore, been Aristotle's meaning, he would, probably, have used, either εἰκως, or εὐλογως, or some other such word appropriated to that meaning; not ὁμαλως, which is never, as far as I know, used in the sense of *consistently*.

4. But it is objected, that if we take ὁμαλως ἀνωμαλως to mean "*uniform all the way*, i.e. such "an irregular character to the end of the play, "as it was at the beginning," this, "is, in effect "to say, let it be uniform; which apparently "destroys the latter part of the precept, and "makes it an unmeaning tautology with the "former."—The first part of the precept, I think, is, Let the manners be uniform; or, as we say, *of a piece*. Now to this an objector might say,—

* In Horace's character of *Tigellius*, lib. i. sat. 3. "Nil "ÆQUALE," is, ἰσὺν ὈΜΑΛΟΝ. And so, "Vixit IN- "ÆQUALIS"—ἀνωμαλῶς, in sat. 7. lib. ii. of PRISCUS, another character of the same stamp, "VERTUMNIS, "quotique sunt, natus iniquis." v. 14.

^b Thus, in the next note—"All these considerations "put together, Electra might assist at the assassination "of her mother, *consistently* with the strongest feelings "of piety and affection." Notes on the Ep. to the Pisos, p. 112.

say,—“ This cannot be an indispensable rule ;
 “ *uniformity* cannot be essentially requisite to the
 “ manners : for, what, if the Poet should take
 “ for the subject of his imitation a person whose
 “ manners are *not* uniform ? ”—The answer, or
 “ second part of the precept,” is,—“ then, that
 “ want of uniformity must be such as constitutes
 “ the very *character* itself ; for this falls within
 “ the rule ; the ‘ very inconsistency ’ of the cha-
 “ racter (to use the ingenious critic’s own words,)”
 “ being, in this case, ‘ of the essence of its uni-
 “ formity.’ ” I confess I do not here perceive any
 thing that can properly be called *tautology* ; for
 though the philosopher says, indeed, in the *second*
 part of the precept no more than he *meant* to say
 in the *first* ; yet he plainly apprehended it was
 more than he might be *understood* to say, and
 therefore he subjoined this necessary explanation.
 What he says is, in short, only this—“ Let the
 “ manners be uniform : an ununiform *character*
 “ is no exception to this rule.”

The

* Le Bossu observes, very well, in explaining this rule ;
 that whenever the Poet admits this inequality of manners,
 “ il doit bien faire remarquer aux auditeurs, que cette
 “ inégalité est un caractère qu’il donne exprès à un *person-*
 “ *nage*.” *Livre iv. ch. 7.* The following comparison is
 no unhappy illustration of Aristotle’s precept. “ Il arrive
 “ quelquefois qu’une même personne est *egale et inegale*
 “ (*ὁμοῖος ἀνισότητι*) en même tems. Parceque le carac-
 “ tere, qui dans la plus-part des hommes ressemble au
 “ soleil,

The *Tigellius* of Horace offered himself naturally enough, upon this occasion, to the commentators, as an illustration. We need not, however, suppose Aristotle to have thought of so very fantastic and comic a species of incoherence. Mutability and caprice are sometimes found in higher characters, where they are less ludicrous in their appearance, and, sometimes, very serious in their effects. And though, perhaps, *any* character of the kind may have too much of a comic cast to accord with *our* ideas of Tragic dignity, we have no reason to conclude, that it would have found the same difficulty of admittance upon the Greek stage, where the Tragic muse did, not unfrequently, condescend to be seen, “*Δακρυοειν γιλασασα.*”

I shall only add to this note the following passage from the commentary of Victorius, which appears to me to explain well, in few words, the meaning, and the spirit, of Aristotle's precept.

“*Studens ostendere quantopere hoc præceptum
“ custodiendum sit, affirmat, si quis fortè —
“ varius dissimilisque sibi inductus semel sit, eum,
“ talem in omni facto totius fabulæ servandum
“ esse, ut æquabilitas à Poetâ custodiatur in
“ naturâ illâ inæquabili ostendendâ: quod non
“ fieret, si aliquis levis, nec in eodum proposito
“ permanens,*

“*soleil, dont l'égalité consiste à paroître toujours le même,
“ en d'autres ressemble à la lune, dont l'égalité n'est qu'à
“ changer quatre fois de faces en un mois.*”—*Ib.* p. 450.

“ permanens, inductus, paulò postea firmus et
 “ obstinati animi fingeretur. Si morum igitur
 “ *inaequalitas* naturæque *inconstantia* constanter
 “ servanda est, *quanto magis natura indolesque*
 “ *stabilis, par sibi ac jugis ad extremum servari*
 “ *debet.*”

NOTE 112.

P. 144. WE HAVE AN EXAMPLE OF MANNERS UNNECESSARILY BAD, IN THE CHARACTER OF MENELAUS, &c.

Mr. Potter, in the introduction to his translation of the *Orestes*, says of this passage, that it “ may
 “ be considered as a mysterious oracular sentence,
 “ which wants an expounder.” I can only say, that I think the commentators would have reason to congratulate themselves, if no sentence of this mangled work wanted an expositor more than this. Whether we read *ἀναγκασιον*, or *ἀναγκασις*;—an *unnecessary example* of bad manners, or an example of *unnecessary badness* of manners; the sense seems evidently the same: and that Aristotle could not mean, what the excellent translator of Æschylus and Euripides seems to think he might mean—to “*excuse* the Poet upon the necessity”—sufficiently appears from another passage, at the end of the 25th chapter, [Transl. Part IV. Sect. 7.] where this character is again mentioned as an instance of vicious manners, *excused by no*

necessity—*μη ἀνάγκης ἔσσης*.—Mr. Potter complains of “the little light which the passage “derives from the connexion:” I think without reason. For as the other examples given are examples of the *violation* of his *other* precepts, relative to *propriety*, and *uniformity*, of manners, the connection plainly indicates *this* to be an example of the similar *violation* of his first rule—that the manners should be *good*. So far, then, seems to be clear. In what particular view Aristotle thought the badness of the character *not necessary*, may be, indeed, less clear. I should suppose him to mean, that the historical, or traditional, character of Menelaus, and the observance of the *ῥησιον*, by no means obliged Euripides to paint him in such colours. With respect to the plea, that it was necessary, because “the “drama could not,” *otherwise*, “have been “worked up to this terrible height of Tragic “distress,” Aristotle’s answer would, perhaps, have been similar to that which he makes upon another occasion:—*i. e.* the Poet should not, originally, have so constructed his plan, as to bring upon himself the necessity of committing so great a fault:—*ἰξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ εἰ δὲ συνίστασθαι τοιαύτης*. [sc. *μυθῆς*]. *cap.* xxiv.

NOTE 113.

P. 144-5. OF UNUNIFORM MANNERS, IN
THE IPHIGENIA AT AULIS, &c.

“ How does this appear, independently of the
“ name of this great critic? Iphigenia is drawn
“ indeed at first, fearful and suppliant: and
“ surely with the greatest observance of nature.
“ The account of her destination to the altar was
“ sudden, and without the least preparation: and,
“ as Lucretius well observes, in commenting her
“ case, *NUBENDI TEMPORE IN IPSO*; when
“ her thoughts were all employed, and, according
“ to the simplicity of those times, confessed to
“ be so, on her promised nuptials. The cause
“ of such destination too, as appeared at first,
“ was the private family interest of Menelaus.
“ All this justifies, or rather demands, the
“ strongest expression of female fear and weak-
“ ness. But she afterwards recants and volun-
“ tarily devotes herself to the altar. And this,
“ with the same strict attention to probability.
“ She had now informed herself of the impor-
“ tance of the case. Her devotement was the
“ demand of Apollo, and the joint petition of all
“ Greece. The glory of her country, the dignity
“ and interest of her family, the life of the gene-
“ rous Achilles, and her own future fame, were,
“ all, nearly concerned in it. All this considered,

“ together with the high, heroic sentiments of
 “ those times, and the superior merit, as was be-
 “ lieved, of voluntary devotement, Iphigenia’s
 “ character must have been very unfit for the
 “ distress of a whole Tragedy to turn upon, if she
 “ had not, in the end, discovered the readiest sub-
 “ mission to her appointment. But, to shew
 “ with what wonderful propriety the Poet knew
 “ to sustain his characters, we find her, after all,
 “ and notwithstanding the heroism of the change,
 “ in a strong and passionate apostrophe to her
 “ native Mycenæ, confessing some involuntary
 “ apprehensions and regrets, the remains of that
 “ instinctive abhorrence of death, which had
 “ before so strongly possessed her.

Εθρεψας, Ἑλλάδι μέγα φάος - - -
 Θανυσα δ’ ἐκ ἀναινομαι.

Once the bright star of Greece - - -

But I submit to die.

“ This, I take to be not only a full vindication of
 “ the consistency of Iphigenia’s character, but as
 “ delicate a stroke of nature as is, perhaps, to be
 “ found in any writer.” [*Commentary on the Ep.
 to the Pisos, &c. vol. i. p. 113, &c.*]

If all I knew of the Tragedy in question was
 from this ingenious defence, I should certainly
 acquit Euripides. I cannot acquit him, or can
 only partially acquit him, when I read the Tragedy
 itself. The fact perhaps is, that the question,
 whether

whether the critic's censure be just or not, cannot possibly be decided by any *general* statement of the case. That Iphigenia, so circumstanced as she is here, and very justly, described to be, *might* at first be timid and suppliant, and, at last, meet death with resolution, and this, without any inconsistency, or duplicity of character, will hardly be disputed. But the question is, whether Euripides *has* actually *so* drawn this timidity, and this resolution, as to preserve the unity of character. To determine this fairly, we must, at last, have recourse to the *detail* of the Poet's execution, and the actual *impression* which, on the whole, it leaves upon the reader's mind. All depends here upon *degree* and *manner*. A single *nuance* in the colouring, a slight depression or elevation of tone, in the suppliant, or the heroine, may be sufficient to determine the impression this way, or that. What this impression was upon Aristotle's mind, it may be observed that he has marked very precisely and clearly by the expression, 'ΟΤΑΕΝ ΖΟΙΚΕΝ 'Η 'ΙΚΕΤΕΤΟΤΕΑ ΤΗ: ΤΕΤΕΦΗ:—" *the supplicating Iphigenia is NOTHING LIKE the Iphigenia of the conclusion.*" The expression, I think, does not imply, that he thought the mere circumstance of her supplicating at first for life, and recanting afterwards, was, of itself, necessarily inconsistent, but, that the *manner* in which she supplicated was such, as to make her, in that part, appear to be a different *character*, another *person*,

person, from what she appears to be when she recants,

My own opinion I confess to be, that though the considerations suggested in this ingenious defence of Euripides may prove the censure of Aristotle to be too strongly, or, at least, too generally, expressed, yet they do not prove it to be without foundation. I say, *too generally*, because perhaps there is but one passage in the speech of the suppliant Iphigenia, to which the ΟΥΔΕΝ ΙΑΙΧΕΝ is fairly applicable, in its full force. Her speech, ΕΙ ΜΗ ΤΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ, &c. v. 1211, which, on the whole, is highly pathetic, ends with these unhappy lines ;

— — — — — μαινεται δ' ὅς ἐνχεται

ΘΑΝΕΙ· ΚΑΚΩΣ ΖΗΝ ΚΡΕΙΣΣΟΝ Η ΘΑ-
ΝΕΙΝ ΚΑΛΩΣ^a.

v. 1249.—

I leave it to the reader to determine, whether *any* intervening circumstances, that can be imagined, will make it at all conceivable, that the *same* Iphigenia, should, *in the short space of time taken up by the recital of, at most, only 35 lines of dialogue^b*,
experience

^a This is softened in Mr. Potter's version :

— — — — — “ of his senses is he reft,
“ Who hath a wish to die ; for life, though ill,
“ Excels whate'er there is of good in death.

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^b The reader of Euripides will observe, that Iphigenia continues the same strain of consternation and lamentation *after* the speech of her father in reply to her supplication ;

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experience such a total change of sentiments, as to express the most heroic resolution, and the utmost sensibility to the glory of dying for her country ; as to say,—

- - - - δίδωμι σῶμα τ' ἔμην Ἑλλάδι.

Θυετ', ἐκπορθεῖτε Τροίαν· ταῦτα γὰρ μνημεία μιν,
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Σφαγασιν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν

Ἀνσίη πατρός.

From the end of this monostrophic lamentation to her heroic speech v. 1638, there are, I think, but 35 lines.

“ - - - - “ For Greece I give my life.

“ Slay me, demolish Troy : for these shall be

“ Long time my monuments, my children these,

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- - - - - μαινεται δ' ὅς ἐστιν
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The account of the machinery of a Greek Theatre, in the chapter of Jul. Pollux above referred to, is curious, and amusing, as far as it is intelligible.

NOTE 116.

P. 146. OR THE RETURN OF THE GREEKS
IN THE ILIAD.

Εἰς τὴν ΤΗ ΙΛΙΑΔΙ τὰ περὶ τοῦ ἀποπλεῖν. It has been disputed, whether Aristotle here speaks of the Iliad of Homer, or of some Tragedy called *The Iliad*. See Dacier's note.—But, if we suppose the text to be right here, I see not how we can reasonably reject the first of these interpretations. Ἡ ΙΛΙΑΞ, as Beni has well observed, can only be, THE Iliad,—i. e. *Homer's Iliad*. Dacier supposes the Tragedy to have been called, “ *The Iliad, or, The return of the Greeks;*” and to be that mentioned by Longinus, Sect. 15, and attributed to Sophocles. But, even supposing a Tragedy to be meant, it seems very clear from Aristotle's expression, that the title must have been, Ἡ ΙΛΙΑΞ, only; for he says, ΕΝ Τῇ ΙΛΙΑΔΙ ΤΑ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ἀποπλεῖν—i. e. “ the circumstances, or incidents, “ *relative to the return of the Greeks, in* [the “ Tragedy of] *The Iliad.*”—So, cap. xxiv.—ἐν τῇ Οδυσσεύῃ—τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐκθεῖν.—Indeed, *The Iliad*,
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taken alone, seems an improbable title for a Tragedy; but Dacier's junction is still more improbable. He might as well have imagined a Tragedy with this title—*Η Οδυσσεια*, 'H, 'H ΕΚΘΕΣΙΣ.—As to the Tragedy of Sophocles mentioned by Longinus, it seems clearly to have been his *POLYXENA* ^a.

Supposing, then, the text not to be defective, we cannot, I think, avoid understanding Aristotle to speak of the *machinery*, (to use the word in his general sense,) in the second book of the *Iliad*, where Minerva descends to prevent the return of the Greeks ^b. It is true indeed, as has been objected, that an instance drawn from an *Epic Poem* is not what one would expect here, where the subject is *Tragedy*; and, that though there be, in this instance, a difficulty solved—a *knot cut*—yet *this λυσις*, is not, properly, *λυσις μυθου*, in that sense, in which Aristotle applies the term in cap. xviii ^c. to the *final* denouement of a Tragic fable.—We must therefore suppose him to have produced this, merely as an obvious and well known example of the *sort* of supernatural interposition, or machinery, that would be improper in the *λυσις* of a Tragedy. For, that he intended to censure the "*ministeria Deorum*," so necessary to the Epic Poem, and so frequent in the great model of all Epic Poems, cannot be imagined without absurdity, and is by no means necessarily implied, as Dacier seems to think, in this interpretation.

Such

^a See the note of Ruhnkenius in Toup's Longinus.

^b Il. B. 155, &c. ^c Transl. Part. II. Sect. 18.

Such appears to me to be the only meaning, and the best apology, which the passage will bear, taking for granted the integrity of the original. But of this, I confess, I doubt. M. Batteux translates—"la *petite* Iliade." But if we admit that sense, as Aristotle certainly would not have called *that* Poem *THE Iliad*, without distinction, we must necessarily suppose the text defective, and the word ΜΙΚΡΑ to be omitted^d; and it seems very probable that this was the case. The illustration, indeed, will still be drawn from an Epic Poem; but from one of an irregular and *historic* structure, consisting of a string of ill-united stories*, and which seems to have been considered as a sort of *seed-plot*, or *nursery*, of subjects for the use of the Tragic Poets: so that in referring to it, Aristotle may be understood to refer to such Tragedies as were founded on it; of which he enumerates himself no fewer than *eight*, and one of these was called ΑΠΟΠΛΟΥΣ; taken, I suppose, like the *Polyxena* of Sophocles mentioned by Longinus, from that part of the *Little Iliad*, which related the detention of the Greeks in the Thracian Chersonese, and the appearance of the ghost of Achilles demanding the sacrifice of Polyxena. See the *Hecuba* of Euripides, v. 35, &c. and 104, &c.—
and

^d — τῇ ΜΙΚΡῃ Ἰλιάδι—and, in τῆς ΜΙΚΡᾶς Ἰλιάδος. cap. xxiii.

* See Aristotle's account of it, cap. xxiii. Transl. Part III. Sect. 1.

“ together with the high, heroic sentiments of
 “ those times, and the superior merit, as was be-
 “ lieved, of voluntary devotement, Iphigenia’s
 “ character must have been very unfit for the
 “ distress of a whole Tragedy to turn upon, if she
 “ had not, in the end, discovered the readiest sub-
 “ mission to her appointment. But, to shew
 “ with what wonderful propriety the Poet knew
 “ to sustain his characters, we find her, after all,
 “ and notwithstanding the heroism of the change,
 “ in a strong and passionate apostrophe to her
 “ native Mycenæ, confessing some involuntary
 “ apprehensions and regrets, the remains of that
 “ instinctive abhorrence of death, which had
 “ before so strongly possessed her.

Εθρεψας Ἑλλάδι μέγα φάος - - -
 Θανῆσα δ’ ἐκ ἀναινομαι.

Once the bright star of Greece - - -

But I submit to die.

“ This, I take to be not only a full vindication of
 “ the consistency of Iphigenia’s character, but as
 “ delicate a stroke of nature as is, perhaps, to be
 “ found in any writer.” [*Commentary on the Ep.
 to the Pisos*, &c. vol. i. p. 113, &c.]

If all I knew of the Tragedy in question was
 from this ingenious defence, I should certainly
 acquit Euripides. I cannot acquit him, or can
 only partially acquit him, when I read the Tragedy
 itself. The fact perhaps is, that the question,
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whether the critic's censure be just or not, cannot possibly be decided by any *general* statement of the case. That Iphigenia, so circumstanced as she is here, and very justly, described to be, *might* at first be timid and suppliant, and, at last, meet death with resolution, and this, without any inconsistency, or duplicity of character, will hardly be disputed. But the question is, whether Euripides *has* actually *so* drawn this timidity, and this resolution, as to preserve the unity of character. To determine this fairly, we must, at last, have recourse to the *detail* of the Poet's execution, and the actual *impression* which, on the whole, it leaves upon the reader's mind. All depends here upon *degree* and *manner*. A single *nuance* in the colouring, a slight depression or elevation of tone, in the suppliant, or the heroine, may be sufficient to determine the impression this way, or that. What this impression was upon Aristotle's mind, it may be observed that he has marked very precisely and clearly by the expression, 'ΟΤΑΕΝ ΕΟΙΚΕΝ 'Η 'ΙΚΕΤΕΤΟΥΣΑ ΤΗ ΤΕΤΕΡΗ:—" *the supplicating Iphigenia is NOTHING LIKE the Iphigenia of the conclusion.*" The expression, I think, does not imply, that he thought the mere circumstance of her supplicating at first for life, and recanting afterwards, was, of itself, necessarily inconsistent, but, that the *manner* in which she supplicated was such, as to make her, in that part, appear to be a different *character*, another *person*,

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- - - τα δ' ΑΔΤΝΑΘ' ἡμιν καρτερειν εἰ ῥαδιον.

Αλλα και σε τυθ' ὄραν χρη, μη διαβληθης στρατη,
ΚΑΙ ΠΛΕΟΝ ΠΡΑΞΩΜΕΝ ΟΥΔΕΝ. - - -

ΑΛΛ' ΑΜΗΧΑΝΟΝ· — δίδωμι σωμα τ' ἑμον
Ελλαδι, &c.

v. 1372.

The

The learned Mr. Markland, in his excellent edition of the two *Iphigenias*, defends Euripides upon very different ground. He admits the inconsistency, not only in the character of Iphigenia, but in all the characters of the play, except Clytemnestra; and even in the chorus. But all this he supposes to have been *intended* by the Poet, as a moral lesson—a striking picture of the “*levity and inconstancy of the human mind.*” And he wonders, which I cannot say I do, that this should have escaped the ἀγχιονία of Aristotle⁴.

NOTE 114.

P. 145-6. HENCE IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE DEVELOPMENT ALSO, &c. - - -

Heinsius pronounces this whole passage, to the words, ἐν τῇ Οιδ. τῇ Σοφ.—inclusively, to be certainly out of its proper place⁵. And I should be of his opinion, if such digressive and parenthetical insertions were not very usual with Aristotle. The expression, however, should be observed:—φανερὸν ἐν ὅτι ΚΑΙ τὰς λυσίς, &c. that “the development *also*,” &c. *i. e.* as well as the *other* incidents of the fable, just mentioned. Most of the versions neglect the word καί, which is important, and greatly helps the connection. This digression, however, though not unrelated, is but slightly and obliquely related, to his present subject; and seems introduced

⁴ P. 190. Note on v. 1375.

⁵ *De. Trag. cap. xii.*

introduced rather ἀπο μηχανῆς, and in violation of his own rule—ταυτο μετα ταυτο ἡ ἀναγκαιον ἡ εἰς. It interrupts the connection, and obscures the purport, of the chapter; and though we allow it to be where the author placed it, we may fairly question, whether he has placed it where it *should* be.

NOTE 115.

P. 146. MACHINERY.

Απο μηχανῆς.—It appears from Jul. Poll. lib. iv. cap. 19. that the term, μηχανῆ, was not applied indiscriminately to the machinery of the play-house in *general*, but was appropriated to that particular machine, in which Gods and Heroes made their appearance in the air. Μηχανῆ δὲ, θεοὶ δεικνύσι καὶ ἥρωες τὰς ἐν αἰθέρι.—I hope it was something better than the Μηχανῆ of the French opera, so pleasantly described by Rousseau:—

“ Les chars des Dieux et des Déeses sont
 “ composés de quatre solives encadrées et sus-
 “ pendues à une grosse corde en forme d’escarpó-
 “ lette; entre ces solives est une planche en
 “ travers, sur laquelle le Dieu s’asseye, et sur le
 “ devant pend un morceau de grosse toile bar-
 “ bouillée, qui sert de nuage à ce magnifique char.
 “ On voit vers le bas de la machine l’illumination
 “ de deux ou trois chandelles puantes et mal
 “ mouchées, qui, tandis que le personnage se
 “ démène et crie en branlant dans son escar-
 “ polette,

“ polette, l'enfument tout à son aise. Encens
“ digne de la divinité.”

The account of the machinery of a Greek Theatre, in the chapter of Jul. Pollux above referred to, is curious, and amusing, as far as it is intelligible.

NOTE 116.

P. 146. OR THE RETURN OF THE GREEKS
IN THE ILIAD.

Και ἐν τῇ ΙΛΙΑΔΙ τὰ περὶ τὸν ἀπώτατον. It has been disputed, whether Aristotle here speaks of the Iliad of Homer, or of some Tragedy called *The Iliad*. See Dacier's note.—But, if we suppose the text to be right here, I see not how we can reasonably reject the first of these interpretations. Ἡ ΙΛΙΑΣ, as Beni has well observed, can only be, THE Iliad,—i. e. *Homer's Iliad*. Dacier supposes the Tragedy to have been called, “ *The Iliad, or, The return of the Greeks*,” and to be that mentioned by Longinus, Sect. 15, and attributed to Sophocles. But, even supposing a Tragedy to be meant, it seems very clear from Aristotle's expression, that the title must have been, Ἡ ΔΙΩΣ, only; for he says, ΕΝ Τῇ ΙΛΙΑΔΙ ΤΑ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ἀπώτατου—i. e. “ the circumstances, or incidents, “ *relative to the return of the Greeks, in* [the “ Tragedy of] *The Iliad*.”—So, cap. xxiv.—ἐν τῇ Οδυσσεύῃ—τὰ περὶ τὸ ἐλθεῖν.—Indeed, *The Iliad*,
taken

taken alone, seems an improbable title for a Tragedy; but Dacier's junction is still more improbable. He might as well have imagined a Tragedy with this title—*Η Οδυσσεΐα*, 'Η, 'Η ΕΚΘΕΣΙΣ.—As to the Tragedy of Sophocles mentioned by Longinus, it seems clearly to have been his *POLYXENA* ^a.

Supposing, then, the text not to be defective, we cannot, I think, avoid understanding Aristotle to speak of the *machinery*, (to use the word in his general sense,) in the second book of the *Iliad*, where Minerva descends to prevent the return of the Greeks ^b. It is true indeed, as has been objected, that an instance drawn from an *Epic Poem* is not what one would expect here, where the subject is *Tragedy*; and, that though there be, in this instance, a difficulty solved—a *knot cut*—yet *this λυσις*, is not, properly, *λυσις μυθς*, in that sense, in which Aristotle applies the term in cap. xviii ^c. to the *final* denouement of a Tragic fable.—We must therefore suppose him to have produced this, merely as an obvious and well known example of the *sort* of supernatural interposition, or machinery, that would be improper in the *λυσις* of a Tragedy. For, that he intended to censure the "*ministeria Deorum*," so necessary to the Epic Poem, and so frequent in the great model of all Epic Poems, cannot be imagined without absurdity, and is by no means necessarily implied, as Dacier seems to think, in this interpretation.

Such

^a. See the note of Ruhnkenius in Toup's Longinus.

^b Il. B. 155, &c. ^c Transl. Part. II. Sect. 18.

Such appears to me to be the only meaning, and the best apology, which the passage will bear, taking for granted the integrity of the original. But of this, I confess, I doubt. M. Batteux translates—"la *petite Iliade*." But if we admit that sense, as Aristotle certainly would not have called *that* Poem *THE Iliad*, without distinction, we must necessarily suppose the text defective, and the word ΜΙΚΡΑ to be omitted^d; and it seems very probable that this was the case. The illustration, indeed, will still be drawn from an Epic Poem; but from one of an irregular and *historic* structure, consisting of a string of ill-united stories^e, and which seems to have been considered as a sort of *seed-plot*, or *nursery*, of subjects for the use of the Tragic Poets: so that in referring to it, Aristotle may be understood to refer to such Tragedies as were founded on it; of which he enumerates himself no fewer than *eight*, and one of these was called ΑΠΟΠΛΑΟΥΣ; taken, I suppose, like the *Polyxena* of Sophocles mentioned by Longinus, from that part of the *Little Iliad*, which related the detention of the Greeks in the Thracian Chersonese, and the appearance of the ghost of Achilles demanding the sacrifice of Polyxena. See the *Hecuba* of Euripides, v. 35, &c. and 104, &c.—

and

^d — τὴν ΜΙΚΡΑΝ Ἰλιάδα—and, ἐν τῇ ΜΙΚΡᾷ Ἰλιάδι.—
cap. xxiii.

^e See Aristotle's account of it, cap. xxiii. Transl. Part III. Sect. 1.

and the fine description of the sacrifice, v. 519, &c.
—In Mr. Potter's translation, v. 36—102—501.

NOTE 117.

P. 147. OR OF INDOLENT ---.

Ραθυμῶς:—indolent—*nonchalant*. *Hesychius* explains Ραθυμῶς, —'Ο ΜΗ ΠΟΝΗΤΙΚΟΣ ἀλλ' ΕΚΑΤΤΟΣ. It is improperly rendered, "*timide*," by M. Batteux, and "*mansueto*" by the Italian translators.

NOTE 118.

P. 147. SHOULD DRAW AN EXAMPLE APPROACHING RATHER TO A GOOD, THAN TO A HARD AND FEROCIOUS, CHARACTER.

The original is—'Οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν, μιμημένον καὶ ὀργίλῳ καὶ ῥαθυμῳ, καὶ τ' ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἡθῶν, ἐπιεικείας ποιεῖν παραδειγμάτων ἢ σκληροτητῶν δεῖ: οἷον τοῦ Ἀχιλλεῖα Ἀγαθὸν καὶ Ὀμήρου.— A passage that has much perplexed and divided the commentators. Of all the explanations which this perplexity has produced, that of Dacier is the most improbable and ill founded. He forces ῥαθυμῶς into the sense of, *emporté*, *furieux*, and makes it "*encherir sur ὀργίλῳ*." *Επιεικεία*, he wrenches from the obvious and proper sense in which it is continually used by Aristotle, into that of *probability*. And the result of this violent operation upon the passage, is the following strange

version :—" Il faut tout de même, qu'un Poete
 " qui veut imiter un homme colere *et emporté*, ou
 " quelqu' autre caractere semblable, se remette
 " bien plus devant les yeux *ce que la colere doit*
 " *faire vraisemblablement* (i. e. *πιστικείας*) *que ce*
 " *qu'elle a fait* (i. e. *ἡ σκληροτης*!) et c'est
 " ainsi," &c. I may venture to leave all this to
 the learned reader's rejection, without any farther
 comment. I shall only just observe, that the ex-
 pression, *KAI ὅγ. KAI ῥαθ.* evidently marks dif-
 ferent characters; not, as Dacier makes it, different
 degrees only of the *same* character.

Heinsius first suggested, that the phrase *πισ-
 τικείας ἡ σκληροτης*, was elliptical, and *μαλλον* to be
 understood. But in spite of the "*Attica venustas*,"
 I am much more inclined to suspect an *omission*
 of the word. Aristotle would hardly have used a
 mode of expression so unavoidably ambiguous—
 or rather, that would, almost unavoidably, lead to
 a *wrong* sense; for, the fact is, that *all* the com-
 mentators, before Heinsius, understood the *ἡ*, as
 indeed every reader, I believe, would at first na-
 turally understand it, in the disjunctive sense
 of, *or*. Besides this, I doubt whether any example
 of this elliptic phrase occurs in Aristotle's works.
 That it *may*, I will not take upon me to deny;
 but it seems, at least, very unusual. An instance
 of it I have not found; but the reader may find
 many instances of the full phrase, *μαλλον ἢ*, even in

this treatise^a. However, one, or the other, of these suppositions, it seems necessary to adopt. The passage will then, without forcing the words *ἐπιεικεία* and *σκληρότης* from their usual and proper signification, afford a clear and consistent meaning. *Ἐπιεικεία* is used, I think, here, as it is in cap. xiii. in the general sense of *good*^b. *Σκληρότης* plainly relates only to his first instance, of the *ἐργιλ*⊙, the *angry* character, of which it seems to express the extreme degree. In the *Ethics ad Nicom.* we have—*ΑΓΡΙΟΙ* και *ΣΚΛΗΡΟΙ*, as synonymous, or very nearly so^c. A passage of Plato may serve to illustrate and confirm this sense of the word. Speaking of the *θυμοειδής*, or *irascible* nature, he says, it may produce the *ἀγριον*:—και ὁρῶντες μὲν τραπεζῶν, ἀνδρείων αὖ εἰη· ΜΑΛΛΟΝ Δ' ΕΠΙΤΑΘΕΝ ΤΟΥΤ' ΔΕΟΝΤΟΣ, ΣΚΛΗΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ. τε και χαλίστου γίγνεται' αὖ, ὡς το εἰκ⊙.—And just before—*ΑΓΡΙΟΤΗΤΟΣ* τε και *ΣΚΛΗΡΟΤΗΤΟΣ*, και αὖ *μαλακίας* τε και ἡμεροτήτ⊙^d.

The

^a Cap. i. *φυσιολογον* ΜΑΛΛΟΝ Η *παιτην*.—cap. ix. ΜΑΛΛΟΝ *των μυθων* - - - Η *των μετρων*.—cap. xxiv. *προαυρεισθαι τε ἀδυνάτα και εἰκότα*, ΜΑΛΛΟΝ Η *δυνατα και ἀπίθανα*.

^b So, in the *Rhet.* lib. i. cap. 5. *ἐπιεικὴς* is plainly used as synonymous with *χρησ*⊙. For, defining the word *χρησφιῶνα*, he says—ὃ δὲ και *ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΙΣ* ἀνδρες, [sc. *φιλα εἰσι*] *ΧΡΗΣΤΟΦΙΛΟΣ*.

^c Lib. iv. cap. 8. *ed. Wilk.*

^d De *Repub.* lib. iii. *ed. Mass.* p. 228.

The sense of the passage, then, will be, that, in order to reconcile the *first* precept, of the *χρησιν*, with the *third*, of the *ὁμοιον*, the character should be brought as *near* to a *good* one, as is consistent with the circumstance of *likeness*. Thus, if such a character as that of Achilles is to be drawn, its striking features are to be preserved, but, at the same time, to be rather improved and softened, than exaggerated. For the expression must be observed. Aristotle does not say absolutely, according to the sense of Heinsius, that Achilles *ought* to be drawn, or *was* drawn, *παρδειγμα, ἐπιεικειας*, but *rather* so than otherwise;—ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ἢ σκληροτητι.—"Loin de charger encore " le defect, *il le rapprochera de la vertu*;" as M. Batteux has very well expressed the *spirit* of the rule, though he has generalized it, and made it refer to *all* that precedes — *καὶ ὀργίλους, καὶ ῥαθυμούς, &c.*—whereas it appears plainly, from what has been said of the force of *σκληροτης*, that the words, *ἐπιεικειας ποιεῖν παρδ. ἢ σκληρ.* can be applied only to the *ὀργιλοί*; for as to the *ῥαθυμοί*, such a character may, indeed, be flattered into the *ἐπιεικης*, but cannot well, by any distortion, be made to appear *σκληρ.*

Still, however, what every one, I believe, naturally expects at the first reading of this passage, as it *now* stands, is, that after having mentioned *two* instances of *faulty* characters, the *ὀργιλοί*, and the *ῥαθυμοί*, Aristotle should mention *two* corres-

ponding instances of *good* qualities *bordering* upon, or connected with, each, and of which the Poet might avail himself, to give to each a favourable turn. But, instead of this, we have a *good*, and a *bad* quality, (ἐπιεικεία, and σκληρότης,) both of which, as we have seen, can be made to relate only to his *first* instance, the ἔργον; so that all the rest, between the words ἔργον, and ἐπιεικείας, must be parenthetical. The harshness and embarrassment of such a construction, led me formerly to suspect an error in one of the words, ἐπιεικείας, or σκληρότης; and a conjecture was suggested to me by a passage in the *Rhetoric*, which, I hope, will at least be thought plausible enough to excuse my laying it before the reader. The suspicion seemed to fall upon σκληρότης; for the ἐπιεικεία would answer well enough as a softening, or improvement, of ῥαθυμία; as an indolent man, who concerns himself about nothing, and cares only for his own ease, is often spoken of as a *quiet, good kind of* man. Instead of σκληρότης, then, I thought it not improbable, that Aristotle might have written ἀπλοτης. The passage of Aristotle himself which suggested this to me, is in the first book of his *Rhetoric*, cap. ix. where, delivering the usual precepts relative to the art of encomiastic misrepresentation, he says, — Ληπτέον δὲ — — — ἑκάστον, ἐκ τῶν παρακωλυθέντων αἰεὶ, κατὰ τὸ BEATISTON· οἶον, ΤΟΝ ὈΡΓΙΣΤΗΝ καὶ τὸν μανικόν, ἈΠΛΟΤΗΝ· καὶ τὸν αὐθάδη, μεγαλοπρεπή καὶ σεμνόν· κ. τ. ἀλλ.

The

The whole passage is much to the purpose of this place; and is, plainly, not more applicable to the Rhetorician, with respect to the hero of his oration, than it is to the Poet, with respect to the hero of his poem. A passage of Euripides will add, perhaps, some probability to this conjecture. In the *Iphigenia at Aulis*, Achilles thus draws his own character :

Εγω δ' ἐν ἀνδρῶν εὖσεβεσάτῃ τραφείς,
Χειρῶν, ἐμαθὼν τῆς τροπῆς ἈΠΛΟΥΣ ἔχειν.
Καὶ τοῖς Ἀτρεΐδαις, ἣν μὲν ἠγωνταὶ καλῶς,
Πείσομεθ'. ὅταν δὲ μὴ καλῶς, ἔπεισομεθ'.

v. 926.

Where the meaning of τροπῆς ἀπλῆς, is very well fixed by the two subsequent lines, and by the expression, ἐλευθερὰν φύσιν, in the verse that follows them.

Plato, also, in the *Hippias*, talks much of the simplicity, truth, and sincerity, of Achilles; as if, in his view; they were the prominent features of what was good in the Homeric character of that hero. When Socrates asks Hippias, whether Achilles is not represented by Homer as an artful, designing character, Hippias answers—*Ἡκιστα γε, ὦ Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' ἈΠΛΟΥΣΤΑΤΟΣ*. And, again, ὥς ὁ μὲν Ἀχιλλεύς εἰν ἀληθὴς τε καὶ ἈΠΛΟΥΣ· ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεύς πολυτροπὸς τε καὶ ψευδής*. And the following lines are there quoted, in which Homer has made

Achilles

* Tom. i. p. 364, *ed. Serv.*

Achilles strongly mark this feature of his own character :

Διογενὲς Λαερτιάδῃ, πόλυμῃχαν' Ὀδυσσευ,
 Κρῆ μὲν δὴ τὸν μῦθον ἀπηλεγέως ἀποειπείν,
 'Ἢ περ δὴ φρονέω τε, καὶ ὡς τετελεσμένον ἔσσαι·
 Ἐχθρὸς γὰρ μοι κείνῳ ὁμῶς αἰῶαο πύλῃσιν,
 'Ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κευθεὶ ἐνὶ φρεσὶν, ἄλλο δὲ βαίνει.
 Il. ix. 308.

The sense, then, of the passage before us, according to this conjecture, would be this:—If the Poet chuse for the subject of his imitation a *passionate*, or an *indolent* man, he should give to the former the cast of plain sincerity, and honest frankness; and to the other, (the *ῥαθυμ*) that of moderation, gentleness, good-nature, and what the French, by an expressive word which our language wants, term, *bonhomme*.—But I dwell too long upon a mere conjecture. The evident propriety of the word *σκληροτης*, as applicable to the *unsoftened* and *unflattered* character of Achilles, may justly, perhaps, protect it from suspicion; though, on the other hand, the passages I have adduced, added to the improbability of the *ellipse* supposed by Heinsius, the embarrassment of the parenthesis, and the advantage of leaving the † to its most obvious, *disjunctive*, sense, prevent me from a total rejection of this idea.

The word *παράδειγμα*, here, is taken by most of the commentators to mean a *perfect ideal model*—

“ *summum*

† *Επιεικής*—ΠΡΑΟΣ, ΜΕΤΡΙΟΣ.—*Suidas*.

‡ Robortelli, Victorius, Piccol. Beni, Goulston.

“ *summu* exemplar.” For this I see no reason. I take it to be used here, as it is generally, I believe, if not always, used by Aristotle, merely for *an example*. Of this the reader may easily satisfy himself by consulting the useful index to Mr. Winstanley’s edition.

NOTE 119.

P. 147. AS ACHILLES IS DRAWN, BY AGATHO, AND BY HOMER.

PLATO, in the *third* book of his *Republic*, gives a very different view of the Homeric Achilles. He makes him a mere compound of extreme *pride* and extreme *meanness*: ὥςτε ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ νοσηματα δύο ἰναντιῳ ἀλλήλοιον, ἀνελαιθυρίαν μετὰ φιλοχρηματίας, καὶ αὐτὴν ὑπερηφανίαν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων*. To which we may add, as a companion, Dr. Jortin’s portrait of Achilles: “A *boisterous*, “*rapacious*, *mercenary*, *cruel*, and *unrelenting* “*brute*; and the reader pities none of his calamities, and is pleased with none of his successes^b!” This is far enough from the παράδειγμα ἰπικίας. But for a juster account of this matter, and for the best illustration of this passage of Aristotle that can be given, I refer the reader

* “So that he united in himself two vices the most opposite to each other; avaricious meanness on the one hand, and, on the other, an insolent contempt both of Gods and men.”—P. 174. *ed. Massey*.

^b Six Dissertations, p. 214.

reader to Dr. Beattie's analysis of the character of this hero, as drawn by Homer; Essay on Poetry, &c. Part I. ch. iv.

NOTE 120.

P. 147. AND BESIDE THESE, WHATEVER RELATES TO THOSE SENSES WHICH HAVE A NECESSARY CONNECTION WITH POETRY.

Here are two readings: *τας παρα τα εξ αναγκης ακολουθουσας αισθησεις τη ποιητικη*: and, *τα παρα τας εξ αναγκης*, &c. but in both; the object, and general sense of the passage, seem to be the same, though in both, the expression, it must be confessed, is sufficiently embarrassed and obscure. I have preferred the latter, (which is that of Victorius,) as being, on the whole, the clearest*.

The *senses* that *belong* to, *accompany*, or are *connected with*, Poetry, are, plainly, the *sight*, and the *hearing*, as relative to the *Οψις*, or *spectacle*, in the whole extent of that term, and to the *Μελοδοϊα* or *Music*. When these are said to be *εξ αναγκης ακολουθουσαι τη ποιητικη*, it cannot be meant that the parts relative to them are *essential* to the Tragic Poem, like the *fable*, *manners*, &c. but only, that they are necessary appendages of the drama *in its complete state*, as designed for *representation*.

* In the treatise *Περ αισθησεως*, the same expression occurs: — *η μιν αφη και γευσις ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙ παντων ΕΞ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ*. “Tactus et gustus animalia omnia necessariò comitantur.” *Tom. i. p. 663. ed. Duval.*

representation. This is perfectly conformable to what was before said of the *Οψις*; that, though confessedly, in one view, *ἡκιστα οὐκείων της ποιητικης*^a, yet, in another view, *ΕΞ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ* *ἀν εἴη* *τι μοριον της Τραγωδίας* *ὁ της Οψιως κοσμος*^b.

The drift of the precept is obvious. The *decoration* should be such as to agree with the rules just laid down for the *manners*. The scenery, dresses, action, &c. must be *ἁρμοττοντα, ὁμοια*—probability, nature, and the *costume*, must be observed. Even the *μιμησις βελτιωνων*, the *improved imitation*, has here, too, its obvious application. The squalid hair, and ragged dress, of *Electra*^c, must, as well as the *σκληροτης* of *Achilles*, be a little flattered in the representation, and not *too like*, &c.

The rule extends, also, to the *Melopœia*, or the *Music*; which, from other passages of Aristotle's works, we may suspect to have been sometimes such, as sacrificed propriety, and just expression—the *ἴθι*, the *πρεπον*, &c. to the depraved taste of what he calls the *φορτικῶς* spectators^d.

It

^a Cap. vi.—“is most foreign to the art.”—*Transl.* Part II. Sect. 3.

^b *Ibid. init.* “The DECORATION must necessarily be one of its parts.” Part II. Sect. 2.

^c Σκῆψαι μὲ ΠΙΝΑΡΑΝ ΚΟΜΑΝ,

Καὶ ΤΡΥΧΗ ΤΑΔ' ἡμῶν πεπλῶν.

Eurip. Electra, 184.

^d See, *De Repub.* lib. viii. cap. 6, and 7, p. 457, E. 459, A. *ed. Duval.* The contests (*ἀγῶνις*), indeed, of which

It is probable that Aristotle alludes, also, to cap. xvii. and to the mistakes, which the Poet is liable to commit, who composes without keeping the *stage*, and the effects of representation, in his eye*.

Though the Poet neither painted the *scenes*, nor made the *dresses*, yet all this formed one of the six constituent *parts* of Tragedy; fell, of course, under the direction and controul of the Poet, and was of the utmost importance to the success of his piece, at a time when *representation* was almost essential to the idea of dramatic poetry†.

NOTE 121.

P. 148. ALL THOSE DISCOVERIES IN WHICH THE SIGN IS PRODUCED BY WAY OF PROOF.

* *Αἱ πρῶται ἰσχυαί*. Well explained by Dacier after the Italian commentators. Indeed, the very words of Homer, in the passage alluded to, sufficiently illustrate the meaning of the expression.

E.

which he speaks in these passages, seem to have been merely *musical*. But the known influence of the same *popular audience* in the dramatic contests, and the caution given by Aristotle in the passage we are considering, make it probable, that even in the music of *Tragedy*, especially in the instrumental part of it, something of the same accommodation might prevail.

* Transl. Part II. Sect. 17.

† See vol. i. Diss. I. Part II. at the end.

Εἰ δ' αὖτε δὴ καὶ ΣΗΜΑ ἀριφραδὲς ἄλλο τι δεῖξω,
 Ὅφρα μὲ εὖ γνωτὸν, ΠΙΣΤΩΘΗΤΟΝ τ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ,
 ὍΤΑΗΝ - - - &c. Od. p. 217.

"To give you *firmer faith*, now trust your eye:
 "Lo! the broad *scar* indented on my thigh."

Pope, xxi. 226.

Other instances of *signs* thus used, not for the purpose of *accidental* discovery, but as confirmations of a *voluntary* discovery previously made, may easily be found. Thus, in the *Electra* of Sophocles, when Electra asks her brother, Ἦ γὰρ σὺ κτεῖν;—he answers—

- - - Τῆνδε προσβλέψας' ἔμμε
 Σφραγίδα πατρὸς, ἱκμαθ' εἰ σαφὴ λεγῶ.

NOTE 122.

P. 148. THOSE WHICH - - - HAPPEN SUDDENLY AND CASUALLY, ARE BETTER.

Εκ περιπετίας.—"Non valet hic περιπετία, mutationem illam ingentem fortunarum, sed, in περιπετίας, significat, casu, fortuito, et quia ita cecidit."—Victorius.

So in the passage from Polybius quoted by Suidas, under the words Περιπετία, and Ευμενής:—
 ἡ τυχὴ το πλείον συνεργῶ χρωμένη, ἐδ' ΕΚ ΠΕΡΙΠΕΤΙΑΣ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀγχινοίας. κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle's using the word thus, adverbially, after having hitherto used it only in its technical, or dramatic, sense, of a sudden change of fortune, produces

produces some ambiguity; and the more so, *as* the adverbial phrase, in *περιπεττίας*, seems not to be of very common occurrence. Heinsius, taking *περιπεττία* in the dramatic sense, translates—"quæ *e mutationibus in contrarium oriuntur*;" which, indeed, is the obvious meaning of the expression, if *not* understood adverbially. But it cannot be Aristotle's meaning, because the discovery of the scar of Ulysses was not the consequence of any such *περιπεττία*. Indeed, it was neither the consequence, nor the cause, of any reverse of fortune.

I have sometimes suspected that Aristotle might write it, in *ΠΡΟΠΕΤΕΙΑΣ*, by which all ambiguity would have been avoided. But, perhaps, after all, the phrase had no ambiguity to Greek ears, and the passage may be right as it stands.

NOTE 123.

P. 149. DISCOVERIES INVENTED, AT PLEASURE, BY THE POET, AND, ON THAT ACCOUNT, STILL INARTIFICIAL.

Δευτερας δε, αἱ πεποιημεναι ὑπο τῆ ποιητῆ, διὰ ἄτυχου. — The expression, *πεποιημεναι ὑπο τῆ ποιητῆ*, must necessarily, I think, be understood *emphatically*, and must mean, not merely *invented*, (for so are the other discoveries also, which follow,) but *arbitrarily* invented by the Poet, and *obviously* so, "upon the spur of the occasion;" in opposition to such means of discovery and recognition,

recognition, as, though still indeed of the Poet's invention, are artfully prepared in the very texture of his plot, and appear to arise, necessarily or probably, from the action itself. And thus I find it well explained by Piccolomini:—" Chiama
 " Aristotele questa seconda spetie di riconosci-
 " mento, *fatto dal Poeta*: e così lo chiama, *non*
 " *perche in tutte le spetie il Poeta non sia quello*
 " *che li riconoscimenti, siccome le altre parti dell'*
 " *azione e della favola ponga e formi coi versi*
 " *sui*; ma ha dato à *questa spetie più ch' all' altre*
 " questo nome, perche in essa, non fondandosi il
 " Poeta, nè nello stesso connettimento delle cose,
 " e nella stessa favola, nè in segno alcuno che la
 " persona stessa, che s'ha da riconoscere, gli
 " offerisca inanzi; egli, per questo, come libero
 " divenuto, à suo mero (*quasi*) arbitrio, *reca,*
 " *finge, e pone in bocca della persona à voglia sua,*
 " *quella occasione di riconoscimento che più gli*
 " *piace,*" &c. [p. 230.]—Yet, as this sense is
 rather inferred from the explanation subjoined,
 (ταυτα ἐν αὐτῷ λέγει ἅ BOTAEΤΑΙ Ὁ ΠΟΙΗΤΗΣ,
 ἀλλ' ἐχ' ὁ ΜΥΘΟΣ) than expressed by the words
 themselves, I am much inclined to suppose some
 omission in the text.

The other reading, ὄΥΚ ἀτεχνῶς, is very plausibly supported by the Abbé Batteux, from a passage of Aristotle's Rhetoric, which has been already mentioned in NOTE 104*. I doubt, however,

* Rhet. I. c. ii. Τὴν δὲ πρῶτην, ἣν μὲν ἀτεχνῶς εἶπεν—κ.τ.λ.

however, whether that passage be fairly applicable to this^b. But though it were, the sense above given, and which I think *must* be given, to the expression *πεποιημένα ὑπὸ τοῦ Π.* seems hardly reconcilable with this reading. For can we conceive that Aristotle would assign as a *reason* why such discoveries are *not inartificial*, that they are *arbitrarily* (and therefore easily,) invented by the Poet?—ΔΙΟ ἐκ ἀτεχνῶν.

I must observe, however, that though these two readings are diametrically opposite, —ἀτεχνῶν—ἐκ ἀτεχνῶν—yet, it is some comfort, that whichever we adopt, the general sense of the passage will be the same. As such discoveries *are* of the Poet's invention, they are *not* ἀτεχνῶν, in the rhetorical sense: as they require very *little* invention, compared with those which arise from the action itself, they may, in this view, be denominated, ἀτεχνῶν. In either reading, therefore, Aristotle will be found to say the same thing; i.e. that the discoveries of this *second* species are, in point of art and ingenuity, superior to the *first* species, and inferior to all the *rest*.

^b In that passage, ἀτεχνῶν, is opposed to ΕΝΤΕΧΝΑ, and means, such things as are *foreign to the orator's art*. —Here, the word means, not *foreign* to the Poet's art, but only—*requiring little*, or *no art*, or ingenuity of invention, in the Poet.

NOTE 124.

P. 149. ORESTES, AFTER HAVING DISCOVERED HIS SISTER, DISCOVERS HIMSELF TO HER.

The Greek is—ἀναγνωρισε την ἀδελφην, ἀναγνωρισθεις ὑπ' ἑαυτης:—this, as Victorius has observed, seems to say the reverse; i.e. that Orestes discovered his sister *after* having been discovered by her: which is not the fact. One would rather have expected—ἀναγνωρισας την ἀδελφην, ἀναγνωρισθη ὑπ' ἑαυτης: which would also have been clearer, and not have given occasion to the commentators to suppose, that the discovery of Iphigenia by the letter was meant to be included in this *second* and faulty species of discovery; whereas the expression 'ΟΙΟΝ Οἶ. ΑΝΕΓΝΩΡΙΞΕ την ἀδελφην, leads very naturally to that idea. But it is easy to see, upon the least reflection, that the discovery of *Orestes only* is the example here intended. This is sufficiently explained by Dacier after Victorius. It was natural enough, however, for Aristotle to mention the *other* discovery, in passing, as being the counterpart of a *double* ἀναγνωρισις in the same drama. [See cap. xi. at the end. Transl. Part II. Sect. 9.]—But this whole passage, I may say, this whole chapter, has undoubtedly been most miserably mangled in transcription.

NOTE 125.

P. 149. BUT ORESTES, BY [VERBAL PROOFS] &c.

The reading which Victorius regarded as most authentic is this:—ἐκινῶ δε * * * * * ταῦτα ἐν αὐτῷ λέγει αἰ βελεται ὁ ποιητης, ἀλλ' ἔχ' ὁ μυθῶ. —But *four* Medicean manuscripts, and, it seems, *all* those in the King of France's library, agree in reading—ἐκινῶ δε αὐτῷ λέγει, κ. τ. λ.², and, in the latter, we are told, the words are written without any *hiatus*. This last reading, however, appears to me short and deficient. I cannot but think that the author, after the words ἐκινῶ δε,—had expressed the *means* of the discovery, and by them denominated *this* species, as he has all the others:—δια σημειῶν—δια μνημης—ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ—. But *how* the vacancy was filled, it is impossible to determine; and it is of the less consequence to determine, as we are in possession of the Tragedy itself. Δια σημειῶν, which Victorius found in one MS. or, δια τεκμηριῶν, as Dacier ingeniously conjectured from the words of Euripides himself, seem most probable. In point of *meaning*, it is indifferent by which of these appellations these discoveries were distinguished; τεκμηριῶν being according

* See *edit. Ox.* 1780, and Batteux's translation, *note 3*. —But M. Batteux is mistaken in saying that Victorius omits the words ταῦτα ἐν:—he gives them in his text, and translates them in his commentary. He rejects only the supplement, δια σημειῶν.

according to Aristotle's own definition in his *Rhetoric*, only a species of σημειον. Τῶν δὲ (i. e. τῶν σημείων,) τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, τεκμηρίον^b. Σημειον is a *sign*, or *token*: Τεκμηρίον, a *certain, decisive* sign, such as puts an *end* to all doubt, according to the derivation of the word given by Aristotle in the passage just referred to. We see, therefore, with what strict propriety the word is used by Euripides, when Iphigenia demands, and Orestes professes to give, a *decisive* proof:

Iphig.—ἔχεις τι τῶνδε μοι ΤΕΚΜΗΡΙΟΝ;

And Orestes, presently after, when he produces his last and strongest proof, says——

‘Ἄδ’ εἶδον αὐτῷ, ταδε φράσω ΤΕΚΜΗΡΙΑ’.

It is, indeed, some objection to δια σημείων, in this passage of Aristotle, that it would appear to confound *this* discovery with the *first*; by giving it the same denomination. But this, perhaps, would be sufficiently obviated by the explanation immediately subjoined:—δια σημείων· ΤΑΤΑ μὲν αὐτῷ ΛΕΓΕΙ ὃ βελεται, &c. Σημειον, in the *first* species of discovery, is used for *visible, external* proofs: here, it would be used for *verbal, argumentative* proofs; as it is used, continually, in this treatise. And it may also be observed, that

^b Lib. i. cap. ii. p. 517. *ed. Duval*.

^c *Iphig. in Taur.*—from v. 808—to 826.—In the *Electra* of Sophocles, ΣΑΦΗ ΣΗΜΕΙΑ is used, v. 892, as equivalent to τεκμηρίον which occurs afterwards, v. 910.

that Aristotle himself, at the end of this chapter, (if the integrity of the text be admitted,) refers to this sort of discovery, among others, under the denomination of *πεποιημενα σημεια*.

NOTE 126.

P. 149. FOR, SOME OF THE THINGS, FROM WHICH THOSE PROOFS ARE DRAWN, ARE EVEN SUCH AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN PRODUCED AS VISIBLE SIGNS.

—*Εξην γαρ ἂν ἐνία καὶ ἐνέγκειν.*—In the sense which I have given to this obscure sentence, the only sense that I thought could fairly be extracted from the words, I am glad to find myself supported by the judgment of Victorius.—“*Quare* “ *propè dictum peccatum est: (δι’ ὃ ἔργος τῆς* “ *ἐξημενης ἀμαρτίας ἐστίν.)* quia si illa quibus usus “ est Orestes non omninò *signa* fuerunt;—neque “ enim ostendi potuerunt;—propè tamen illa “ accesserunt; atque ita propè ut quædam ex “ *ipsis illius prosus generis fuerint*, quamvis ita “ *ipsis ille usus non sit.* Hoc enim arbitror vâ- “ *lere, “ licebat enim quædam etiam portare*”— “ id est, manu tenere, et jubere ut ipsa videret ac “ *reminisceretur,*” &c.

Enia, because all the proofs of Orestes were not of this kind, but only Electra’s *work*, and the *lance*.

NOTE 127.

P. 149. THE DISCOVERY BY THE SOUND
OF THE SHUTTLE.

Ἡ τῆς κερκιδὸς φωνή—Dacier, after some other commentators, makes a *speaking shuttle* of this; and wonders, as, indeed, he well might, that the great critic should let so monstrous an absurdity pass without a severer censure than that of its *wanting art*. Others understand, much more reasonably, not the literal, but the metaphorical, *voice* of the shuttle, in the epistolary web by which Philomela is said to have conveyed to her sister the dismal tale of her sufferings,

—ἴσῃ ποικιλμασί ΣΤΟΜΑΤΙ χρησαμένη,

in the language of that most curious of all Poets,
John Tetzels.*

But as this seems to have been the current traditional story, I do not see how it could be adduced as a circumstance *invented* at pleasure by the Poet. I should rather suppose, that the discovery in question, whatever it might be, was effected by the *sound* of the shuttle, which Aristotle calls, φωνή, *voice*, not, probably, in his own language, but in the poetical language of the Tragedy itself to which he alludes. For these κερκιδες, it seems, were a very *vocal* sort of things, nothing like the shuttles of “these degenerate
“ days.”

* *Chil.* vii. 142.—See Ovid's *Metam.* lib. vi. 572, &c.

"days." Every one recollects the "*argute pectine*" of Virgil. But this is nothing to the amplification of some Greek epigrammatists, who scruple not to compare them to swallows, and even to nightingales;

Κερκιδας ὀρθρολαλοισι ΧΕΛΙΔΟΣΙΝ εἰκελοφώνης—

And,

Κερκίδα δ' εὐποίητον ΑΗΔΟΝΑ—^b.

Hence the ridiculous fancy of Joseph Scaliger, that the metamorphosis of Procne into a swallow was exhibited in the *Tereus* of Sophocles, and that a *shuttle* was made use of, instead of a *whistle* or *bird-pipe*, to imitate the swallow's voice!—

NOTE 128.

P. 149. THUS IN THE CYPRIANS OF DI-CÆOGENES - - -.

That this was a distinct Poem from the *Κυπρια* mentioned afterwards in cap. xxiii. seems clear from this single circumstance, observed by Victorius, that the Epic Poem called *The Cypriacs*,—*τα Κυπρια ἐπη*,—is mentioned there by Aristotle, as it is, generally, by other antient writers, in terms that imply a doubt of its author^a: whereas here the author is named, without any expression of uncertainty.

Whether the Poem was *Epic*, or *Tragic*, cannot be determined; nor, from the ambiguity of the

the

^b *Anthol. lib. vi. cap. 8.* ^a —ὁ *τα Κυπρια* παπῶς - - -.

the case, τοῖς Κυπρίοις, whether the title of it was τῆς Κυπρίας, or, Οἱ Κυπριοί—The *Cypriacs*, or, The *Cyprians*. The latter is, certainly, the most probable title for a *Tragedy*, and therefore, as Dicæogenes is recorded only as a Tragic and Dithyrambic Poet, I have ventured to adopt it.

NOTE 129.

P. 149. IN THE TALE OF ALCINOUS - - -

See Od. viii. 521.—There is another *discovery* of the same kind in the 4th book, where Menelaus recognizes Telemachus by the tears he sheds at the mention of his father. There is not, I think, either in Homer, or in any other Poet, a more natural and affecting picture of friendly-regret on the one hand, and filial affection on the other.—“Of all the friends I have lost,” says Menelaus, addressing himself to Telemachus without knowing who he was—“*one* there is, whom I lament more than all the rest:”—

- - - ὅς τε μοι ὕπνον ἀπεχθάραι καὶ ἰδῶδην
Μνησόμενῳ ἔπα ἔτις Ἀχαιῶν τοσσ' ἔμογησεν
Ὅσσ' Ὀδυσσεύς ἔμογησε καὶ ἤρατο — τῷ δ' ἄρ'
ἰμελλεν

Αὐτῷ κηδεῖ ἴσσεσθαι, ἐμοὶ δ' ἀχῶ. αἶεν ἀλαστον
Κεῖνε, ὅπως δὴ δῆρον ἀποιχεται· ἔδε τι ἴδμεν,
Ζῶει ὄγ', ἢ τεθνήκεν. Ὀδύρονται νῦν περ αὐτὸν
Λαερτιάδης θ' ὁ γέρον, καὶ ἑχέφρων Πηνελόπεια,
Τηλεμαχῶ θ', ὃν ἔλειπε νεὸν γεγῶντ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ.

Ὡς φάτο·—τῷ δ' ἄρα πατρὸς ὑφ' ἡμέραν ὤρετ
 γοοιο. [αἰκisas,
 Δακρυ δ' ἀπο βλεφαρων χαμαδις βαλε, πατρὸς
 Χλαιναν πορφυρεην ἀντ' ὀφθαλμοῖν ἀνασχων
 Ἀμφοτερεσι χερσιν νοησε δε μιν Μενελαῖος. — — —
 Od. Δ. 105—².

That the title, Αλκινος, or Αλκινε, ἀπολογος, was understood to refer *chiefly* to the long narration of Ulysses, which occupies four books of the Odyssey, seems clear, even from the proverbial application of the expression. Απολογος Αλκινος.—ἐπὶ των φλυαρευτων, και μακρον ἀποτενοντων λογον.—*Suidas*. And so Jul. Pollux:—ἐπὶ μακρων ῥησιων^b. But a passage in Aristotle's Rhetoric leaves no doubt. He there expressly mentions Homer's *account* of the speech of Ulysses to Penelope, Od. xxiii. 310, &c. as being the Αλκινε ἀπολογος^c compressed into an abridgment of thirty verses.—Παραδειγμα ὁ Αλκινε ἀπολογος, ὅτι προς την Πηνελοπην ἐν τριακοντα ἐπισι πεποιηται^c. Now those verses are, in fact, a mere *table of contents* to the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th books, which contain the narrative of Ulysses at the court of Alcinous.—This title, therefore, (Αλκινε Απολογος) must *at least* have extended to those *four* books. But the passage which is the subject of this note, seems to
 prove

^a Not ill translated by Fenton, in *Pope's Odyssey*, book iv. 131.

^b II. 4. and VI. 26.

^c III. 16. p. 603. *ed. Duval*.

prove that it extended still farther; for here we are referred to the *eighth* book under that title; though the speech, the *μακρὰ ῥησις* of Ulysses, does not commence till the *ninth*. The editions prefix the title, *Αλκίον ἀπολόγοι*, only to the eighth book.—The fact seems to be, that the titles, by which the different parts of Homer's Poems were first distinguished, were applied to parts of very unequal lengths; so that afterwards, when the equal, or nearly equal, division into *books* took place, it would not always coincide exactly with the other division, formed by the different *distinct* subjects or episodes of the Poem; but *one* title would sometimes comprehend several books, and different parts of the *same* book, would sometimes be distinguished by different titles. Thus, for example, the *fifth* book of the *Odyssey* had *two* titles, *Καλυψὲς Ἀντρον*, and *Σχεδία*, or *Τὰ περὶ τὴν σχεδίαν*: and the last book *three*, *Νεκυίαν*—*Τὰ ἐν Λαίρτῃ*—and, *Σπονδαί*⁴. And thus, on the other hand, the title, *Αλκίον Ἀπολόγου*, is not, I apprehend, to be considered as appropriated to any one book, but, probably, comprehended *five* books—from the eighth to the twelfth, inclusively; perhaps, was understood to refer, generally, to the whole *Episode of Alcinous*; as indeed the expression *ΑΛΚΙΝΟΤ ἀπολόγου*—“the story of *ALCINOUS*”—seems rather to imply. And the
different

⁴ See *Ælian*, *V. Hist. lib. xiii. cap. 14*, and the notes of Perizonius.

different parts of this long Episode were, again, subdistinguished by other titles; such as, *Κυκλωπία*, *Νεκρία*, *Τα Κίρκης*, &c. Indeed, the title, *Αλκίνας Απολογοί*, though prefixed only to the eighth book, seems evidently extended beyond that book by the title subjoined as its equivalent,—*Ἡ, τὰ τῷ Ὀδυσσεὺς παρὰ Ἀλκίνοῦ*. But how the word *ἀπολογία* got into the plural number here, I do not well understand. This circumstance, however, together with the idea of its being confined to this single book, has, I think, led Perizonius and other learned men into mistakes concerning the *reason* of the appellation. Perizonius (*ubi sup.*) thinks the eighth book was so called, “*because there are several speeches of Alcinous in it*,” and others suppose, that the title alludes to the songs of Demodocus*.

NOTE 130.

P. 150. THE DISCOVERY OCCASIONED BY REASONING, OR INFERENCE; SUCH AS THAT IN THE CHOEPHORÆ—

Here is much obscurity and confusion.—One thing, however, seems clear; that *ἐκ συλλογισμῶν*, cannot mean as some interpreters have understood it to mean, “by reasoning or inference in the mind of the person who *makes* the discovery;” because this is common to *all* the modes of discovery. When Electra recognizes her

* Schenkius, in Pind. Nem. p. 34.

her brother, does she not *infer*, or, in the philosopher's language, *sylogize*? "This man has seen the lance—nobody *could* see it but Orestes—This is Orestes."—And the same may be said of all the other recognitions. Discovery *by inference*, therefore, *on the part of the discoverer*, cannot be made a distinct species. The discovery Aristotle means, is plainly a discovery, not *made*, but *occasioned*, by inference. Throughout all his instances, he considers only the means, or occasion, of discovery, as furnished, in some way or other, by the person discovered. With respect to bodily marks, bracelets, &c. the letter of Iphigenia, and the verbal *τεκμηρια* of Orestes, this is obvious enough. But the case is the same with the discovery *by memory*: in both the examples of that species, the persons are discovered, not by recollection in the discoverers, but by the *effects* of it in themselves. And so here too, in the three *last* examples of discovery *by συλλογισμους*, however obscure in other respects, *this* at least seems clearly enough expressed, that the persons are discovered by their *own* reasoning, or inference; that is, by something which it leads them to *say*.*

But, the difficulty is, that Aristotle's *first* example, appears not to accord with this idea, and with

* Some time after these remarks were written, I found them coincide exactly with those of Piccolomini, whose comment on this passage is, as usual, exact and clear. See also Benius, who follows him.

with the other examples. The *inference* here, *appears* to be, even from the words themselves ^b, and, if the *Choëphoræ* of *Æschylus* be intended, as the commentators suppose, certainly is,—inference in the mind of the person who *makes* the discovery. But as this, for the reasons already given, cannot, I think, be admitted, we must either leave this *knot* as it is, or solve it by supposing some *other* Tragedy, not extant, to be meant, in which the *conclusion* mentioned was, as in all the other instances that follow, the *occasion* only of the discovery ^c. Nor will this appear a very improbable supposition, if we recollect the swarm of Tragic Poets who were continually exercising their invention upon a few popular subjects, and the number of different Tragedies which, in consequence, we find recorded, not only on the same *subject*, but even with the same *title*; often with some slight variation only, in the *mode* of a discovery, and other episodic incidents of the plot, which would still leave a general resemblance, a sort of *family* likeness, between them, such as, in fact, we find
in

^b Τεταρτη δε, ἡ ἐκ συλλογισμῶν οἶον, ἐν Χορηφοῖς [αἰ. Χορηφοῖς] ὅτι, ἄμοι⊖ τις ἐληλυθεν· ἄμοι⊖ δὲ ἔθεις ἀλλ' ἢ Οὔρεως· οὐτ⊖ ἀρὰ ἐληλυθεν.

^c So, Beni: "Itaque *primum* exemplum sic intelligen-
" dum crediderim, ut *Electra* agnita sit, non *Orestes*:
" ita, nimirum, ut cum *Orestes* eo modo ratiocinantem
" audiret puellam, dum *Orestem* sibi similem diceret, inde
" *Electram* agnoscat." Pauli Benii, in *Ar. Poet. Com-*
ment. p. 348.

in Tragedies on the same subject now extant; in the *Electra* of Sophocles, and that of Euripides, and the *Choëphoræ* of Æschylus.

But we may say, farther, that this supposition seems to be favoured by the Tragedy of Æschylus, itself; with which, what Aristotle here says, appears to me by no means exactly to correspond. The reader, who will take the trouble to examine the whole passage supposed to be here alluded to, from v. 166, to v. 233^d, will, I believe, think with me, that the discovery, in that play, cannot with propriety be denominated a *discovery made by inference from resemblance*. The circumstances of the lock of hair, and the footsteps, produce in Electra's mind no more than a glimmering of hope—*σαινόμεαι δ' ὑπ' ἱλπίδος* [v. 192.]—and she is so far from *discovering Orestes by them*, that even when he appears before her, she is not convinced till he produces the *ὑφασμα*—the vest, or veil. This is justly remarked by Brumoy; “*Tout cela (i. e. the hair, &c.) ne fait que la rendre plus inquiète : Elle demeure donc dans ce trouble jusqu' à ce qu' Oreste paroisse à ses yeux. Il se montre tout à coup, et se fait reconnoître pour son frere, en lui présentant un voile qu'elle a tissu elle-meme.*” This I take to be the true

ἀναγνώρισις

^d In Mr. Potter's Æschylus, from p. 329, to 334-
Quarto.

^e Theat. des Grecs, ii. p. 6.—Mr. Potter is of the same opinion:—“*No discovery is from hence raised: but*
“ the

ἀναγνώρισις of this drama; and it belongs rather to Aristotle's *first* class—*διὰ σημείων*; if not even to the worst sort of that class, where the sign is produced *πίστις ἰνέα*,—*by way of proof*. Indeed, even admitting that Electra may be considered as recognizing her brother by inference from the resemblance of the lock of hair and the footsteps only, still, as Piccolomini acutely and solidly observes, this instance would belong to the *first* species of discovery *by signs*. “Questo riconoscimento *non è della quarta specie, ma della prima; nato, non da sillogismo, ma da segno: posciache Elettra, preso per segno d'Oreste la capigliatura, sopra tal segno, quasi sopra mezzo termine, fabbrica il sillogismo che ella fa in se stessa, argomentando, che colui fusse Oreste: havendo io già detto, ch' in ogni riconoscimento suol' intervenir sillogismo ed argomentazione dentro all' animo della persona riconoscente.*” p. 236.

NOTE 131.

P. 150. “HE CAME TO FIND HIS SON, AND
“HE HIMSELF MUST PERISH.”

It is not very obvious, how these words are to be brought to any thing like *reasoning*, or *inference*. — But all here is darkness. The far-fetched explanation which Dacier has condescended
to

“the mind of Electra is deeply struck; she reasons and conjectures, and so is finely prepared for the discovery which soon follows.” *Notes on the Choëphoræ.*

to borrow, without notice, from Castelvetro, for whom, in his preface, he expresses so much contempt, only serves to make the "darkness" more "visible."

I know not whether it be worth while to remark a mere resemblance of expression, but a very close one, in Homer :

Μη πατερ' ἀντίθεον ΔΙΖΗΜΕΝΟΣ, ΑΥΤΟΣ
'ΟΛΩΜΑΙ. Od. O. 90.

NOTE 132.

P. 150. THERE IS ALSO A COMPOUND SORT, &c.

When the *meaning* of an author cannot be satisfactorily explained, all that a translator can do, is, to be particularly careful to render faithfully his *words*. This I have *endeavoured* to do here : but whether I *have* done even this, the manifest corruption of the text must leave uncertain. Whatever sense may be enveloped in the Greek, I hope remains enveloped in the English. But what that is, I will not undertake to say.—With respect to the title of the drama, *Οδυσσεύς Ψευδαγγέλης*, if I have *not* given it its only *possible* sense, I have, surely, given it its most natural and obvious sense :—Ulysses *in the disguise* of a messenger. For I am really not able to see, how the words, without violent twisting, can be made to signify *passively*, as Castelvetro would have it, "Ulisse di

"*cui sono recate false novelle*;" though Victorius has pronounced a man to be a fool, who pretends to determine which of these two meanings is the right one^a. Had a *false Ulysses* been meant, it seems probable, that the word *Ψευδοδυσσεύς* would rather have been used; as *Ψευδεραικῆς*, *The false Hercules*, was the title of a Comedy of Menander.

Αναγνωρίζοντες—sc. *τῶν θεατρῶν*: I see no other construction, as the text stands. And so Victorius:—" *Spectatores ita accepisse illam vocem, tanquam si ipsi, rei illius auxilio, ipsum agnū-turi essent.*"

Ulysses seems to have been a rich and valuable resource to the dramatic writers. His history furnished the subjects of many *Comedies*, as well as *Tragedies*. See Casaubon upon Athenæus, p. 297.—There were, *Ulysses Wounded*—*Ulysses Mad*—*Ulysses the Deserter*—*Ulysses Shipwrecked*—*Ulysses Weaving*, &c.—The subject of the play here mentioned seems to have been suggested by Homer, *Od. ζ. 120*. But, *what* it was—how this discovery was *compound* (*συνθετός*)—or how, indeed, it was a discovery at all—what the precise *paralogism* was, &c. I confess myself totally unable, from the short, perplexed, and probably *corrupt* words of the text, to make out. The reader may see, however, a great variety of different conjectures in the commentators; and

I believe

^a "Hæc enim ita incerta sunt, ut *stultum* esse videatur aliquid ipsorum affirmare."

I believe when he has read them all, he will find himself just where he was. For my part, I leave ~~this~~ bow of Ulysses to be bent by stronger arms than mine :—

Ω φίλοι, ἔ μιν ἔγω ταυῖα·—λαβέτω δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι.

NOTE 133.

P. 151. BUT OF ALL DISCOVERIES, THE BEST IS THAT WHICH ARISES FROM THE ACTION ITSELF ---.

I agree with those commentators, who understand this to be given by Aristotle as a species of *ἀναγνωρισίς* distinct from any of the preceding. This appears, 1. From his examples, which are very different from all those before produced, and not reducible, I think, to any of his classes. The discovery of Iphigenia by the letter, is, indeed, mentioned under his *second* class, but not as an *instance* of that species.—See NOTE 124. 2dly, and principally, from his saying, “ After these, “ the *next* best are the discoveries *by inference*”—naming an *entire species*; which he would not, surely, have done, had his *best of all discoveries* been such, as might be found equally in the *other* species; had he been speaking, as some understand him, only of the best way of *using* the discoveries already enumerated.

NOTE 134.

P. 151. SUCH DISCOVERIES ARE THE BEST, BECAUSE THEY ALONE ARE EFFECTED WITHOUT INVENTED PROOFS, OR BRACELETS, &c. NEXT TO THESE ARE THE DISCOVERIES BY INFERENCE.

If the words, *πεποιημένων σημείων*, refer, as it is generally understood, to the *second* sort of discoveries exclusively, it is not easy to see how it can be true, that the *fifth* and best sort of discoveries, that *ἐκ πραγμάτων*, is the *only* one that is effected without *invented signs, bracelets, &c.*—for, on this supposition, the same may evidently be said of the *third* and *fourth* classes, those by *memory*, and by *inference*, which are expressly distinguished from the two first classes.

This inconsistency is not, I think, to be removed, but by understanding the words *πεποιημένα σημεία*, *here*, to be used in a wider sense, as including the *third* and *fourth* species, and, in general, all discoveries that have *any degree* of the defect which Aristotle means to point out by the expression *πεποιημένοι ἀπὸ τε ποίητε*, used in describing the *second* species, as opposed to what he calls, *ἐξ αὐτῶν πραγμάτων*; though that *second* species only is expressly so denominated, because it had this fault in the most glaring degree.

Any incident, or single action, of that combination of actions that compose a fable, is said,
I think,

I think, to be *ἐξ αὐτῶν πραγμάτων*, when it is *prepared in the texture* of the plot, and appears to follow so naturally and of course (*κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκ*—) from the incidents which precede it, that the spectator does not see how it could have been otherwise^a. On the contrary, those incidents are *not ἐξ αὐτῶν πραγμάτων*, which are not thus gradually prepared, but have, more or less, the appearance of *expedients* brought in to answer the purpose of the moment; which suggest the idea of occasional and easy contrivance; which, though not, perhaps, improbable, yet have not *such a degree* of probability, as answers fully the purpose of dramatic illusion, by acting upon the mind of the spectator as *necessity*^b, and keeping his attention rivetted to the action, without suffering him, as it were, to turn his eyes a moment from it, to the resources of the *Poet's* invention.

Now the *third* and *fourth* sorts of discovery appear, when we examine them, to be of this kind.

They

^a What is here expressed by, *ἐξ αὐτῶν πραγμάτων*, is more fully expressed, *cap. x.* where he says of the discovery and revolution, that they should arise *ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ μύθου ὡς ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων συμβαίνειν, ἢ ἐξ ἀναγκῆς ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἰκ*, γιγνέσθαι ταῦτα. *Transl. Part II. Sect. 8.*

^b “ Puisque la fonction du vraisemblable dans la Tragédie, est d’empêcher de s’appercevoir de la feinte, le vraisemblable qui trompe le mieux est le plus parfait, et c’est celui qui devient *nécessaire*.” Fontenelle, *Refl. sur la Poétique*, *Sect. 63.*

They are not prepared and brought on gradually by the *previous* circumstances of the fable, as in the examples given from the *Oedipus*, and *Iphigenia in Tauris*, but effected by contrivances, more or less naturally introduced by the Poet, at the moment when they are wanted; by *tears* suddenly shed at the sight of a picture, by an *exclamation* suddenly uttered. These, therefore, are not improperly included under the denomination of *πεποιημένα* (ὕπο τὰ ποιητὰ); and they are, also, in the proper and logical sense of the word, *σημεία*; the *tears*, in the one case, and the illative *reflection*, or *exclamation*, in the other, being *signs* or *tokens*, by which the persons are recognized. And thus, what Aristotle here says seems true—that the discovery which *arises out of the action itself*, is the only sort that is *entirely* effected ἀνευ τῶν πεποιημένων σημείων καὶ περιδέραιων: by *περιδέραια*, meaning the *first* class of discoveries, and under *πεπ. σημ.* comprehending the *three* other classes.

He has, plainly, arranged his modes of discovery, as he had before arranged the modes of managing the *παθῆ*, or *disastrous incidents*, of Tragedy (*cap. xiv.*)—in the order of their comparative excellence; beginning with the *worst*, and proceeding gradually to the *best*. When he tells us, that the discoveries by *inference* are the *next best*, he evidently considers them, as *not* being, strictly at least, ἐξ αὐτῶν πραγμάτων; and so far, I think, is intelligible: but, in *what respect* they are

are better than the preceding species, *δια μνημης*, he has not told us. The discovery by *recollection* may, perhaps, in this respect be regarded as *less* *ἐξ αὐτῶν πραγμάτων*, or, *more* of the "*Poet's making*," as it seems to require the introduction of something accidental and extraneous, such as the *picture* in his first instance, and the *Bard* and his performance, in the second; circumstances, which have *more* the appearance of expedients than the reflection of Orestes, for example, in the Tragedy of Polyides. For that reflection arose, at least, *naturally*, and *solely*, from his *situation*, and that situation was essential to the fable.—But it is time to release the reader, and myself, from the embarrassments of one of the most corrupt, confused, and ambiguous chapters of this mutilated and disfigured work.

NOTE 135.

P. 152. THIS, THE POET, &c.

Ὁ μὴ ὄρῶντα τὸν θεατὴν ἰλάνθανει. Dacier has, at least, I think, satisfactorily proved, that this passage wants *some* emendation, and that the sense must be—"escaped the *Poet*, (not the *spectator*,) "for want of his *seeing*, or *conceiving* himself to "see, the action." He might have added to his other reasons, that the word *λανθάνειτο*, applied just before to the *Poet*, seems to fix the same application of *ἰλάνθανει* here. The opposition, as he has observed, is strongly marked:—it escaped

the *Poet*; ἐπὶ ΔΕ τῆς ΣΚΗΝΗΣ, &c. *but* upon the *stage*, &c. Castelvetro had seen this before Dacier, and conjectured, ὁ μὴ, ὄρωντα, ΩΣ ΤΩ ΘΕΑΤῃ, ἰλανθάνει. AN. "La qual contrarietà non "sarebbe potuto essere celata a Carcino, se "avesse riguardata la sua Tragedia non come "Poeta, ma *come veditore*." The ingenuity of the conjecture may be allowed; not so, I fear, the accuracy of the Greek.

NOTE 136.

P. 152. IN COMPOSING, THE POET SHOULD ALSO, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, BE AN ACTOR.

— Τοις σχήμασι συναπεργαζομενον ποιειν — The same expression occurs in the *Rhetoric*, III. 8.— ἀνάγκη τὰς συναπεργαζομενὰς σχήμασι, καὶ φωναίς, καὶ ἰσότητι, καὶ ὅλως τῇ ὑποκρίσει, ἐλπεινότερας εἶναι. But there, this is mentioned only as the means, by which the *Orator* may excite greater emotion in the hearer, immediately: here, as the means, by which the *Poet* may excite a stronger emotion, a greater *reality* of imagination and feeling, and a more perfect alienation of person, if I may venture so to call it, in *himself*, immediately; in order to produce afterwards a correspondent effect upon the spectator, by the force and truth of his imitation.

"I have often observed," says the admirable author of the *Inquiry concerning the Sublime and Beautiful*,

Beautiful, “that on mimicking the looks and
 “gestures of angry, or placid, or frightened, or
 “daring men, I have involuntarily found my mind
 “turned to that passion whose appearance I en-
 “deavoured to imitate; nay, I am convinced it
 “is hard to avoid it, though one strove to sepa-
 “rate the passion from its correspondent ges-
 “tures.” I believe, however, it is hardly
 possible to put on the bodily appearance of any
 passion, without *previously* turning the mind, *in*
some degree, to that passion. But it is certain,
 that the effect, in this case, will react upon the
 cause, and convert a slight and nascent emotion
 into a more steady, strong, and real feeling of the
 passion.

A singular instance of the practice of this rule
 of Aristotle—σχῆμασι συναντιπραζόμενον ποιεῖν—in
 a sister art, is given in the following curious ac-
 count, from Felibien, of Domenichino, a painter
 remarkable for *expression*.

“Il ne pouvoit comprendre qu’il y eut des
 “peintres qui travaillassent à des ouvrages consi-
 “dérables avec si peu d’application, que pendant
 “leur travail ils ne laissassent pas de s’entretenir
 “avec leurs amis. Il les regardoit comme des
 “ouvriers qui n’avoient que le pratique, et nulle
 “intelligence de l’art; étant persuadé qu’un
 “Peintre, pour bien réussir, doit entrer dans une
 “parfaite

^b Part IV. Sect. IV.—See also the curious account
 there given of Campanella.

“ parfaite connoissance des affections de l'esprit
 “ et des passions de l'ame ; qu'il doit les sentir
 “ en lui même, et s'il faut ainsi dire, *faire les*
 “ *memes actions et souffrir les memes mouvemens*
 “ qu'il veut représenter : ce qui ne se peut au
 “ milieu des distractions. Aussi on l'entendoit
 “ quelquefois parler en travaillant, avec une voix
 “ languissante et pleine de douleur, ou tenir des
 “ discours agréables et joyeux, selon les divers
 “ sentimens qu'il avoit intention d'exprimer. Mais
 “ pour cela, il s'enfermoit dans un lieu fort retiré,
 “ pour n'être pas apperçu dans ces differens états,
 “ ni par ses élèves, ni par ceux de sa famille ;
 “ parcequ'il lui étoit arrivé quelquefois, que des
 “ gens qui l'avoient vû dans ces transports,
 “ l'avoient soupçonné de folie. Lorsque dans sa
 “ jeunesse il travailloit au Tableau du Martyre
 “ de S. André qui est à S. Gregoire, Annibal
 “ Carrache étant allé pour le voir, il le surprit
 “ comme il étoit *dans une action de colère et*
 “ *menaçante*. Après l'avoir observé quelque-
 “ temps, il connut qu'il representoit un soldat qui
 “ menace le S. Apôtre. Alors ne pouvant plus
 “ se tenir caché, il s'approcha du Domeniquin, et
 “ en l'embrassant, lui avoüa qu'il avoit dans ce
 “ moment-là beaucoup appris de lui^b. ”

I will just observe, farther, that this precept, or
 rather *counsel*, of Aristotle, would appear the less
 strange

^b Felibien, — *Entretiens sur les vies des Peintres, &c.*
 tome iii. p. 379.

strange to the Poets of his time, because, as he himself tells us, the earlier Tragic Poets were also actors: *ὁπρὸς οὗτοί γε αὐτοὶ τραγῳδίας εἰ ποιεῖται το πρῶτον*.—*Rhet.* III. 1.—But, indeed, I am so far from seeing any thing strange or improbable in this advice, that, on the contrary, if it be liable to any objection at all, it is, perhaps, rather to that of being unnecessary: for I scarce believe, that any Poet of genius, antient or modern, ever yet composed a Tragedy without practising involuntarily, in *some* degree or other, what the critic here recommends. No dramatic Poetry, I think, can be less chargeable with the *μανικόν*, than that of the French. Yet M. Marmontel sees no difficulty in this precept. In his account of this part of Aristotle's work, he says, "Il recommande
" que l'on soit présent à l'action que l'on veut
" peindre, que l'on se pénètre soi-même des sen-
" timens que l'on doit exprimer, et qu'on imite,
" en composant, l'action des personnages qu'on
" met sur la scène: méthode qui contribue réel-
" lement à donner au style plus de chaleur et de
" vérité." [*Poet. Franc.* I. p. 15.] Mr. Mason says of the late ingenious and amiable Mr. Whitehead, whose dramatic compositions, whatever other merit may justly be allowed them, certainly bear no marks of any unmanageable phrensy in the Poet,—that "he is apt to believe, that he
" always acted, or at least declaimed, while he was
" composing for the stage." If, then, even the
modern

modern Tragic Poet is, almost necessarily, more or less, "an actor in composing," there can surely be little difficulty in conceiving an Æschylus, or a Sophocles, in their free, solitary, and unwritten meditations, to have given still greater scope to their imaginations, and, ὍΣΑ ΔΤΝΑΤΟΝ, at least, σχημασι συναπεργασασθαι. We must, for once, divest ourselves of modern ideas, and think, not of a spruce Poet of "these degenerate days," shut up in his study, with his pen in his hand, and his writing-table before him—but of Euripides, retired into that lonely, dark, and shaggy cavern, which is said to have been the favourite scene of his Tragic meditations. "Philochorus refert, in "insulâ Salamine speluncam esse tetram et horridam, quam nos vidimus, in quâ Euripides Tragœdias scriptitârît."—*Aul. Gell.* xv. 20.

NOTE 137.

P. 152. FOR BY NATURAL SYMPATHY, &c.

Πιθανωτατοι γαρ ἀπο της αὐτης φυσικης οἱ ἐν παθεισιν ὡσι.—Nothing, I think, can be more forced and improbable, than the sense given to the words, ἀπο της αὐτης φυσικης, by Victorius, and, after him, by Goulston and Dacier: "*eorum qui pari naturâ ingenioque præditi, &c.—De deux hommes qui seront d'un égal genie, celui qui se mettra dans "la passion sera toujours plus persuasif."*

If the text be right, the only sense I see is that given by Heinsius:—"propter similitudinem ejus—
" *dem*

“*dem naturæ*.”—i.e. “*from natural sympathy*.”

—But I am much disposed to suspect, that we should read, ἀπ’ ΑΤΤΗΣ ΤΗΣ φυσικῆς—*ab ipsâ naturâ*;—*Ipsâ naturâ comparatum est*, ut, &c.—

A similar, but contrary, transposition, of the same words, occurred at the end of the second chapter: ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ—plainly, as Victorius observes, instead of ἐν Τῇ ΑΤΤῃ—. And, indeed, this sense is so obvious, that Robertelli, Castelvetro, and Piccolomini, have all given it in their translations, though certainly not warranted by the text. However, as the other reading seems to express, though somewhat obscurely, the same idea, I have not departed from it any farther, than by adopting the explanatory version of Heinsius, which takes the meaning, and leaves the obscurity.

NOTE 138.

P. 152. WE SHARE THE AGITATION OF THOSE WHO APPEAR TO BE TRULY AGITATED—THE ANGER OF THOSE WHO APPEAR TO BE TRULY ANGRY.

Χαίρουντες ὁ χειμαζόμενοι, καὶ χαλεπαίνοντες ὁ ὀργιζόμενοι ἀληθινώτατα. I have given that sense of this passage, in which all the commentators I have seen are perfectly agreed. But I cannot dissemble a difficulty which has always occurred to me in this interpretation, though, to my surprise, I have not found it any where taken notice of. I mean, that it gives a *transitive* sense to the verbs,

χειμαίνω,

χειμαίνε, and χαλεπαίνει. With respect, particularly, to the verb χαλεπαίνει, (for the other occurs but seldom,) the difficulty from the general, if not the constant, use of it, as a verb *neuter*, seems not easily to be overcome. This use of it, by Aristotle himself, and by other prose writers, is so common and well known, that it would be mere trifling to produce instances. That it is *never* used by them transitively, it would be rash, perhaps, even in those, whose Greek reading is much more extensive than my own, to affirm. I can only say, that I have never seen a *clear* instance of it, either in prose, or verse. The lexicographers, indeed, send us to Homer: but without giving any instance that appears to me to be at all decisive*. And, on the other hand, the word occurs *clearly* in its usual and intransitive sense in other passages: as, *Il. E.* 256. *Il.* 386. *Σ.* 103, &c. But even admitting the verb to be now and then used by Homer in a sense indisputably transitive, it seems very unlikely, that Aristotle should transplant so rare, and poetical, a use of the word, into plain and philosophical prose; especially as *other* verbs were probably at hand, if he meant what he is supposed to mean, which would not have been liable to this ambiguity.

This difficulty has sometimes led me to suspect, that the passage may possibly, after all,
admit

* See *Il. T.* 183.

admit of a different sense; and that Aristotle may have meant only to say this:—"The Poet should work himself, as far as may be, into the passion he is to represent, by even assuming the countenance, and the gestures, which are its natural expressions. For they, of course, have most probability and truth in their imitation, who actually feel, in some degree, the passion: and no one *expresses agitation* of mind ($\chi\eta\mu\alpha\iota\upsilon\iota$) so naturally, ($\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\iota\nu\omega\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$), as he who is really agitated, ($\chi\eta\mu\alpha\zeta\omicron\mu\epsilon\iota\theta\iota$), or *expresses anger* ($\chi\alpha\lambda\epsilon\pi\alpha\iota\upsilon\iota$) so naturally, as he who is really angry ($\delta\epsilon\gamma\iota\zeta\omicron\mu\epsilon\iota\theta\iota$)."—Thus, the forms, $\chi\eta\mu\alpha\iota\upsilon\iota$, $\chi\alpha\lambda\epsilon\pi\alpha\iota\upsilon\iota$, will retain their neuter signification, referring to the Poet's *expression* of the passion in his composition; as, $\chi\eta\mu\alpha\zeta\omicron\mu\epsilon\iota\theta\iota$, and $\delta\epsilon\gamma\iota\zeta\omicron\mu\epsilon\iota\theta\iota$, refer to the *internal* feeling of the passion, which he has excited in his own mind. $\chi\eta\mu\alpha\zeta\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ —to be violently agitated in mind:— $\chi\eta\mu\alpha\iota\upsilon\iota$ —to *express* that agitation by *words* or *actions*^b: $\delta\epsilon\gamma\iota\zeta\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ —to be angry: $\chi\alpha\lambda\epsilon\pi\alpha\iota\upsilon\iota$ —to *express* that anger by words or actions.—It will, perhaps, be objected, that $\chi\alpha\lambda\epsilon\pi\alpha\iota\upsilon\iota$, used as a verb neuter, appears to be synonymous with $\delta\epsilon\gamma\iota\zeta\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$. That it may be often so, I will not take

^b This verb seems to be rare. I neither recollect, nor can, at present, find, any other instance of it, than in the 9th Pastoral of Theocritus, v. 20, where it is used impersonally: $\chi\eta\mu\alpha\iota\upsilon\iota$, i.e. when *it is winter*. An instance, which, as far as it goes, is in favour of the sense I would give to the word here.

take upon me to deny: but numerous instances may certainly be produced, where it is *not* so—where it clearly denotes something beyond the mere internal passion. In this line of Homer, for example;

Ζεύς, ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἀνδρῶσι ΚΟΤΕΣΣΑΜΕΝΟΣ
ΧΑΛΕΠΗ·ΝΗ. Il. Π. 386.

—“*iratus sæviat* ;”—where the *anger* of Jupiter is expressed by κοτεσσαμεν^Θ; but χαλεπήνη goes on to the external demonstration of it, ὅτε λαβροτατον χερσιν ὕδωρ. v. 385.

So, too, Od. T. v. 83.

Μη πῶς τοι δισποινα κοτεσσαμένη ΧΑΛΕΠΗ·
ΝΗ· - - -

—which, in vulgar language, would be fairly rendered, “lest your mistress should *be angry*, and “*scold*.”

Thus, again, Il. Ε. 256, of Jupiter:

- - - ὃ δ' ἐπεγρόμεν^Θ ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΕ
ΡΙΠΤΑΖΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΔΩΜΑ ΘΕΟΥΣ.—

In the very passage adduced to exemplify the *transitive* use of this verb, Il. T. 183, it appears to have the same sense: for the words, ὅτε τις προτιε^Θ χαλεπήνη, allude to Agamemnon's own words, Il. B. 378.

Και γὰρ ἐγὼν Ἀχιλεὺς τε μαχεσσαμέθ', εἵνεκα κερῆς,
Ἀντιβίοις ΕΠΕΕΣΣΙΝ· ἐγὼ δ' ἮΡΧΟΝ ΧΑΛΕ-
ΠΑΙΝΩΝ.

Χαλεπαινῶν is here, I think, put as synonymous with μαχεσθαι ἐπεισσειν. Agamemnon confesses,
that

that he himself gave the first *verbal provocation*; alluding, I think, to his speech, v. 131, where he first hints at the seizure of Briseis. For though Achilles speaks, indeed, somewhat roughly to the king in the preceding speech, yet his *wrath* cannot properly be said to commence before the subsequent speech, Ω μοι, ἀναιδισιν, &c. v. 149.

I shall add only an instance or two more.—In the first book of Plato's *Repub.* Socrates says to Thrasymachus,—ἰλεῖσθαι ἂν ἡμᾶς πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰς ἔστι παρ' ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν, ἢ ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ—*i. e.* “we deserve rather to be pitied by you wise men, than to be scolded at.”—In the passage quoted NOTE 22, p. 283, vol. i. Plato says of a dog,—ὅν μιν ἂν ἰδὼν ἀγνοῶτα, ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΕΙ—ὅν δ' ἂν γινώσκοντες, ΑΣΠΑΖΕΤΑΙ: “*fawns* on those he knows, and *barks* at strangers.” In the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, II. 2, we have—Αἰσθόμενος δὲ ποτὶ Λαμπρόκλεια, τὸν πρεσβυτάτου υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ, πρὸς τὴν μητέρα ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΟΝΤΑ: *i. e.* “when he had heard him *speaking angrily* to his mother.”

It seems, then, that the passage will fairly admit of the meaning I have proposed. And whether that meaning would not be more to Aristotle's purpose, than the other, I willingly submit to the reader's consideration. For *why* recommend it to the Poet to help his imagination by *action*, when he composes?—plainly, for the sake of the effect of this method upon his *poetry*; that his *expression* of passion may have more of truth and nature;

nature; that his characters may *χρμαίνειν*, or *χαλεπαινειν*, ἀληθινωτατα *. Now it seems more consonant to this purpose, that the words which follow as the *reason* of the advice, should refer to this *immediate* effect upon the Poet's work, which is the object of the advice, than to the more *remote* and *implied* effect of the work upon the spectator. It seems, indeed, to have been this reference to the audience, in the usual way of understanding the passage, that led Madius into the mistake of supposing this precept intended, not for the Poet, but for the *Player*.

Such are my objections to the sense hitherto given to this passage, and my reasons for thinking, that its meaning may have been mistaken. I abandon them, without reserve, to the judgment of the learned reader: in my own, it is impossible for me to confide, when I reflect, that the whole band of commentators, who have preceded me, have acquiesced, without doubt or scruple, in that interpretation which to me appears so unsatisfactory.

* It is somewhat in favour of this interpretation, that it gives the adverb, ἀληθινωτατα, its most natural and obvious construction, with the verbs, *χρμασι* and *χαλεπασιν*. As the passage is commonly understood, it must be joined with the *participles*.

NOTE 139.

P. 152. GREAT NATURAL QUICKNESS OF PARTS - - -.

Εὐφους ἡ ποιητικὴ ἔστιν - - -. Εὐφύια—ΟΞΥΤΗΣ. *Hesychius*. See also Casaub. upon Athenæus, p. 454, and Suidas, *voc.* Εὐφουα, and Εὐφύια, where the passage he quotes from *Alex. Aphrod.* shews what was the *common* idea of εὐφύια, though its *propriety* is disputed. The εὐφους were generally understood to be οἱ ῥαδίως—μανθανόντες, ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχοντες πρὸς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα, &c. The passage seems to allude to *Ethic. Nicom.* III. 5. p. 113. *ed. Wülk.*

No epithet can be more exactly adapted to the εὐφους, than that of εὐπλασ^{ος}, which follows; a man of quick, *mimetic* parts, who can *turn himself*, as we say, *to every thing* with equal facility, and mould himself, without effort, to every form. But the word had considerable latitude, and would have been applied by the antients, to the *genius* of a Shakspeare, the *talents* of a Foote^a, or the *docility* of a school-boy^b.

^a Philip of Macedon would have caressed such a man as Foote. He delighted, we are told, ἰσθρῶναι τοῖς ΕΥΦΥΤΕΣΙ καθεμένοις, καὶ τὰ γελοῖα λεγόντι καὶ ποιοῦσι. *Athen.* 260.

^b Περὶ τῶν ΕΥΦΥΤΩΝ, says Isocrates, speaking of scholars, οὗτοι μὲν λαμβάνουσι μισθόν, ὅτι ΠΟΛΛΑ ΜΑΝΘΑΝΟΥΣΙ· παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἈΦΥΤΩΝ, ὅτι πολλὰς πομπὰς παρεχόμενοι.—An admirable inscription for a school door.

NOTE 140.

P. 152. OR, AN ENTHUSIASM ALLIED TO
MADNESS - - -.

Ἡ μανία.—My translation here will, I fear, be thought too paraphrastical. But this is one among many passages, that have occurred, where I have found it impossible to give, at the same time, *word* for *word*, and *idea* for *idea*. This, indeed, is the great misfortune of translation; for what Mr. Harris has observed is too true,—that “much of the force of the original will necessarily be lost in the translation, where *single* words in one language cannot be found corresponding to *single* words in the other.”

The word, μανία, wanted no explanation to Greek readers, to whom, from the writings of Plato, in particular, it was familiar to consider *enthusiasm* of every kind, as a species of *madness*¹. They would understand no more, from Aristotle's expression, than that *comparative* insanity which Cicero has so exactly expressed:—Poetam bonum “neminem — sine inflammatione animorum” existere

¹ *Philos. Arrang.* p. 211, note.

² See, particularly, the *Phædrus*, p. 244, 245, ed. Serr.—Aristotle himself, too, in his *Rhetoric*, says—ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΜΟΣ γὰρ ἡ ποίησις, III. 7. ed. Duval.—I cannot help just reminding the reader of the admirable humour with which Horace ridicules the *practical* abuse of this idea, in his *Art of Poetry*, v. 295—304.

“*existere posse, et sine quodam afflatu quasi furoris*.”—But what can a mere modern reader think, when he is told, in Dacier’s translation, that, to succeed in Poetry, “il faut avoir un genie excellent, *ou etre FURIEUX*?”

Nor could I, without danger of confounding the philosopher’s distinction, have rendered *ῥῆσις* by the single word *genius*; which, as we usually apply it to the fine arts, implies much of that very warmth, and illusive power, of imagination, that “*inflammatio animorum*” which Aristotle meant to express by the other word, *μανία*.

I must not omit, that this whole passage receives considerable illustration from another, in the *Problems*, pointed out by Mr. Winstanley in his edition, p. 292^d.

If Aristotle had given any instance of the *μανία* among the Tragic Poets, it would, in all probability, have been Æschylus. It is pleasant to observe the appearance which the wild invention and ferocious sublimity of his PROMETHEUS, had to the eye of a French critic, of admirable good sense, indeed, but, *καρδία ῥηπορ*. “Je crois,” says Fontenelle, “qu’*Eschile* etoit UNE MANIERE DE FOU, qui avoit l’imagination très-
“vive,

* De Or. II. 46.

^d P. 817. B. ed. Duval. Ὅσοις δὲ καὶ ἔστι.—to *ἰνσαν*, C. The reading, *ἰνσαν*, instead of *ἰξσαν*, if it stood in need of any confirmation, would be confirmed by this single passage beyond all doubt.

"vive, et pas trop réglée". He would probably have said much the same of Shakspeare. The charge certainly cannot be retorted upon the French Tragic writers. It is related of the unfortunate Nat Lee, that, when he was in Bedlam, somebody had the inhumanity to tell him, it was a very easy thing to write like a madman. "No," replied the Poet, "it is not an easy thing to write like a madman; but it is a very easy thing to write like a fool." I believe these two things are almost equally difficult to our ingenious neighbours. It would be hard to detect Racine writing like a fool. But I confess I never read him without wishing he had written a little more like a madman. We must allow him much merit;—but he never "rolled his eye" in the "*fin phrensy*" of the Poet; he knew little of "*the tricks*" of "*strong imagination*." The character given of him by Lord Kaims appears to me perfectly exact and just; that "he is always sensible, generally correct, never falls low, maintains a moderate degree of dignity without reaching the sublime, paints delicately the tender passions, but is a stranger to the genuine language of enthusiastic or servile passion".

I have

* *Tome ix. p. 415.*—"Il me semble," says this agreeable writer, "qu'il ne faudroit donner dans le sublime, qu'à son corps défendant." [Preface to his *Hist. des Oracles*.] No wonder then, that he could not relish Æschylus.

¹ *Elements of Crit. vol. i. p. 488.*

I have often wondered, what it was that could attach Mr. Gray so strongly to a Poet whose genius was so little analogous to his own². I must confess I cannot, even in the *dramatic* fragment given us by Mr. Mason, discover any other resemblance to Racine, than in the *length* of the speeches. Its fault, indeed, is Racine's; its beauties are, surely, of a higher order. What pity, that a work of genius, should have been smothered in its birth, by a little cold and trifling criticism!—We have, indeed, been told, that “it was *certainly* no loss to the English stage, that “*Agrippina* was never finished:” but we have been told it by the same critic who has pronounced, also, that the BARD of Gray, only “*endeavour*” “at sublimity;” who saw in the juvenile Poems of Milton “no promise of *Paradise Lost*,” and who has admitted, with seeming complacence, into the catalogue of English POETS, such names as *Blackmore*, *Yalden*, and *Pomfret*—

“*Alcandrumque Haliumque Noemonaque
Prytanimque!*”—

NOTE 141.

P. 152. WHEN THE POET INVENTS A SUBJECT - - -

Here is a confusion of various readings, none of them, I think, free from suspicion. How the sense

² See Letter xvi. Sect. 4. of the *Memoirs of Mr. Gray*.

sense given to the passage by Victorius, and almost all the commentators, is *fairly* to be obtained from any of them, I confess, I never could see. I follow the common, and, in my opinion, the least suspicious, reading—*τας τε* λογας τας πεποιημενας*—. And I understand Aristotle to speak of subjects, either wholly invented by the Poet, like the *Λογ* of Agatho, or, having only some very slight and general foundation in history or tradition. — *Λογ*—the *general story*, or *argument*. — (*Λογ*—*ἡ τοῦ δράματος θεοῦ ἐξίς*. *Hesychius*.)—*ΚΑΙ αὐτοὶ ποιεῖν*τα,—because, I suppose, such *arguments* were commonly drawn up by *others*, probably in the *Διδασκαλῆαι*, and, perhaps, prefixed to the copies of the play. But here, Aristotle—"poetam etiam ipsum hoc facere jubet; " quod novum erat, et inusitatum :"—as the force of *ΚΑΙ ΑΤΤΟΝ* seems rightly explained by Victorius.

NOTE 142.

P. 153. WHEN HE HAS GIVEN NAMES TO HIS CHARACTERS - - -

This seems to shew plainly, that by *λογας πεποιημενας* the critic means only such subjects as were of the Poet's own invention*. For he says—*first*,

* *τας ΔΕ λογας*, which, according to VICTORIUS has MS. authority, would, perhaps, be preferable.

* As, *πεποιημενον ὄνομα*, cap. xxi. "a word of the Poet's invention."—*πεποιημενα σῆμια*—*πεποιημεναι ἀναγυριστις*, cap. xvi.

first, form a general sketch of your fable; *then*, give names to your characters. This manifestly implies, that the names were not already fixed by history or tradition, but were at the Poet's choice. To avoid this difficulty, the Abbé Batteux translates, "on remet les noms ^b." But this, certainly, is not what Aristotle *says*; and it is too trifling, surely, to be what he *means*. If the names are given by the particular history which the Poet follows, what purpose will it answer to omit them in his plan?—They will certainly be in his mind; they may as well be upon his paper. In short, the method here recommended by Aristotle seems perfectly absurd and nugatory, upon any other supposition than that of a story, either wholly invented by the Poet, or, of which, at least, he owes only some slight hint to fact, and real life. In this case, and in this only, it is, that the subject *first* presents itself to the Poet's mind in a general and abstracted view, which he afterwards circumstantiates by time, place, and names, and fills up by the detail of particular episodes and scenes.

That this is the meaning, will appear, I think, still more clearly from the 9th chapter, with which this passage should be compared. What is *here* said

cap. xvi. and, *παρανομήματα ὀνόματα*, cap. ix. "names invented
" by the Poet."

^b And, see his note, N° 3, upon chap. xvi.—It is the explanation of Beni:—"jam nomina imponi jubet, non
" tam illa fingendo, quam reddendo."

said of the method to be pursued by *Tragic* Poets, answers exactly to what is *there* said of the *Comic*: εὐρησάντες γὰρ τοὺς μύθους διὰ τῶν εἰκόνων, ὅτι τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεῖν;—with this difference, indeed, that the *Comic* writer may give whatever names he pleases; while the *Tragic* generally adopts *historical* names, even when his subject is feigned. Yet Aristotle, there, not only allows that *Tragedy*, as well as *Comedy*, may be *all* invention, both plot and names, but even says, that it would be “*ridiculous*” to think otherwise: γελοῖον τὸ το ζῆναι. And he immediately adds, that it is the *invention* or *making* of his *fable*, (not of his *verse* only,) that truly constitutes the *Poet*.*

NOTE 143.

P. 153. THAT THE EPISODES BELONG PROPERLY TO THE SUBJECT - - -.

See NOTE 37*.—Here are two instances given by Aristotle of what he means by *episodes* in dramatic Poetry. They confirm, I think, what was said in that note. That *Orestes* should be *taken*, *by some means or other*, and should, by some means or other, be *saved*, were essential parts of the Poet's fable. *These* were not episodes, in Aristotle's view; for he expressly includes them both in that general sketch of the story, which is previous to the intertexture of the episodes:—ἐλθόν

δε

* Cap. ix.—Transl. Part II. Sect. 6. * In vol. i.

δι καὶ ΑΗΘΡΕΙΣ — and, ἰσχυρὸν δὲ ἡ ΣΩΤΗΡΙΑ. The *episodes* are the circumstances by which the Poet chose to effect this *capture*, and this *escape*; i. e. the *madness* of Orestes, and the *ablution* of the statue; or rather, these facts drawn out into some particularity of descriptive narration, so as to form distinct, though subordinate, parts of the action; for this, perhaps, made a part of Aristotle's idea of *ἰσχυροδιδόν*.—And the examples here given seem to confirm this. See the *Iphig. in Tauris*, v. 260, to 340.—v. 1153, &c.—And, particularly, the narration of the ἀγγελοῦ, v. 1327, &c.

From the very observation, that these episodes should be *properly related to the subject**, and from what he adds of the difference of dramatic and epic episodes in point of *length*, it clearly appears, that, as I observed in the note referred to, the word is not applied to Tragedy in a *different sense* from that in which it is applied to the Epic Poem.

NOTE 144.

P. 153. BUT IN THE EPIC THEY ARE THE MEANS OF DRAWING OUT THE POEM TO ITS PROPER LENGTH.

* Ἡ δ' ἰσοποῖα ταῖς μηχανεταί.—Compare cap. XXIV. Ἐχὺ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιεκτείνεσθαι, κ.τ.αλ.—το, ἰσχυροδιδόν.

* They could not therefore be considered by Aristotle as "*parties nécessaires de l'action*," according to Le Bossu's definition, lib. ii. ch. 6.

NOTE 145.

P. 153. THE GENERAL STORY OF THE ODYSSEY—LIES IN A SMALL COMPASS.

ΜικρⓈ, (instead of *μακρ*Ⓢ,) has now the support of a manuscript. See, *ed. Ox.* 1780, with the learned editor of which I perfectly agree. *Λογ*Ⓢ is plainly used here in the same sense as before, for the general argument, or summary, of the Poem: whereas, if we read *μακρ*Ⓢ, it *can* mean only the *entire* story at full length, with all its episodes. Farther; the epitome of the Odyssey which follows, is evidently the exemplification of the preceding assertion, that the story of the Odyssey, stripped of its episodes, is very *short*.

Homer himself has given us a still more general outline of the Poem in two lines and a half;—*συνοψιν πασης της Οδυσσειας*, as the scholiast has observed upon it:

Φη, *κακα πολλὰ παθόντ', ὄλισαντ' ἀπο πάν-
τας ἱταίρας,*

Ἀγνοῶσιν πάντεσσιν, ἱεῖκος δ' ἰνικυτῶ,

Οἰκαδ' ἔλευσεσθαι. - - - Od. B. 174.

—where, *ὄλισαντ' ἀπο πάντας ἱταίρας*, is equivalent to Aristotle's *μινε ὄντ*Ⓢ.

NOTE 146.

P. 154. PERSECUTED BY NEPTUNE - - -.

ΠΑΡΑΦΤΑΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΟΥ ὡς το Ποσειδῶν. —

The same idea is thus expressed by Virgil :

- - - nec Teucris addita Juno

Usquam aberit.

Æn. vi. 90.

—upon which passage the reader will find an excellent and useful note in the best of all editions of this Poet, that of Heyne.

Horace comes still nearer to the word παραφταττεσθαι :

Incontinentis nec Tityi jecur

Relinquit ales, nequitiae ADDITUS

CUSTOS.

Lib. III. Ode iv.

NOTE 147.

P. 154. AND MAKING HIMSELF KNOWN TO SOME OF HIS FAMILY - - -.

Αναγνωρισας τινας, αὐτοῖς ἐπιθιμεν. — This is all very strange, and, probably, very corrupt; as may appear, merely from the awkward and cacophonous repetition of the pronoun—ΑΥΤΟΣ ἀφικνιται - - ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ἐπιθιμεν, ΑΥΤΟΣ μὲν ἐσθθη.

And what is, ἀναγνωρισας τινας?—Certainly, not what one expects. Ulysses, we know, was *discovered* by the nurse, and *discovered himself* to Eumæus, and the herdsman, and to Telemachus; but

but I do not recollect that he *discovers* any one. Castelvetro saw this; and he says, that “οἰκτιρῶ is “to be understood; and that the signification of “the word ἀναγνωρίσας here must be observed, “which is, not that Ulysses *discovered* any of his “friends, but that he *made himself known to* “them.” But we have no authority, that I know of, for *this* use of ἀναγνωρίζω with an accusative case. Piccolomini, too, understands this passage as Castelvetro did—“*datosi à conoscere ad alcuni.*” And the Abbé Batteux—“*se fait reconnoître,*” &c.

But what, again, is, αὐτοῖς ἐπιθεμεν?—Does αὐτοῖς refer to the *friends*, or to the *enemies*, of Ulysses?—Is ἐπιθεμεν, *deceiving, imposing on*, as it is rendered by Victorius, and others after him, or, as others understand it, *attacking*? for it will bear either of these senses. I have preferred the latter as most obvious, and, on the whole, most to the purpose. *Ἐπιτιθεμενοι* is used by Aristotle in this sense, *Rhet.* II. 5. It generally, I believe, implies an attack more or less *insidious*, such as that of Ulysses upon the suitors. The scholiast upon Homer, Od. γ. 156, observes, that a day of festivity was made choice of, as furnishing a favourable opportunity of attacking the suitors: *ἐν ταῖς ἀνδρῶν περὶ τὴν ἰορτὴν καταγινόμενων, εὐχαιρὸν ἔχον το ἐπιτιθεσθαι τοῖς μνησθηπεί.*

NOTE 148.

P. 154. I CALL COMPLICATION, ALL THAT IS BETWEEN THE BEGINNING OF THE PIECE, AND THE LAST PART, &c.

Aristotle is here, as usual, very short and dry in the information he bestows upon us concerning this *ἀντιστροφή* and *ἀντιστροφή*. I wish he had given us a definition of their meanings, instead of a mere designation of their places. One would suspect, on the first view, from the mention of a change *ἀντιστροφή* only, (in which reading all the MSS. I think, agree,) from his instance, (if it be the same Tragedy as he before cited, *cap. xi.*) and from the common acceptance of the word *ἀντιστροφή* itself, that he was speaking only of those Tragedies in which the principal characters are extricated from the difficulties they were involved in, and the end is happy. And, indeed, the way in which Le Bossu, and others after him, explain this *nœud* and *dénouement*, leads naturally to this idea, and seems hardly consistent with their allowing, as they do, that the *dénouement* may be either calamitous or prosperous*. For they explain the *nœud*, or *ἀντιστροφή*, by “*obstacles à vaincre*”^b — “*efforts contraires* — i.e. *aux efforts du héros pour l'exécution de son dessein*.” — “*Les obstacles présentés s'appellent nœuds, et la manière dont*”
“*on*”

* Le Bossu, *Traité du Poème*, Ep. II. 16.

^b Batteux's note on this passage. ^c Le Bossu, II. 13.

" *on les force, se nomme, denouement* ⁴."—This will do very well for Æneas, or Ulysses. But when *Oedipus* finds himself guilty of parricide and incest, and, from a state of regal dignity and happiness, becomes a wretched, blind, and banished vagabond—this is but a strange way of *surmounting obstacles*.

The truth is, that the obstacles of the *disis*, or the *knot*, are those which are presented to the *mind* of the *spectator*; the difficulty overcome is that of *seeing how the piece will terminate*. And thus, indeed, the Abbé Batteux more accurately expresses himself elsewhere :—" *Le nœud dans le Cinna est, de sçavoir si Cinna tuera Auguste,*" &c⁵. The *lusis* is, to the spectator, the solution of the problem, "How will all this end?" And we may add, the more difficult the problem, the greater the pleasure of the solution.

It may be objected, that this is applicable only to those Tragedies, the subjects of which are totally unknown to the spectator; and it may be asked, "Where is the problem to be solved, in those dramas, which we have repeatedly seen and read, and of which we are perfectly acquainted
" with

⁴ Batteux, *Principes de la Lit.* tome ii. p. 226.

⁵ *Princip. de la Lit.* tome iii. p. 51. And so, too, Le Bossu, where he says of the *nœud*, that it lasts "autant de temps que *l'esprit du lecteur est suspendu sur l'événement de ces efforts contraires,*" &c. *ch. xiii.* Dacier, too, talks in the same equivocal language. See his notes, 1, 2, and 3.

“ with the catastrophe, and every incident that
 “ leads to it?” To this I can only answer, that
 it is a fact, and certainly a curious fact, that it
 makes little difference, or none at all, in the sym-
 pathetic interest which a spectator feels during the
 course of the action, whether he knows, or does
 not know, beforehand, how the piece will end.
 “ Quelque prévenu que l’on soit de la manière
 “ dont tout va se résoudre, *la marche de l’action*
 “ *en écarte la réminiscence : l’impression de ce que*
 “ *l’on voit empêche de réfléchir à ce que l’on sait ;*
 “ et c’est par ce prestige que les spectateurs qui
 “ se laissent toucher, pleurent vingt fois au même
 “ spectacle.”—[Marmontel, *Poet. Franc.* ii. 220.]

The term *λυσis*, therefore, is as applicable to the
 calamitous catastrophe of the *Oedipus*, as to the
 satisfactory conclusion of the *Iphigenia in Tauris*.
 For Aristotle expressly gives these parts, as parts
 of every Tragedy. *Εστὶ δὲ ΠΑΡΗΣ τραγῳδίας, το*
μὲν, δις, το δὲ, λυσις.

NOTE 149.

P. 154. THE LYNCEUS OF THEODECTES ---.

Castelvetro has *guessed*, with some ingenuity,
 the subject and plot of this Tragedy, from Hyginus,
 Fab. 45. See Goulston’s supplemental version,
 which is taken from him. It seems, however, very
 improbable, that a Tragedy should be denominated
 from a person who had no other share in the
 action, than that it passed under his roof.

Dacier

Dacier understands this to be the *Lyncæus* mentioned before, cap. xi. All I see is, that his application of the word, *ταῖς*, to *Lyncæus* the husband of Hypermnestra, cannot be admitted. The diminutive *ταῖς*, is, I believe, never used but to signify a *child*. In this respect, certainly, Castelvetro's conjecture has greatly the advantage; as it has, also, in the explanation of *αἰνιτικὴν τὰ θάρσυν*, which, in Dacier, is terribly forced. See his version.

NOTE 150.

P. 155. THERE ARE FOUR KINDS OF TRAGEDY, DEDUCIBLE FROM SO MANY PARTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED.

It is incumbent on a commentator to state, as clearly as he can, the difficulties of his author, whether he be able to remove them, or not. This has not been done with respect to this passage, in any of the comments that I have seen.

Aristotle says, *Τραγῳδίας δὲ εἶδη εἰσὶ, τέσσαρα· τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐκτεθῆναι*. "There are four species of Tragedy; for so many also are the parts which have been mentioned." This is saying, as expressly as words can say it, that the four different species of Tragedy correspond to, and, of course, arise from, four different parts already mentioned. Now what are those parts? Four parts of quantity have indeed been mentioned; (cap. xii.) but these are quite out of the question.

question. If we have recourse to what are called the parts of *quality*^a, these are *six*; and if, with Dacier, we reduce them to *four*, by throwing out the *decoration* and the *music*, the four that remain, i. e. *fable*, *manners*, *sentiments*, and *diction*, will furnish out, among them, only *one* of the species of Tragedy enumerated—that which is denominated *ἡθικὴ*. These, then, cannot be the *four parts* pointed at as the foundation of the four species. There remain only the parts which Aristotle calls *μερῶν Μῦθου*: the parts, not of Tragedy, but of *one* of the *essential parts* of Tragedy—the *Fable*. These he enumerated in the 11th chapter^b, and to these, the commentators, in general, are agreed in understanding Aristotle to allude.

But the difficulty here is, that he refers to *four parts mentioned*, and here are only *three*—i. e. *ῥησις*, *ἀνὰρσις*, (which he expressly calls *δύο μέρη μερῶν*), and, *thirdly*, *ἡθικὴ*: ΤΡΙΤΟΝ δὲ, *ἡθικὴ*.—There is no mention of *ἡθικὴ*, to furnish his third species, the *moral* Tragedy; nor, indeed, was it, by any means, to be expected there, where he is professedly enumerating the parts of the *Fable*. *ἡθικὴ*, in the sense in which the word is there used^c, may, unquestionably, be considered

^a Cap. vi. Transl. Part II. Sect. 2.

^b Transl. Part II. Sect. 9, at the end.

^c *ἡθικὴ*, in its usual sense, of *passion*, is a part, not of the *μῦθος*, but of the *Διγνῶσις*. (See cap. xix. Transl.

considered as parts of the *Fable*; ἤθη, or manners, cannot.

The Abbé Batteux thinks the *ethic* species is tacitly implied, as the opposite, or negative, of the *pathetic*. The three parts of the fable, περιπέτεια, ἀναγνώρισις, παθόν, give, *directly*, only two species of Tragedy; the two first constituting, (one, or both of them,) the *complicated*, (πεπλεγμένην,) and the third, the *pathetic*, or *disastrous*, Tragedy. The two other species are only the negatives of these. If the fable is *without* revolution or discovery^d, the Tragedy is *simple*, as opposed to *complicated*; if, *without* παθόν, or disasters, it is ἡθικὴ, as opposed to παθητικὴ.—Such is the explanation of this ingenious writer^e; which seems to be much favoured by the manner in which these species are arranged afterwards, when applied to *Epic* Poetry in *cap.* xxiv.; where we have—ἡ γὰρ ἈΠΛΗΝ ἢ ΠΕΠΛΕΓΜΕΝΗΝ,—ἡ ΗΘΙΚΗΝ ἢ ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΗΝ, δεῖ εἶναι; and, also, by the frequent opposition of παθόν and ἡθόν, παθητικόν and ἡθικόν, in antient writers^f.—

It

Part II. Sect. 22.) But, in the sense defined *cap.* xi. (Transl. Part II. Sect. 9.) it is an *action*—ΠΡΑΞΙΣ φθαρτικὴ, &c. and, therefore, part of the *plot*, or συνθεσις πραγμάτων, as much as the revolution, and discovery.

^d - - - ἌΝΕΤ περιπέτεια; ἢ ἀναγνώρισμα, as he says above, in defining the *simple* fable. *Cap.* x.

^e See his note; and his *Principes de la Lit.* tome iii. p. 84.

^f See, for instance, *Rhet.* III. 17. Quintil. VI. 2. p. 299, 300, *ed. Gibs.* &c.—I am aware, indeed, that in this

It may, indeed, be objected, that this cannot be reconciled to Aristotle's words—*τοσαυτα γαρ και τα μερη* 'ΕΛΕΞΘΗ; which seem to refer clearly to four parts that had been all expressly *mentioned*. But, if we should suppose Aristotle here to consider that as said, which was only implied, and as explained, which was only hinted, we should, perhaps, take no liberty that is not warranted by the magisterial and elliptic brevity of his general style, and even by similar instances in his writings*. But even this will not entirely remove the difficulty, while, by the *parts* alluded to, we understand Aristotle to mean only the *μερη μυθου* of the 11th chapter: because *παθου*, as I before observed, could be neither mentioned, nor implied, as a part of the *fable*. Perhaps, therefore, he meant to use the word *μερη* in a *general* sense, as he clearly does use it, cap. xxiv. *και τα ΜΕΡΗ, ἔξω μιλ. και ὁψιως, τ'αυτα και ΓΑΡ περιπτεειων δει, κ.τ.αλ.*—where the *και ΓΑΡ* shews, that the *parts* he had just mentioned

this opposition, *παθου* is not taken in the dramatic sense, of blood-shed, disasters, &c. but in the usual sense of *passion*. But as this sense is, in fact, involved in the former, (for we can scarce conceive a disastrous, or, as we call it, a *deep*, Tragedy, that is not also highly *pathetic*, or *passionate*.) this is not, perhaps, any material objection.

* His references are frequently obscure, or ambiguous. So, the *καθαπερ ειρηται*, cap. xi. see NOTE 83. And the, *ωσπερ ειρηται*, cap. xv. see NOTE 110.—An embarrassment of enumeration somewhat similar to that of this passage has occurred in cap. xiv. See NOTE 105.

mentioned included *both* the six constituent parts of Tragedy, and the three *parts of the fable* which he enumerates. If we understand *μερη* in this way, the meaning will only be, that so many different *parts*, (of one kind or other,) have been mentioned (*ἐλεγχθη*), from which these species may be deduced: these are, the three *μερη μυθου*, which furnish the *complicated*, the *simple*, and the *pathetic*, species; and the *second* of the essential parts of Tragedy, *ἦθος*, which, though indeed it be a part of every Tragedy, admits, according to Aristotle's own account, of more or less^b, and, when predominant, may be characteristic of another species, the *ethic*, or *moral* Tragedy, naturally enough opposed to the *pathetic*.

I confess I see no other possible consistent sense that can be given to this passage, as we now read it: for *four* parts are here mentioned; and *four* parts cannot be made out, if we confine ourselves to the *μερη* ΜΥΘΟΥ in *cap.* xi.

Dacier seems to have perceived this; and his explanation agrees so far with mine, that he, also, makes "la peripetie, la reconnoissance, la passion, *et les mœurs*," the four parts that produce the four sorts of Tragedy. But when, in order to reduce the *seven* parts, (i. e. fable, manners, diction, sentiments, discovery, revolution, disasters,) to the *four* which he wants, he rejects three, i. e. *fable*, *diction*, and *sentiments*, because they

are

^b *Cap.* vi.—ἀντὶ δὲ ἡδυν γινώσκει ἂν (sc. Τραγῳδία) &c.

are common to all Tragedy, he makes a distinction for which there seems to be no foundation; the manners being equally included by Aristotle among those parts which are expressly ΠΑΣΗΣ τραγωδίας μέρος¹. But, though all these parts necessarily belong, in some degree or other, to every Tragedy, any one of them may be so predominant, as to characterize a Tragedy, and give it, if we please, a specific denomination. Thus, there may be, and there is, such a species as the *sentimental* Tragedy, of which, in the critic's language, το ὅλον ἡ Διανοια:—another, of which the *language* may be the most striking character—ἡς το ὅλον ἡ Λεξις^k; and he himself speaks of a sort of Tragedy that might very well be denominated, ἡ Οπτικη^l, of which examples are not wanting on the modern stage. The Italian opera is a Tragedy, ἡς το ὅλον ἵεν ἡ Μελωποιῖα.—But Aristotle's business was not to enumerate all the different species which want of taste or judgment might produce, but those only which were considered as legitimate, and such as sound criticism would approve. Hence, he has recourse, for the formation of the *four* regular and

¹ Cap. vi.

^k Of the first, Mr. Harris gives *Measure for Measure* as an instance; of the last, *Cato*.—*Philol. Inq.* p. 161.—But *Cato* seems rather a compound of the two species. Dr. Johnson, in his life of Addison, has more justly characterized it by—"just sentiments in elegant language."

^l See cap. xiv. Transl. Part II. Sect. 13.

and authorised species, only to the two *first* and most *important* of the six constituent parts of Tragedy—the FABLE, and the MANNERS.

But after all, when we have made the best we can of the text in this passage, we must allow, I believe, that it is more for the credit of Aristotle to suppose it faulty. And that it is so, I am the rather inclined to think, as one difficulty still remains. The expression—"there are *four* sorts of Tragedy; FOR *so many* parts have been mentioned"—seems clearly to imply, not merely, that those four sorts are deducible, *in some way or other*, from those parts, but, as I at first observed, that they, *respectively*, arise from those parts, *each* of which produces its *correspondent species* of Tragedy. But this, as we have seen, is by no means the case. Of the four parts, only *παθος*, and *ηθος*, produce directly their correspondent species, the *παθητικη*, and the *ηθικη*. The other two parts, *περιπετεια*, and *αναγνωρισις*, denominate *one* species from their *presence*, (the *πεπλεγμενη*,) and another, (the *απλη*,) from their *absence*.

NOTE 151.

P. 155. ANOTHER, THE MORAL - - -

Ηθικη.—"Videant studiosi hujus libri, an intelligi debeant, et tanquam *απο κοινης* repeti, et hic et infra, verba illa quæ in explicatione fabulæ *implexæ* posuit: intelligo, inquam, hæc—*ης το*

“ ὅλον ἔστιν : et quod præterea utroque loco con-
 venit, inde sumptum, [i. e. παθεῖν — ἡθικῶς] ut,
 “ quemadmodum inquit in describendâ illâ per-
 “ plexâ—ἥς το ὅλον ἐστὶ περιπετὰ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσις,—
 “ ita, in *patheticâ*,—ἥς το ὅλον ἐστὶ παθὴ; et in
 “ *moralâ*, ἥς το ὅλον ἔστιν ἡθικόν.” So Victorius; and
 the observation seems just and important.

By ἡθικόν, I cannot think, that the mere absence
 of παθὴ is meant, as M. Batteux supposes^a, or, as
 Dacier and others take it, the mere *moral ten-
 dency* of the example. I understand the τραγωδία
 ἡθικόν to be, in the most obvious and usual sense
 of the word, that kind of Tragedy, ἥς το ὅλον ἔστιν
 ἡθικόν—of which the *manners* are the predominant
 part; which seems sufficiently to imply the ab-
 sence of that violent perturbation, deep distress,
 and terrible catastrophe, which distinguish the
pathetic species. This obvious sense of ἡθικόν is
 confirmed by Aristotle’s exemplification in *cap.* xxiv.
 For there, he plainly opposes it to the παθητικόν of
 the Iliad, and applies it to the Odyssey; a poem
 eminently characterized as a picture of life and
manners^b. The word is also used, evidently, in
 the same sense in the *Rhetoric*; where the two
 species of the drama, ἡθικόν, and παθητικόν, are
 mentioned,

^a “ La fable *morale*, opposée à la *Pathétique*, doit être
 “ celle où il n’y a point de sang répandu; telles sont le
 “ Cinna de Corneille, et la Berenice de Racine.”—*Prin-
 cipes de la Lit.* iii. p. 85.

^b See Longinus, *Sect.* 9, *ad finem*.

mentioned, as being each of them, accommodated to *action*, and preferred, on that account, by the players, as peculiarly favourable to the display of their mimetic powers^c. Now this would not be the case, if by ἠθικὴ nothing more than a moral lesson and a virtuous example were intended. Yet this idea is by no means excluded by the other; and Victorius seems to have rightly adjusted this matter. “Animadvertendum autem Tragediam “illam vocari *moratam*, quæ *non solum accuratè* “*mores exprimit*, sed eos *etiam* inducit *probos*; “quod ipse significavit suprâ, ubi de moribus “disseruit; primum enim præcepit ut *χρηστὰ ἦν* “fingerentur.”

If it be objected, that, the delineation of *manners* being the peculiar province of *Comedy*, this account of the Τραγωδία ἠθικὴ confounds the limits of these two opposite species of the drama; we may answer, that the *moral*, or rather *mannered* Tragedy, (for we seem to want a word here,) though allowed by Aristotle, was certainly not that which he himself considered as the best, or the most *Tragic*^d; yet, that even this was sufficiently distinguished from *Comedy* by the *kind* of manners which it imitated. They were to be, if possible,

good,

^c — ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ, [sc. λεξις—*oratorical diction*] ἢ ὑποκριτικωτάτη· ταυτὴς δὲ δύο εἶδη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ, ΗΘΙΚΗ, ἡ δὲ, ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΗ. διὸ καὶ οἱ ὑποκρίται τοιαῦτα τῶν δρᾶματων διακρίνει, καὶ οἱ ποιῆται τὰς τραγέας. [sc. ὑποκρίταις.] *Rhet.* III. 12.

^d See *cap.* xiii, *Transl.* Part II. Sect. 12.

good, (*χρημα*),—at all events they were to be, on the whole, *serious*—*σπουδαία*: whereas the object of Comedy, with respect to manners, as to every thing else, was the *ridiculous*. We must remember too, that, as I have before observed, the two dramas were by no means, in Aristotle's time, so rigorously separated as they now are. There were, then, but two dramatic muses, the muse of Tragedy, and the muse of Farce. Yet there is something between a flood of tears and a broad laugh; and as *Farce* obstinately refused to put any degree of restraint upon her muscles, *Tragedy*, who, as we have seen, was so accommodating, as even, occasionally, to approach to the very laugh of Farce, frequently condescended to dry her tears, and to put on, without scruple, the intermediate *smile*, which *Comedy* should have supplied.

NOTE 152.

P. 155. AND, FOURTHLY, THE SIMPLE, SUCH AS ----- AND ALL THOSE TRAGEDIES, THE SCENE OF WHICH IS LAID IN THE INFERNAL REGIONS.

Το δὲ τεταρτον, οἶον, αἵτις Φορκιδες, καὶ Προμηθευς, καὶ ὅσα ἐν αἰδῷ—The enumeration of these species in *cap.* xxiv. leaves no room to doubt the omission of the word ἈΠΛΟΤΗ here. Το δὲ τεταρτον, ἀπλυν, οἶον, &c.

The commentators have been much puzzled to discover, why all those Tragedies, that have for their

their subject *τα ἐν αἰδῷ*, should be of the *simple* construction; and I have, indeed, been sometimes strongly inclined to believe, that the words, *καὶ ὅσα ἐν αἰδῷ*, were out of their place, and belonged to the *second* species; thus: ἡ δὲ Παθητικὴ, οἷον, ὅς τε Αἰαντὶς, καὶ οἱ Ἰξίονες, καὶ ὅσα ἐν αἰδῷ. Why such subjects should belong to the *disastrous* class, no one can want a reason; and the words follow naturally, and pertinently, in this view, after the instance of *Ixion*. I have been surprised not to find so obvious a conjecture in any of the comments. Piccolomini, indeed, glances at it:—
 “Non sò vedere, perchè più tosto in essemplio
 “delle Tragedie *pathetiche*, che delle semplici,
 “non le habbia poste; havendo riguardo in ciò
 “*alle punction, e supplicii dell’ inferno.*” p. 255.
 And it is very singular, that Dacier’s note (N° 10.) is exactly such, as if he had himself made this conjecture; of which, however, he says nothing. But, after all, it is obvious enough, as Beni has observed, that, in these *infernal* Tragedies, *no περιπετειαί*, no *sudden reverse* of circumstances, could well have place. The comment of that acute Italian upon this passage, is the best I have seen, and will, perhaps, satisfy the reader, that no such conjecture is wanted.—“Clausula hæc sit;—
 “ex istiusmodi fabulis exemplum duxisse Aris-
 “totelem ad illustrandam *simplicem* fabulam,
 “quòd cum illi [sc. Tantalus, Sisyphus, &c.] in
 “eas pœnas atque tormenta, non à prosperitate,
 “quem-

“ quemadmodum Oedipus et alii plerique, devol-
 “ verentur, sed ab initio ad finem usque illis
 “ jactarentur, *peripetia aberat quàm longissimè*.
 “ Imò verò, non modò repentè fortunæ commu-
 “ tatio haud fiebat, quod est proprium peripetiae,
 “ verum etiam *mutatio in decursu toto fiebat*
 “ *levissima ac propè nulla*; ita ut ab initio ad
 “ finem usque, mira *simplicitate* flueret fabula.
 “ Ex quo fiebat, ut commodiùs ex aliis, in quibus
 “ *repentè* vulnera, cruciatus, et cædes continge-
 “ bant, *patheticæ* duceretur exemplum, quàm ex
 “ iis, quibus nullus *repentè* cruciatus infligebatur,
 “ et tamen simplicitas de quâ dicebam mirificè
 “ apparebat.”—*Benii Comment. p. 372.*

As to the reading itself, *iv αἶδς*, it seems to be sufficiently confirmed even by a collation of blunders; for the MSS. exhibit, *iv αἶδοι—iv αἶδ—iv αἶδς—iv αἶδς*.

Victorius seems to doubt, I know not why, whether there existed any such Tragedies. The Σίσυφος Πετροκυλίστης of Æschylus must, clearly, have been of this kind; and probably his Ψυχάγωγος. His *Prometheus* may be conceived to come the *nearest* of any Greek Tragedy extant to a specimen of this kind of drama.—Dacier has very properly reminded us here of what Aristotle had said, *cap. xiii.* of the *old Poets*—that τὰς τυχόντας μὲθες ἀπληθύναν—i. e. they took, as we say, any subject that came uppermost.

NOTE 153.

P. 157. BUT IN THE DRAMA, THE EFFECT OF SUCH A PLAN IS FAR DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS EXPECTED.

Πολυ παρα την ὑποληψιν ἀποβαίνει;—literally, “*it turns out very differently from what was expected, or supposed, by the Poet.*”

The ὑποληψις, the view, and expectation of the Poet, when he crowds so many incidents into his piece, is, that he shall make it interesting and pleasing by its *variety*. But the contrary happens. The necessity of not exceeding the usual length, and time of representation, reduces the proposed variety to a confused and huddled mass of incidents, not long enough dwelt on, or sufficiently detailed, to be either interesting, or clear. His Poem will be καταπελεγμενον τη ποιικιλίᾳ, as the critic well expresses it in another passage that should be compared with this*. Thus, the Poet, in this ill-judged attempt, is disappointed in the same manner as the architect, who aims at a beautiful *variety* by a multitude of small and crowded ornaments, which spoil the *general effect*, and, at the same time, are too many, and too minute, to afford pleasure by separate inspection. And thus, πολυ παρα την ὑποληψιν ἀποβαίνει; or, as the ingenious author of the *Analysis of Beauty* has

* Cap. xxiii. Transl. Part III. Sect. 1. “*perplexed by its variety.*”

has expressed the same idea, in a chapter which affords no bad illustration of this passage from a sister art, "*variety, when overdone, is a check upon itself*."

Such appears to me to be the meaning of this passage, which, I think, has not been fully seen by any of the commentators.

NOTE 154.

P. 157. AS EURIPIDES, BUT NOT ÆSCHYLUS, HAS DONE, &c.

This passage affords a good specimen of the distressing ambiguity that prevails so remarkably throughout

^b Hogarth's *Anal. of Beauty*, cap. viii.—a work, to which, with all its imperfections, I think it may fairly be said, that the public have not done full justice; perhaps, through the author's own fault, who did it *more* than justice himself, by his pretensions. When Hogarth attempted to philosophize, he was lost. His meaning is often obscured by awkward expression, and sometimes seems, pretty plainly, not to have been well known even to himself. (See particularly his chap. on *Proportion*.) Yet the book abounds, I think, with sensible, useful, and, at the time it was written, I believe, *uncommon*, observations. The ideas of eminent artists, relative to their own arts, must always be, more or less, valuable and useful; and they ought not to be discouraged from communicating those ideas to the public, by criticism too severely exercised upon the *manner* in which they do it. A few ideas, even roughly thrown out, from an artist of genius, will often be of more utility to the progress of the art, than whole pages of fine writing and refined speculation from the unpractised *amateur*.

throughout this work. It fairly admits of two different constructions, and two different senses². It may be thus: ὅσοι περσιν Ἰλιε ὅλην ἐποίησαν καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέρος, (ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης Νιοβην, ἢ Μηδῆαν, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ Αἰσχυλ,) ἢ ἐκπιπτέσιν—κ.τ.αλ. Or thus: ὅσοι περσιν Ἰλιε ὅλην ἐποίησαν,—καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέρος (ὥσπερ Εὐρ. Ν. ἢ Μ. [sc. κατὰ μέρος ἐποίησε,] καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ Αἰσχ. [sc. ὅλην ἐποίησε.]) ἢ ἐκπιπ. κ.τ.αλ. —In the first of these ways, the censure will fall on Euripides; in the other, on Æschylus. Victorius contends for the first, but his reasons, though plausible, seem not decisive. The whole, as he observes, turns upon this—whether the ὥσπερ refers to the *whole* sentence—ὅλην ἐποίησαν καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέρος,—or, only to the words immediately preceding, i.e. κατὰ μέρος. On the whole, the last construction, I think, offers itself most naturally; and it seems rather favoured, too, by the similar application of μὴ ὥσπερ, to the *Poet censured*, presently after; where, speaking of the Chorus, he says it should συναγωνίζεσθαι, ΜΗ ὩΣΠΕΡ παρ' Εὐριπίδῃ, ἀλλ' ὩΣΠΕΡ παρα Σοφοκλεῖ. —But this, after all, is one of those passages, where the “*æquato examine lances*” are so nicely balanced, that a commentator might continue in suspense for ever, if the necessity of going on did not oblige him to turn the scale by a touch of his own hand.

² Dacier's interpretation (*note 19.*) I pass over as perfectly inadmissible. This forced construction he borrowed from Castelvetro, p. 398.

NOTE 155.

P. 157-8. FOR, IN REVOLUTIONS, AND IN ACTIONS OF THE SIMPLE KIND, THESE POETS SUCCEED WONDERFULLY IN WHAT THEY AIM AT; AND THAT IS, THE UNION OF TRAGIC EFFECT WITH MORAL TENDENCY, &c.

Those annotators who make the words, 'Εν δὲ ταῖς περιπέτειαις—the beginning of a separate precept relative to the use of the *wonderful*, have the natural construction of the text, and the uniform reading of all the MSS. against them. The natural and obvious construction, surely, is, ἐν τῇ μόνῃ· ἐν ΔΕ ταῖς περ.—κ.τ.αλ. And this is also confirmed by the mention of Agatho again, presently afterwards. All the MSS. too, it seems, give θαυμάσιως, which can never be forced into the sense of "*per admirabile*." The alteration proposed by Heinsius—στοχαζῖται, and βλεῖται—in order to make this refer exclusively to Agatho, seems unnecessary. Στοχαζονται refers, very naturally, to Agatho in conjunction with the *other* Poets just mentioned, whose mistake, and whose failure, were the same.

I have ventured to render this passage in a manner somewhat different from any translator or commen-

* Yet so Mr. Winstanley seems to understand it. See his note, p. 294. If there are any examples of the adverb θαυμάσιως so used, I could wish he had produced them.

commentator that I have seen^b. Τραγικὸν γὰρ τὸτο, καὶ φιλανθρωπὸν. The question is, to what τὸτο refers? The commentators are divided. It appears to me, that it refers to the *purpose*, at which these Poets are said to have *aimed*; and the τὸτο, which follows, explains the τραγικὸν καὶ φιλανθρωπὸν.—Τὸτο ΓΑΡ—“for this (i. e. which “they aim at,) is both Tragic and Moral.” The reader will see how exactly what follows suits this sense; and how this passage helps to confirm the sense given to the word φιλανθρωπὸν, in cap. xiii. [See NOTE 94.] where, ἔλπειν καὶ φοβεῖν, is plainly equivalent to τραγικὸν here. The difficulty was, to reconcile these two effects. Aristotle’s expression, στοχαζόνται ΘΑΤΜΑΣΤΩΣ — “surprisingly well”—implies this difficulty, and, that he does not speak of the practice as perfectly agreeable to his own theory of the Tragic drama. —In the subjects here instanced, there was the φιλανθρωπὸν, because the ἀδικία and πονηρία were punished: and, at the same time, the τραγικὸν, though not amounting to what the critic required, was not wanting, because there was the *unexpected reverse of fortune*, a calamitous event, παθὴ, &c^c. The persons suffering, too, were distinguished by eminent *wisdom* and *courage*; and though such characters

^b The best comment is that of Benius, p. 379.

^c ἢ τραγικὸν, ΑΠΛΘΕΣ γὰρ, cap. xiv. “not Tragic, because it exhibits no disastrous event.” Transl. Part II. Sect. 14.

characters are not what Aristotle recommends as the fittest for *Tragic* purposes^d, yet, by the substitution of admirable and splendid, for moral and estimable, qualities, they are made to produce, in some degree, a similar *effect* upon the spectator.

This appears to me to be the sense of the passage; and it leads me strongly to suspect, that, instead of ἐν τοῖς ἈΠΛΟΙΣ πράγμασι, we should read — ἐν τοῖς ΔΙΠΛΟΙΣ πρ. How easily the mistake might happen, is obvious to the eye. My reasons are these: 1. The φιλανθρωπον—moral tendency—poetical justice, &c. was the *very* characteristic of the *double* fable, (διπλη συγασις) and the *very* reason, probably, why the Platonic critics, as well as the good-natured audiences, preferred it as the *best* plan*. 2. The instances here given seem to accord exactly with this idea. They are plainly examples of the διπλη συγασις, not of the *simple* fable—i.e. *the fable without revolution or discovery*. The expression, τραγικον γαρ τετο και φιλανθρωπον, implies, that the *Tragic and Moral* were aimed at, and effected, by these Poets, *both* in the περιπετειαί, and in the *other* actions mentioned, whatever they were—ἐν τοῖς περιπ. και ἐν τοῖς --- πράγμασι: and, consequently, his subsequent examples of the τραγικον και φιλανθρωπον must equally accord with *both*. But, if we read ἀπλοῖς, this will not be the case; for those exam-
ples

^d See cap. xiii. ὁ μεταξυ, &c. Transl. Part II. Sect. 11.

* See cap. xiii. Transl. Part II. Sect. 12. *last parag.*

ples are such as necessarily imply *revolutions*, and a *sudden* and *unexpected turn of events*, which suit very well with ΔΙΠΛΟΙΣ πραγμασι, but are incompatible with ἁπλοῖς; the *simple* fable being defined by this very circumstance, that it is ἀνεπιπετυαί, &c. (cap. x.)

NOTE 156.

P. 158. SUCH EVENTS, AS AGATHO SAYS, &c.

This alludes to these two lines of Agatho:—

Ταχ' ἂν τις εἰπῇ αὐτο τετ' εἶναι λεγοί,
Βροτοισι πολλὰ τυγχάναν ἔκ εἰκοτα.

Even *this*, it may be said, is *probable*,
That many things *improbable* should happen,
In human life.—

See *Rhet.* II. 24. p. 581, *ed. Duval*.—And Bayle's Art. AGATHON, note [F], who mentions a similar maxim of St. Bernard's: "Ordinatissimum est, minus interdum ordinate fieri." "Il est tout à fait de l'ordre, que de tems en tems il se fasse quelque chose contre l'ordre."

This general, and, if I may call it so, *possible* sort of *probability*, may be termed, *the probability of romance*; and these lines of Agatho furnish a good apologetical motto for the novel writer. It might be prefixed, perhaps, without impropriety, even to the best productions of the kind—to a CLARISSA, or a CECILIA. Nothing is so com-

monly complained of in such works, as their *improbability*; and often, no doubt, the complaint is well founded: often, however, the criticism means nothing more, than that the events are *uncommon*, and proves nothing more, than the want of fancy, and an extended view of human life, in the reader. If the events were *not* uncommon, where would the book find readers?

“ Si la nature ne combinoit jamais des evenemens d’une maniere extraordinaire, tout ce que le Poete imagineroit au-delà de la simple et froide uniformité des choses communes, seroit incroyable. Mais il n’en est pas ainsi. Que fait donc le Poete?—Ou il s’empare de ces combinaisons extraordinaires, ou il en imagine de semblables. Mais au lieu que la *liaison* des événemens nous échappe souvent dans la nature, et que, faute de connoître l’ensemble des choses, nous ne voyons qu’une concomitance fatale dans les faits; le *Poet* veut lui qu’il regne dans toute la texture de son ouvrage une liaison apparente et sensible; en sorte qu’il est *moins vrai, et plus vraisemblable que l’historien*.”—Diderot, De la Poes. Dram. at the end of his *Pere de Famille*, p. 306.

NOTE 157.

P. 158. THE CHORUS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS ONE OF THE PERSONS IN THE DRAMA - - - AND A SHARER IN THE ACTION.

This is not, I think, contradicted, but only properly limited and explained, by what the author says elsewhere—that, to *act*, is, ἐν οἰκείῳ χόρῳ ἔτι γὰρ ὁ χόρῳ ΚΗΔΕΪΤΗΣ ΑἰΠΑΚΤΟΣ · εὐνοίαν γὰρ μόνον παρεχεται ὁς παρῖσι ^a. He is, there, comparing the Chorus with the *persons* of the drama. In that view, the Chorus might be said, comparatively, to have *no share in the action*.—But *here*, he is comparing those Choruses whose songs are properly connected with the action, and who are interested in its event, with such as appear to have no concern with it, and to be, not merely inactive, but *indifferent*, spectators. In this view, it was as natural to say—the Chorus should be regarded as a *person* of the drama, and a sharer in the action: a sharer, that is, not by the *active part*, but by the warm interest, which it takes, and expresses, in that action. However, the word αἰπακτῶ must not be taken in its strictest sense. We find the Chorus, in the Greek Tragedies, frequently contributing, in some little degree, to the progress of the action, by *active* offices of friendly attention and assistance; as, for example, in the *Philoctetes*, and the *Ajax* of Sophocles.

^a Prob. 49, of Sect. 19.

NOTE 158.

P. 159. THEIR CHORAL SONGS, &c.

There cannot, surely, be the least doubt, that, for ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝΑ, we should read, ΑΙΔΟΜΕΝΑ : an emendation so obvious, that it occurred to me the first time I ever read the passage. But I afterwards found, that it had occurred, long ago, to Madius; a circumstance, which, to my great astonishment, has been passed over in utter silence by all the subsequent commentators that I have seen. The words of Madius are—"Mendum igitur in verbis omnino esse censeo; ac primum in voce δίδομενα, quæ in locum vocis αἰδομενα irrepserit: nam verbum αἰδεν, quod paulò post ponitur, aperte indicat, locum, ut nos fecimus, castigandum."—I can attribute it only to some inadvertence, or mistake, that Mr. Winstanley, in his note, p. 294, has omitted to take notice of this most material part of Madius's comment on the passage. The emendation is confirmed by the αἰδοσι, and αἰδεν, which follow; by the extreme facility of the mistake, and by the difficulty of giving any reasonable explanation of the other reading. Διδόμενα, says Victorius, "quia magis tratus eos (sc. *choros*) dabat." But he agrees that μελη is understood; and though we read, often, of the magistrate's giving a Chorus, (δεναι χορον,) that is, furnishing the expence of the choral

dresses, &c. we no where read, I believe, of their *giving the Choral Odes*.

NOTE 159.

P. 160. BUT IT IS EVIDENT, THAT, WITH RESPECT TO THE THINGS THEMSELVES ALSO, &c.

Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν. The alteration of Heinsius, *δράμασιν*, appears to me, not only to be unnecessary, but to pervert Aristotle's meaning. Τα *πράγματα*, here, are, I think, the *things themselves*—the circumstances and incidents of the action or fable, as opposed to *Δianoia*, the *sentiments*, or *thoughts*, and to *ὅσα ὑπο τῆς ΛΟΓΟΥ κ.τ.αλ.* He had referred to the rhetorical treatises for what concerns the *διανοία*; he goes on, (after a short explanation of *διανοία* and its various branches,)—"But it is plain, that, not only for the *διανοία*, or sentiments, but also for the *things themselves* (ΚΑΙ ἐν τοῖς *πράγμασιν*,) how they are to be made *terrible*, *piteous*, &c. the Poet should draw from the same sources, and may be referred to the same treatises."—Thus, for example, in the second book of Aristotle's Rhetoric, he may learn what sort of *things*, *persons*, and *events*, are proper to raise *terror* or *pity*^a, the peculiar objects of Tragic imitation. After which observation, he goes on, very naturally and properly, to remark, as Dacier has well observed, "*la difference entre les choses*
" que

^a See particularly cap. v. and viii. ed. Duval.

“ que traitent les Orateurs, et celles que traitent
 “ les Poetes.”—For the rest, my idea of this pas-
 sage accords with that of Dacier, (note 3); but
 he does not appear to have seen the force of the
 expression, **ΚΑΙ ἐν τοῖς πραγ.** Indeed, he entirely
 drops the conjunction, which is here of great im-
 portance; for it seems to fix the sense of *πραγ-*
μασιν, and to point its opposition to *διανοια*:—*Τα*
μὲν ἂν περὶ τὴν ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΝ ἐν τοῖς ῥήτ. κεισθῶ - -
 - - *δὲ, ὅτι ΚΑΙ ἐν τοῖς ΠΡΑΓΜΑΣΙΝ ἀπο*
τῶν αὐτῶν εἰδῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι - - -.

In Goulston's version, which follows Castelvetro,
 this opposition is rightly expressed; but in what
 follows, Aristotle's meaning is, I think, mistaken:
 for the *difference* he is shewing, (*πλὴν τοσαύτου*
διαφερει, &c.) is not, I apprehend, the difference
 between the *things* and the *sentiments, in Tragedy*,
 but, between the *things themselves only*, con-
 sidered in different views, as the subject of the
Orator, or of the *Poet*.—These commentators
 understand the expressions, *ἐν τῷ λόγῳ*, and, *τῷ*
λεγομένῳ, of the *dramatic speech*, and speaker.

NOTE 160.

P. 160. MUST DRAW FROM THE SAME
 SOURCES - - -.

— *Απο τῶν αὐτῶν εἰδῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι*.—The expres-
 sion, *χρῆσθαι ΑΠΟ*, is, I believe, uncommon. It
 seems rightly explained by Victoriús “— to bor-
 “ row from:”—“ *quasi utendum illinc sumere*
 “ *atque mutuari*.”

NOTE 161.

P. 160. WITHOUT BEING SHEWN TO BE SUCH. - -

—*Ανευ διδασκαλιας*. “Senza che si dica e che “*s'insegni* che sian tali.”—*Piccolomini*:—I believe, very exactly. The reader may compare *Rhet.* I. 2. p. 514, B. — and III. 1. p. 584, B. and, (*διδασκαλικη*,) I. 2. p. 515, A.

The truth of what the philosopher here observes, may appear from this single consideration. Suppose two *Tragedies* written by two Poets on the same subject, and of which the plot and principal incidents are the same^a: and suppose two pleadings of the same *cause*, by two speakers. It seems very plain, that the difference of the effect upon an audience in the former case, would bear much less proportion to the difference between the *Poets*, than it would, in the other case, to the difference between the *Speakers*.

^a For example, the *Merope* of Voltaire, and that of Aaron Hill. As *poems*, there can be no comparison between these two productions. But I doubt whether, in both, the same *fable* has not always produced much the same effect upon the audience. This shews the truth and propriety of the rank which Aristotle assigns to the *fable*, as the “*soul* of Tragedy.”

NOTE 162.

P. 160. IF THEY ALREADY APPEAR SO IN THEMSELVES.

—Εἰ φαινοῖτο ἡδία.—That ἡδία is wrong, I have no doubt. For if we admit it, we must take it, as Victorius does, for a single *instance*; as if Aristotle had said, “*aut jucundæ, aut tristes, aut atrocēs, &c.* - - - : quamvis enim nunc *unum* horum ponat, i. e. *jucunda*, reliqua tamen audienda sunt.”—But how improbable it is, that he should not chuse his single instance, if he meant to give one, out of those which had just been mentioned?—that he should not rather have said, εἰ φαινοῖτο ἔλκεινα, or δεινα, than ἡδία, *jucunda*; which, besides, is evidently not at all to his purpose. I cannot, therefore, help thinking it something more than probable, that Aristotle wrote this, φαινοῖτο ἡΔΗ [sc. τοιαυτα—that is, ἔλκεινα, δεινα, &c.]—“If they appear *already* so;—in *themselves*.” The elliptic brevity of the expression will hardly be objected to, in a writer who abounds with instances much more harsh and obscure than this. In the same manner, τοιαυτα is understood with φαινεσθαι just before: — τα μὲν δὲ φαινεσθαι (sc. τοιαυτα) ἀντιδιδασκαλίας.

The same conjecture had, I find, occurred, long ago, to Castelvetro, but, which I think somewhat singular, has not been taken notice of by any of the

the commentators I have seen. He says—"ἰ: φαίνοιτο ἡδία: Coloro, li quali non riconoscono che qui sia errore, assegnino à queste parole, se possono, senso degno e conveniente ad Aristotele. Adunque io crederei che non fosse male à leggere ἡδῆ, in luogo d' ἡδία, e'l senso sarebbe conveniente." [p. 406.]

The reader may see a very different explanation of this whole passage in the Abbé Batteux's notes; but an explanation which cannot, in my opinion, be reconciled to the text. His censure of Dacier and others, that they have rendered this chapter "*à contresens*," seems to me to recoil upon himself.

NOTE 163.

P. 160. FIGURES OF SPEECH - - -.

—Τα σχήματα τῆς λέξεως—. Dacier, Batteux, and indeed almost all the commentators, seem to take σχήματα, here, for the *gestures*, modifications of countenance, and tones of voice, that accompany speech *. But, *first*, I much doubt whether the Greek will fairly admit of such a sense. Aristotle says, σχήματα ΛΕΞΕΩΣ, figures, or forms, of the speech itself, not of the speaker. The same expression occurs several times in the *Rhetoric*, and always means the form of the diction itself; never

* "Σχήματα vocat habitus quosdam, conformationesque frontis, oculorum, vultus, gesticulationis manuum," &c. Rebertelli, p. 227.

never the gesture with which it is delivered *.—

2. Aristotle explains himself by—*οἷον, τι εντολη και τι ευχη*, &c. i. e. *what they are*, not, *what action or tone of voice they require* ^b; "*avec quel ton et quel geste on ordonne*," as M. Batteux unwarrantably translates it.—3. Aristotle says, that no blame, or none worth regarding, (*αξιον σπουδης*,) can fall upon *the Poetry*, (*εις την ποιητικην*,) in consequence of the Poet's ignorance of these matters, or of his not knowing them technically. A remark, surely, very unnecessary, if mere action and pronunciation were intended by *σχηματα*.—

But, 4. The thing seems evident from the instance given of a criticism of this kind. Protagoras plainly charged Homer with ignorance, or inaccuracy, with respect to these *σχηματα λεξιως*, whatever they were. Now, according to the common explanation, the criticism could fall only on Homer's *pronunciation* or *action*: but, of this, Protagoras knew nothing; all he appears to have meant, is, that Homer had made an improper use of the *imperative mood*; that is, had used one *σχημα λεξιως*, where he *should* have used another.

But *what*, then, *are* we to understand by these *σχηματα λεξιως*?—The learned reader will immediately see, that, as Victorius has observed, they
are

* Rhet. II. 24, p. 579. III. 8, p. 591, B. and 10, p. 594, B.—And *De Soph. Elench.* p. 284, D.

^b Had this been his meaning, he would rather have said "*τι εντολης—τι ετιχης*," &c.

are not to be confounded with those *σχηματα λεξεως*, of which we hear so much from Cicero, Quintilian, Dion. Hal. &c.—those “*figuræ verborum*,” which are opposed to the *σχηματα διανοιας*, the “*figuræ mentis, sententiarum*,” &c. Indeed, no such division of *σχηματα* is, I believe, to be found in Aristotle. It seems to have been the invention of the later Rhetoricians; and how little they were agreed, as to the number and the species of these *σχηματα*, the propriety of the division itself, and even the precise sense of the word *σχημα*, may be seen in Quintilian IX. 1.—The *σχηματα λεξεως* of Aristotle, in this place, are plainly such, as would have been denominated by later writers, *σχηματα διανοιας*—figures of the *thought* or *sense*. Indeed we find them actually enumerated among the figures of that class. See *Dionys. Halicarn. de Struct. &c. Sect. 8.*—So Quintilian; “*Figuras quoque mentis, quæ σχηματα διανοιας dicuntur, res eadem recipit omnes, in quas nonnulli diviserunt species dictorum, (i. e. of jokes, bons mots.) Nam et interrogamus, et dubitamus, et affirmamus, et minamur, et optamus.*”

I see, therefore, not the least reason, why the expression *σχημα λεξεως* should not be rendered here, exactly as in the other passages above referred to, “*figura orationis*”—*form, or configuration, of speech*. For *λεξις*, it must be observed, is here used,

used, not in the particular sense of *diction*, or *style* and *manner of expression*, (as it is used *Rhet.* III. 8.) but in the general sense of λογική, *speech*, as we find it used in the beginning of the next chapter.

But though I cannot admit, that σχήματα means "configurationes oris," &c. or, should be so rendered, yet I certainly admit, that Aristotle appears plainly to consider these different forms of speech, or sentences, with a *view* to action, or delivery; and, possibly, the observation of Victorius may be well founded, that—"vocatæ hæ figuræ ita videntur, quia aliter atque aliter vultus, totumque corpus, cum variantur illæ, conformantur; ut meritò hæc de causâ, σχήματα, figuræ, ipsæ appellatæ sint."—I find the same thing in the following passage of *Aristides Quintilianus*, which seems evidently to allude to this very part of Aristotle's treatise, and may be thought to afford some illustration.—Περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν ΣΧΗΜΑΤΩΝ φύσεως, εἰς προσαγεῖν χρὴ τὰ νοήματα, ἃ πολλὰ λεγέειν δεῖν ἡγεῖται. ἸΚΑΝΗ ΓΑΡ Ἡ ὙΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΣ ΤΑΤΤΑ ΔΗΛΩΣΑΙ. Καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἰκασὸν [i. e. each of these σχήματα διανοίας, ὁ νοημάτων,] ἡ συγγέλλει πῶς, ὡς αἱ παραιτήσεις, ἡ ἀνιψιν, ὡς αἱ συγχωρήσεις, τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ ἤτοι μικροπρεπείς, ὡς αἱ διορθώσεις, ἡ μεγαλύνσεις, ὡς αἱ γυμολογίαι καὶ ἀφηγήσεις, ἀπεργάζονται. ὧν ἕκαστὴ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΤΥΠΩΝ ΑΡΙΣΤ' ἈΝ ΔΙΑΓΝΟΙΗΜΕΝ, ὧν [leg. forte ὅΤΕ] ἕκαστον, ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΥΠΟΚΡΙΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ-
PON,

PON, ΤΟΙΣ ΣΩΜΑΣΙΝ ΕΝΤΙΘΗΣΙ· ΠΑΡ' Ο ΚΑΙ
ΣΧΗΜΑΣΙΝ ΑΤΤΟΙΣ ΣΥΝΕΒΗ ΚΛΗΘΗΝΑΙ⁴.

I rather suspect, we should read ΠΡΟΑΓΕΙΝ, in the beginning of this passage; in the sense of *ἐκφέρειν, προφέρειν*, &c. Meibomius renders σχημάτων, "*gestuum*," which cannot be the meaning; for by the *τῶν ἰκασόν*, and the exemplification which follows, (*παραιτήσεις, συγχωρήσεις*, &c.) and, indeed, by all the rest of the passage, it is clear, that he speaks of the *configurations* of the *speech* or *sentence*, of which he goes on to describe the different effects, *first* on the *mind*, and, ultimately, on the *action*, of the speaker. The version should, therefore, have been thus:— "*De figurarum naturâ quibus animi notionēs proferendæ*," &c. Or, if *προαγεῖν* be right, the meaning, I think, must be—" *to which those νοήματα are to be referred— under which they are to be classed.*" See the passage above, from Quintilian, and that of Dion. Hal. Sect. 8. which is much to the purpose.

Why Aristotle should dismiss this subject, as of much more concern, to the Actor, than to the Poet, requires no explanation. There could scarce, indeed, be any other occasion for the study of these *σχήματα*, but in order to learn, or to teach, in what manner, with what variations of tone, countenance, and gesture, propriety required them to be pronounced.—At the same time, it will not appear strange that he should *mention* them, if we recollect,
that

⁴ Aristid. Quintil. "*De Musica*," p. 86, ed. Meibomii.

that the Poets themselves were, at first, actors also, in their own pieces, and, afterwards, no doubt, instructed their actors; and hence perhaps, after all—not, as is commonly understood, from the *moral* teaching of the drama itself*—the well known phrases, *διδασκειν τραγωδιαν*, *docere fabulam*, &c. may, most naturally, be accounted for.

Nor was this practice peculiar to antient times. We know with what eagerness and animation Voltaire *taught his Tragedies*, almost to his latest hour. During his last visit to Paris, where he died, “ Il n’y vit rien, ne songea à y rien voir ; il n’y vécut que pour des Comédiens, qu’il fatiguoit, en voulant leur donner des leçons de *declamation*.”

NOTE 164.

P. 161. THE PROFESSED MASTERS OF THAT KIND—

—Τῆς τῆς τοιαύτης ἰχούσης ἈΡΧΙΤΕΚΤΟΝΙΚΗΝ.—

For this word, see *Eth. Nicom.* I. 1, 2.—Thus, here, it seems to mean that *master art*, which teaches the principles of elocution, the art of *public speaking*, in general.

* See Casaub. in Athen. p. 413. and *De Satyr. Poet.* p. 113

• Tableau de Paris, tome viii. p. 20. Since this note was written, I have had the satisfaction to find the above explanation of the phrase *διδασκειν τραγωδιαν*, &c. supported by Heyne : “ *Διδασκαλῆς* est poeta, qui fabulam committit, in theatrum producit ; quia eam actores docet.”—In *Epicteti Enchir.* cap. xvii.

NOTE 165.

P. 161. THE CAVIL OF PROTAGORAS - - -.

See *Hermes*, I. 8. p. 144.

This, it seems, was his usual style of criticism; for, *διανοίαν ἀφεις, προς τ' ὄνομα διελεχθῆ*, as Diog. Laertius says of him^a. He seems, indeed, to have been the inventor of these *σχηματα λεξικως*. At least the same writer says, *διελε τον λογον ΠΡΩΤΟΣ εις τεσσαρα · ΕΤΥΧΩΛΗΝ, ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΝ, ΑΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΝ, ΕΝΤΟΛΗΝ*· (οἱ δὲ, εις ἑπτα — κ. τ. αλ.) *ἐς και πυθμενας ειπε λογων*:—"the foundations of speech"^b.

There is something amusing in the history of this man. He was originally a *porter*; and might have continued so, if his extraordinary genius for *tying up wood* had not attracted the notice of Democritus, by whose instructions and encouragement, from an eminent porter, he became as eminent a sophist. The reader may see the story in Aulus Gellius, V. 3.—The public was, certainly, not much obliged to Democritus. Protagoras was of more use to mankind when he invented porters' *knots*^c, than when he invented the *σχηματα λεξικως*,
and

^a IX. 52. *ed. Meib.*

^b IX. 54.—See *Hermes*, as above, about the different species of sentences; and *ch. ii.*

^c — *την καλεμενην ΤΥΛΗΝ, ἐφ' ἧς τα φορτια βαταξοσι, ευρειν, ὡς φησιν Αριστοτελης. D. Laert. IX. 53.*

and undertook to teach, at the price of *a hundred minæ*^d, the art of Belial - - -

- - - - "to make the worse

"Appear the better reason :"- - -

—τον ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν^e.

"If a *cobler*," says Socrates in the *Meno* of Plato, "or a *taylor*, should return the shoes, or "the clothes, he undertook to mend, in a worse "condition than that, in which he received them, "he would soon lose his business, and be starved "for want of work. But it is not so with the "*sophists*. PROTAGORAS was able to carry on, "for forty years together, without detection, and "with great credit, the trade of spoiling all those "who became his disciples, and sending them "back much worse than he found them^f."

NOTE 166.

P. 161. TO ALL DICTION BELONG, &c. - -

See Diss. I. p. 55. vol. i.—After having discussed *three* of the constituent parts of Tragedy, the fable, the manners, and the sentiments, Aristotle now comes to the *diction* (Λεξις), upon which he bestows three chapters. His subject plainly required

^d Above £. 300.—D. Laert. *ibid.* and Suidas. Aristotle, however, gives a different account of the way in which he was paid, *Ethic. Nicom.* IX. 1.

^e See *Rhet.* II. 24. p. 581, D.

^f Ed. Serr. tom. ii. p. 91.

required him to speak of the diction of *Tragedy**, not of poetic diction *in general*; much less, to descend to the grammatical elements of *language in general*. Yet, of his three chapters on diction, the first is merely grammatical, and such, as even in a *rhetorical* treatise would appear misplaced; and even the two following chapters relate to *poetic* language in general, without any thing applicable to the diction of *Tragedy* in particular—his proper subject—except a single observation, or, rather, *hint*, at the end of the third chapter^b.

Dacier, who discharged, with as much fidelity as any commentator ever did, the duty of seeing nothing amiss in his author, has zealously defended the propriety of this grammatical chapter: but all he says amounts, I think, to little more than this—that the chapter should be there, because it is there. No man is nice about reasons, when the point to be proved has been determined before he looks for them.

NOTE 167.

P. 161. DISCOURSE OR SPEECH—.

ΛΟΓΟΣ.—Mr. Harris, in the *Hermes*, p. 19, has rendered the word, *sentence*. He took that *part* of the idea, that suited his subject; but, that this is not the whole sense of the word, but only a
sense

* See the conclusion of cap. xxii. Περὶ μὲν τῆς Τραγῆ-
δίας, κ. τ. αλ.

^b See NOTE 209.

sense *included* in the word, is evident from what is said below, in the definition of λογος, where the entire Iliad is comprehended under that term. Had I *here* rendered λογος by *sentence*, I must, to have been consistent in my translation, have there called the Iliad *a sentence*.

The word λογος here plainly answers—not to *sentence*, exclusively, nor yet, exclusively, to what Mr. Harris calls “*Oration or Discourse*,” as composed of *several sentences*; but, it is a general term, comprehending *both* these, and applicable, like the Latin word *oratio*, or the English, *speech*, to every *significant* combination of words, whether consisting of a single sentence, or of many; as, indeed, appears from Aristotle’s definition itself. Nay, the word appears not even to have been limited to a complete *assertive* sentence; for the philosopher, in the treatise περι Ἑρμηνειας, gives the denomination of λογος to these *two* words—καλος ιππος. He says, εν τῷ ΛΟΓΩ, (in *hac oratione*,) καλος ιππος. It was what he calls a *merely significant* λογος, as distinguished from an *assertive* λογος; or *proposition*, such as, καλος ΕΣΤΙΝ ιππος.

I was unable to find any English word, that would express λογος adequately, and clearly. And it seems somewhat remarkable, that the Greek language, rich and copious as it is, should not afford—at least I am not aware that it does—

any

* *Hermes*, p. 324.

any single word *perfectly synonymous* to our word, *sentence*. Λόγος, as I have observed, is too *wide*; it serves equally to express a single sentence, or a whole *speech*, or even *less* than a sentence. It is applied by Aristotle to a combination of *two* words—a substantive and an adjective, without a *verb*—and, to the *Iliad*. Περίοδος was only one particular *kind*, or *form*, of sentence^b. Κωλον did not necessarily contain a complete *sense*, or *thought*, which is essential to our word, *sentence*^c.

NOTE 168.

P. 162. IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE MOUTH - - .

Τοποις.—Clearly right; nor can I conceive, what should have induced any critic to suspect this reading.—See *Dionys. Halicarn. Sect. 14.*—his curious and accurate analysis of articulation: and *Aristides Quintil. p. 89. ed. Meib.*—where, in describing the formation of the letters, these expressions occur:—ἐκ τῶν περὶ τῆς ὀδοντίας ΤΟΠΩΝ—and, ἐκ μίσε τε φωνητικῆς ΤΟΠΟΥ. See, also, *Hermes*, III. 2, p. 322.—TONOIS, which had occurred to Mr. Winstanley*, would be mere tautology; for that idea is *fully* expressed afterwards, by ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρυτητι. Thus, *Rhet.* III. 1. τοῖς ΤΟΝΟΙΣ, ὈΙΟΝ ὀξεῖα καὶ βαρεῖα, καὶ μίση.

^b See *Rhet.* III. 9. p. 592. ^c *Demet. de Eloc. Sect. 2.*

* *Ed. Ox. 1780, p. 296.*

NOTE 169.

P. 162. AS THEIR TONE IS ACUTE, GRAVE,
OR INTERMEDIATE.

—Οξύτητι, βαρυτητι, καὶ τῷ μισῷ.—All the commentators seem agreed, that by τῷ μισῷ is meant the *circumflex*. Mr. Foster, in his *Essay on Accent*, &c. expresses some degree of doubt about this^a; and, I confess, it appears to me to be somewhat more than doubtful. Certainly, the only *obvious* and *proper* sense of the word *mean*, or *middle*, thus applied to the pitch of sound, is, that which is *between* ὀξύ and βαρυ; not, that which is *compounded* of the two, as the circumflex is always represented to be. At least the expression, in this latter sense, would not be very accurate and philosophical. A circumflexed syllable is described to be, a syllable that has *both* an acute and a grave accent;—ἀμφοτέρως τὰς τασίς, as it is expressed by *Dion. Halicarn. Sect. 11*. The voice first rises, and then falls, on the *same* syllable. A man would be thought to speak very strangely, who should describe any object painted half white and half black, by saying, that it was of a colour *between black and white*.

But, farther, I observe, that in other passages of Aristotle's works, where he speaks of *accents*, the word μισόν no where occurs. Indeed, he uses neither this, nor any other word, to denote
the

^a P. 22.—See the *note*.

the *circumflex* accent. He mentions only ὀξύ, and βαρύ, *acute*, and *grave*. See *De Soph. Elench.* p. 284, C.—288, E.—304, A.—306, A. *ed. Duval*. In the last of these passages especially, his expression is remarkable: εἰ παρα προσῳδιαν ὀξείαν, Ἡ ΒΑΡΕΙΑ προσῳδία λυσις· εἰ δὲ παρα βαρείαν, Ἡ ΟΨΕΙΑ. That is—"If the sophism supposes *the acute accent*, the answer is—it is *the grave accent*; and *vice versâ*." Here are no traces of the triple division of accents, given by later writers, into acute, grave, and circumflex. Nay more; he speaks in the same way, even when the very ambiguity in question lies between an acute, and a *circumflex*, accent; as, ἄ, (*non*,) and ὤ (*ubi*). See the passage, p. 304, A: where the circumflexed ὤ is expressed by the word βαρυτέρων^b.—This, I confess, much increases my doubt with respect to the word μέση in the passage before us. For, had that been Aristotle's term for the *circumflex* accent, as the common explanation supposes, we probably should have found the expression in some of the passages referred to; at least, in that last mentioned.

I cannot, surely, be misunderstood, as meaning to infer, from these passages, that the flexure itself of the voice upon a single syllable, which was afterwards denominated by Grammarians, περισπωμένη, was unknown to Aristotle and the earlier writers.

^b A marginal note in Duval's ed. says—"Semper enim Aristoteles βαρυτέραν vocat την περισπωμένην."

writers. The *thing*, undoubtedly, has always existed, and *must* exist, more or less, in *every* language. But these passages *do*, I think, afford a pretty strong presumption, that the circumflex had then no appropriated term*, and, consequently, that, in this passage, the word *μερον* has a different, and its *usual* and *proper*, meaning; that, in which it is used continually by the writers on Harmonics⁴.

But, farther, it appears to be so used by Aristotle himself, in a similar passage of his *Rhetoric*. In the beginning of the *third* book, speaking of oratorical *action* or *delivery*, (*ὑποκρισις*) as far as it relates to the voice, he says, ἐστὶ δὲ αὕτη μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, πῶς αὕτη δε χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἑκάστον παθεῖν· οἷον, ποτε μεγάλη, καὶ ποτε μικρά, καὶ ποτε μέση· καὶ πῶς τοις τανούτοις, οἷον, ὀξύειρα, καὶ βαρεῖρα, καὶ ΜΕΣΗ. Now, even supposing this to relate to *accents*, it seems, that

* Mr. Foster, who had undoubtedly examined this matter more thoroughly than I pretend to have done, does not, I think, produce any such *clearly appropriated* term, from Aristotle, Plato, Aristoxenus, or any other writer of that age. See ch. v. p. 140, &c. of his very learned *Essay on Accents and Quantity*, &c.

⁴ See the passage from Euclid, below. Thus too *Batchius*: Τροπὸς τῆς φωνῆς ποσὺς λεγόμεν εἶναι;—Τρεῖς· ὀξύν, ΜΕΣΟΝ, βαρύν. p. 10. ed. *Meib.*—meaning, by *μέση*, the Phrygian mode or key, which was *between* the Dorian and the Lydian, as D is between C and E.—So *Arist. Quintil.* τῶτων, ὃ μὲν ὀξύειρα, πρὸς τὰ βαρυτέρα τῆς φωνῆς ἐπισημασθῆναι χρῆσθαι· ὃ δὲ λυδίειρα, πρὸς τὰ ὀξύτερα· ὃ δὲ φρυγίειρα, πρὸς τὰ ΜΕΣΑ. p. 25.

that *μισση*, here, should naturally have the *same* meaning, with respect to *ἰξεια*, and *βαρεια*, as it has when applied immediately before to *μεγαλη* and *μικρη*, where it plainly means the *medium* between loud and soft.—But I think the passage clearly does *not* relate to the mere syllabic *accent*: for he is there professedly speaking of the accommodation of the voice to the expression of different *passions*; he must therefore mean *such* variation of tone or pitch, as depends upon the speaker's choice; not that of the *accentual* acuteness and gravity; for this is always spoken of as a fixed and invariable thing*. Aristotle therefore means, I believe, exactly what Cicero has expressed in the following words; and, from the similitude of the expression, it seems probable, that he had this very passage of Aristotle before him, or in his memory.—“*Nam voces, ut chordæ, sunt intentæ, quæ ad quemque tactum respondeant, acuta, gravis; cita, tarda; magna, parca; quas tamen inter omnes est sua quoque in genere mediocris.*”—That is, as it seems rightly explained by Dr. Pearce, every one of these differences of voice, high and low, loud and soft, &c. has its *medium*—*μισση*^f. To this passage of Cicero, I shall add one from Quintilian to the same purpose, and which affords a still clearer commentary upon that in the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle.

* See Mr. Foster's Essay, p. 23, 24, 25.

^f Cic. de Or. III. 57. p. 417, ed Pearce.

tote. — “*Utendi voce multiplex ratio. Nam*
 “*præter illam differentiam quæ est tripartita,*
 “*acutæ, gravis, flexæ,—tum intentis, tum re-*
 “*missis—tum elatis, tum inferioribus modis, opus*
 “*est,—spatiis quoque lentioribus aut citatioribus.*
 “*Sed iis ipsis MEDIA interjacent multa*.” If
 the reader compares this with the passage of Aris-
 totle, he will see how exactly it answers to the
 Greek. Here are *three* differences of voice cor-
 responding plainly to the three mentioned by
 Aristotle. The difference of *intentis* and *remissis*
 (*loud* and *soft*) expresses his *μεγαλή και μικρά*;
 that of, *elatis, et inferioribus modis, (acuter, or*
graver, tones or pitches,) his *ὀξεῖα και βαρεῖα*; and
 that of *spatiis* *lentioribus, &c.* (quicker or slower
times) his *ῥυθμοῖς τισι, &c.* And, that Quintilian
 did not understand, by *ὀξεῖα* and *βαρεῖα*, the acute
 and grave *syllabic accent*, is clear from his ex-
 pressly saying, that there are those *three* differ-
 ences *besides* that of the different accents —
 “*præter illam differentiam,*” &c.—*Lastly*, the
 “*media interjacent multa,*” plainly alludes to the
μεση of Aristotle.

The following passage, from the clear and ac-
 curate musical treatise of Euclid, will serve to
 illustrate, at the same time, *both* the terms of Aris-
 totle, *τονοῖς*^b and *μεση*. Enumerating the different
 acceptations

^a II. 3.

^b Whenever Aristotle *clearly* speaks of *accents*, he
 always, as far as I have observed, uses the word *προσῳδιαί*,
 not

acceptations of the word *τονος*, one of which is *τασις*, *tension* or *pitch*, his instance of that sense of the word, is, ὁ δὲ, ὡς τασις, *τονος* λεγεται, καὶ ὁ φαιεν ἔχουσιεν τινα, ἡ βαρυσιεν, ἡ ΜΕΣΩ: ΤΩ: ΤΗΣ ΦΩΝΗΣ ΤΟΝΩ: *κεχρησθαι*: i. e. a *middling pitch of voice*¹.

On the whole, then, I see no reason why we should not understand the word *μεση* to be used in the same sense in the passage which is the subject of this note. For though, indeed, Aristotle is there speaking of *single letters*, and therefore can only mean *syllabic* accents or tones, yet it is plain, that these accents must have admitted of the distinction of *high*, *low*, and *intermediate*, even in *single words*, when of more than two syllables²; much more, in whole *sentences* or *periods*, where what Mr. Foster calls the *oratorical* accent, (*if*, indeed, it be compatible with a *fixed* syllabic accentuation of single words, of which I profess myself not yet convinced,) must necessarily

not *τονω*. See the passages above referred to, in the treatise *De Soph. Elench.* And, in *this* work, *cap.* xxv.

¹ P. 20, *ed.* Meib.

² Let any man pronounce a word of many syllables—*μεγαλοπρεπείστα*, for example—having *one acute* syllable, as *D. Halic.* says, among many *grave*—*ἐν πολλῶν βαρεσις*. *Sect.* 11. He will hear plainly, if he has any ear, that the *acute* syllable is only the *acutest*; and that the *grave* syllables are of different degrees of elevation, and some of them of course, *μεσαι*—intermediate, between the *most acute* and the *most grave*.

sarily have varied the tone or pitch of the *same nominal* syllabic accent, from word to word.

But whatever sense of the word *μεση* we adopt, there is a difficulty, in this passage, which I must leave as I find it. The mention of *tone* or *pitch* of voice here, seems to me to be strangely misplaced. Accent, or tone, belongs to *syllables*, not to *letters*, of which Aristotle is here speaking. The vowels, indeed, may be acute or grave; but *as* syllables making a part of words, not as *letters*, *separately* considered, as they here are.—Besides; the other differences mentioned are fixed, *essential* differences. Of these letters, he says, *some* are formed in this manner, and *others*, in that: some are aspirated, and others smooth—some long, others short. But, can it be said, with any propriety, that *some* are *acute*, and *others* *grave*? Are there vowels that are *always* acute, as there are vowels that are *always* long?—This seems not more accurate, than it would be to conclude an enumeration of the differences of *words*, by adding that some are *said*, and some are *sung*:—or rather, it seems just the same, as if a man, describing the different sorts of bricks that are made, should conclude with telling us, that some are put at the top of a wall, some at bottom, and some in the middle.

NOTE 170.

P. 163. A CONJUNCTION IS A SOUND, &c. ---

The whole of this *first* definition of the conjunction appears to me to be corrupt beyond all hope of restoration from conjecture. Mr. Harris plainly passes it over as inexplicable, and takes the second definition only^a. I may well, therefore, be excused for not attempting to translate, what I confess myself totally unable to comprehend. I do, indeed, understand very well, that a conjunction, "neither *hinders* nor *constitutes*—" "neither *gives* nor *takes away*—the meaning of "the sentence in which it stands." But how this can be regarded as a *definition* of a conjunction, I do *not* understand. To define a thing *only* by what it does *not* do, (for it is here given as a separate and complete definition,) is hardly reconcilable with Aristotle's logical accuracy^b. Dacier, in his translation, has obviated this objection, by uniting the two definitions; but without any authority from the text.

I must, again, confess, that what follows, about the situation of the conjunction in different parts of a sentence, has not been made intelligible to me,

^a Hermes, II. 2. note (a).

^b See *Topic*. lib. vi. cap. 6, *Sect.* 5.—where he represents a definition as vitious, *ἐὰν ἀποφασίῃ διαφῇ τὸ γένος*—*i. e.* if the specific difference be expressed by a negation. He excepts the definition of *mere privations*, (as *blindness*,) which *can* be defined no otherwise. *Sect.* 7.

me, by any explication I have seen; particularly, the expression, καθ' αὐτον, which M. Batteux, after Castelvetro, renders, "*by its nature*:"—"à moins que *par elle-même elle ne soit faite* pour "être au commencement." But this sense cannot be admitted; nor, I think, any other, than—"by itself—alone." This Mr. Winstanley explains by αὐτῶν ἀνταποδοσεις: but I cannot see how his translation—"modo eas conjunctiones excipias quæ in initio periodi, καθ' αὐτας,—ritè stare "*non possunt*," &c.—accords with Aristotle's words—ἢν μὴ ἀρμοττη ἐν ἀρχῇ λογε τιθῆναι καθ' αὐτον—i. e. "*unless they are such as should be* "placed in the beginning, by themselves."—To make these words correspond to Mr. Winstanley's version, another negative seems wanting.

NOTE 171.

P. 163. AN ARTICLE ----- MARKS THE BEGINNING, OR THE END OF A SENTENCE.

The commentators all tell us, that this means the *prepositive*, and the *subjunctive* article; but none of them have clearly and fairly shewn us, *how* the one, because it is placed before a *word*, marks the beginning of a *sentence* or *discourse*, (ΛΟΓΟΥ ἀρχην;) or, how the other marks the end of it, because it follows the *word* to which it belongs. In the very sentence before us, for example, Ἀθρόον δὲ ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἀσημῶς Ἡ λογὴ ἀρχὴν ἢ τελεῶς, ἢ διορισμον, δηλοῖ—in what sense does the subjunctive

subjunctive article, *ἡ*, mark the *end* of the sentence—*τελ* *λογ*? “L'article subjonctif,” says Dacier, “est celui qui marque la fin du discours: “*c'est-à-dire*, qu'il suit la chose qu'il designe, “comme, *qui*, *lequel*.”—It is easy to explain things in this manner.

For my part, I see not what is to be made of this, unless we may understand Aristotle to mean only that power of the article, by which, in the Greek language, it distinguishes the subject from the predicate, in certain propositions, and determines the *order* of construction. See *Hermes*, II. 1. p. 230.—But, then, this is no other than a species of *διαρισμ*, and is, indeed, given by Mr. Harris as one example of the *definitive* or *ascertaining* power of the article.

The *second* definition of the article, (—*φω**ν**α**ἀσημ* ----- to *συντιθεσθαι*) I have omitted. It is the first definition of the conjunction repeated *verbatim*. It may, indeed, be *true* of both; but if so, it must inevitably follow, I think, either that the two things must be the same, or, that the words are not truly a *definition* of either. Yet this passes smoothly with all the commentators I have seen, except Madius and Piccolomini.

NOTE 172.

P. 163. FOR EVEN IN DOUBLE WORDS, &c.

Compare cap. ii. and iv. of Aristotle's treatise, *Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*. This is rendered by Piccolomini, with

with his usual accuracy, “ perochè nei nomi
“ doppij [ò ver composti] *non usiamo le parti*
“ *d’essi, secondo che, da per se prese, hanno signi-*
“ *ficazione*: come, (per essempro) in questo nome
“ Theodoro, quella parte (*doro*) non é signifi-
“ cante.” p. 286.

NOTE 173.

P. 163. INDICATION OF TIME IS NOT INCLUDED, &c.—

’Οὐ ΠΡΟΣΕΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ το ποτε. See *Hermes*, I. 6. note (*d*), p. 96. Aristotle has given a fuller definition of the verb, in the book περι Ἑρμ. cap. iii.

NOTE 174.

P. 164. OTHERS RELATE TO ACTION OR PRONUNCIATION - - -.

’Η δὲ, κατὰ τὰ ὑποκριτικά—sc. σχήματα: mean-
ing the σχήματα λέξεως mentioned just before,
cap. xix. with which these modes plainly coincide;
for the πτώσεις ῥημάτων here mentioned are no
other than the ἑγκλίσεις, *modes*, or *moods*, of the
Grammarians.—[See *Hermes*, I. 8. p. 144, and
particularly the notes there.] Καὶ κατὰ ποίας ἐγ-
κλίσεις, ὡς δὴ τινες ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΡΗΜΑΤΙΚΑΣ καλεσι.
Dion. Hal. de Struct. &c. Sect. 6.—But he speaks
of the term as applied only to the *modes*; for the
tenses, διαφοραὶ χρόνων, are immediately after men-
tioned by him, as not included in that term. But
Aristotle,

Aristotle, in the *περι ἑρμην.* expressly mentions the *tenses* also, as *πτώσεις ῥημάτων*. See *cap.* iii. *Sect.* 5.

NOTE 175.

P. 164-5. FOR ALL DISCOURSE IS NOT COMPOSED OF VERBS AND NOUNS:—THE DEFINITION OF MAN, FOR INSTANCE.—

—'Ου γὰρ ἀπας λογ[⊕] ἐκ ῥημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων συγκείται* οἷον, ὁ τε ἀνθρώπος ὀρισμ[⊕]· ἀλλ' ἐνδεχεται ἀνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον. This is very ambiguously expressed. We are left to make out, as well as we can, whether the "definition of man," is referred to as an instance of a sentence without a verb, or of a sentence with both noun and verb.—The *construction* seems, indeed, to lead more naturally to the latter interpretation. But the other, I think, is more to Aristotle's purpose, (for, an example of a sentence with both noun and verb, it was hardly necessary to produce,) and is confirmed by the following passage in his book *περι Ἑρμηνείας*:

Ἀναγκη δὲ πάντα λόγον ἀποφαντικόν (every *assertive* sentence or speech) ἐκ ῥηματ[⊕] εἶναι, ἢ ἐκ πτωσίως ῥηματ[⊕]· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τε ἀνθρώπος λογ[⊕] (i.e. ὀρισμ[⊕], *definition*; for so λογ[⊕] is continually used by Aristotle,) ἐὰν μὴ το, εἰν, ἢ, εἶναι, ἢ τι τοῖστον ΠΡΟΣΤΕΘΗ, εἴπω λογ[⊕] ἀποφαντικ[⊕]·. The definition itself, (the same, probably, to which he alludes

* P. 38, C.

alludes in the passage before us,) follows; it is, ζῶον τιζόν διπνυ^b. Now these *three* words alone constitute the *definition*, and it is of this only that Aristotle here speaks. In the full, assertive sentence, Ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ ζῶον τιζόν διπνυ, the two first words are no part of the definition itself, but, as Victorius has well observed, only *indicate* the *thing* defined. And accordingly, the philosopher, we see, in the above quotation, considers the verb as superadded to the definition.

However, this sense would be so much more clearly expressed, if the words—ὄιον, ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος ὄρισμ^c—followed, instead of preceding, the words ἀλλ' ἐνδεχεται ἀνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον, that I should hardly doubt of their being misplaced, if this sort of embarrassment were less frequent than it is in Aristotle's writings.

This whole passage receives much illustration from that part of the treatise περὶ ἔρμ. to which I have referred. A sentence without a verb is what Aristotle calls a *significant* sentence, but not an *assertive* sentence, or *proposition*; i. e. that *affirms* or *denies* something, and of which it may be predicated, that it is *true*, or *false*^c. Such only, in that *logical* work, it was to his purpose to consider; the other, the merely *significant* sentence,

^b The same definition occurs in other parts of his works; vol. i. p. 167, B.—237, D.—vol. ii. 920, 921.

^c See cap. iv. sect. 4 and 5. p. 38.

sentence^d, he dismisses, as belonging rather to rhetoric and POETRY. 'Οι μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι [λογος], ἀφεισθῶσαν ῥητορικῆς γὰρ, ἢ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ, οἰκιοτέρα ἢ σκεψίς. ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικῶς τῆς νυν θεωρίας^e.

NOTE 176.

P. 165. SIGNIFICANT, AS THE WORD CLEON IS, &c. - - -

It has been observed, that the sense seemed to require an instance of a sentence with only *one* significant word ; at least, not composed of both verb and noun, as βαδίζει Κλεων is. But I rather believe, that Aristotle did not *intend* this as an instance of such a sentence, but merely as an explanation of the σημαίνει, and καθ' αὐτα σημαίνει τι, that precede. "It is not," says he, "essential to what I call λογῶς, *oratio*, that it should contain both a noun and a verb, i. e. that it should be a complete *proposition* : but *some* significant part it *must* have ; significant, I mean, as a whole word, separately taken, as Cleon is, for example, in the sentence, *Cleon walks* ; not as making a part of a *word*, like δωρον in the compound name Θεοδωρον, which *has*, indeed, a meaning, but not καθ' αὐτο — κεχωρισμενον—*by itself*—as a *word* in the sentence."

That

^d He instances in *precatory* sentences or speeches ;—
 οἷον, ἢ εὐχῇ, λογῶς μὲν, ἀλλ' ἔτε ἀληθῆς, ἔτε ψευδῆς. *Ibid.*
^e *Ibid.*

That this is the meaning, seems probable from the chapter in which Λογ^{ος} is defined in the book *περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*. For there, as soon as he has given the definition, (Λογ^{ος} δὲ ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντική - - ἥς τῶν μερῶν ΤΙ σημαντικὸν ἐστὶ ΚΕΧΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΝ,) he immediately proceeds to explain the expressions; declaring what sort of *significant part* he means. "Significant," he says, "as the word ἀνθρώπος is; that is, κεχωρισμένον, *by itself*; not as, ἀνθρώπος ἐστὶ, or ἄν ἐστὶ, which *signify* as *assertive sentences*, nor yet, as a syllable, or part of a simple word, (like ὤς in μὺς,) or, even as a word making "part of a compound word".

Now, what Aristotle there expresses fully, he meant, I think, to say, more briefly, in the words, ΜΕΡΟΣ μιντοὶ αἰεὶ ΤΙ σημαίνειν ἔξει· ὅσον ἐν τῷ, Βαδίζει Κλειών, ὁ Κλειών. [sc. σημαίνει.]

See *Hermes*, I. 2. p. 21, note (d).

NOTE 177.

P. 165. A DISCOURSE MAY BE ONE, IN TWO SENSES, &c.

Compare, *περὶ Ἑρμην.* cap. v. p. 38. — *Analyt. Post. lib. ii. cap. 10.* p. 169, E.—*Metaphys. VII. 4.* p. 910, D. (where he uses τῷ συνεχεῖ, as equivalent to συνδεδεμῶ) and VIII. 6. p. 931, C.

¹ Cap. iv. p. 38.

NOTE 178.

P. 165. LIKE MANY OF THOSE USED BY THE
MEGALIOTÆ - - -

I have read, in some ludicrous book, of a country that was "*lost by the ignorance of geographers.*" This seems to have been the case of these *Megaliotæ*, if such a people ever existed. They are nowhere recorded. — Dacier reads, *μεγαριζοντων* — "*ceux qui disent de grandes choses* : and cites *Hesychius* — *Μεγαριζοντες* — *μεγαλα λεγοντες*. But this is too distant from the present reading, *Μεγαλιωτων*. Mr. Winstanley's conjecture — *μεγαλειων*, *ως*^a, is somewhat nearer, and, in other respects, preferable : but it is, I think, a strong presumption against its truth, that Aristotle constantly uses *οιον*, when he gives an instance ; never, as far as I recollect, *ως*.

I have sometimes thought it not very improbable, that the passage might originally have stood thus : *των μεγαλα Διωκοντων* : i. e. of those who *affect*, *aim at*, are *fond of*, grandeur and pomp of expression ; who *love hard words*, as we say. Nothing more common than this sense of *διωκειν*. They who are versed in emendatory criticism, and the *theory* of transcriptive blunders, know it to have been one source of corruption in antient manuscripts, that the transcribers, when they found
vacuities

^a Ed. Ox. 1780, p. 298.

vacuities and *lacunæ* which they could not fill up, rather than reduce the price of their copy by visible imperfection, often chose to write the passage as if there had been no such chasms; especially when that could be done, as in this case, with some passable appearance of a meaning^b. And thus, here, if we suppose the letters I have distinguished by capitals to have been destroyed, or rendered illegible, in the original MS. ὑπο νοτίας και σήτων^c, they would leave exactly the letters we now have—μεγαλ**ιω***των.

If a commentator, harassed by obscurity and perplexity, can now and then relieve his labour by treating a passage of desperate corruption as a riddle, and can amuse himself by guessing the meaning, when he cannot inform his readers by discovering it, who will envy him this harmless privilege? I have here hazarded my *guess* with others; but I give it for what it is. None of us, I believe, have yet deprived our successors of the same amusement. The riddle, probably, still remains, and will remain, till the arrival of those "*codices expectandi*" of which the critics talk so much; those precious manuscripts, that are always to be *waited for*, and never to be *expected*.

^b See Le Clerc's *Ars Critica*, P. III. S. I. C.XVI. parag. 7.

^c See the passage from Strabo, given in the preface.

NOTE 179.

P. 165. BY COMMON WORDS, I MEAN, &c. --

Κυρίων.—I have translated this, *common*, not *proper*, because this last term would convey a wrong idea ; for κυρίων here is plainly opposed, not to μεταφορά only, but to all the other species of words just enumerated : not to what is *figurative* only, as the Latin *proprium* is, but to whatever is *unusual*. This appears indeed from the definition—"a word that every body uses." What we call *proper* words are only one sort of the κυρία ὀνόματα of Aristotle. The expression must even include all those words, which, though originally metaphorical, are, as Mr. Harris says, "so naturalized" by common use, "that ceasing to be metaphors, they are become, (as it were,) the proper words^a." That is, as an excellent writer has expressed it, "they have nothing of the effect of metaphor upon the hearer. On the contrary, like *proper* terms, they suggest directly to his mind, without the intervention of any image, the ideas which the speaker proposed to convey by them^b."

The same clear opposition of κυρίων to whatever is *uncommon* in speech appears throughout the next chapter,

^a *Phil. Inq.* p. 198. He gives for instances—the foot of a mountain—the bed of a river. He, also, has rendered κυρίων by *common*, p. 191, note.

^b *Philos. of Rhet.* vol. ii. p. 185, 186. See *Demet.* Περὶ Εἰρωνείας, Sect. 88.

chapter, where γλωττα, μεταφορα, &c. are all said to be ΠΑΡΑ το κυριον, and included under one common term of ξενικα.—See also *Rhet.* III. 2. p. 585, A.

NOTE 180.

P. 166. SO THAT THE SAME WORD MAY BE BOTH COMMON AND FOREIGN, &c.

If κυριον here meant only *native*, in opposition to *foreign*, (γλωττα) as some commentators have supposed *, it would be arrant trifling to observe, that the same word might be, at the same time, γλωττα and κυριον, i. e. *foreign* and *native*, to different nations. For it could not possibly be otherwise; as Robortelli observes, and calls the observation, which he explains as Aristotle's, "*magnoperè adnotandum, et PULCHRUM SCITU.*" p. 246. Dacier follows him: "Cela ne sauroit être autrement, le même mot qui est étranger pour celui qui l'emprunte, ne peut qu'être propre pour celui qui le prête."—But, if it *must* be so, why does Aristotle say it *may* be so?—εἶναι δυνατόν?—The truth is, that a *foreign* word is not necessarily a *common* word, in his sense of κυριον, among the people to whom it is *native*; it may, or may not, be so; it cannot, indeed, be to *them* γλωττα, but it may be a metaphorical word, or a word of any of the other species enumerated as ΠΑΡΑ το κυριον ^b.—Aristotle seems to have added this

* Robortelli, and Castelvetro after him. ^b Cap. xxii.

this observation on purpose to *prevent* the very mistake which these expositors have made: *to* prevent κυριον from being taken merely as the opposite to γλωττα.

NOTE 181.

P. 166. A THOUSAND IS A CERTAIN DEFINITE MANY. - - -

Το γὰρ μυριον, πολυ ἔστι.—Here, I may venture, I believe, for once, to adopt the positive tone of emendatory criticism. *Legendum omnino*, πολυ ΤΙ ἔστι. The sense, indeed, no one can mistake: but the text, as it stands, does not express that sense. It *says* only, “for a thousand is *many*, which he “now uses instead of *many*.” There can be no doubt, that Aristotle added ΤΙ here, as in all the other instances, ἱκαναί ΤΙ—ἀφελαν ΤΙ. But, to put the matter beyond all doubt, he afterwards, speaking of the same sort of metaphor, says, το γὰρ Παντες ἀντι τῶ πολλοι, κατὰ μεταφορὰν, εἰρηται· το γὰρ Παν, ΠΟΛΥ ΤΙ. *Cap.* xxv.—I am surprised that so very obvious an error should have escaped the notice of all the commentators I am acquainted with.

NOTE 182.

P. 167. FOR HERE, THE POET USES ταμην - - - INSTEAD OF ἀρυσαι, &c.

Here a commentator is not perplexed by a little glimmering of light, that promises to shew him something,

something, and shews him nothing; but is relieved at once from all trouble by a total and comfortable obscurity. The quotations are so short, and, in all probability, so incorrect, that it seems impossible to apply to them Aristotle's definition of this metaphor, or to see *how*, where the Poet has used *ταμην*, *ἀφύσαι* would have been the *proper* word, and vice versa. Yet the commentators slide over this difficulty. *Victorius*, however, has noticed it, and, giving up the quotations as inexplicable and incorrigible, proposes a more intelligible example from the *Rhetoric*, III. 2.—το φαναι, τον μιν πτωχευοντα, ὡχεσθαι· τον δε εὐχομενον, πτωχευον· ὅτι ἀμφω αἰτησις. *Dacier* has entirely omitted the passage, and substituted another from the *Rhet.* III. II. p. 597, B.—Not, however, that he did not *understand* the passage; it was an inviolable rule with him always to understand his author: but only, it seems, because the example could not conveniently be *expressed in French*—"il ne peut être traduit en nôtre langue."

Castelvetro gives a very pleasant illustration. He does not pretend to see how *ταμην* and *ἀφύσαι* are put for each other in the Greek examples: but he says, that, to *draw*, and to *cut off*, might be thus metaphorically put for each other; if, for example, we should say, "Take this pruning-hook, and *draw* some branches from the olive-tree: " or, Take this pail, and *cut off* some water from
" the

“ the fountain.” — Undoubtedly any man may speak in this way, who chuses it.

NOTE 183.

P. 167. IN THE WAY OF ANALOGY, WHEN, OF FOUR TERMS, &c.

The difficulty here is, to distinguish clearly this, which Aristotle calls the *analogical* or *proportional metaphor*, from the metaphor which precedes it—that *from species to species*: for as to the two first sorts, that from *genus to species*, and *vice versâ*, they plainly belong, as has been observed, to the trope since denominated *Synecdoche*; the word *μεταφορα* being clearly used by Aristotle in its most general sense, including *all the tropes*—all the ways in which a word is *transferred* to a meaning different from its *proper* meaning. See *Cic. Or. cap. xxvii.* Of the four species of *μεταφοραι* here mentioned, only the two last seem to answer to *our METAPHOR*—the metaphor founded on some *resemblance* between the thing *from* which, and that *to* which, the term is transferred.

The difference between these two sorts of metaphors, as far as I am able to comprehend it, appears to me to be only this. Each of them is founded on some resemblance; but in the first, the resemblance perceived is between the two things

* “ Prendi quella falce, e *attigni* de’rami dell’ ulivo ;
“ o vero, Prendi quella secchia, e *taglia* dell’ acqua del
“ fonte.” p. 453.

things themselves; in the other, between the *relations* which they, respectively, bear to two other things ^a. Those are metaphors ἀπ' εἰδὸς ἐπὶ εἶδος, where the likeness is perceived, as Aristotle elsewhere expresses it, “*by the genus*,” that is, where the *common* quality, which constitutes the likeness, immediately occurs, and it is, therefore, sufficient simply to substitute the one word for the other. Those are metaphors κατ' ἀναλογίαν, where the resemblance is not thus perceived by the *common quality*, but by the *common relation*, of the two things; where, therefore, that relation must be pointed out, more or less expressly. Thus, to take Aristotle's own examples, when old age, or rather, an *old man*, is called “*stubble*,” the resemblance is sufficiently perceived, by a comparison of the things themselves; in Aristotle's language, we perceive it, “*by the genus* :—ἔταν γὰρ εἰπὴ [Ὅμηρος] τὸ γῆρας ΚΑΛΑΜΗΝ, ἵποισι μαθησιν καὶ γυνυσιν διὰ τὸ γένος· ΑΜΦΩ γὰρ ΑΠΗΝΘΗΚΟΤΑ ^b. But when old age is called “*evening*,” what strikes us is the resemblance *with respect to* two other things, *life*, and *day*; a resemblance of *relation*.

In

^a ἡ γὰρ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγου, ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΤΕΤΤΑΡ-
ΣΙΝ ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΙΣ. i. e. “*Analogy, or proportion, is*
“equality of *ratio, or relation*, and requires *four terms at*
“least.” *Ethic. Nicom.* V. 3.

^b *Rhet.* III. 10. p. 593. The passage of Homer alluded to is in *Od. E.* 214, 215. See Harris's *Philol. Inq.* p. 191. For the force of the expression, ἵποισι μαθησιν, see NOTE 22. in vol. i.

In this idea of the *analogical metaphor* I have the concurrence of Piccolomini. "La metafora di proportione è quella, che sopra la somiglianza dei rispetti che hanno l'une cose con l'altre, sarà fondata;" &c. See his *annotations*, p. 305, and his clear and useful, though prolix, *Parafrase della Retor. d'Arist.* tom. iii. p. 52, &c. In the rest of his explanation he does not satisfy me.

NOTE 184.

P. 167. AND, SOMETIMES, THE PROPER TERM IS ALSO INTRODUCED, BESIDES ITS RELATIVE TERM.

—Και ἰνιοτε προστιθεασιν αὐθ' ἔ λεγει πρὸς ὁ ἑστ.—
No words can well be more obscure and perplexing. Taking them as they are, they seem to admit, fairly, of only one sense—that which Victorius gives them. "Et quandoque apponunt, *pro quo* "dicit *ad quod* est." That is, as he explains this literal and obscure version, they add, "*ad quod* "refertur illud nomen quod omittunt, et *pro quo* "aliud vocabulum usurpant." Προστιθεασι, πρὸς ὁ ἑστ [sc. τερτο] αὐθ' ἔ λεγει: i. e. they add, to the substituted word (*cup*), the word to which the proper word (*shield*) relates; i. e. *Mars*. They not only name *cup*, instead of *shield*, but call it the cup of *Mars*.

My objection to this sense of the passage is, that it seems to confound the analogical metaphor with that *from species to species*, in which one word

word is simply put in the room of the other, as *καλαμῆ* is used in the passage of Homer, referred to by Aristotle as an example of that sort of metaphor*:

Αλλ' ἐμπῆς καλαμῆν γε θ' οἶμαι εἰσορῶντας

Γινώσκειν. - - - - - Od. ξ. 214.

For if, "*sometimes*," *ἐνίοτε*, this addition is made, it is implied, that not only *sometimes*, but *generally*, and for the *most* part, the analogical metaphor is used in the same manner as that *ἀπ' εἶδους* &c. and *cup* is merely called *shield*, and *old age*, *evening*. But, if I understand the matter rightly, it is essential to this kind of metaphor to express *two* terms, at least, of the four which constitute the analogy; i. e. to express *with* the metaphorical word, either the thing to which the *proper* word belongs, (as, *evening* of *life*,) or, as Aristotle presently after says, a *negative epithet*. See NOTE 189.

And the philosopher himself *seems* to have said this, (for I confess the passage is not perfectly clear,) in the following words: ΑΙΕΙ γὰρ ΕΚ ΔΥΟΙΝ λεγόνται [sc. αἱ εἰκόνες, *comparisons*], ΩΣΠΕΡ Ἡ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑ" οἶον, ἡ ἄσπις, φαμεν; ἐστὶ ΦΙΛΛΗ ΑΡΕΟΣ, καὶ τοξόν, ΦΟΡΜΙΓΞ ΑΧΟΡΑΟΣ.

ὅτι

* He does not, indeed, expressly call it, *ἀπ' εἶδους ἐπιθετόν*; but that it is so, seems sufficiently clear from his expressions, *ἐποίησε μάθησιν διὰ τὰ ΓΕΝΟΤΣ*—and, *ΑΜΦΩ γὰρ ἀπαθήμετα*, which answers to *ἀμφὶ γὰρ ἀφελὴν π* ἐστὶ, here.

ἔτω μὲν ἐν λεγέσιν, ΟΥΧ' ἈΠΛΟΤΝ· το δ' εἶπεν το
τοξὸν "φορμιγγα," ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα "φιαλὴν," ἈΠΛΟΤΝ^b.
Thus "*capitis nives*," for gray hairs; *evening* of
life; *morning* of the *year*; *eye* of *day*; and, among
many instances in the *Rhetoric*, *ἡμεῖς ῥοπαλοῖ*—
λήμῃ τε Πειραιεως—ὁδὸς τῶν λόγων, &c.^d.—The fact,
indeed, seems to be, that this analogical metaphor
is only a way of stating metaphors founded on re-
semblance*, when that resemblance, depending
wholly, or chiefly, on *relation*, would not be obvious,
and the metaphor, consequently, would be harsh
and obscure, unless the relation were, by some
means or other, pointed out.—Victorius himself
allows, that, in Aristotle's own examples, the mere
substitution of *cup* for *shield*, and of *evening* for
old age, would be "*nimis durum*."

I think,

^b Rhet. III. 11. p. 596, E. ^c Quintil. VIII. 6.

^d Rhet. III. 10.—Instances abound in Homer:—
ἡνιοχὸς νηὸς—ἔδαρ ἀρουρης—ποιμένα λαῶν—σπέρμα πυρὸς—
a seed of fire, for a spark. (Od. E. 490.) &c.—See the
Life of Homer, commonly attributed to Dion. Halic. and
given in vol. v. of the ed. of Homer by Ernestus, p. 162.

* It seems, that any instance of the *metaphora à specie* &c. may be stated analogically: thus, "*old age*, we
"may say, is to *man*, what *stubble* is to *corn*," &c. And,
on the other hand, converting an analogical metaphor
into a metaphor from *species* to *species*, we may say,
evening and *old age* are, both of them, ends of certain por-
tions of time.—It was, perhaps, the vicinity of these two
species of metaphor, and their convertibility, that induced
later writers to drop the distinction, though they made
many other distinctions which Aristotle did not.

I think, then, that Aristotle *meant* to say, and, in some way or other, *had* said, “And *sometimes*,” (*ἰνίοτε*.) now and then, for the sake of clearness, “they add the *proper* word, (the word, *ἀνθ’ ὅ*—“for which, the metaphorical word is put,) to, “or *besides*, the *προς ὃ ἐστὶ*—i. e. that *to which* the “proper word *relates*.” They not only call the shield, the *cup* of *Mars*, but they mention *shield* also, and say, the *shield* is the *cup* of *Mars*: or, taking the other instance, *old age* is the *evening* of *life* *. Thus all will follow naturally: ΚΑΙ ἰνίοτε—And, sometimes, they add the *proper* term, &c. *Ἐνίοις δέ, ἐκ ἑστὶν ὀνομα—ἀναλογον.*—But, in *some* analogical metaphors, there *is* no proper term; in that case, therefore, the metaphor cannot be so used: yet it may be used in the *first*, and most common way, as well as if such *proper* term subsisted; it is still an *analogical metaphor*, and may be used as such:—*ἔδεν ἥττον, ὁμοίως* [i. e. *ἀναλογως*, as Castelvetro rightly explains it,] *λεχθῆσεται*. Thus, in the metaphor exemplified, of *sowing*, applied to the *sun*, we may say the *sun* *sows* his *rays*, though we cannot assign any *proper* term, for which *sows* is put—any *word* appropriated to the dispersion of *light* from the sun, as, to *sow*, is appropriated to the dispersion of *seed*.—Such
appears

* Thus Homer uses the analogical metaphor in the following line:

Ὅνδ' εἰνῆς ἐρετμα, τὰ τε πτερά νηυσὶ πελονται. Od. A. 124.
“Oars, which are the wings of ships.”

appears to me to be the connection of this passage.

It will, undoubtedly, be objected, that the sense I would give the words *προσθιᾶναι* &c. cannot be fairly obtained from them as they now stand: and I confess it cannot; unless we might be allowed to render the words thus, taking *προς* as a repetition of the preposition in *προστιθεῖσιν*: "they add the word, *for* which they use, *or say*, the metaphorical word, (*ἀνθ' ἑ* ΛΕΓΕΙ,) *to* ὁ ΕΣΤΙ—to what it *is*—to the word which *is* used: they add the word that *should* be to the word that *is*." But this appears to me so harsh and improbable a construction, that I would rather suppose the passage to be defective. *Perhaps* it might originally be thus:—*Καὶ ἵνα ἴσῃτε προστιθ. ἀνθ' ἑ λέγει, ΠΑΡΑ [το] πρὸς ὁ ἑστίν*—i. e. *besides adding the thing to which the proper term relates*¹. But there seems to be still another fault in the passage. I cannot reconcile the plural *προστιθεῖσιν*, with the singular, *λέγει*. Goulston renders "*apponit*;" and I am surprised that no MS. should exhibit *προστιθῇσιν*. That *λέγει* is right, is highly probable, from the singular verb *ἔρει*, repeatedly used here, and the *εἰποί*, afterwards: *εἰ τὴν ἀσπίδα Εἰποί*—*κ. τ. ἀλλ.*

¹ The transcribers, seeing two prepositions, *παρὰ πρὸς*, unusually put together, and not understanding the *relative* sense of *πρὸς ὁ*, might reject the first as redundant.

NOTE 185.

P. 167. THE SHIELD, THE CUP OF MARS, &c.

Φιάλη Ἀρεως.— The φιάλη seems to have been a large, expanded, (ἰκπεταλον,) kind of vessel, like a ewer. See *Il.* ψ. 270, and the notes. Hesych. v. Ἀμφιθετός.—It had also, sometimes, an ὀμφαλος, or *umbo*. See *Athen.* p. 501. It had probably, therefore, *some* resemblance to a shield, which makes the metaphor appear less strange; as Piccolomini has remarked, p. 306: who also observes, very well, that this kind of metaphor is then most clear and perfect, when the resemblance of *relation* is aided by some degree of resemblance between the things themselves: and that here, for example, if *lance* were used instead of *shield*, the metaphor would be spoiled, though the common relation would still subsist.

This seems to have been a favourite instance of this sort of metaphor; for it occurs several times in the *Rhetoric*. See *III.* 4. p. 588, and 11. p. 596, E. In the former of these passages Aristotle says, that an analogical metaphor ought to admit of inversion: thus, says he, if we may call the cup the *shield* of *Bacchus*, we may, with equal propriety, call the shield the *cup* of *Mars*. But Demetrius observes, alluding to that passage of the *Rhetoric*, that this is not the case of *every* such metaphor: ἐπεὶ τὴν ὑπὸρειαν μὲν τῆς Ἰδης, ποδα

ἔχην εἶπειν τὸν ποιητὴν^a, τὸν δὲ τὴν ἀνθρώπου ποδὰ, ἔκτετι
ὑπὸ ῥέαν εἶπειν. *Sect.* 79.

NOTE 186.

P. 167. OR AS EMPEDOCLES HAS EXPRESSED IT, LIFE'S SETTING SUN.

Δυσμας βίη.—Victorius has pointed out this expression in Plato's sixth book *De Legibus*, where the Athenian says, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐν δυσμαῖς τε βίη, οἱ δὲ, ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, νεύει^a: probably alluding, in Plato's usual manner, to the very passage of Empedocles. See also Ælian, *Var. Hist.* II. 34.—ἐπὶ δυσμαῖς ἴσμεν: where, as the metaphor was sufficiently explained by the subject of the conversation, the word βίη is not added. Victorius remarks, also, the βίη ΔΥΝΤΟΣ αἰγῶναι of Æschylus, *Agamem.* v. 1132. The rest of that passage is very obscure^b; but *this* expression seems, clearly enough, to describe the *dying eye*, that opens, for the last time, upon the light:—

Βλεψαί πρὸς ΑΥΓΑΣ βελεται τὰς ἡλίου,

Ὡς ἔποτ' αὐθις, ἀλλὰ νῦν πανυσατον,

Ἀκτινα, κυκλονθ', ἡλίου προσφεται.

Euip. *Alcest.* 203.

or,

^a Il. B. 824.

^b *Ed. Serr.* tom. ii. p. 770.

^c I am inclined to read, and point the passage thus:

----- ἀτε καὶ δορὶ πτωσι ΜΟΤΣ

Ξυκαυται, βίη δυντ' αἰγῶναι.

i. e. "such as destroys, dispatches (as we say,) those who
"fall by the spear, in the last gleams of setting life."

or, in the finest picture of the kind, I think, that Poetry affords,

----- oculisque errantibus, alto
Quæsitæ coelo lucem, ingemuitque repertâ.

Æn. iv. 691.

—The poetical reader, I believe, will pardon me, if I wander so much farther from my subject, as to take occasion, from these beautiful passages, to point out three lines of Petrarch, which shew, that his powers were not confined to the expression of amorous tenderness, but were capable of rising, on occasion, to the true sublime. In the sonnet, "*Se lamentar augelli*," &c.^c. written after the death of Laura, he imagines himself to hear her voice, in his solitude, consoling him for his loss, in these lines :

Di me non pianger tu ; ch' i miei dì fersi
Morendo eterni ; e, NEL ETERNO LUME,
Quando mostrai di *chiuder* gli' occhi, *APERSI* !—

NOTE 187.

P. 167. THERE IS NO PROPER ANALOGOUS TERM, &c.

Όνομα κειμενον.—Κειμενον, here, is equivalent to κυριον ; a word established by common usage.—Ετι, εἰ ΜΗ ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΙΣ ὀνομασι χρηται, οἶον Πλατων, ὀφρευσκιον, τον ὀφθαλμον. - - - - παν γαρ ἀσαφες το ΜΗ ΕΙΝΘΟΣ.—*Topic.* VI. 2. p. 242.—See also, *Categ.* c. vii. p. 23, C.

^c Ed. di Gesualdo, p. 288.

NOTE 188.

P. 168. - - - - - SOWING ABROAD

HIS HEAVEN-CREATED FLAME.—

Σπειρων θεοκτισαν φλογα.—Part of an Iambic verse, and probably from some Tragic Poet. The commentators quote Virgil's "*Spargebat lumine terras.*" This, however, is not exactly applicable, because *spargere* does not, I think, appear to have been the proper, *specific* word, for *sowing*, as σπειρειν was. The passage of Lucretius is more apposite :

Sol etiam summo de vertice dissupat omnes
Ardorem in partes, et *lumine* CONSERIT arva.

II. 211.

Every reader will recollect Milton's beautiful application of this metaphor to the stars :

And *sow'd* with stars the heav'n, thick as a field.—

P. L. vii. 358.

— and to the dew-drops, metaphorized into *pearls*, v. 1.

But the idea of *pouring*, applied to the great fountain of light, seems both a more just, and a more elevated, metaphor. It is happily touched by Virgil in this line :—

Jam sole *infuso*, jam rebus luce relectis.

Æn. ix. 461.

—a *sketch* which Thomson has finely filled up, and finished :

- - - young

- - - - young day *pours in* apace,
And opens all the lawn prospect wide :
 The dripping rock, the mountain's misty top,
 Swell on the sight, and brighten with the dawn;
 Blue, thro' the dusk, the smoking currents shine.

Summer, 52.

In his *hymn*, he has taken up the metaphor in a sublimer tone :

Great source of day ! best image here below
 Of thy Creator, ever *POURING wide*,
From world to world, the vital ocean round ! v. 66.

—To which I cannot restrain myself from adding
 a fine passage of the same kind in the hymn of
Dionysius to the sun :

Ἀκτινα πολυζρεφον ἀμπλεκων,

Ἀγλας πολυδερχεα * ΠΑΓΑΝ

Περι γαιαν ἀπασαν ἑλισσων.

ΠΟΤΑΜΟΙ δὲ σεθεν ΠΥΡΟΣ ΑΜΒΡΟΤΟΥ

Τικτεσιν ἐπηρατον ἀμεραν.

* M. Burette prefers πολυκερδεα, a reading of a French MS.; and he translates it, "une riche source." He should have said, "a cunning source;" for I do not believe there is good authority for any other sense of πολυκερδης.—See *Mem. de l'Acad. des Inscript. tome vii. Dissert. sur la Melopée*, &c.—The reader may see the hymn, at the end of the *Ox. Aratus*, and in Dr. Burney's *Hist. of Music*, vol. i. p. 90, with a translation. There is, also, a translation in Dodsley's *Miscellany*, vol. v. But, however partial I may be thought, I must give the bays on this occasion to my friend. He is no professed Poet; but his version has, surely, far more of the animation, enthusiasm,

NOTE 189.

P. 168. THE WINELESS CUP.—

Αοινος. This emendation of Victorius, (instead of *ἀλλα οἶνος*, the reading of all the editions and MSS.) seems confirmed, beyond all doubt, by *Rhet.* III. 6. p. 590, A. and 11. p. 597, A.

Metaphors, from their nature, are in danger of being obscure, or forced, though it is essential to their beauty and effect, that they should be clear and apposite. For this purpose, a metaphor may be guarded in various ways. If the simple substitution of the improper, for the proper, term, would be obscure, or harsh, the metaphor may be converted into an *image*, or *comparison*^a; it may be used *analogically*, and we may say, *φιάλη ΑΠΕΟΣ*, or *φιάλη ΑΟΙΝΟΣ*; or, if that be not sufficient for perspicuity—that is, if the meaning be not sufficiently pointed out by the manner, or circumstances, in which the expression is introduced, we may join these, (*φιάλη Ἀπεῶς αἰνῶς*), or even add to either of them the *proper* word itself^b.

There

enthusiasm, and solemnity of the original. No *Persian*, indeed, could have entered more thoroughly into the spirit of solar adoration.

^a See *Demet.* Sect. 80.—And, again, Sect. 86, of the negative epithet used for the same purpose,

^b See above, NOTE 184.

There is a fine instance of this *negative* mode of explaining a metaphor, in Isaiah, li. 21. "Thou drunken, *but not with wine* *."

The same end is often answered by an epithet, *affirming* of the thing *expressed* some quality belonging to the thing *signified*; thus, ships are "*floating* bulwarks," and the lyre a "*chorded* shell," where Dryden has made the same use of the affirmative epithet, *chorded*, that Theognis did of the negative, ἀχορδῶς, in his metaphorical expression for a bow—φορμιγξ ἀχορδῶς^d. Sometimes the explanatory epithet is itself a metaphor; as in the πτερωτοὶ ἄρμασι of Euripides;—"winged chariots." Here we have a double metaphor; *chariot* for *ship*, and *wing* for *sail*.

It should be remembered, that these *negative* epithets are very common in the Greek Poets. Victorius points out many instances: as κῆμον ἀναυλοτατον, Eurip. Phœniss. 818.—θιασον ἀβαχχυτον, Orest. 319.—μηνυτηρῶς ἀφθιγχε, Æsch. Eumen. 245.—ἀπτεροὶ πωτημασιν, *ibid.* 250, &c.

NOTE 190.

P. 168. - - - AN INVENTED WORD, &c.

Between this and the preceding definition Aristotle must have placed that of Κοσμηῶς—the *ornament*, or *ornamental word*. That it was purposely passed over

* See Bp. Lowth's *Comm. on Isaiah*.

^c Mr. Mason's Ode to the Naval Officers.

^d Demet. Sect. 86.—Arist. Rhet. III. 11. p. 597.

over by him is hardly credible. This is, most probably, one of the lamentable *διαβρωματα* that Strabo talks of*.

The commentators differ widely as to the meaning of *κοσμῶ*. Castelvetro says, the word admits, here, of five different senses, which he sets up, like nine-pins, for the pleasure of knocking them all down.—The only reasonable account of the matter seems to be that given by Dacier from Victorius. It seems clear enough, that what Aristotle here calls *κοσμῶ*, is *included*, at least, under what he calls *οἰκειον* in the *Rhetoric*. For he says, at the end of the next chapter (*cap. xxii.*) speaking of those species of *words* that are used in *prose*, that they are these three, *το κυριον, και μεταφορα, και ΚΟΣΜΟΣ*: and in the *Rhetoric*, after referring to the very enumeration of words in *this* chapter, and setting aside such as he calls *poetical*, (i. e. *γλωτται, διπλα ὀνοματα, &c.*) he says, *το δε κυριον, και το ΟΙΚΕΙΟΝ, και μεταφοραι, μοναι χρησιμοι προς την των ψιλων λογων λεξιν* παντες γαρ μεταφοραις διαλεγονται, και τοις ΟΙΚΕΙΟΙΣ, και τοις κυριοις^b. And these *οἰκεια-ὀνοματα*, again, seem plainly synonymous with *ἐπιθετα*, mentioned presently after:—*δει δε και τα ἐπιθετα και τας μεταφ. κ. τ. λ.*—By *οἰκεια* and *ἐπιθετα*, Aristotle seems to have expressed the *genus*, of which, *κοσμῶ*, the *ornamental* or *embellishing* epithet, was a species.

But

* See the passage in the Preface.

^b Rhet. III. 2. 585.

But as he has not, by any means, explained himself fully, nor given any definition either of οἰκείον or ἐπιθετον, the mist which he has left upon this subject must remain. I shall only remark, that the word κοσμος is *once*; (and I think but *once*;) used by him in his *Rhetoric*, apparently in the same sense as in this chapter. For, speaking of the propriety of diction, and its correspondence to the subject, he observes, that “an ornament should not be applied to a *mean* word; for this,” says he, “has the appearance of burlesque; which is the case with Cleophon, who has used expressions of this sort as ridiculous, as it would be to talk of an “AUGUST *fig-tree*.” The word κοσμος here, and the example by which he explains it, seem to prove, that κοσμος, in the treatise on Poetry, means such an epithet as *embellishes* or *elevates* the thing to which it is applied. For I do not imagine that the term includes what the Grammarians call *perpetual epithets*, such as “*humida vina*,” γαλα λευκον, &c. because Aristotle expressly says, that the κοσμος is used in common speech: now these *redundant* epithets are banished, both by him, and by Quintilian^d, even from *oratory*; much more from ordinary discourse.

It

^c — μητ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεὶ ὀνοματὶ ἐπὶ ΚΟΣΜΟΣ· εἰ δὲ μη, καμωδία φαίνεται· οἷον ποιεῖ Κλεοφών· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἐνία ἐλεγε, καὶ εἰ εἶπεν ἄν, ΠΟΤΝΙΑ ΣΤΥΚΗ.—III. 7. p. 590.

^d Rhet. III. 3. p. 587, C.—Quintil. *De Instit. Or.* VIII. 6.

It may be objected, as it *has* been objected by Piccolomini (p. 337), that, as an epithet may, at the same time, be a *foreign* word, a *metaphorical*, an *extended*, or of any of the other sorts, it could not be enumerated by Aristotle as a *distinct species* of words among the rest. But the truth is, that he is *not* there enumerating so many distinct *species of words*, which exclude each other, but only a number of *distinct properties* of words, several of which may subsist together in the *same* word. Thus, an *extended* word may, manifestly, be, at the same time, a *metaphorical*, or a *foreign* word, or both: a *metaphorical* word may be, also, an *invented*, *extended*, *altered* word, &c. But none of these words can be, at the same time, *proper*, *common* words; and the only exclusive distinction that Aristotle intended, is between the *common* word, and the others; *all* of which are words, on some account or other, *uncommon*.

NOTE 191.

P. 169. NOUNS ARE DIVIDED, &c.

In passages where great corruption and little importance meet, a commentator may be reasonably indulged in silence, or brevity. What all this has to do in the midst of an analysis of *poetical* language, as distinguished from that of *prose*, I confess myself totally unable to see.

The defects of the passage have been fully pointed out by almost all the annotators. See

Mr. Winstanley's note, p. 300, *ed. Ox.* 1780.—But we have lately been told, that all the commentators have entirely mistaken the sense of the passage, and supposed it, without reason, to be imperfect, merely because they did not see, that Aristotle here speaks, not as a Grammarian, but as a Philosopher, and is considering, not the conventional gender of verbal inflection, but the real gender of the *things signified*. Thus, it is admitted, indeed, that all *words* ending in *ν*, and *ρ*, are not masculine; yet, if we examine the nature of the *things denoted* by words of those terminations, we shall find, it seems, that *they* are masculine, though the words themselves are regarded as feminine*. Let us try, then. Μητηρ, for example, ends in *ρ*. Did Aristotle's philosophy lead him to consider a *mother* as of the masculine gender?

NOTE 192.

P. 170. THE EXCELLENCE OF DICTION CONSISTS IN BEING PERSPICUOUS, WITHOUT BEING MEAN.

Λεξις ἀρετή—i. e. of diction, or language, *in general*; not, "*elocutionis Poeticæ*," as Goulston and others render it. For Aristotle gives the *same* definition of the excellence of *oratorical* diction,
in

* "Non enim omnia quæ desinunt in *ν* et *ρ* sunt masculina; nisi ad sensum earum rerum quas denotant respicias, qui mas est, licet ipsa nomina fœminina habeantur." *Ed. Cantab.* 1785, p. 156.

in his Rhetoric; adding, only, with respect to the *degree* of elevation, such a restriction as his subject there required^a. Now had he intended here a definition of the language of Poetry, as discriminated from that of Prose, he would hardly have confined himself to two characters common to *both*; viz. that it should be *perspicuous*, and yet not *mean*, or low, like colloquial language, consisting only of common and proper words, without metaphors, or any of the other ornamental words which he enumerates; *some* of which he makes essential to the *excellence* (*ἀρετή*) and *proper* elevation, even of *prose* elocution^b. For, that this is the force of *ταπεινὸν*, is clear from his own explanation.

Still, it is obvious to ask, why the philosopher, when his subject was the excellence of *poetic* diction, should thus set out with a *general* definition, instead of giving us, at once, the definition of the *species*.—The reason, I suppose, was, that he conceived the *poetic* to differ from the *rhetorical* language, only in the *degree* of elevation above ordinary speech^c; and to define *degrees* is not easy. Nor, indeed, was even *this* difference common to *all* Poetry. If the diction of the Dithyrambic and other Lyric kinds, and the Heroic, with their pompous apparatus of compound epithets, foreign and antiquated words, and boldness
of

^a Rhet. II. 2. p. 584. ^b See Rhet. III. 2. p. 585.

^c See the ch. of the Rhet. last referred to.

of metaphor, rose far above the highest elevation of prose diction ; on the other hand, that of Tragedy, we know, frequently descended, in its lowest parts, even below what Aristotle assigns as the proper level of rhetorical speech, to a style differing from common speech in no other circumstance but that of metre ^d.—Dacier, with the stiff and inflexible dignity of French Tragedy before his eyes, appears to have been shocked at the expression, *μη ταπεινή* ; for he translates, not the words only, but the *ideas*, of his author, into French : “ La vertu de l’expression consiste dans “ la netteté et dans LA NOBLESSE.”

NOTE 103.

P. 170. SUCH IS THE POETRY OF CLEOPHON - - .

See NOTE 14. in vol. i. From what Aristotle says of this Poet in the *Rhetoric* ^a, it appears, that he sometimes variegated his vulgarity with a dash of bombast. He gave fine epithets to low words. The *εὐτελες ὄνομα*, there, agrees with what is said of him here.

What is there said of Cleophon, La Motte says of HOMER himself. — “ Homere emploie quel-
“ quefois les *mots les plus vils*, et il les releve
“ aussitôt par *des epithetes magnifiques* ^b.” It must,
indeed,

^d See what is said at the end of this chapter, (*cap.* xxii.) about the Tragic and other species ; and NOTE 209.

^a III. 7.—See NOTE 190, p. 297. ^b Disc. sur l’Illiade.

indeed, be confessed, that, after all the apologies of critics and commentators, Homer's $\Delta\iota\omicron\upsilon\sigma\eta\varsigma$ —“*divine swineherd*”—has not, to *our ears*, a much better effect than $\kappa\omicron\tau\upsilon\alpha\ \epsilon\upsilon\chi\eta$. The only reasonable way of defending Homer, is, surely, to content ourselves with saying, in general, that the expression *could* not have the same incongruous appearance in Homer's time; as, in that case, he certainly would not have used it. At least, this would be a better apology, than to assert, with Boileau, that $\epsilon\upsilon\beta\omicron\tau\eta\varsigma$ is one of the *finest words* in the Greek language^c.

NOTE 194.

P. 170. AND THAT OF STHENELUS.

This seems to explain a fragment of Aristophanes, in which the Poet, alluding probably to the

^c Reflex. 9, sur Longin.—“Il n'y a peut-être pas dans “le Grec deux plus *beaux mots* que $\epsilon\upsilon\beta\omicron\tau\eta\varsigma$ & $\beta\epsilon\kappa\omicron\lambda\omicron\varsigma$.”—*Le Bossu*, the admired *Le Bossu*, apologizes in a different way. The passage is a morsel of such rare and exquisite absurdity, that I cannot withhold it from the reader. “Nous trouvons de grandes bassesses dans les termes de “chaudrons & de marmites, dans le sang, dans les graisses, “dans les intestins & autres parties des animaux; par- “ceque tout cela n'est plus que dans nos cuisines & dans “nos boucheries, & que ces choses nous font bondir le “cœur. Et nous ne prenons pas garde, que tout cela, au “temps d'Homère et de Virgile, *étoit au goût du S. Esprit* “*même, qui n'a jamais pu l'avoir mauvais*; que Dieu “avoit très-soigneusement ordonné toutes ces choses à “Moïse,” &c. *Traité du Poëme Epique*, VI. 8.

the flatness and insipidity of the diction of Sthenelus, as wanting the poetic seasoning of metaphor, &c. introduces some hungry fellow saying, that "he could make shift to eat even some of the words of Sthenelus, if they were but dipped in salt, or vinegar."

Και πως ἔγω Σθένελε φαγοιμ' αὖ ῥημα τι,
Εἰς ὅζος ἐμβαπτομενον ἢ λευκῆς ἀλας.

Athen. ix. init.

NOTE 195.

P. 170. AN ÆNIGMA, IF COMPOSED OF METAPHORS—.

"Ut modicus autem atque opportunus ejus usus illustrat orationem, ita, frequens et obscurat et tædio complet; *continuus verò in allegoriam et ænigma erit.*"—*Quintil. VIII. 6.*

NOTE 196.

P. 170. THE ESSENCE OF AN ÆNIGMA CONSISTS, &c.

I can neither assent to the emendation proposed by Mr. Winstanley, nor see the least want of any emendation. The passage appears to me perfectly clear and unexceptionable, as it is. Τα ὑπαρχοντα must, by no means, be joined with ἀδυνατα. It evidently means here, in a sense very usual, things that actually *exist*—i.e. are *true*. As, *Rhet. II. 25*, λυεται δε και τα σημεια, - - - κ' ἢ ὑπαρχοντα : where, ὑπαρχοντα is synonymous with

with ἀλφθεις, in *lib. i. cap. ii.* p. 517—λυτον δε, κ' αὖ
ΑΛΗΘΕΣ ἦ.

The passage is accurately and closely rendered by Piccolomini. “La forma e l'essentia dell' “enigma consiste in questo, che *nel dir cose, che* “VERAMENTE SIANO, *si congiunghino insieme* “*cose ch' appaiano impossibili à star' insieme.*”—And this is an exact definition of an ænigma—such an ænigma, at least, as Aristotle means. But in the other way of constructing the passage, which is that of Castelvetro, and some other interpreters, it is no definition at all. For if the *essence* of a riddle consists *merely* in “*putting together things* “*that are incompatible and impossible,*”—τα ὑπερχοντα ἀδυνата συναψαι—then the Italian Poet made a *riddle*, when he described a man fighting after he was cut in two :

- - - - - del colpo non accorto,
Andava combattendo, ed era morto *.

NOTE 197.

P. 170. NOW THIS CANNOT BE EFFECTED BY THE MERE ARRANGEMENT OF THE WORDS, &c.

Κατα μὲν ἐν τῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων συνθεσιν.—*Heinsius*—
τῇ τῶν ΚΥΡΙΩΝ ὀνομάτων—. But the κυριον ὄνομα,
as I have already observed, is, throughout, opposed
by Aristotle, not to μεταφορα only, but to *all* the
other words. He would hardly, therefore, have
used

* Berni, *Orlando Innamorato*, *lib. ii. canto 24, stanza 60.*

used it here in a different sense, as opposed to *metaphor* only. If any emendation were necessary, I should think ΑΛΛΩΝ ὀνομάτων more probable^a. But perhaps no word is wanting. Aristotle had used the expression, ἀδύνατα ΣΤΝΑΨΑΙ—"to *put together* things impossible." This might lead to suppose, that an *ænigma* might be made by the mere συνθεσις ὀνομάτων—by a certain *arrangement* or *construction* of the words only. Therefore he adds—"this cannot be done by the mere *arrangement* of the words; by the *metaphorical* *use* of them it *may*."

As this sense seems sufficiently clear^b, supposes no defect in the text, and, after all, coincides, in the main, with that of Heinsius, (for we must necessarily understand, an arrangement of words *not metaphorical*—) I have adopted it in my translation, after Dacier, and Batteux.

^a So, I find, Piccolomini translates:—"dell' *altre* parole."

^b It seems also to result, most naturally, from Aristotle's expression; in which, κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὀΝΟΜΑΤΩΝ ΣΤΝΘΕΣΙΝ, and, κατὰ ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑΝ, seem opposed:—"by *construction*—by *metaphor*."—If he had written κατὰ τὴν τῶν ΑΛΛΩΝ (or ΚΤΙΩΝ) ὀνομ. συνθ. he would probably have written also —κατὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν μεταφορῶΝ (sc. συνθεσιν.)

NOTE 198.

P. 170. A MAN I ONCE BEHELD, &c.

See *Rhet.* III. 2. p. 586, where this is called an *approved*, or *admired*, riddle:—*ἐν τῷ αἰνιγματὶ τῷ εὐδοκιμεῖντι*—. I wish it may *εὐδοκιμεῖν* with a modern reader. In *Athenæus* another line appears:

*Ἄνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ' ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα;
'Οὐτω συγκολλῶς ὥς τε συναιμα ποιεῖν.*

Lib. ix. p. 452.

But Casaubon seems right in supposing this pentameter to have been a modern addition; for it is not found, I believe, in any more antient writer. Even in *Plutarch*, I observe, that the hexameter not only appears by itself, as in *Aristotle*, but is plainly given as the *whole*. See his *Symposium*, p. 267, *ed. H. St.* It appears from that passage to have been the production of a lady, *Eumetis*. I doubt whether, in these “degenerate days,” it would have gained her a prize in the *Lady's Diary*.

The Greeks were fond of these puzzles. The reader may find some curious specimens of this sort of wit in *Athenæus*, X. 448, &c.

NOTE 199.

P. 171. AS OLD EUCLID DID, OBJECT^{ING}, &c.

Fontenelle talks in the same way. “*Du tems d'Homere c'étoit une grande merveille qu'un*
“ *homme*

“ homme pût assujettir son discours à des me-
 “ sures, à des sillabes longues et breves, & faire
 “ en même tems quelque chose de raisonnable.
 “ On donnoit donc aux Poetes des licences infinies,
 “ & on se tenoit encore trop heureux d’avoir des
 “ vers. *Homere pouvoit parler dans un seul vers*
 “ *cing langues differentes*; prendre le dialecte
 “ Dorique quand l’Ionique ne l’accommodoit
 “ pas; au defaut de tous les deux, prendre l’At-
 “ tique, l’Eolique, ou le commun; *c’est-à-dire,*
 “ *parler en même tems, Picard, Gascon, Nor-*
 “ *mand, Breton, & François commun.* Il pouvoit
 “ *allonger un mot s’il étoit trop court, l’accourcir*
 “ *s’il étoit trop long*; personne n’y trouvoit à
 “ redire ^a.”

But, could this ingenious and sensible writer
seriously suppose, that the language of Homer’s
 poems had at all the same effect to a hearer, or
 reader, of his time, that an English poem would
 now have, if composed of all the provincial dia-
 lects of Great Britain?—We are always told, how
 Homer enriched his language by “ visiting all the
 “ principal nations of Greece, and learning the
 “ peculiarities of their speech ^b.” Just as if an
 English

^a *Digression sur les Anc. et les Mod.*

^b Blackwell’s *Enquiry*, &c. p. 292.—And so, indeed,
 the author of the treatise *De Hom. Poes.*—Λέγει δὲ ποιικλῆ
 πεποιημένην, τὰς ἀπὸ πάσης διαλέκτου τῶν Ἑλλήνων χαρακτηρισ
 ἔγκραταμίξεν, ἐξ ἣν δηλῶ ἐστὶ, καὶσαν μὲν Ἑλλάδα ἐπελθὼν καὶ
 ἰλλῶσαν ἰδὼν.

English poet, because he had resided some time in Yorkshire, or Lancashire, might, in his next poem, put *neet* for *night*, *loise* for *lose*, or a *halliblan*, a very well-sounding Lancashire word, for *blaze*.

This account makes the language of Homer no other than the *κοινον* which Quintilian repro-
bates; among the *vitia orationis*^c: something worse than the “Babylonish dialect” of Hudibras;

- - - - “a party-colour’d dress
“Of patch’d and piebald languages.

“ - - - - -

“It had an odd promiscuous tone,

“As if he’d talk’d three parts in one;

“Which made some think, when he did gabble,

“They had heard three labourers of Babel;

“Or Cerberus himself pronounce

“A leash of languages at once.”

With such an idea of Homer’s language, Fontenelle might well add—“Cette étrange confusion de
“langues, cet assemblage bisarre de mots tout
“défigurés, étoit la langue des dieux; du moins
“il

^c “*Κοινον* quoque appellatur quædam mista ex
“variâ ratione. linguarum oratio; ut si Atticis Doricæ,
“Ionica, Æolica etiam dicta confundas. Cui simile vitium
“est apud nos, si quis sublimia humilibus, vetera novis,
“poetica vulgaribus misceat.”

De Inst. Or. VIII. 3. p. 396, ed. Gih.

Quintilian certainly did not intend this for a description of Homer’s language.

“ *il est bien sûr que ce n'étoit pas celle des hommes.*”

—And, indeed, I firmly believe with Lord Monbodo, that “such a mongrel dialect was never written by any man;” and that “Homer wrote, either the language that was spoken in the country where he was born and educated, or that was used by the poets that had written before him, and was the established language of Poetry^d.”

NOTE 200.

P. 171. AND THEN GIVING A BURLESQUE EXAMPLE OF THAT SORT OF DICTION.

ἱαμβοποιήσας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει.—Two senses have been given to the word *ἱαμβοποιήσας*; both of them, I think, far from satisfactory. Some render it—*making Iambic verses*: “*Iambis usus est.*” [Vict.] But, is it likely, that Euclid, meaning to ridicule Homer’s *hexameters*, should do it in *Iambic* verse?—Besides that the lines themselves, such as we find them, have not the least air of Iambics, but fall easily enough, with a little help, into hexameters. In this I perfectly agree with Dacier; though I see no reason to suppose with him, that Euclid had composed —“*un ouvrage en vers heroïques.*”

Others,

^d *Orig. and Prog. of Lang. vol. iii. p. 19.*—And see the rational account given of this matter, and of the progress and intermixture of the Greek dialects in general, by Mr. Burgess, in his valuable edition of the *Miscell. Crit. of Dawes, Pref. xxi. and p. 405.*

Others, and Madius in particular, understand the word to mean, *satirizing, ridiculing*, the Poet;—"se moque de lui." [*Dac.*] A meaning that, undoubtedly, suits the *passage* better; whether it suits the *word* itself I much doubt, but will not venture to decide. As Aristotle uses *ιαμβοποιος*, in the sense of a *satiric Poet**—a maker of the *ιαμβος*, or *satiric poem*, he may possibly have used the verb, *ιαμβοποιειν*, here, in the correspondent sense of *making a satire upon*, or *burlesquing*:—*ιαμβοποιησας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λεξει*—"having ridiculed him in that sort of diction," in the following manner, &c.—As this sense appears to me, on the whole, far more eligible than the other, I have followed it: for I see no third sense that can, with any shew of probability, be extracted from the present text. But that it is defective, and that *ιαμβοποιησας* is an error, I have very little doubt. If conjecture might be indulged, I should be inclined to suppose, that *what* Aristotle had said was this;—"that it is an easy matter to versify, *even in common speech*, (i.e. *αὐτῇ τῇ λεξει*,) if one may be allowed to extend syllables and words at pleasure, so as to convert, for instance, an *Iambic foot*, which is continually occurring in common conversation, into an *Heroic* or *Spondee*." And the examples that follow, were probably two *prose* sentences so converted, or convertible, into hexameters.

But

* See *cap. ix.*

† *Cap. iv.*—*μαλιστα γὰρ λεκτικῶσι, &c.*

But as to the *manner* in which Aristotle had expressed this in the text, I have no conjecture to offer that is satisfactory, even to myself.—Of the mangled lines which follow, with their perplexing variety of indeterminable readings, I shall say with Victorius, “*veritate desperatâ, nihil amplius curæ de hac re suscipere volui.*” It is some comfort however, as M. Batteux has observed, that both the *objection* of Euclid, and Aristotle’s *answer*, are clear enough, independently of the examples.

I ought to mention, that Castelvetro has explained this passage, *without* supposing the text wrong, in a manner different from any other interpreter, and which, in part, accords with my idea. By *ἰαμβοποιεῖν* he understands neither *saturizing*, nor making Iambic *verses*; but, making Iambic *feet instead of spondees, in hexameter verse*. And the sense he gives the whole passage is this: “It would be a very easy thing to write *heroic verse*, if this liberty of *extension* were allowed; for then, a Poet might put Iambic feet in the room of Spondees, and commit no fault, because the short syllables might be lengthened at pleasure.” And the lines that follow he supposes to be examples of such defective hexameters.

There is somewhat ingenious in this explanation, as there is in many others of this acute writer; but it has likewise the fault, which many of his

explanations have; that of being by no means reconcileable with the original.—See his comment. p. 481.

NOTE 201.

P. 172. WHEN THESE LICENCES APPEAR TO BE THUS PURPOSELY USED - - - -.

—Το μὲν ἐν ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ πως χρωμενον, κ. τ. ἀλ.—
The force, both of φαίνεσθαι, which I understand to be emphatic here, and of πως, seems perfectly well explained by Castelvetro. “Non so perchè
“alcuni vogliano rimuovere di questo testo, πως,
“essendoci stato posto per dimostrare, che allora
“il vitio si scopre, e’ l riso si muove, quando si
“comincia in alcun modo a riconoscere, che il
“poeta ha usata a studio, e ricercata questa maniera di parole.” p. 482.

So, too, Piccolomini’s translation — “l’esser
“veduto --- usar così fatto modo di locutione.”—
For πως, I once suspected we should read ΑΙΠΕ-
πως; as presently after—χρωμενός ἀπρεπως. But
I believe πως is right:—*aliquo modo*.

NOTE 202.

P. 172. HOW GREAT A DIFFERENCE IS MADE, &c.

Ὅσον διαφέρει.—Not “quantum excellat,” as Goulston and others translate; but, “*what a difference the proper use of such words makes*” — “*how different the effect is.*” As, above, *cap. x.*

ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ γὰρ πολὺ—"it makes a great difference:" and, *cap.* xviii. τὶ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ.—Nothing more common than this use of the word. The *difference* here expressed, is, plainly, between the ἀρμόττον, and the ἀπρεπὺς, in the use of such words: χρωμένῳ Αἰπειλῶς—το αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπεργασαίτο· ΤΟ ΔΕ ἈΡΜΟΤΤΟΝ ὅσον διαφέρει—κ. τ. λ.

NOTE 203.

P. 172. - - - AND TEMPERATE USE OF SUCH WORDS—.

—Εντιθεμένων τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς τὸ μέτρον :—literally, "the words being put into the metre:" i. e. as Victorius and others explain it, "taking care, that, in *changing* the words, you do it 'salvo metro.'" A very unnecessary caution surely; besides that the Greek hardly *says* that, whatever it may *mean*. Let us try its meaning by the fairest test, that of strict and literal translation; for we can sometimes see nonsense in *English*, which we cannot see in *Greek*. "But what difference is made by a *proper* use of such words, may be observed in hexameter verse, *when the words are put into* (i. e. as it is explained, "adapted to—) *the metre*."—*What words?*—Metaphorical, foreign, extended, &c. of which he had just been speaking. Very well. But how—*put in*, or *adapted to*, the metre?—for not a word has *yet* been said about *changing* the words. Goulston understands, putting in these poetical words

words *instead of the proper and common words**. I see nothing of this in the original.

In short, it appears to me, that nothing tolerable can be made of the phrase, *εἰς τὸ μέτρον*, taken in this sense. If it might be taken, as some have taken it^b, *adverbially*, for *μέτριως*—*to a moderate degree*—all would be well. “Let it be considered in heroic verse, what a difference is made by such words, when *properly* used, and *not inserted, or introduced, too frequently*.” But I cannot think that the expression will admit of this sense, though somewhat favoured, perhaps, by the circumstance of *μέτρον*, having been just before used in the sense of *moderation*: *τὸ δὲ μέτρον, κοινὸν ἀπαντῶν*, &c. If the article *τὸ* were omitted, the adverbial sense would be *less* improbable; but, *εἰς τὸ μέτρον*, can only, I think, mean—*into the metre*. Still, however, I incline to think this was Aristotle’s meaning, and that he probably wrote *εἰς τὸ ΜΕΤΡΙΟΝ*. A single letter makes all the difference. The word *μετρίον*, as far as that may add any probability to my conjecture, occurs in that part of the *Rhetoric* where he is treating of the very *same* subject—the proper and *moderate* use of metaphors, epithets, and other tropical and ornamental words, in oratory. Thus, III. 2. p. 586, speaking of epithets and diminutives,

* See the notes on his Latin version.

^b Castelvetro—Dacier —(“*mises avec mesure*.”) and the editor of the unaccented Ox. ed. of 1760.

tives, he says, εὐλαβείσθαι δε δεῖ, καὶ παρατρεῖν ἐν αἰμοφῶν TO METPION. And again, of epithets—δεῖ στοχαζίσθαι TOT METPIOT. p. 587.

As this was the only satisfactory sense I could make of the words, I have ventured to give it in my version.

NOTE 204.

P. 172. FOR A COMMON AND USUAL WORD ---.

Κυρίῃ εἰωθεῖ. As κυρίον, in Aristotle's sense, is *common*, the addition of εἰωθεῖ, (*usual*), seems, at first view, to be mere tautology. But the case, as it is very well explained by Victorius, appears to have been this. The word ἰσθίει, which he here calls κυρίον εἰωθῆ, was not *strictly* κυρίον, but only a *common metaphor*; that is, a word which, though *originally* metaphorical, had acquired, by constant use as a surgical term*, the *effect* of a *proper* word. [See NOTE 179.] As κυρίον, therefore, in Aristotle's enumeration, was opposed to μεταφορά, as well as to γλωττα, and the rest of the poetical words, the application of it here, to a word that was evidently metaphorical in its original use, might seem inconsistent: the word εἰωθεῖ was therefore, probably, added, to obviate, in his short way, this objection.

I cannot

* Aristotle, probably, would not have given the denomination of κυρίον, at all, to the same word in this line of Homer:

Τὴς ἀμα σοὶ παντὰς κυρ ἰσθίει.— Il. Ψ. 182.

I cannot guess what induced Dacier to render *γλωτται*, here, by "*mot metaphorique*;" or Castelvetro to assert, that Aristotle calls *θεινται* a *foreign* word, only on account of the *boldness of the metaphor*. By *γλωττα*, I think, we are to understand, any word that belongs either to another language, or another *dialect* of the same language, and that is not naturalized by *common and popular use*. For foreign words, by long usage, become common and popular words; like *entire*, *dame*, and a great number of other French words in our language, which were *γλωτται* when first introduced, and for a considerable time afterwards; but have now, for many years, ceased to be considered as *foreign* words. Such words in the Greek language Aristotle, I apprehend, did not comprehend under the term *γλωτται*, as not being *strange, uncommon*, *ξενικα*. This is evident from a passage in his *Rhetoric*: *αἱ μὲν ἐν ΓΛΩΤΤΑΙ, ΑΓΝΩΤΕΣ· τὰ δὲ ΚΥΡΙΑ, ΙΣΜΕΝ*^b.

There is, however, one sort of poetic words not distinctly provided for in Aristotle's enumeration; I mean, *obsolete* words. Yet these make so considerable a part of the privileged language of verse, that we can hardly suppose him to have overlooked them. *Γλωτται* seems the only class to which they can possibly be referred: yet his definition of *γλωττα* is, "a word, *ᾧ χρῆνται ΕΤΕΡΟΙ*;" which is not applicable to an obsolete word,

^b *Rhet.* III. 10. *init.*

word, used by *nobody*. Perhaps he did not think it worth while to distinguish between words belonging to *another* language, or dialect, and words that *once* belonged to the native language, but which, having long fallen into disuse, have, when occasionally revived, the *effect* of *foreign* words.

NOTE 205.

P. 172. THE CANKEROUS WOUND THAT EATS MY FLESH.

—Φαγδαίνα ἢ με σαρκας ἰσθίαι ποδῶ.—We should read, probably, for the sake of the metre, either Φαγδαίνα γ' ἢ, as it is corrected in the Oxford Euripides, or, which seems still better, φαγδαίνα δὴ, which is Du Pauw's emendation. And σαρκας, for the same reason, must have been altered to σαρκα, in the verse of Euripides, as, I see, it is given in the Oxford edition.

Had Aristotle told us no more about *these* two lines, than that *one* of them was of Æschylus, and the other of Euripides, what critic would not have confidently given the θοινάται to Æschylus?

NOTE 206.

P. 173. Νυν δὲ μ' ἔων ΟΛΙΓΟΣ τε καὶ ΟΥΤΙΔΑΝΟΣ καὶ ΑΚΙΚΤΣ.

Od. IX. 515.—In the *altered* line, thus:
Νυν δὲ μ' ἔων ΜΙΚΡΟΣ τε καὶ ΑΣΘΕΝΙΚΟΣ
καὶ ΑΕΙΔΗΣ.

Among

Among these substituted terms, that *μικρ* answers to *ὀλιγ* is clear enough; but how *αἰδης* answers to *ἀκικυς*, it is not easy to make out. This difficulty struck me, long before I had seen the comment of Victorius, who makes the same remark; and I had accounted for the mistake in the same way that he does: for, if *ἀκικυς* be the true reading, the commentators must, probably, have been misled by taking it for granted, that the substituted words must necessarily correspond, in order, as well as meaning, to the original words*. But it is easy to see, that *αἰδης*, *ugly*, or *deformed*, cannot answer to *ἀκικυς*, which is *weak*; and that *ἀσθενικ* does exactly answer to it. *Ἀκικυς*—*ἌΣΘΕΝΗΣ*, *ἀδυνατ*. *Hesych.*—But my difficulty goes still farther. I do not see how *αἰδης* can correspond, in meaning, to *ἐτιδαν*. I once thought it should be *ΑΕΙΚΗΣ*.—*Ουτιδαν*—*ἰδαν*—*αἷξ*. *Hesych.* *Αεικελις* — *εὐτελις*, *ΟΥΔΕΝΟΣ ΑΞΙΟΥΣ*: and, *ΑΕΙΚΕΣ*—*ΕΥΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΗΤΟΝ*. *Id.* So *Suidas*; *Αεικελις* — *ὁ εὐκαταφρονητ*. But, notwithstanding the authority of lexicographers, and the common derivation of the two words, *αἰκης* and *αἰκελις*, I question whether the former is ever used by Homer in the sense of *ἐτιδαν*, *contemptible*, *mean*, &c. though *αἰκελις* is. *Αεικης* seems

* —“Aristotelem, *ordinem* Homericorum verborum in “*immutatione* eorum *non servasse*; atque *id fecisse*, ut “*metrum servaret*; et, quum inquit, *ἀσθενικ*, quod secundum apud ipsum est, tertium apud poetam exprimere voluisse.” *Vict. Comment.* p. 237.

seems always to mean, *indignus, unworthy, sad, shocking, shameful, &c.* It is a word of *serious indignation*^b. *Αἰκελίων* seems to be used sometimes in *that* sense^c, and sometimes in the *contemptuous* sense^d, as in the line of Homer which Aristotle next produces. The only passages that I have found in Homer, where *αἰκής* will admit well of this sense, are *Od.* II. 199, and *Od.* Ω. 249, in the expressions, *αἰκία ἴσσο*, and, *αἰκία ἴσσαι*: yet even there, it is not necessary to render it “*meanly clad*;” it may be, as in other places, *sadly, unbecomingly, indigne, &c.*

With respect to the word *αἰδαν*^e, Hesychius gives *αἰδνης* as one of its meanings; and *αἰθενικ*^f might well enough answer to it here, were it not for the stronger claim of the word *αἰκυς*; which, however, after all, may *possibly* be a mistake. We know how variously Homer was read and quoted by the antients. Three Medicean manuscripts here give *αἰδης*, instead of *αἰκυς*^g; and so, the *ed. Ald.* and the version of *Valla*. This reading is also mentioned by *Eustathius*. Perhaps, then, *αἰδης* might be the reading of Aristotle’s copy—the precious copy *ἐκ παρθεν*^h, of which we hear so much; and he might mean to exemplify his proposed experiment of substituting *common*, for *poetical*, expression, only in the *two first* words; repeating the last, *αἰδης*, merely to complete his verse.

^b Vide indices Homericos. ^c As *Od.* Δ. 244. ε. 32. θ. 237.

^d Ind. Homer.

^e See Mr. Winstanley’s edition.

verse. But whatever becomes of this conjecture, one thing I cannot help just observing—that this reading, *αἰδης*, is favoured by the preceding lines in Homer. *Polyphemus* says—

ΑΛΛ' αἰεὶ τινα φῶτα ΜΕΓΑΝ καὶ ΚΑΛΟΝ ἔδεγμην
Εὐθαδ' ἐλευσεσθαι, μεγαλήν ἐπιειμενον ΑΛΚΗΝ.

Νυν δὲ μ', ἔων ΟΛΙΓΟΣ τε καὶ ΟΥΤΙΔΑΝΟΣ
καὶ ΑΚΙΚΤΣ, &c. v. 513.

One would expect the three words in this last line to answer, as opposites, to *great*, *handsome*, and *strong*, in the two first: which they will not do, if we read *ἀκικυς*; for *στίδαν*, though it may very well be opposed to *μεγαλήν ἐπιειμενον ἄλκην*, cannot be, with any propriety, opposed to *καλόν*. Whereas, if *αἰδης* be substituted for *ἀκικυς*, all will answer exactly; *ὀλιγ*, to *μεγαν*, *στίδαν*, to *μεγαλήν ἐπιειμενον ἄλκην*, and *αἰδης*, to *καλόν*.

In these examples, it is not always easy to ascertain the particular class, to which Aristotle would have referred the words which he changes. We learn, however, that all these Homeric words were *ξενικά*, *uncommon*, and *poetical*; and that all the substituted words were *χυρία*—words in *common* and familiar use.

NOTE 207.

P. 174. FOR IT IS THIS ALONE, WHICH CANNOT BE ACQUIRED, &c.

Well translated, though very freely, by M. Bateux. “ C'est la seule chose qu'on ne puisse
“ emprunter

"emprunter d'ailleurs. C'est la production du
"génie, le coup-d'œil d'un esprit qui voit les rap-
"ports." Compare *Rhet.* III. 2. p. 585, D. and
11. p. 595, E. where it is observed, that, *καὶ ἐν*
φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὸ ὅμοιον, καὶ ἐν πολυδίεχόρῳ,
θεωρεῖν, εὐτόχῃ. — See Mr. Harris's *Philol. Inq.*
p. 186, 187, where all these passages are quoted
and translated.

NOTE 208.

P. 175. THE DOUBLE ARE BEST SUITED
TO DITHYRAMBIC POETRY, &c.

—Χρησιμωτάτη ἡ διπλὴ λέξις τοῖς διθυραμβοῖς·
οὗτοι γὰρ ψαφῶδεις· αἱ δὲ γλῶτται, τοῖς ἐποποιῖαις·
σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ αὐθαδές· ἡ μεταφορὰ δὲ, τοῖς
ἱαμβεῖοις. *Rhet.* III. 3. p. 587.

NOTE 209.

P. 175. BUT TO IAMBIC VERSE, WHICH IS,
AS MUCH AS MAY BE, AN IMITATION OF
COMMON SPEECH - - -

This, as I have already observed*, is the only
passage in these three chapters concerning the
diction, that strictly relates to the subject—the
diction of *Tragedy*, as distinguished from that of
the Epic, and other species. It is a hint only;
but a pregnant hint, and one that might furnish
matter for a dissertation of some length. How
frequently,

* NOTE 166.

frequently, even in the best Tragedies, do we see the Poet, as it were, through the actor; hear him indulging himself in his *own* language, instead of imitating that of his characters; substituting declamation for passion, *describing* when he should *express*^b; and, in the unrestrained and *epic* elevation of his diction, losing all sight of that *natural* language, of which, undoubtedly, the language of Tragedy should be, according to the precept here *implied* by Aristotle, only an *improved imitation*. This improvement, indeed, admits of *more or less*, but should, at least, bear always the *same proportion* to what we conceive would be the natural language^c of the persons who speak,
is

^b See *Diss.* I. vol. i. p. 25, &c.

^c What I here call *natural* language is, by no means, confined to *simple* and *familiar* language. See NOTE 226, and Dr. Hurd's note on v. 94 of the Ep. to the Pisces, there referred to. To which I must add the judicious observations communicated to the public, long after this note was written, by Mr. Mason, in his *memoirs* of Mr. Whitehead, p. 58, 59, 60. I perfectly agree with what is there said—that the Tragic style not only admits, but demands, “the use of strong images, metaphors, and figures;” that “it cannot, indeed, be truly impassioned without them;” and that “while it discards unmeaning epithets, it should be liberal of those, that add force and vigour to the sentiment.” Nor is all this in any degree incompatible with *such* imitation, such *improved* imitation, of common speech, (ΟΤΙΜΑΙΕΤΑ *κατα μίμησιν*;) as Aristotle attributes to Tragic diction, which he does not require to be confined to *common* and *ordinary* expression.

in the situation, whatever it may be, of the scene before us. For this last circumstance makes a great difference. Tragedy has its *ἀργα μέρη*, its comparatively "idle parts," as well as the Epic Poem^c; and, considering how rare the talent is of true poetic fancy, and poetic expression, the critic, who would rigorously exclude them from every part of Tragedy, must be an *Ariphrades*, or a *Euclid*.—The first speech of Caractacus, in Mr. Mason's exquisite drama, is highly poetical. Possibly, a severe critic might wish it somewhat less so;—but we have so little of such Poetry!—No Poet, however, knows better than Mr. Mason, when the simpler tone of nature and passion should take place. When Caractacus is exhorted by the Druids to "bethink him"—

- - - - - if ought on this vain earth

Still holds too firm an union with his soul,

Estranging it from peace - - -

he answers,

- - - - - I had a Queen:—

Bear with my weakness, Druid!—This tough
breast

Must heave a sigh—for she is unreveng'd.

And can I taste true peace, she unreveng'd?

—So chaste, so lov'd a queen!—ah, Evelina,

Hang

expression, (*συρία*,) but expressly allows it to use also metaphors, and epithets: το συριον, και ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑ, και ΚΟΣΜΟΣ. *cap.* xxii.

^c *Cap.* xxiv. *Transl. Part III. Sect. 6.*

Hang not thus weeping on the feeble arm
That could not save thy mother. - - -

The reader will find some excellent observations on this subject in Dr. Beattie's *Essay on Poetry, &c.* Part II. chap. i. Sect. 1. p. 224, &c. and Sect. 3. p. 267, 268, where a charming example of simple Tragic language is given from *Othello*⁴.

With respect to the *Greek* Tragedy, its earliest language appears to have been of a low and burlesque kind—the *λεξίς γέλεια* of its satyric origin, conveyed in the suitable vehicle of the dancing *tetrameter*⁵. When it was reformed and dignified, (*ἀπεστυρωθή*,) *Homer* was the model; and *ÆSCHYLUS*, with a conception naturally sublime, and the *Iliad* before him, raised the tone of Tragedy above its proper pitch, not only to the pomp of the *Epic*, but even, frequently, to the wild, and tumid, and dark audacity of the *Dithyrambic*: so that, sometimes, as extremes will meet, the *λεξίς γέλεια*, which he took so much pains to avoid, came round and met him, in the shape of bombast, at the very moment when he thought himself at the greatest distance from it. There could not well be any thing in the theatrical cart of *Thespis*
more

⁴ In his note, Dr. Beattie has “translated it into the *fnical* style.” But we see plainly, that he is by much too good a Poet to succeed well in spoiling good Poetry.

⁵ Cap. iv. *Transl. Part I. Sect. 7.*

more laughable, than to call smoke "*the brother of fire*," and dust, the "*brother of mud*."

SOPHOCLES reduced the *general* language of his dialogue to a more equable and sober dignity, but still, Homer, we know, was his great model[†]; and of his diction it may, perhaps, be said, that it is often *Epic*, though his measure is *Iambic*. Most modern readers, however, will, I believe, think it, (as we are told many *antient* readers did[‡],) more adapted to the genius of Tragedy than

[†] Πυρρὸ καπν. *Sept. contra Theb.* v. 500.—καπνὶ πύρρῳ. *Agam.* 503.—The commentators are very amusing, when they admire this, and tell us, it is the same thing as the beautiful expression of *χεύρας τινος ἰνιδῶ*, applied to the Oracle, in the *Oedipus* of Sophocles, [v. 161], the *παμφορὸν γαίης τινος* of Æschylus, applied to flowers [Pers. 620.] or the "*Sylvæ filia nobilis*," of Horace. [See Burton's *Pentalogia*, and Stanley's notes on Æschylus.] De Pauw, indeed, finds fault; but he is equally diverting in another way. His note upon καπνὶ πύρρῳ, is—"Inepte: pulvis ille est ipsum lutum arefactum et com-minutum: oculati vident statim."—It is to be observed, that both these metaphors of Æschylus are in the *dialogue* part. Dante has a *riddling* metaphorical expression of the same kind, but much more poetical. He calls a hoar frost, the *sister of snow*.

Quando la brina in su la terra assempra
L'immagine di sua sorella bianca.

Inferno, Canto xxiv. v. 4, 5.

[‡] Ὅμηρον μὲν, Σοφοκλέα ἱπικόν, Σοφοκλέα δὲ, Ὅμηρον τραγικόν. *Suidas*, v. POLEMON. *Diog. Laert.* IV. 20.—το καὶ Ὅμηρος ἱππικὰ. *Auctor Vitæ Sophoclis.*

[†] Namque is, (*Euripides*,) et in *sermone* (quod ipsum reprehendunt quibus *gravitas et cothurnus et sonus Sophoclis* videtur

than that of EURIPIDES; who seems to have been regarded by the ancients as the first who brought down the *language* of Tragedy into unison with the *measure*, so that the one bore the same degree of resemblance to common speech in its *expressions*, as the other did in its *rhythm*. At least, this appears to have been Aristotle's opinion, from a passage in his *Rhetoric*, where, after having explained the difference between the diction of Oratory and that of Poetry, and the foundation of that difference, he observes, that such a degree of embellishment as forces on the hearer the idea of art, and labour, and preparation, is to be avoided, not only by the Orator, but even by the Poet, if he would be natural and affecting: and he compares such *evidently artificial* language to the voices of the generality of actors, as opposed to the voice of *Theodorus*, which always appeared to be the real voice of the character he personated; whereas *their* voices were evidently feigned¹. He then adds—"The best way to conceal
 " artifice, and make your language appear easy
 " and natural, is, by forming it, chiefly, of the
 " words and phrases of customary speech, pro-
 " perly *selected*; as EURIPIDES does, *who first*
 " *set the example*²."

A pas-

videtur esse sublimior,) magis accedit oratorio generi.—
Quintil. X. 1.

¹ See *Diss. I. vol. i. p. 61. note 1.*

² — δει λαμβάνειν παλαιάς, και μη δοκεν λεγειν πεπλεγμένας,
 άλλα πεφικμετάς· τὸτο γὰρ πῶσαν· ἐπειρο δὲ, τ' ἐπαρτίον· — — —

A passage that precedes this, deserves to be given entire, from its close connection with the subject of this part of the treatise on Poetry, and the curious, though short, sketch it contains of the history of Tragic diction.

“ As the Poets appeared to owe their reputation to their *language*, which never failed to be admired, however foolish and absurd the *matter* it conveyed; on this account, even *prose* diction was, at first, poetical, like that of *Gorgias*. And even now, they, who use such language, are looked upon, by illiterate people, as the finest speakers; which is far from being true; for *oratorical* diction, and *poetical* diction, are different things. And as a proof of this, we see what has actually happened: for now, even among the Poets themselves, those who write *Tragedy* no longer make use of that sort of language; but, as they had exchanged the Trochaic *verse* for the Iambic, because *this*, of all metres, approaches the nearest to common speech; so now, they have also discarded all those words and phrases, so remote from common speech, with which the earlier Tragic Poets used to embellish their diction, and which are still employed

και οὖν ἡ Θεοδωρε φωνη πεπονηθε προς των των άλλων υποκριτων· ἡ μὲν γὰρ, τὴ λεγοντο· ἰσοκεν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἄλλοτριαι. κληττικαὶ δ' εἰ, ὡς τις ἐκ τῆς εἰσόδου διαλεχτι ἐκλεγων συνετὴν· ὡς Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ, ΚΑΙ ΤΗΕΔΕΙΞΕ ΠΡΩΤΟΣ. *Rhet.* III. 2. p. 585, B.

" ployed by those who write *Hexameters*. It
 " would be ridiculous, therefore, to imitate the
 " Poets in a language, which they themselves have
 " abandoned as improper¹."

The Abbé Batteux, by understanding *ιαμβείοις* here to mean Iambic, or satirical, *Poems*, has, unluckily, thrown away the only passage in these three chapters, that was strictly to Aristotle's purpose. He has, also, with Dacier, misrepresented his meaning, by rendering—" *ne peut recevoir que* " *ce qui est employé dans la conversation.*" We are, undoubtedly, to understand, ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ ἀρμολογῆναι, as before: for that Aristotle did not mean absolutely to exclude the other Poetic words—the double, the foreign, &c. from every part of the Tragic dialogue, is plain from his allowing the occasional use of them even in *prose*. *Rhet.* III. 2. p. 585, C. 7. p. 590, E. 591, A.

¹ — ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ ποιῆται, λεγοντες εὐνήν, δια τὴν λέξιν ἰδοῦναι πορίσασθαι τὴνδε τὴν δοξάν· δια τὸτο, ποιητικῇ πρῶτῃ ἐγένετο λέξις, οἷον ἡ Γοργίη· καὶ νῦν ἐτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν τὰς ποιητικὰς αἰοῦνται διαλεγέσθαι καλλιῶς. Τὸτο δὲ ἐκ ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἕτερα λόγῳ καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστίν. Διότι δὲ το συμβαίνειν· ὅτι γὰρ οἱ τὰς Τραγῳδίας ποιῶντες ἐτι χροῦνται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκ τετραμμετρῶν εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετεβήσαν, δια τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τὸτο τῶν μετρῶν ὁμοιοπατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων· ὅτι καὶ τῶν ὀνοματῶν ἀφῆκασιν, ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διαλεκτὸν ἐστίν· οἷς δ' οἱ πρῶτον ἐκοσμεῖν, καὶ ἐτι νῦν οἱ τὰ ἐξαμετρα ποιῶντες, ἀφῆκασιν. [The repetition of ἀφῆκασιν, here, has much the appearance of error. I suspect we should read thus: ὅτι καὶ τῶν ὀνοματῶν, ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διαλεκτὸν ἐστίν, οἷς θ', οἷς TE, οἱ πρῶτον ἐκοσμεῖν καὶ—ποιῶντες, ἀφῆκασιν.] διὸ γελοῖον μμεῖσθαι τὸτο, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐκ ἐτι χροῦνται ἐκείνῳ τῷ τρόπῳ. *Rhet.* III. 1. p. 584.

NOTE 210.

P. 177. EVEN IN THIS, THEREFORE, &c.

Ἡδη καὶ ταυτη.—*Ἡδη—already—even* in the *first* operation of his genius—the very choice of his subject, and formation of his plan. Such appears to me to be the force of ἡδη in this passage, which, I think, is injured by those commentators who punctuate—ὥσπερ εἶπομεν ἡδη—“as we have *already* said.”

NOTE 211.

P. 177. HE HAS, FROM THE REST, INTRODUCED MANY EPISODES—.

Νυν δὲ, ἐν μέρει ἀπολαβὼν, ἐπεισοδίοις κίχρηται Αἴτων πολλοῖς.—i. e. as the commentators explain it, of the *other parts* of the war. But, what should we think of this English—“Selecting *one part* of the war, he introduces many episodes of *them?*” If Aristotle meant the *other parts* of the war, αὐτῶν must, surely, be wrong: if αὐτῶν be right, I confess I cannot see *what* he meant. I wish we had manuscript authority for the αὐτοῦ of *Heinsius*, which is adopted and explained by Le Bossu, II. 5, and 6.—But a learned friend has suggested to me a conjecture still more probable; that Aristotle wrote ΑΛΛΩΝ. Νυν δὲ, ἘΝ μέρει ἀπολαβὼν, ἐπεισοδίοις κίχρηται ΑΛΛΩΝ [sc. μερῶν] πολλοῖς. “Selecting *one part* only of the war, he has, from *other parts*, introduced many *Episodes,*” &c.

NOTE 212.

P. 178. THE AUTHOR OF THE CYPRIACS,
AND OF THE LITTLE ILIAD.

To the authors usually referred to on the subject of these Poems, it may now be useful to add Heyne, *Excursu primo ad Æn.* II. p. 228, 229—a very learned and curious dissertation concerning the writers on the Trojan war.

NOTE 213.

P. 179. THE FALL OF TROY.

See Heyne, *Excursu primo ad Æn.* II. p. 230, 231.

NOTE 214.

P. 179. HOMER GAVE BOTH THE FIRST, AND
THE MOST PERFECT, EXAMPLE.

Ὅς ἅπασιν Ὅμηρος κίχεται, καὶ πρῶτος, καὶ ἴκανος.—“Neque quemquam alium, cujus operis
“*primus* auctor fuerit, in eo *perfectissimum*,
“præter HOMERUM, et *Archilochum*, reperi-
“mus.” *Vell. Patereulus*, I. 5.

Victorius, and other commentators, have, I think, done some injustice to the force of Aristotle's expression here, by taking the adverb, ἴκανος, too literally. They render it—“*ita ut satis putari*” “*debeat.*” (*Vict.*)—“*accurate satis.*” (*Goulston.*) &c.—This gives the *word*, indeed, but falls short of the meaning, which Castelvetro alone has,

according to my idea, adequately expressed :
 “ Gran lode è quella, che è data da Aristotele ad
 “ Homero, che egli sia stato il *primo*, che abbia
 “ usate tutte e quattro le spetie dell’ Epopea, &c.—
 “ e le habbia usate *bene & perfettamente*.” And
 his translation is—“ Le quali cose tutte Homero
 “ usò, e *primiero, e perfettamente*.” Undoubtedly,
 the literal meaning of *ixavoc* is, *sufficiently well* ;
 but in *Poetry* nothing is *sufficiently well*, that is
 not as well, or nearly as well, as *possible* : and,
 farther, if I am not mistaken, the Greek writers,
 not unfrequently, use *ixavoc*, and *ixavoc*, as the
 Italians use the word *assai* ; sometimes for *enough*,
 (which, I suppose, is the primary signification of
assai,) and sometimes for *much, a great deal,*
very, &c. *ixavoc—ἀξιστα, ΠΟΛΛΗΝ. Hesych.*

NOTE 215.

P. 180. IF THE EPIC POEM WERE REDUCED
 FROM ITS ANTIENT LENGTH, SO AS NOT TO
 EXCEED THAT OF SUCH A NUMBER OF TRA-
 GEDIES AS ARE PERFORMED SUCCESSIVELY AT
 ONE HEARING.

If we knew certainly, how many Tragedies were
 performed at one hearing, (*sic μὲν ἀποφασίμ*), we
 should know, with equal certainty, to what length
 Aristotle thought the Epic Poem ought to be re-
 duced, in order to be perfectly, or sufficiently,
ἐνεννόντων. But, unfortunately, the premises here
 are

are not less obscure than the conclusion ; the information to be picked up in antient authors, relative to the Tragic contests and the *Tetralogiæ*, being extremely imperfect and unsatisfactory. Let us however try, what little glimmering of light may be thrown upon this subject, from those authors, or from the nature of the thing itself.

The general principle, upon which Aristotle here fixes the length of an Epic Poem, is the same with that, upon which he fixes the length of a Tragedy : viz. “ that it should be such as to admit of our comprehending, at one view, the beginning and the end. And this,” he goes on, “ would be the case, were it reduced from its antient length, so as not to exceed that of such a number of Tragedies, as are performed successively at one hearing.” Here then is a rule, which, at the time he wrote it, was as clear and determinate, as if he had expressly said, that an Epic Poem ought not to exceed a certain number of verses. But, as an ingenious friend has suggested to me, “ he probably chose to put his rule in the way he has put it, rather than in this latter way, as wishing to convey an intimation, that the length of an Epic Poem should be such, as would admit of its being fairly recited, or read, in a single day.”

It seems to have been a commonly received opinion, that the four dramas of each Poet, which composed the *Tetralogiæ*, were always performed

at one hearing—in one day*. In this case, if *one* Poet only produced his Tetralogia, there could be but four Tragedies; if *two*, there must be eight; if *three*, twelve, and so on: there could be no intermediate numbers. In so obscure a subject, I certainly shall not take upon me to decide. The passage, however, commonly adduced, I believe, as the principal authority in this matter, from *Diogenes Laertius*, appears to me to be against this supposition. The words are these: Εκيني [sc. *Tragici*] τετρασι δραμασιν ηγωνιζοντο, Διονυσιοις, Αθηναιοις, Παναθηναιοις, Χυτροις, ων το τεταρτον ην σατυρικον· τα δε τεττιρα δραματα εκαλειτο Τετραλογια^a.—Here are *four* festivals, and *four* dramas; and the most obvious meaning of the passage, surely, is, that each contending Poet produced, not his entire Tetralogia at the *same* festival, but one Tragedy only at *each* different festival. And so Is. Casaubon appears to have understood it. “*Quot Athenis Liberalia agitantur, tot fabulas diversas a Tragicis Poetis doceri solitas legimus*^b.” But it seems difficult to reconcile this account with what is generally, I think, said, and what Casaubon himself has elsewhere said, of the satyric piece; viz. that it was played *between*, or *after*, the serious Tragedies, on each festival, by way of relaxation and relief.

* See Dacier, p. 118.

^a *Diog. Laert.* III. 56.

^b De Satyr. Græc. Poes. lib. i. cap. 5.

relief^c. For, to say, that of the *four* dramas exhibited by each Poet on the *four different* festivals, the *fourth* was a satyric drama, (*ἡ τοῦ ΤΕΤΑΠΤΟΝ ἡ σατυρική*), is to say, pretty plainly, that *all* the satyric pieces were performed together at the fourth and last festival, the *Xurgoi*. And so indeed some commentators seem to have understood it^d. Perhaps the matter might, not unreasonably, be compromised, by supposing the rule, in fact, to have been, that, of the different Poets contending on each day, *one* should always produce the satyric drama of his Tetralogia, and that drama always close the exhibition of the day.—But I forbear to indulge conjecture farther upon this dark subject. Let us return to Aristotle and his rule.

Dacier tells us, very gravely, that *twelve*, and sometimes *sixteen*, Tragedies were performed in one day^e: an account, which, upon the very face of it, exceeds all bounds of probability. It is rather

^c De Satyr. Græc. Poes. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 128.

^d *Chytrii*] Genus hoc certaminis satyrici fuit, ut ex Laertii verbis apparet, in quo, *dramata satyrorum propria certarentur*. Dio. Laert. ed. Meib. III. 56, note 205.

^e P. 118, note 15.—This reminds one of the account given of Chinese plays, “dont la representation dure dix ou douze jours de suite, en y comprenant la nuit, jusqu’ à ce que les spectateurs & les acteurs las de se succéder éternellement, en allant boire, manger, dormir, & continuer la piece, ou assister au spectacle, sans que rien y soit interrompu, se retirent enfin tous, comme de concert.” Brumoy, *Theatre des Grecs*, I. 53.

rather difficult to conceive, that the representation of a single Tragedy could take up less time than three hours. If however we suppose it to have taken up only *two*, and also, what could hardly be the case, that Tragedy succeeded Tragedy without any intermission, just as scene succeeded scene in the same piece, the whole exhibition of the day, according to Dacier's lowest statement, would have taken up 24, and according to his highest, 32 hours. But is it conceivable, that any audience, however intemperate their fondness for this amusement, could sit so many hours together to hear Tragedies, and to hear them attentively, so as to judge of, and decide upon, their comparative merits?—This account, therefore, of Dacier, that the number of Tragedies performed “at one hearing,” and to the same audience, (for that is implied,) amounted to *twelve*, we may venture at once to reject as the most palpable impossibility. Shall we then suppose *eight*, the next lowest number possible, on the supposition, that the four dramas of the *Tetralogia* were exhibited in one day? The representation of eight Tragedies, we may venture to say, could not possibly take up less time than sixteen hours. Let any man conceive himself sitting in a Theatre, and hearing Tragedy after Tragedy, from six o'clock in the morning till ten at night, and then pronounce as to the probability of even this supposition. If we reject this number, and still adhere to the common
 notion

notion of these exhibitions; we shall be reduced to a single *Tetralogia*; in which case there can have been no *rival* exhibition on the *same day*. It seems therefore impossible to adjust this matter in any reasonable way, without supposing, that the four dramas of the Tetralogia were exhibited on different festivals: a supposition, I think, fairly deducible from the passage of Diog. Laertius above quoted. A supposition too, which seems to be rendered more probable from the very nature of *rival* exhibitions; as each contending Poet would then produce his drama at the same hearing, each hearing would be a distinct day of contest, and there would be, at each contest, a sufficient ground of judgment upon the comparative merits of each performance. This idea will allow us to assign about *twelve* hours, as the utmost time taken up by the whole exhibition of the day; and the great difference of length, which we observe in the Greek Tragedies that are extant, will also allow us to conclude, that, occasionally, *five*, or possibly even *six* Tragedies, *might* be brought within that compass, or nearly so[†]. On this ground, then,
it

[†] See NOTE 64. p. 54. There are not 1100 verses in any of the seven Tragedies of Æschylus, except the *Agamemnon*. Some of those of Euripides fall short of 1200 lines: e.g.—the *Alcestis*, *Heraclidæ*, *Rhesus*. Several are within 1300. It should also be considered, that the *satyric* dramas, which probably closed the entertainment of the day, were, perhaps, considerably shorter than the
serious

it will appear, I believe, that the extent, to which Aristotle proposed to limit the Epic Poem, could hardly exceed that of about 7000 lines.

But, if we admit this, we must of course admit, that he meant to include the Poems of Homer in the number of those which he regarded as too long. And that he did so mean, however unwilling, Dacier and other commentators are to allow it, I have no doubt*. For, 1. The actual length of those Poems seems sufficiently to prove this. The number of lines in the *Iliad* is nearly 15,000; in the *Odyssey*, nearly 12,000. Now whoever can believe it possible, that an audience could sit, and make a common practice of sitting, 22, or even 18 hours together, to hear Tragedies, (which, at the lowest allowance, of *two* hours only for the performance of each piece, must have been the case, if Homer's Poems fell within Aristotle's rule,) may believe, that he thought those Poems of a proper length. Dacier, indeed, tells

serious Tragedies, as is the case with our farces; at least, if we may judge from the only drama extant of the kind, the *Cyclops* of Euripides, in which there are but 709 verses.

* Beni and Piccolomini are of my opinion. See their commentaries. Victorius, too, though by ἀρχαῖον he understands the Poets before Homer's time, yet, by his explanation of Aristotle's rule, plainly supposes Homer to be glanced at; for he makes the time, allowed by the critic for the recitation of an Epic Poem, to be only *eight* hours. P. 250.

tells us, that even the Iliad may be read through in a single day^h. For a wager, indeed, I will not say what might be done, if we had *reading* races at Newmarket. But, 2. Had Aristotle meant to except Homer, why not expressly except him? Gladly as he appears to seize every opportunity of giving the Poet his just praise, would he not, here also, have opposed his conduct to that of other Poets, as he has done in so many other instances? Or why, indeed, refer us to the number of Tragedies successively performed in one day, when he might as well have referred at once to the Iliad, or the Odyssey? All this seems to leave no doubt, that he thought those Poems drawn out to too great a length. And this is also conformable to what he afterwards says, of the advantage which the Tragic has above the Epic Poem in this circumstance, that it effects its purpose "*in a shorter compass*," — ἐν ἱλαττοῖ μῆκειⁱ. I do not forget what he had said in the preceding chapter—that if Homer had taken the whole war for his subject, his Poem *would not have been* εὐσυνοπτον: which, it may be urged, implies, that he thought it *was* εὐσυνοπτον as Homer had managed it, and therefore not too long. But the contradiction here is merely apparent.

^h — "L'Iliade, l'Odyssée, & l'Énéide, sont entièrement conformes à la règle d'Aristote: elles peuvent être lues chacune dans un seul jour." P. 415.

ⁱ *Cap. ult.* — The proverbial expression, μακροτέρως Ἰλιάδῃ, is well known.

apparent. The *εὐθυνοπτεον* admits of degrees; and all that Aristotle appears to mean, in the passage before us, is, that the Poems of Homer would have been *more εὐθυνοπτα*, and, in that respect, more perfect, had they been shorter.

But, to return once more to the dramatic exhibitions—the time of *twelve* hours seems to be the very utmost that can reasonably be allowed, and is more, I believe, than will readily be allowed, without considering the particular character of the Athenians, and the circumstances attending these theatrical exhibitions. The intemperate fondness of that people for these amusements is well-known; and Aristotle himself gives us a pretty strong picture of it, when he says, though only in the way of hyperbolical supposition, “if A HUNDRED Tragedies were to be exhibited in concurrence^k.” We must, also, consider the *variety* of subjects in the different Tragedies performed, and, indeed, the variety resulting from the very nature of the Greek drama, with its choral troop, its odes, its accompaniments of music and dance: the relief, also, of the *satyric* drama, which closed the performance by way of Farce; the pleasure of *comparing* the rival Poets and actors, the zeal of party in favour of this, or that, particular Poet or performer, &c.—And we may add to all this a curious circumstance in the dramatic history of the Greeks; that the people never sate *ἀστικοὶ θεωροῦντες*, but eat, and drank,

^k Part II. Sect. 4.—Orig. cap. vii. See NOTE 64.

drank, and regaled themselves with cakes, and nuts, and wine, during the performance, like an English audience at Sadler's Wells, or Bartholomew Fair¹.

In the whole theatrical system of the antients, and every thing relating to it, all seems to have been proportionably vast, extravagant, and gigantic. Their immense theatres, their colossal dresses, the stilts, buskins, or heroic *pattens*, on which the actor was mounted^m, their masks that covered the whole head, their loud, chanting, and *speaking-trumpet* declamationⁿ—all this is upon the same scale with the intemperate eagerness of the people for these amusements, the number of Tragedies exhibited in one day, and, we may add, the almost incredible number said to have been written even by their best Poets.—Would not this last circumstance alone, supposing not a single drama to have been preserved, have furnished a reasonable proof, *à priori*, or, at least, a strong presumption, that the Greek Tragedy *must* have been, in many respects,

¹ See Athen. p. 464, F. and Casaub. *Animadvers.* p. 779, and the passage there cited from Aristotle's *Ethic. Nicom.*

^m The reader will find a curious description of the dress and figure of the antient Tragic actors in Lucian's treatise *De Salt.* p. 924. *ed. Ben.* and *De Gymnas.* p. 406, 415. But he will allow something for the exaggerations of a man of humour. See also, the *Gallus*, p. 263.

ⁿ See Dr. Burney's *Hist. of Music*, I. p. 154, and *Pl. IV, Fig. 1, 2, 3.*

respects, a simple, unequal, imperfect thing, just such as, in fact, and prejudice apart, we find it to be? SOPHOCLES, confessedly the most correct and polished of the three great Tragic Poets, is said to have written above *an hundred* Tragedies^p.

NOTE. 216.

P. 181. FOR, IN THIS RESPECT ALSO, THE NARRATIVE IMITATION IS ABUNDANT, AND VARIOUS, BEYOND THE REST.

Περιττή γὰρ καὶ ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων.—*περιττή* is rendered, by almost all the commentators, *eximia, præstantior, more excellent*, than the other imitations; which makes Aristotle directly contradict himself. And this Victorius allows, at the same time that he adheres to that sense:—“*præstantiorem esse [hanc poësin] inter cæteras, et “altiore loco tenere.”* How this can be reconciled with the critic’s decided preference of Tragedy in the last chapter, I do not see. I believe Dacier is right, in giving to *περιττή*, in this passage, the sense of, *more abundant*—la *plus excessive* de toutes^a. The text, however, appears to

^p See NOTE 33. vol. i.

^p 123: See Suidas. *Fabric. Bib. Græc.*—Casaub. in *Athen.* p. 496.

^a The same sense is given to the word by Robortelli; but he understands *περιττή τῶν ἄλλων*—abundant in other things also: a sense which, I believe, the phrase will not bear; besides that, for this purpose, the *καὶ* should be otherwise placed—*καὶ τῶν ἄλλων*.

to me to be defective: for what becomes of the *και*, which Dacier, and other translators, have been forced to neglect? The only fair version of the passage, as we now read it, is this:—"for *the narrative imitation* ALSO, is more abundant," &c. ΚΑΙ ἡ διηγ. μιμ.—of which I can make no reasonable sense.—Farther, some word seems wanting, to express *in what* the Epic is περιττη; and this Dacier found himself obliged to supply in his translation and note: *en cela* la plus excessive—. I cannot, therefore, help suspecting, that τατοις [sc. ξενικοις ὀνομασι], or rather ταυτη, has been omitted; and that we should read thus—περιττη γαρ, και ΤΑΤΤΗ, ἡ διηγηματικη μιμησις των ἄλλων^b. "In this respect too"—alluding to the several other respects mentioned in this chapter, in which the Epic imitation was περιττη των ἄλλων: as, in the *time* of its action, and the *length* of the Poem itself; in its *Episodes*, and the variety and μεγαλοπρεπεια arising from them, and from the admission of contemporary events; in the degree, also, to which it admits of the *wonderful*, and even the *incredible*^c. This, also, agrees perfectly with what he had said, cap. xxii. και ἐν μὲν τοις ἡρωικοις ΑΠΑΝΤΑ χρησιμα τα εἰρημενα.

^b So above, cap. xxiii.—ΚΑΙ ΤΑΤΤΗ θεσπισι ἐν φανει Ομηρῷ παρα τις ἄλλας.

^c See what presently follows in this chapter: Part III, Sect. 4. of the translation.

NOTE 217.

P. 181. HAVE MORE MOTION.

Κινητικά. The scruple of Victorius, who proposed to read *κίνητα*, from a doubt, whether *κίνητικα* would admit of a *passive* sense, seems to have been ill-founded. The passage in Plutarch, *De primo frigido*, referred to by Goulston in his note, is this: *ὡς βραδύνα καὶ ΣΤΑΣΙΜΟΣ [ἀντικίνηται] πρὸς ὀξύρροπον καὶ ΚΙΝΗΤΙΚΟΝ*. p. 1755, *ed. H. S.* But the word is used in the same sense by Aristotle himself, in the 50th of the *Harmonic Problems*, p. 770, where *κίνητικόν* is applied to the acuter sound of a concord, on account of the velocity of its vibrations, and opposed to *ἡρεμαίον*, by which he characterizes the graver sound.

NOTE 218.

P. 181. THE OTHER, ADAPTED TO ACTION AND BUSINESS.

Πρακτικόν.—See NOTE 45. p. 3. of this volume.

NOTE 219.

P. 182. THE POET, IN HIS OWN PERSON, &c.

The reader may compare Plato's account of Homer, *De Rep.* lib. iii. p. 393, *ed. Serr.* p. 178, *ed. Massey.*

NOTE 220.

P. 182. BUT EPIC POETRY ---- ADMITS EVEN THE IMPROBABLE AND INCREDIBLE, FROM WHICH THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF THE SURPRISING RESULTS, BECAUSE, THERE, THE ACTION IS NOT SEEN.

Δει μὲν εἶν ἐν ταῖς Τραγῳδίαις ποιεῖν το θαυμαστον·
μαλλον δ' ἐνδεχεται ἐν τῇ ἑποποιῇ το ἀλογον, δι' ὃ
συμβαίνει μαλιστα το θαυμαστον, δια το μη ὄραν εἰς το
πραττοντα.—Such is the reading which I have fol-
lowed. The sense, which I have given it, accords
very nearly, if not exactly, with that given by
Victorius and Goulston, and adopted by Dacier
and M. Batteux^a. Victorius supports his emen-
dation—AAOTON, instead of ἀναλογον—by reasons
of considerable cogency: *viz.* the difficulty, or,
rather, the impossibility, of making any satisfac-
tory sense of το ἀναλογον, as the *rest* of the pas-
sage stands^b; the explanatory *instance* itself,
which

^a — “ Mais encore plus dans l'Épopée, qui va en
“ cela jusqu' au deraisonnable ; car, comme dans l'Épopée
“ on ne voit pas les personnes qui agissent, tout ce qui
“ passe les bornes de la raison est très propre à y pro-
“ duire l'admirable & le merveilleux.” *Dacier*.—
“ L'Épopée, pour étonner encore plus, va jusqu' à l'in-
“ croyable ; parce que ce qui se fait chez elle n'est point
“ jugé par les yeux.”—*Batteux*.

^b If ἀναλογον be right, it can be understood no other-
wise, I believe, than *adverbially*—ἐναλογως—in proportion ;

which *immediately* follows, and is, plainly, an instance of the *ἀλογον*, and even expressly called *γελοιον*, *ridiculously* improbable; and the similar instance, presently after given, of the *landing of Ulysses* in the *Odyssey*, which he expressly calls, *τα ἐν Οδυσσειᾳ ΑΛΟΓΑ*, &c.

But, though I think the sense of the passage, thus read, and thus explained, is, in itself, *unexceptionable*, yet I can by no means rely with perfect confidence upon the reading from which it is obtained. *All the manuscripts*, it seems, give, with one consent, *ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ*. This circumstance,

as it has been understood by those commentators who have adhered to that reading. But, in proportion *to what*? Castelvetro explains it thus: “Ma, se si conviene fare la maraviglia nella Tragedia, molto più si conviene, ed è licito, à farla nell’ epopea *secondo proportionem*. Quasi dica—se in una attione ristretta al termino d’un giorno, & allo spatio d’un palco, [of a stage,] si fa maraviglia, che sia d’un grado, si dovrà fare in attione che sia, pogniamo, di trentasette giorni, & avvenuta in mare & in terra, quale è l’attione compresa nell’ Odissea, *secondo proportionem*, di trenta e sette gradi:—e, το ἀναλογον, è detto *averbially*, come se fosse, ἀναλογως.” p. 549.—I know not how the reader will relish this *Rule of Three* explanation.—But what is to be made of the *διε*, which follows?—“*Wherefore*” [i. e. *because* the Epic is more capable of the surprising than Tragedy] συμβαίνει μάλιστα το θαυμαστον—“the surprising occurs, or is to be found, *most* in the Epic Poem, *because* there the action is not seen.”—I see no other *fair* translation of the passage, according to the old reading.

stance, in a passage not free, in *other* respects, from suspicion, should be sufficient to prevent our admitting the emendation of Victorius, however probable, without some reserve — “*expectandi codices.*” I should perhaps, therefore, have done better, had I omitted the doubtful part of the passage—the words, το ἀναλογον, διο μάλιστα συμβανει το θαυμαστον: for the omission will leave a clear and complete sense; and, moreover, a sense, in which the only meaning that can well be given to the words omitted, seems, in fact, to be implied. Δει μιν ἢ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ποιεῖν το θαυμαστον· μαλλον δ’ ἐνδεχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιῇ, — δια το μη ὄραν εἰς τον πραττοντα. “The surprising is “necessary in *Tragedy*: but the *Epic Poem* “admits of it to a greater degree, — because, “there, the action is not *seen*.”

NOTE 221.

P. 183. ACHILLES MAKING SIGNS, &c.

The passage is this:

Λαοισιν δ’ ANENETE KAPHATI δι᾽ Αχιλλεως,
 Ουδ’ εἰα ἔμεναι ἐπὶ Ἑκτορι πικρα βελεμνα,
 Μη τις κυδ᾽ ἀραιτο βαλων, ὁ δὲ δευτεροῦ εἶλθαι.
 Il. 22. 205.

NOTE 222.

P. 183-4. IT CONSISTS IN A SORT OF SOPHISM, &c.

In the words, δι’ ὃ δὴ αἶν—to προσθῆναι, inclusively, the text seems evidently mangled beyond all hope

of conjectural restoration. This *ulcus insanabile* I presume not to touch, either as commentator, or as translator. I can make nothing consistent of it myself: I have seen nothing consistent made of it by others.

The words, *τατο δὲ ἐστὶ ψευδὲς*, are ambiguous. Victorius doubts, whether they mean, "this posterior *fact* is false," (the *τοδο γινεται*;) or, "this *conclusion* is false"—namely, *εἰ το ὑστερον ἐστὶ, καὶ το προτερον εἶναι*. What follows, had it been tolerably clear, would, probably, have fixed the sense of *ψευδὲς*. As this is not the case, I have given it that sense which appears to me most obvious; and I think I am warranted by the very same expression used in the same sense, in the *Rhetoric*, II. 23. p. 579, A. where, *ἐστὶ δὲ τατο ψευδὲς*, clearly means, this is a false *conclusion*.

But the most important question is, in what manner Aristotle meant to apply this logical paralogism to Homer's management of fiction. None of the commentators, whom I have seen, appear to me to have given any satisfactory explanation.

The paralogism *παρ' ἐπομινον, à consequenti*, here alluded to, the reader will find clearly explained in several parts of the philosopher's other works*. It consists in taking a proposition as convertible, that is not so. Because rain wets the ground, we conclude, when we see the ground wet, that it must

* *Tom. I. p. 286, A. and B. Sect. 6, 7, 8.—Rhet. II. 24. p. 580, E. ed. Duval.*

must have rained. Because every man in a fever is hot, we conclude, that a person who is hot must be in a fever: ἀνάγκη ΚΑΙ του θερμον πυρεττειν^b. These are some of Aristotle's own explanatory instances.—Now, he tells us here, that Homer's art of *lying*—ψευδη λεγειν ὡς δε—consists in imposing his marvellous fictions upon the reader's imagination by a sort of poetic sophism, similar to this logical sophism. And this is all he says. He has left us to make out the similitude as well as we can. No writer, I believe, ever paid more frequent compliments of this kind to the sagacity of his readers.

Dacier, with other commentators, seems to understand nothing more, than that artful intermixture of historical, or acknowledged, *truth*, which, by throwing the mind, as it were, into a posture of belief and conviction, has its effect even upon what we know to be feigned, and makes the false pass glibly with the true. But I cannot think, that this comes up to Aristotle's meaning, nor that his observation, here, amounts only to that of Strabo:—ἐκ μηδεν^c ἀληθους ἀναπτειν καινην τερατολογιαν, ἐξ Ομηρικον, κ.τ.αλ^c. For no one has attempted to shew, and I believe no one can shew, *how* that, which Aristotle says of the particular paralogism denominated παρ' ἱπομενον, is applicable

^b Tom. I. ubi supra.

^c Lib. I.—And see Dacier's note, p. 427.

applicable to the intermixture—the *mere juxtaposition*, of fact and fiction.

The similitude of the logical and poetic sophism appears to me to be this. It is not merely, that, where there is a mixture of history and fiction, the truth makes the fiction pass; but the comparison, I think, relates to the connection between the *fictions* of the Poet, considered as cause and effect, as antecedent and consequent. The Poet invents certain extraordinary characters, incidents, and situations. When the actions, and the language, of those characters, and, in general, the *consequences* of those events, or situations, as drawn out into detail by the Poet, are such as we know, or think, to be *true*—that is to say, poetically true, or *natural*; such, as we are satisfied must necessarily, or would probably, follow, if such characters and situations actually existed; this probability, nature, or *truth*, of representation, imposes on us, sufficiently for the purposes of Poetry. It induces us to *believe*, with hypothetical and voluntary faith, the existence of those false events, and imaginary personages, those *ἀδυνάτα, ἀλόγα, ψευδή*—those marvellous and incredible fictions, which, otherwise managed, we should have rejected: that is, their improbability, or impossibility, would have so forced themselves upon our notice, as to destroy, or disturb, even the slight and willing illusion of the moment.

Whenever,

Whenever, says the philosopher, *supposing* such a thing to be, it would certainly be followed by such effects; if we see those *effects*, we are disposed to infer the existence of that *cause*. And thus, in Poetry, and all fiction, this is the *logic* of that temporary imposition on which depends our pleasure. The reader of a play, or a novel, does not, indeed, syllogize, and *say* to himself-- "Such beings as are here supposed, had they existed, *must* have acted and spoken exactly in this manner; therefore, I believe they *have* existed:"—but he *feels* the truth of the premises, and he *consents* to feel the truth of the conclusion; he does not revolt from the imagination of such beings. Every thing follows so naturally, and, even, as it seems, so necessarily, that the probability and truth of nature, in the *consequences*, steals, in a manner, from our view, even the *impossibility* of the *cause*, and flings an air of truth over the whole. With respect to *fact*, indeed, all is equally *ψευδῆς*; for if the *causes* exist not, neither can the *effects*. But the *consequent lies* are so told, as to impose on us, for the moment, the belief of the *antecedent*, or fundamental *lie*^d.

For instances of this art, no reader can be at a loss. He will find them, not only in almost all the

^d Hobbes, with his usual acuteness, observes, that "*probable fiction* is similar to reasoning rightly from a "*false principle*." p. 13, of his works, *Sect. 9*.

the "*speciosa miracula*" of Homer, but even in the wilder and more absurd miracles of Ariosto; whose poem is, indeed, a striking example of the most improbable, and, in themselves, revolting *lies**, to which, however, every poetical reader willingly throws open his imagination; principally, I believe, from the easy charm of his language and versification, and the remarkable distinctness of his painting; but, partly too, from the truth and *nature* which he has contrived to fling into the *detail* of his description. But were I to chuse, from the productions of poetic genius at large, an example, which would, singly, illustrate this passage of Aristotle, more than any other that I recollect, it should be the *Caliban* of Shakspeare.

I shall only add, without troubling the reader with any comment of mine, one passage of the *Rhetoric*, which may serve, both to illustrate the paralogism itself, here alluded to, and to confirm the application which I have given it. In that passage, Aristotle applies the paralogism *παρ' ιπομυον*, to the effect of oratorical elocution, in producing persuasion and conviction in the hearers.

----- Πιθανοι δε το πραγμα, και η οικεια λεξις.
ΠΑΡΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΤΑΙ γαρ η ψυχη, ως αληθως λεγοντ*,
οτι,

* It may be said of this Poet, in the language of Shakspeare's *Coriolanus*, that he has—

Murder'd *impossibility*, to make
What cannot be, slight work.— *Act v. Sc. 3.*

ὅτι, ἐπὶ τοῖς τοῖστοις, ἕως ἔχουσιν ὡς οἶοντα, εἰ καὶ
μη ἕως ἔχουσιν, ὡς ὁ λέγων, τὰ πραγματά, ἕως ἔχουσιν.^f—

“What the Orator says, is, likewise, rendered
“probable and credible by a suitable diction and
“elocution. For we are cheated into the per-
“suasion, that the orator speaks truly, merely
“because we know that men, so circumstanced
“as he assumes to be, are actually affected in
“*that* manner: so that we take it for granted,
“that things are really as the speaker represents
“them to be, when, in fact, they are not so.”

The art here pointed out by Aristotle, as eminent in Homer's poetry, evidently extends to fiction in general; but, by *ψευδή*, I understand him to allude, *chiefly*, to fictions of the extraordinary, marvellous, and improbable kind—such as require the utmost art and management of the Poet to make them pass. The connection of the whole passage, if I am not mistaken, shews this to be the author's meaning; the application of *ψευδή* being fixed, both by the terms *θαυμάσιον*, and *ἀλογον*, in what precedes, and by the *ἀδυνατά καὶ εἰκότα* which follow, and which I take to be, or, at least, to include, those very *ψευδῆ λεγόμενα ὡς δὲ*, of which he had, immediately before, been speaking.

^f *Rhet.* III. 7. p. 590.—See also, *ib. cap.* xvi. p. 603, E. *ἐπὶ, ἐκ τῶν παθητικῶν*, &c. a passage, which Victorius cites as illustrating the words—*διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶδεναι*, &c.

NOTE 223.

P. 186. IF, HOWEVER, ANY THING OF THIS KIND, &c.

I much doubt of the integrity of the text. The sense I have given seems to be the only one, which the passage, as it now stands, will reasonably bear. Dacier, after Victorius, understands—"if the admission of *one* improbable circumstance be the means of giving more probability to the *rest*." I do not well comprehend this: I am sure it is not what Aristotle has said. His words are, *ἀν δε θη, και φαινηται εὐλογωτερον*—i. e. "if he *has* introduced such a circumstance, or incident, and *it* (not the *rest*, the *whole*) has some appearance of probability," &c.

I suppose Aristotle meant to say, that, though improbabilities are certainly faults, and ought to be carefully avoided in the first choice and structure of a fable, yet, they might be so well managed by a Poet of genius, (especially in the *Epic*, which is here the subject,) as to appear *rather probable*—*εὐλογωτερον*;—to pass with some shew of probability; and, in this case, should be *admitted*, or *tolerated*, even though pushed to the *αἰσιον*, or *absurd*. This sense accords perfectly with what immediately follows, which is precisely an instance of such management; of absurdity, or, at least, improbability, (*τα ἐν Οδυσσεια ἀλογα*—) veiled by the charms of poetry, and finding almost

as ready an admission into the imagination of the reader, under the passport of the beauties by which it is accompanied, as if it were, in itself, ever so consonant to nature and experience. With respect to the words—*ἰνδισχέσθαι καὶ αἰτεῖσθαι*—it seems necessary to adopt one or the other of the two manuscript readings—*ἐνδισχέσθαι*, or *ἀποδισχέσθαι*. The former of these verbs Mr. Winstanley takes in the sense of *ἀπαργαῖν*, *κάλυπαιν*, upon the authority of *Suidas*. But in the very passage adduced by that lexicographer, the *immediate* sense of *ἐνδισχέσθαι* is, to *receive*. *Γίγνεται τι παρατιταγμένα ἢ, εἰς τὸ ΕΚΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ τὰ τῶν βαρβαρῶν τεξίματα.* i. e. to *receive* them; and *by* receiving them to *keep them off* from their bodies. *Arcere*, here, is only what we may call the *consequential* meaning of the word. I do not see, that it may not, in this place, very well bear the sense of *receiving*, *admitting*, or, rather, *tolerating*: but of this I would not be understood to speak positively. This seems, at least, to be the sense, which the purport of the passage requires; and it refers, I think, not to the *Poet himself*, as some understand it, but to the audience, or the reader. When Aristotle has just said, *ἀνδρὶ δὲ θῆ*—i. e. “but “ if he *has* introduced, or admitted it,” how can he be understood to add, “ he *should* admit it?” Farther, the word *ἀνεκτα*, (*tolerabilia*,) which, in the instance immediately subjoined, clearly relates to the hearer, or reader, seems sufficiently to fix

the *same* reference of the correspondent word, *ἐκδιχισθαι*, or *ἀποδιχισθαι*, here.

Mr. Harris, in his *Philol. Inquiries*, p. 220., though he has not quoted, or translated, this particular passage, appears, pretty clearly, to allude to it, and to have understood the verb as here explained. He says, speaking of *improbabilities* in the drama—" 'Tis true, indeed, *did such plays exist*," [*ἀν δὲ θῆ*—] "and were their other dramatic requisites good, these improbabilities might be *endured*, and the plays be still admired."

The version of Piccolomini agrees with mine:—
 "Ma se, ponendovisi poi qualche cosa, che in se
 "habbia del non ragionevole, *si adorerà, e si*
 "tratterà, in maniera, *ch'ella apparir possa ragio-*
 "nevole, potrà, in tal caso, trovarvi luogo." p. 392.

NOTE 224.

P. 186. THE ABSURDITY IS CONCEALED
 UNDER THE VARIOUS BEAUTIES, &c.

In the language of *Pindar*,—

Και περ τι καὶ βροτῶν φρονέας,
 ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λόγον,
 διδαιδάλμενοι ψευδῶσι ποικίλοις,
 ἰζαπαταῶντι μυθοί.

ΧΑΡΙΣ

* " L'homme est de glace aux vérités,

" Il est de feu pour les mensonges."

La Fontaine, Fab. 174.

ΧΑΡΙΣ δ', ἅπερ ἅπαντα τεύ-

-χει τα μείλιχα θνατοῖς,

ἐπιφεροῖσα τιμάν,

ΚΑΙ ΑΠΙΣΤΟΝ ἘΜΗΣΑΤΟ ΠΙΣΤΟΝ

ΕΜΜΕΝΑΙ - - - - -.

Olymp. I.

The reader, I believe, will be pleased with the comparison of a *poetical* passage so remarkably apposite to this observation of the *philosopher*; and, indeed, to all this part of his treatise, relative to the management of fiction.

On account of the same *general* relation to the subject, I may be excused for adding these agreeable lines of *Plautus*:—

Sed quasi Poeta, tabulas cum cepit sibi,

Quærit quod nusquam est gentium, reperit tamen,

Facit illud verisimile quod mendacium est,—

Nunc ego Poeta fiam.

Pseud. Act I. Sc. 4.

NOTE 225.

P. 186. THE IDLE PARTS OF THE POEM—.

ἌΡΤΑ μέρη. The expression is best explained, according to my idea of it, by *Castelvetto*.—

“ Dobbiamo —— intendere per *parti otiose*,

“ quelle, nelle quali il poeta *parla di sua persona*,

“ e con *facella sua* ci fa vedere quello che si fa:

“ le quali perciò si domandano, *μέρη ἄργα*, che

“ non sono in atto, ed operanti, come sono

“ quelle, le quali sono rappresentate in palco, e

“ quelle, nelle quali per gli poeti epopei sono

“ *introdotte*

“ *introdotte le persone à favellare* ; le quali parti,
 “ *perche paiono pressoché montare in palco, ed*
 “ *operare, si contrapongono alle parti otiose, e*
 “ *contengono, principalmente, le sententie, ed,*
 “ *accessoriamente, i costumi.*” p. 578.

Dacier’s “ *parties foibles*,” in which he is followed by M. Batteux, presents a different, and, I think, a wrong idea.

NOTE 226.

P. 186-7. IN WHICH NEITHER MANNERS
 NOR SENTIMENTS PREVAIL.

It has been inquired, why Aristotle here passes over in silence the *passionate* parts of the Poem ; to which a laboured and splendid diction seems as ill suited, as it is to the expression of manners and sentiments. This inquiry has produced another ; whether he did, or did not, mean to include the *passionate* parts in *διαοντικαίς*. *Madius* contends that he did : *Victorius*, that he did not. I believe the latter is right. For if we take *διαονα*, here, in that wide sense which is given it in *cap. xix* ^a. it will include “ *whatever is the object of speech* ;”—“ *every thing*,” as Mr. Harris has explained it, “ *for which men employ language*” ^b. If, therefore, the *μεν διαοντικα*, here, comprehend those *thoughts* which express *passion*, they will also comprehend such as express *manners*, or *character* ;

from

^a *Transl. p. 159. vol. i.* ^b *Philol. Inq. p. 173, &c.*

from which Aristotle expressly distinguishes them:
 μὴτε ἠθικοῖς, μὴτε διακρηστικοῖς.

But, whether he did, or did not, mean to include the *passionate* parts of the Poem, it seems true, and he would probably have allowed it, that such a diction as he here describes is improper for the expression of *passion*: nor is this at all inconsistent, as, on a superficial view, it may seem to be, with the following passage in his *Rhetoric*.—Τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα, τὰ ἐπιθετά, καὶ διπλά πλεῖω, καὶ τὰ ξένα, μάλιστα ἀρμόττει λειγῶσι ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΩΣ· συγγράμμη γὰρ ὀργιζομένη, κακὸν φαναι “ἄρανομηκες, ἢ πάλωρος” εἶπαι^c, &c. The strong and figurative language, and, what may be called, the *natural Poetry* of passion—a sort of Poetry which we every day hear from the mouths of those, who never made, and scarce, perhaps, ever read, a verse—this is a very different thing from the ΔΙΑΠΟΝΕΙΝ λιξί, the ΛΙΑΝ ΛΑΜΠΡΑ λιξίς, of which the philosopher here speaks.—But, for an exact, though short, discussion of this subject, with its proper distinctions and limitations, I must refer the reader to an excellent note on v. 94, of Horace’s *Epistle to the Pisos*^d. It will be found, I think, perfectly consistent with *both* the passages of Aristotle here considered, and will afford the best support to the above remarks.—See NOTE 209.

^c *Rhet.* III. 7. p. 590, E.

^d Dr. Hurd’s *Horace*, vol. i. See, particularly, p. 79, 80.

NOTE 227.

P. 187. OBSCURED BY TOO SPLENDID A
DICTION.

ΑΠΟΚΡΥΠΤΕΙ γὰρ πάλιν ἡ λίαν λαμπρά λεξις τὰ
ῥῆθ καὶ τὰς διανοίας.—In the same sense, in which
ἐγκρυπτεται is used, in a similar passage of *Longinus*,
Sect. 15.—where, speaking of the effect of lively
imagery, in stealing one's attention from *argument*,
he says, Φυσεὶ δὲ πως, ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀπάσιν, αἱ τε
κρεῖττον^ς ἀκρομεν^ς ὄντων, ἀπο τῆ ἀποδεικτικῆς περι-
εχομένης εἰς τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν ἐκπληκτικόν, ὃ τὸ
πραγματικόν ΕΓΚΡΥΠΤΕΤΑΙ ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΠΟΜΕΝΟΝ.
—So also, Sect. 17.—ΑΠΕΚΡΥΨΕ τὸ σχῆμα - - -
τῷ ΦΩΤΙ ΑΥΤῶ. —And again—διὰ ΛΑΜΠΡΟΤΗΤΑ
- - - τὴν τέχνην ΑΠΟΣΚΙΑΖΕΙ, καὶ οἷον ἐν ΚΑΤΑ-
ΚΑΛΥΨΕΙ τῇσι.

The following passage of the *Rhetoric*, con-
cerning the mixture of the *argumentative* with the
pathetic, will also help to illustrate that before
us.—Καὶ ὅταν παθ^ς ποιῇς, μὴ λεγὲ ἰνθυμημα· ἡ γὰρ
ἐκκρεσσι τὸ παθ^ς, ἡ ματὴν εἰρημεῖον εἶναι, τὸ ἰνθυμημα^ς
ἐκκρεσσι γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλας, αἱ ἀμα^ς καὶ, ἡ
ΑΦΑΝΙΖΟΤΕΣΙΝ; ἡ ἀσθενεῖς ποιεῖσιν, *Rhet.* III. 17.
p. 604, E.

In the same manner the expression of Aristotle
is well explained by *Piccolomini*, in his commen-
tary, p. 394.

NOTE 228.

P. 189. IN WORDS, EITHER COMMON, OR FOREIGN, &c.

Λεξει ἡ καὶ γλωτταις—. *Heins.* ΚΥΡΙΑΙ ΛΕΞΕΙ, ἡ καὶ γλωτταις. The insertion seems necessary, but would, perhaps, be better thus: ΛΕΞΕΙ, Η ΚΥΡΙΑΙ, ἡ καὶ γλωτταις, &c. Victorius and other commentators suppose κυρίως to be understood. But this I cannot conceive. Λεξις appears clearly to be used here, as in *cap.* xxii. for diction in general, including, as in that chapter, every sort of words.

NOTE 229.

P. 189. WHICH ARE THE PRIVILEGE OF POETS.

ΔΙΑΔΟΜΕΝ γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς. The same expression is made use of by *Isocrates*, in the following passage, to which I referred in NOTE 5. vol. i. p. 239, and in which the privileges and advantages of the Poet are well set forth, and the importance of *verse* to the effect of even the best poetry, is strongly insisted on.

Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ ΔΕΔΟΝΤΑΙ κόσμοι. Καὶ γὰρ πλησιαζόντας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰς θεὰς οἰοῦντ' αὐτοῖς ἐσι ποιεῖν, καὶ διαλεγόμενες, καὶ συναγωνιζόμενες, οἷς ἂν βεληθῶσι καὶ περὶ τέτων δηλῶσαι, μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις^a ὀνομασίην,

^a τεταγμένοις, here, is equivalent to Aristotle's *κωροῖς*; as, *καινῶς*, to his *πεποικημένοις*, and *ξέροις*, to his *γλωτταις*.

ὀνομασιν, ἀλλὰ, τῇ μὲν, ξένοις, τὰ δὲ, καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ, μεταφοραῖς· καὶ μὴδὲν παραλίπειν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἰδεσι διαποικίλαι τὴν ποιήσιν. Τοῖς δὲ περὶ τῆς λογῆς ἔδεν ἔξῃς τῶν τοιῶτων· ἀλλ' ἀποτομῆς, καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς πολιτικοῖς^b, καὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τοῖς περὶ αὐτὰς τὰς πράξεις, ἀναγκάσιον ἔστι χρῆσθαι. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἱ μὲν μετὰ μετρῶν καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιεῖσι· οἱ δὲ ἔδεν^Θ τέτων ποιήσασιν· ἃ τούτου ἔχει χάριν, ὥς, ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμημασιν, ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως ταῖς γε εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγῇ τῆς ἀκρότης. Καταμαθοὶ δ' ἂν τις ἐκείθεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν· ἣν γὰρ τίς τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκίμωντων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοίας καταλίπη, τὸ δὲ ΜΕΤΡΟΝ διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδέεσθαι τῆς δοξῆς, ἥ νυν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν^c. See NOTE 5. vol. i. p. 240, the passage from Plato.

4

NOTE 230.

P. 189. WHAT IS RIGHT IN THE POETIC ART, IS A DISTINCT CONSIDERATION FROM WHAT IS RIGHT IN THE POLITICAL, OR ANY OTHER ART.

This is one of those passages, which the commentators appear to me to have darkened by illustration. See, particularly, *Dacier's* note. His account of the difference between Poetry and *all other*

^b See note 57. p. 36.

^c *Enag. circ. init.*

other arts, seems evidently false. What Aristotle says of Poetry—that it has two kinds of faults, essential, and incidental—is, at least, true of all other *imitative arts*. It is even true, as *Beni* has shewn, of Rhetoric and Logic*. Aristotle only says, (to give the passage *literally*,) “the rightness “ of the poetic, and the rightness of the political “ art, are not the same; nor of any other art and “ the poetic art.” The plain meaning of which appears to me to be that which I have given—that the *ὀρθότης*, or rectitude, of Poetry itself, is not to be confounded with that of Politics, nor of any other art that may be the *incidental subject* of the Poetry, which, in itself, may be good, and even excellent, though it may deliver things false or inaccurate in Politics, Natural History, Navigation, Geography, &c. This sense of the passage seems clear of all the difficulties with which the common explanation is embarrassed, and leads naturally to the following division of the faults of Poetry, into essential and incidental.—*Castelvetro* is the only one, of the commentators I have consulted, who appears to agree with me, if I understand

* “ Nam Rhetorica & Dialectica suos egredi fines
 “ solent, & in alienos campos excurrere, perinde ferè ac
 “ nos de Poeticâ docemus. Temerè igitur Aristoteles,
 “ quod inter Poeticam & Politicam notavit discrimen,
 “ idem inter Poeticam, rursus, ac cæteras artes, notasset:
 “ nam Rhetorica & Dialectica ejusdem videri possunt
 “ rectitudinis cum Poeticâ.” *Beni Comm. in Arist.
 Poet. p. 460.*

stand him rightly, in this explanation of the passage^b.

The allusion, here, to the severe objections of PLATO, who would allow of Poetry no farther than as it could be made to coincide with the views of his own strict and moral legislation, has been sufficiently pointed out. The reader may see, particularly, a fine passage to this purpose in the *seventh* book of his *Laws*, [p. 817, *ed. Serr.*] where, addressing the Tragic Poets, he refuses to admit them into his republic, till the magistrates have satisfied themselves, by inspection of their poems, that they contain nothing but what is in perfect unison with the laws and moral discipline of the state.—Μη δὲ δοξῆτε ἡμᾶς ῥαδίως γε ἔτις ὑμᾶς ποτε παρ' ἡμῖν ἰασεῖν, σκηνας τε πηξάντας κατ' αἶγορας, καὶ καλλιφώνους ὑποκρίτας εἰσαγομένους, μαιζόν φθειγγομένους ἡμῶν, ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμῖν δημηγορεῖν πρὸς παῖδας τε καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς πάντα ὄχλους, τῶν αὐτῶν λεγόντας ἐπιτηδεύματων περὶ μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ἄπειρ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ', ὥς το πολὺ, καὶ ἰσχυρὰ τὰ πλεῖστα. Σχεῖδον γὰρ τοὶ κ' οὐ μαινομένοισι τιθεὶς ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἅπαντα ἡ πόλις, ὥς ἂν ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέποι δορᾶν τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, πρὶν κρίναι τὰς ἀρχάς, εἴτε ῥήτα καὶ ἐπιτηδεῖα πεποινηκατέ λεγῇν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ. Νῦν ἂν, ὦ παῖδες μαλακῶν μῦθων ἐκχρησάμενοι, ἐπιδειξάντες τοῖς ἀρχαῖσι πρῶτον τὰς ὑμετέρας παρὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ὁδούς, ἂν μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ γέ, ἢ καὶ βέλτιον, τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν φαίνεται λεγόμενα, δώσωμεν ὑμῖν χοροὺς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὦ φίλοι, ἐκ αὐτοῦ ποτε δυνάμεθα.—

De

^b See p. 592, and 599, of his commentary.

De Leg. VII. p. 817.—To this way of talking it was a plain and direct answer, to say—Οὐχ' ἡ αὐτὴ ὁρθότης^c ἐστὶ τῆς ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ καὶ τῆς ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ.

In what is added—ἔδε ἄλλης τεχνῆς καὶ ποιητικῆς—Aristotle may, I think, be supposed to glance more particularly at that part of the *tenth* book of Plato's *Republic*, where he exposes the idle notion, current among the rhapsodists, that Homer was a perfect master of all arts and sciences. And with respect to the absurdity of this notion, Aristotle undoubtedly agreed with him. But there was danger, lest the credit of Homer should suffer from the *manner* in which Plato combated this idea. For those extravagant admirers of Homer not only asserted the *fact*, that he had an accurate knowledge of every art and science on which he touched, but they went farther, and maintained, that such accuracy was essential to a good Poet: Αναγκη γὰρ, they urged, τὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ, καλῶς ποιῆσειν, εἰδοτα ἅρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἶοντε εἶναι ποιεῖν^d. Now Plato, whose object here is to vindicate his rigid exclusion

^c This very word, ὁρθότης, is often used by *Plato*; and, particularly, in this passage, which perhaps Aristotle had in his view—Καίτοι λεγούσι γε οἱ πλείοι, μουσικῆς ὈΡΘΟΤΗΤΑ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πορίζουσαν δύναμιν.—An idea which he rejects with abhorrence. The word *μουσική* here is used in its widest acceptation, including Poetry. *De Leg.* ii. 655.

^d *Rep.* X. p. 598, E. ed. *Serr.*

exclusion of all mimetic poetry, and that of *Homer* in particular, from his republic, confutes the *fact*, without confuting the *general* position. While he shews the pretensions of the Homerists to be false, he *seems*, at least, to allow, that they *ought* to be true. For he flings in no savings; he no where says, what Aristotle has here said for him—that the want of this supposed accurate knowledge of arts and sciences no way affects the character of Homer as a Poet. By denying that he *had* that knowledge, and, at the same time, not denying, or not *expressly* denying, that he *ought* to have it, he leaves the reader to understand, that he meant to detract, on this account, from his merit as an *imitator*. And this, indeed, is perfectly consonant to the whole design of this part of his work, which was, to discredit poetic imitation in general, by shewing *the distance of its representations from truth*.*

* This fanciful argument is thus shortly and clearly stated in the *Comment. on the Ep. to the Pisos*, &c. vol. i. p. 254. "Poetical expression," says the philosopher [*Plato*], "is the copy of the Poet's own conceptions; the Poet's conception, of things, and things, of the standing archetype, as existing in the-divine mind. Thus the Poet's expression is a copy at third hand, from the primary, original truth."—See *Plato De Rep.* 10. p. 597, 598.—To prove his point the better, he shews, that the Poet's conceptions are distant even from the truth of things, because his knowledge of those things is imperfect and inaccurate. p. 598, 599.

NOTE 231.

P. 189. THE FAULTS OF POETRY, &c.

The original is—ΑΤΤΗΣ δι τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἡ ἁμαρτία. The word αὐτῆς appears to me to make strange confusion. For Aristotle is here distinguishing two sorts of faults in Poetry, *essential* and *accidental*; and his expression, presently after, for the former, is ΑΤΤΗΣ ἡ ἁμαρτία—"a fault of the "Poetry itself." As the text stands, therefore, it is just as if he had said—"There are two faults "of the *Poetry itself*: one, of the *Poetry itself*, "and the other, *incidental*."—Accordingly Dacier, Batteux, and almost all the translators, neglect the word αὐτῆς. Possibly it might, originally, have stood thus:—ἐν ἄλλῃς τέχνῃς, καὶ ποιητικῇ αὐτῇ. Τῆς ΔΕ ποιητικῆς, &c.

NOTE 232.

P. 189. IF THE POET HAS UNDERTAKEN TO IMITATE WITHOUT TALENTS FOR IMITATION - - -.

Εἰ μὴ γὰρ προέλετο μιμησασθαι ἀδυναμία. —So, the MSS. But ἀδυναμία never, I believe, means *impossibility*, but *want of power, incapacity**. This was, long ago, sufficiently proved by Victorinus. If the word be right, some preposition must be wanting.

* *Ἀδυναμία* δι ἐστὶ ΣΤΕΦΕΙΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΣ. *Metaph.* V. 12. p. 893, C.

wanting. Heinsius supplies — KAT' ἀδυναμiam. The credit of the conjecture is due to Castelvetro^b. Still the phrase, μιμησασθαι κατ' ἀδυναμiam, for *imitating without ability, or talents, for imitation*, is harsh, and, as far as I know, unsupported by any other example. It seems not improbable, that Aristotle might have written it—ΠΑΡΑ ΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ. Supposing the three first letters of the preposition to have been destroyed, the passage would stand thus — μιμησασθαι * * ΑΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ: which it was obvious enough for the transcriber to *mis*correct into ἀδυναμiam. The phrase, προσήκει μιμησασθαι παρὰ δύναμιν, would be clear and unexceptionable. So, *cap.* ix.—παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παραινάστις μύθον.

Victorius remarks, and, I think, justly, that Horace probably had his eye upon this passage, in the lines—

*Sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, æquam
Viribus; et versate diu, quid ferre recusent,
Quid valeant, humeri. Cui lecta potenter erit
res, &c. Epist. ad Pis. v. 38, &c.*

—where Aristotle's προαίρεσθαι, he thinks, is expressed by “*sumite materiam*,” and, “*lecta res* :” and κατ' ἀδυναμiam glanced at in the other expressions, but, particularly, in the adverb — “*potenter*.”

^b P. 602, of his commentary.

NOTE 233.

P. 190. TO HAVE REPRESENTED THINGS IMPOSSIBLE WITH RESPECT TO SOME OTHER ART, &c.

No interpretation that I have seen, or been able to devise, of this whole ambiguous, perplexed, and, probably, mangled passage, is without its difficulties. All I could do was, to chuse that, which, after the closest attention to the original, and to the best comments, appeared to me “*minimis urgeri*.” I will not attempt to drag the reader after me, through the detail of my own doubts and embarrassments. But lest my version, from that degree of closeness, to which, in all passages where the *meaning* is doubtful, I have thought it right to confine myself, should retain, in some degree, the ambiguity, or obscurity, of the original, some explanation may be necessary.

By the various expressions, μιμησασθαι κατ’ ἀδυναμiam — ἀμαρτια ἢ καθ’ αὐτήν — αὐτης — καθ’ ἑαυτην, and, above all, by ΚΑΚΟΜΙΜΗΤΩΣ ἱγγραψῆς, which seems to fix clearly the sense of the rest, Aristotle means, I think, to indicate all such faults as are incompatible with *good imitation* — that is, in *his* view, with *good Poetry*. All other faults he denominates, κατὰ συμβεβηκός — *incidental*. Faults he allows them to be; but smaller, and more pardonable, faults: ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ γὰρ, εἰ μὴ ᾄδει, &c. In this class he reckons, τὰ ἀδυνάτα —
things

things impossible. The expression is unhappily ambiguous: for we may understand either *ἀδύνατα in general*, or, *ἀδύνατα κατ' ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην*. The commentators are divided. I cannot be of *their* party, who adopt the first of these senses. I see not how impossibilities, or absurdities *, *in general*, could, consistently with Aristotle's principles, be admitted by him into the number of merely incidental faults *—*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*—such as affected not the *Poetry itself*. We must, I think, understand—*ἁμαρτήματα ἢ ἀδύνατα*—things *inaccurate*, or, what is worse, *impossible*, *καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην*—upon the principles of some *other* art †.

Aristotle then goes on, and applies his solution, founded on the foregoing distinction, to the *worst* species of such *incidental* faults—to things *ἀδύνατα*. Take, he says, the worst: suppose the Poet to have represented something *impossible*, with respect to some particular art, as that of medicine, geography, &c. This, strictly speaking, is a fault; but

* That the *ἀδύνατα* here meant are not what he afterwards calls *πίθανα ἀδύνατα*, *probable impossibilities*, but such as he denominates *ἄλογα*, is plain from his instance; *παράδειγμα, ἢ τὸ Ἑκτορος θωξίς*, which he had, in the preceding chapter, expressly given as an instance of the *ἄλογον*. See *Transl.* p. 182, 183. vol. i.

† In recapitulating the different critical objections to which Poets were exposed, he expressly selects *improbability*, and vitious manners, as the *justest* grounds of censure. *Ὅρθη δὲ ἐπιτιμησις, καὶ ἈΛΟΓΙΑ καὶ μοχθηρία. Cap. penult.*

‡ So M. Batteux: see his note on the passage.

but it is a fault that may even be *justified* (ἐπὶ ἰχνῷ,) if, by means of it, the Poet has answered, better than he could have done without it, the *end* of his *own* art, &c.—Still, he continues, supposing this not to be the case, we are to consider, whether the fault, admitting it to be a fault, be τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβηκός, &c.—If the pursuit of *Hector* cannot be absolutely *justified* by the θαυμάσιον, the ἐκπληξίς which is produced by it, still it is not κακομιμητὸς γυγμιμῶνον; the *Poetry* is good, and the end of Poetry, the pleasure arising from the wonderful and the striking, is actually attained, though it be true, that it *might* have been attained without the fault in question.

By the expression, τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην ἀδυνατά, I understand—with respect to the art of which the Poet speaks; not, with respect to the art of Poetry itself: though I confess the latter sense to be that, which the words, αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην, *the art itself*, most naturally present. But this sense of the expression seems to me to be utterly irreconcilable with the sense of the *whole* passage. In rejecting it I have the concurrence of Victorius, Piccolomini, and M. Batteux.—Besides, that the expression itself seems to be jargon. For, what are “things impossible to, (or, with respect to,) *the art of Poetry itself*?”—The only reasonable meaning of the phrase is—things, which it is *beyond the power* of the art to represent or imitate; as it is beyond the power of painting to imitate
2
sounds.

sounds*. But how can the phrase be applied, as Dacier applies it, to the *ἀλογον*, “*deraisonné*—“*tout ce qui est absurde?*” Is it not just as possible for Poetry to represent a horse flying, as a ship sailing?—The sense, which I have given, seems also supported by the antithetic expression that follows—*τελῶς τοῖς ἌΡΤΗΣ*—“its own purpose;” and still more by the clearer phrase which he presently after uses—*τῇ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΤΕΧΝῇ*—“the art to which these things belong.”

I must, however, repeat my confession, that no passage of this treatise appears to me to be of more desperate perplexity than this; nor is there any of the numerous and stubborn difficulties I have had to encounter, of which I wish to be understood to offer my solution with less confidence. Here, as in many other places, had I waited for perfect satisfaction, I might have stood still for ever:—

- - - - - εἰκελῶ ἀνδρὶ
Κεῖνω, ὅς ἐν τριοδοῖσι πολυτρεπτοῖσι κυρησας
Ἔσῃ ἐφορμαινων· κραδιῇ δὲ οἱ ἄλλοτε λαιῶν,
Ἄλλοτε δεξιτερὴν ἐπιβαλλεται εἰς ὁδὸν ἔλθειν.
Παπταινει δ' ἐκάτερθε· νοῶ δὲ οἱ ἥύτε κυμα
Ἐίλεται,—μαλα δ' ὄψε μῆς ὠρεζατο βελῆς^d.

* Plato uses—*ἀδύνατα* EN τῇ τεχνῇ, in this sense:—*Κυβερνήτης ἀνρῶς, ἢ ἱατρῶς, τα τε ΑΔΥΝΑΤΑ EN Τῇ ΤΕΧΝῇ, καὶ τα δύναντα, διασθάνεται.* Rep. II. p. 360. ed. Serr.

^d Oppian. Ἀνιντ. III. 501, &c.

NOTE 234.

P. 190. ACCORDING TO WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY SAID OF THAT END.

Το γὰρ τέλει ΕΙΡΗΤΑΙ. This reading has been questioned ; but, I think, without sufficient reason. It may very well be understood to refer to all that Aristotle had said, or, at least, *hinted*, about the end of the art—the θαυμαστον, *ch.* xxiv.—ἐκπληξις, *cap.* xiv. and xvi. &c. This is not the only instance in this treatise, of reference to something *implied*, as if it had been expressly *said*.—See NOTE 150, p. 226, 227. and *note* ².

Victorius illustrates ἐκπληκτικώτερον by an apt quotation from Aristotle himself: Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ΕΚΠΛΗΞΙΣ ΘΑΥΜΑΣΙΟΤΗΣ εἶναι ΤΗΡΒΑΛΛΟΤΕΣΤΑ. *Top. lib.* iv. .

Strabo says—Μυθεῖ ΤΕΛΟΣ, ἡδονὴν καὶ ΕΚΠΛΗΞΙΝ. *p.* 25. *ed. Cas.*

NOTE 235.

P. 190. WHETHER A FAULT BE, &c.

Ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀμαρτημαῖ· των κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβηκε. —I cannot perceive, that this wants any emendation ; much less, that it is, as Mr. Winstanley says, “*nullo sensu.*” He contends for the certainty of ΑΤΟΠΩΤΕΡΟΝ—a reading, which Robortelli says he found in all the manuscripts he consulted. I would only ask, whether
Aristotle

Aristotle can be conceived to have written such a sentence as this?—"A fault in the Poetry " itself is a more *absurd* thing than a fault in " some other incidental matter; FOR it is a *less* " fault," &c. Yet this, I think, is the plain English of the Greek—Ετι, ἄτοπωτερον ἐστὶ το αἰμαρτημα των κατα την τεχνην, ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβε- βηκε· ἔλαττον ΓΑΡ—κ.τ.λ.

Victorius contends strongly, and, I think, with much better reason, for *ποτερων*. He says well—"Nam *quæ adjunguntur* videntur significare ita " prorsus legi debere: duo enim genera pecca- " torum contraria inter se indicant. *Utrorum* " *igitur peccatorum id*, cujus arguitur poeta, " videndum esse præcipit: alterum enim eorum " genus faciliorem excusationem habet." p. 274.

NOTE 236.

P. 191. HAS NOT REPRESENTED THINGS CONFORMABLY TO TRUTH—.

Ὁυκ ἄληθ. —AN ἑπιτιμησις very frequent in the mouth of PLATO, to whom, undoubtedly, Aristotle here alludes. "The Poets ought not," says Plato, speaking of the representations of *Hesiod* and *Homer*, "to be permitted to tell us—ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολεμεῖσι τι, καὶ ἐπιβελιουσὶ καὶ μαχοῦνται· ΟΥΔΕ γὰρ' ΑΛΗΘΗ."—They ought not, λοιδορεῖν ἀπλως εἶναι τὰ ἐν ᾧδε, ἀλλὰ, μᾶλλον, ἐπαινεῖν· ὡς ΟΥΤ'

* *De Rep.* II. p. 142. *ed. Mass.*

ΟΥΤ' ΑΛΗΘΗ λεγοντας, ἐγ' ὠφελίμα τοις μέλλουσιν
μαχίμοις ἵσσεσθαι^b.—So again, of Homer's account
of the cruel treatment of the body of Hector by
Achilles, and of his sacrificing twelve Trojan
captives to the manes of Patroclus [*Il. ψ.*]:
ἐμπάντα ταῦτα ΟΥ φησομεν ΑΛΗΘΗ ἱσσεσθαι.—
And again, presently after—οὐδ' ἴσμεν ταῦτα, ΟΥΤ'
ΑΛΗΘΗ^c. To all which objections, as appears
from what follows, Aristotle's answer would have
been—ὅτι πτω ΦΑΣΙΝ.

NOTE 237.

P. 191. SOPHOCLES—DREW MEN, SUCH AS
THEY SHOULD BE; EURIPIDES, SUCH AS THEY
ARE.

The difference here intended, between the two
great Tragic Poets, seems to me to be rightly ex-
plained by Dacier in few words: “Sophocle
“*tâchoit de rendre ses imitations parfaites, en*
“*suivant toujours bien plus ce qu' une belle na-*
“*ture etoit capable de faire, que ce qu'elle faisoit.*
“*Au lieu qu' Euripide ne travailloit qu' à les*
“*rendre semblables, en consultant davantage ce*
“*que cette même nature faisoit, que ce qu'elle*
“*etoit capable de faire.*” *p. 458.*—It is thus in-
deed, that, by comparing different passages, we
shall

^b *De Rep.* III. p. 160.—He alludes particularly to the
famous declaration of Achilles, *Od. A.* 487, which he im-
mediately quotes; with other passages of the same kind,

^c *Ibid.* p. 174.

shall find Aristotle clearly explain himself. What he here means by ἀληθῆ, is sufficiently clear from the synonymous expressions, εἰσι εἶαι—εἰα ἦ, ἢ ἔστιν, in this chapter, and ὁμοίως—καθ' ἡμᾶς—and, ἀντι, in chapter ii. where he explains the *different objects* of poetic imitation*. To these expressions are opposed another set of expressions, which I take to be synonymous with each other—δα εἶναι δα—οὕτως δα, here; το βελτιον, and the παραδειγμα ὑπερχειν, presently after; καλλίως, cap. xv^b.—βελτιονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς—βελτιονας τιναων, cap. ii^c. All these expressions correspond to the various expressions of, *improved nature*—*la belle nature*—*ideal beauty*, &c. in modern writers.

The objection then, to which Aristotle here points out the *best* answer, I understand to be this—"Your imitation is not *true*; it is not an "exact copy of such nature as we see about us."—The answer is—"No: but it is an *improved* copy. "If I have not represented things as they *are*, I "have represented them as they *ought* to be."

A very different explanation of this passage has been given by an eminent critic; but, I confess, it appears to me to be irreconcilable with Aristotle's expressions, clearly interpreted, as I think they are, by comparison with each other. According to that explanation, the answer of Sophocles to the objection—ἐκ ἀληθῆ, and indeed the

* Transl. Part I. Sect. 3. ^b Transl. vol. i. p. 146, 147.

^c Part I. Sect. 3.

the sense of the objection itself, are very different from what Dacier, and, I believe, all the commentators, have represented them to be.—The explanation is this :

“ And this will further explain an essential
 “ difference, as we are told, between the two great
 “ rivals of the Greek stage. Sophocles, in re-
 “ turn to such as objected a want of truth in his
 “ characters, used to plead, *that he drew men*
 “ *such as they ought to be, Euripides such as they*
 “ *were.* Σοφοκλῆς ἴφη, αὐτῷ μὲν οἷος δεῖ ποιεῖν,
 “ Εὐριπίδης δέ, οἷοι εἶσι. The meaning of which
 “ is, Sophocles, from his more extended commerce
 “ with mankind, had enlarged and widened the
 “ narrow, partial conception, arising from the
 “ contemplation of *particular* characters, into a
 “ complete comprehension of the *kind*. Whereas
 “ the philosophic Euripides, having been mostly
 “ conversant in the academy, when he came to
 “ look into life, keeping his eye too intent on
 “ single, really existing personages, sunk the *kind*
 “ in the *individual*; and so painted his charac-
 “ ters naturally indeed, and *truly*, with regard
 “ to the objects in view, but sometimes without
 “ that general and universally striking likeness,
 “ which is demanded to the full exhibition of
 “ poetical truth^d.—Again—after an illustration
 of the Electra of Sophocles with that of Euri-
 pides,

^d *Comment. on the Ep. to the Pisos, p. 255.*

pides, the conclusion is—"Whether this representation of Sophocles be not more agreeable to truth, as collected from wide observation, *i.e.* from human nature at large, than that of Euripides, the capable reader will judge. If it be, the reason I suppose to have been, *that Sophocles painted his characters, such as, from attending to numerous instances of the same kind, he would conclude they ought to be; Euripides, such, as a narrower sphere of observation had persuaded him they were.*"

From these two passages compared, it appears, I think, that by *ὁμοίαν δὲ σίμω*—such as they ought to be—the learned commentator understands, such as they ought to be in order to possess "that general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth." But a comparison of Aristotle with himself, in the several passages above referred to, seems to fix the sense clearly to that ideal perfection, that poetic elevation and improvement of nature, which may be said, rather, to exclude such "general and universally striking likeness" of "human nature at large:" and this, I think, was the very objection made to Sophocles by the patrons of his rival.

According to the interpretation which I am taking the liberty to examine, Sophocles is made to answer the charge by denying its truth: for the

answer,

answer, as here stated, will be this—You say, my representations are *not true*, and those of Euripides are true. I deny this. You use the term improperly. My representations are “agree-
 “able to truth,” because they are “collected
 “from wide observation, i. e. from human nature
 “at large;” those of Euripides are *not* agreeable
 to truth, because they are representations, not of
 the kind, but of *individuals*.—The answer, as I
 understand Aristotle, is very different. The
 charge is not denied¹, or explained away, but
admitted and justified. Sophocles says, “If you
 “would have men represented *as they are*—*οὐ*
 “*οὐκ*—you must, indeed, go to Euripides. I
 “have *not* drawn them so—I never *intended* to
 “draw them so. I have done better—I have
 “delineated mankind, not such as they really
 “are, but such as they *ought* to be.” Euripides
 does not appear to have been charged, by those
 objectors, with what may be termed *individual*
improbability of imitation, but with too close and
 portrait-like delineation of *general* nature. In
 short, the difference, which I understand to be
 here intended, between the two Poets, cannot be
 more exactly expressed, than it is by the ingenious

commentator

¹ The reader will observe, that in all the objections,
 drawn from this source, the *truth* of the objections—the
facts—“this is not true”—“this is neither true, nor as
 “it *ought* to be,” &c. are all admitted. Οὐκ ἀληθὲς
 Ἄλλ’ οὐα δει.—Εἰ δὲ ΜΗΔΕΤΕΡΩΣ, ὅτι ἔτω φασιν.—Ἰσως
 δὲ ΟΥ βέλτιον μὲν, Ἄλλ’ οὐτως εἶχεν.

commentator himself, in the beginning of the note to which I refer; where it is observed, [p. 253] that "*truth* may be followed too closely in works of imitation, as is evident in two respects. For, 1. the artist, when he would give a copy of nature, may confine himself too scrupulously to the exhibition of *particulars*, and so fail of representing the general idea of the *kind*. Or, 2. in applying himself to give the *general* idea, he may collect it from an enlarged view of *real* life, whereas it were still better taken from the nobler conception of it as subsisting only in the *mind*." Now, if we apply the latter of these differences to the two Poets in question—if we say, "In applying himself to give the *general* idea, *Euripides* collected it from an *enlarged* view of *real* life; whereas *Sophocles* took it from the nobler conception of it, as subsisting only in the *mind*"—this will express exactly what I take to be the sense of Aristotle.

To the support, which the common interpretation of this passage receives from Aristotle himself, may be added that which it receives, and, I believe, is generally acknowledged to receive, from the Tragedies themselves, which are extant, of the two Poets in question. That *Euripides* is, in general, liable to the censure of *particular* imitation—of "sinking the *kind* in the *individual*," I cannot say I have observed. But who can read this Poet *without* observing the examples, with

with which he every where abounds, of that very "*general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth?*" In *Sophocles*, we find more elevation, more dignity, more of that improved likeness, and ideal perfection, which the philosopher expresses by his *δια δε—προς το βελτιον*, &c. In *Euripides*, we find more of the *αληθεις*, the *ομοιον*, &c.—we are oftener reminded of the common nature and common life, which we all see around us. And if this, in conjunction with other causes¹, be sometimes found to lower the imitations of this Poet, beneath the proper level of Tragic dignity, and to produce something of the *καμψια τις πηλογυμνη*, which Longinus¹ attributes to the *Odyssey*, the fault is amply redeemed, perhaps in those very parts, by the pleasure which results from the closeness and obviousness of the imitation; certainly, in many others, by those precious touches of nature, which must, at once, strike every individual of every audience; such, if I mistake not, as are much more rarely to be found in *Sophocles*, and such, perhaps, as, after all that we have heard about the *beau ideal* and *improved nature*, can only be produced by an exact transcript of nature, *as it is*; of what the Poet has actually *felt* himself, and actually *seen* in others.

The truth seems to be, that both in Poetry, and in Painting, if the *sublime* be aimed at, the

Poet,

¹ Such as were mentioned in NOTE 33. vol. i. ¹ Sect. 9.

Poet, and the Artist, must look up to the *δία ΔΕΙ
σιναί*: their eyes may "glance from earth to
heaven," and they may "body forth the form of
things *unknown*." But, if emotion and the *pathe-
tic* be their object, they will, neither of them,
attain their end, unless they submit to descend a
little towards *earth*, and to copy with some close-
ness that nature which is before their eyes. We
are told of *Michael Angelo*, that "his people are
"a superior order of beings;" that "there is
"nothing about them, *nothing* in the air of their
"actions, or their attitudes, or the style and cast
"of their very limbs or features, *that puts one*
"*in mind of their belonging to our own species*." If
this be the character of that painter's works, I
must confess, for my own part, that I should be
disposed to turn from them to those of the charm-
ing artist, whose words I quote, where we see
human nature *improved*, but not *forgotten*. I am
very well content to be reminded of my own spe-
cies, as he reminds me of them. But this, at
least, is certain, that such a character, applied to
a *Tragic Poet*, would be the severest censure that
criticism could pronounce*.

* Sir Jos. Reynolds's Discourses, &c. p. 170.

* The writer just quoted, among other excellent
observations on this subject, in his notes on Du Fresnoy,
allows, that, even in *painting*, "a dash of individuality is
"sometimes necessary to give an interest."

NOTE 238.

P. 191. BUT, AS XENOPHANES SAYS, &c.

Ἀλλ' ἰτυχιν, ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνης· ἀλλ' ἔΦΑΣΙ ταδε.
Thus all the MSS. and editions. *Victorius* proposed—ἀλλ' ἔΣΑΦΗ ταδε: and supported his conjecture by the following fragment of *Xenophanes*, preserved in *Sext. Empiricus*, to which he supposes Aristotle to allude:

Καὶ το μὲν ἐν ΣΑΦΕΣ ἔτις ἀνὴρ ἰδεν, κἂν τις ἴσται
ἔδωκε, ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε, καὶ ὅσα λεγὰ περὶ πάντων.
Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μαλιστα ΤΥΧΟΙ τετελεισμένω εἰπὼν,
Αὐτῷ ἑμὼς ἐκ οὐδὲ, δοκῶ δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τετυκται*.

Few conjectural emendations invite assent by a more remarkable union of ingenuity and probability: and, as it appears to me, that, without *some* emendation, nothing consistent or satisfactory can be made of the passage, we need, I think, have little scruple in admitting the reading of *Victorius* as true, till manuscript authority produces something better.

Xenophanes is here introduced, probably, because he had written against the theology of HOMER and HESIOD^b. The following lines are quoted from him by *Sextus Empiricus*:

Πᾶντα

* The sense is—"Concerning the nature of the Gods, and of the universe, nothing ever has been, or ever can be, *clearly* known by man. For should we even *chance* to *guess* the truth, we cannot *know* it to be the truth. All is mere *opinion*."

^b *Diog. Laert.* IX. 18.

Παντα θεοὶς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρος θ' Ἡσίοδος τε,
 Ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψυχὸς ἐστὶ,
 ΚΛΕΙΠΤΕΙΝ, ΜΟΙΧΕΥΕΙΝ τε, καὶ ΑΛΛΗ-
 ΛΟΥΣ ΑΠΑΤΕΥΕΙΝ*.

By alluding to those other verses, where he descants on the uncertainty and obscurity of all inquiries relative to the nature of the Gods, and asserts, that all, on that subject, is mere *conjecture* and opinion, Aristotle seems, silyly enough, to have intended to make Xenophanes answer himself; and to excuse Homer's theology, even by the testimony of one who had been most forward to condemn it. "These *may* be opinions taken up " at random, as *Xenophanes* says; and *his* representation of the Gods may be the true:—but, " as he *himself* owns, these are matters *not clearly known*.—*Ἄλλ' ἔ σαφὴ ταῦτα*.—Homer was therefore right, as a Poet, in following popular " tradition and belief^d."

Aristotle also alludes here, without doubt, to the objections of PLATO, *De Repub.* II. p. 150, &c. *ed. Massey*.

I cannot forbear to mention one curious maxim of Xenophanes about drinking, which we find in some pleasant elegiac lines preserved in *Athenæus*. It was his opinion, it seems, that no man had drunk too much, provided he was *able to walk home without a guide*.

Οὐχ'

* See the *Poësis Philosophica* of H. Stephens, p. 36. where other fragments of this philosopher are collected.

^d See REMARK 32. p. 467 of this volume.

Οὐχ' ὕβρις πίνειν δ' ὅποσον μὲν ἔχων ἀφικαίῃ
Οἰκάδ' ANET ΠΡΟΠΟΛΟΥΤ. - - -

Athen. p. 462.

And what says the *severe* and *moral* PLATO on this subject?—He forbids *young* men this indulgence, but allows it to *old*:—μεθης δε, και πολυσινιας τοπαρᾶπαν ΤΟΝ ΝΕΟΝ ἀπεχίσθαι. Till the age of 18, he allows *no* wine; for, to drink it at that time of life, he says, is “*adding fire to fire, both* “*in body and mind.*”—πυρ ἐπὶ πυρ ὀχίτευειν, εἰς τε το σῶμα, και την ψυχην. From 18 to 30, a *moderate* use of wine might be allowed:—οἶνε γευσθαι τε ΜΕΤΡΙΟΥ. At 40, and after, it might be used in a *jolly* kind of way—εἰς παιδιαν·—ὥς ἀνηβαν ἡμᾶς, και δυσθυμιας ΛΗΘΗΝ γιγνεσθαι, μαλακωτερον ἐκ σκληροτερον το της ψυχης ἡθῶ, καθαπερ εἰς πυρ σιδηρον ἐντεθεντα, γιγνομενον· και ἔτως εὐπλαστοτερον εἶναι. For wine, says he, was given to man, as—φαρμακον - - - ἐπικερρον της τε ΓΗΡΩΣ αὐγρητοτητῶ. —*De Leg. II. p. 666. ed. Serr.*

NOTE 239.

P. 192. WHETHER WHAT IS SAID, OR DONE, &c.

I believe *Victorius* is right in referring this to the accusation, or ἐπιτιμησις, which Aristotle, at the end of the chapter, expresses by ὡς βλαβερα. “*Arbitror autem rationem hanc pertinere ad formam eam, quam vocavit, ὡς βλαβερα. Docet enim nunc, si poeta arguitur, quod personam* “*aliquam*

“ aliquam induxerit, quæ quippiam dixerit aut fecerit, quod meritò *reprehendi* possit, aut speciem habeat *nocendi*, quomodo illud defendi purgarique debeat.” p. 278. It is true, the word *βλαβερον* does not here occur: but Aristotle uses *other* words, as synonymous, at the conclusion of the chapter; as, *μοχθηρια*, *πονηρια*: and here, the same thing is sufficiently indicated by the moral expressions, *μη καλως*, and *φ αυλον*. And though this *solution* cannot, that I see, be considered as arising from the application of any of the *three principles* laid down at the beginning of the chapter, yet it seems plainly *connected*, as I have observed in the notes on the translation, with what precedes.

NOTE 240.

P. 193. FOR THE SOLUTION OF SOME OBJECTIONS, WE MUST HAVE RECOURSE TO THE DICTION.

Τα δε, προς την λειξιν ὀρωντα δε διαλυουσ. So, undoubtedly, the passage should be punctuated; not, as in some editions, very absurdly, τα δε προς την λειξιν, ὀρωντα δε διαλυειν: of which the fair, and only fair, translation would be—“ Those objections, which relate to the diction, we must solve *by looking at them*!” Goulston, who adopts this perverse construction, is forced to supply:—

“ his

* “ Quæ verò ad dictionem pertinent, oportet *intuentem* *solvere*.” Ed. Cantab. 1785.

"*his modis intuentem*:" and Heinsius has inserted *ἰσως* in his text; on what authority, I know not. But the true construction certainly is, *ὄφρατις πρὸς τὴν λέξιν*—i. e. by having an eye to, or, considering, "the diction." And so the passage was, long ago, well explained by Victorius; who was followed by Castelvetro, Piccolomini, and Beni.—Dacier, though he translates rightly, mistakes the sense with those, whose translation is wrong. He supposes Aristotle here to be suggesting answers to *objections against the diction*. But the instances might have set him right; none of them appearing to be criticisms on the diction, but, all of them, objections to the *sense*, though the *answers* are drawn from the *diction*. Indeed Dacier seems to have seen this, and is therefore forced to make the *diction*, *Λέξις*, include the *thoughts*, *διαιρέσεις*; thus confounding Aristotle's clear distinction^b.

In this whole chapter, *words* are considered no farther, than as they afford the means of obviating objections against the *sense*.

NOTE 241.

P. 195. WHEN ON THE TROJAN PLAIN
HIS ANXIOUS EYE, &c.

The censure, here, is generally supposed to have fallen on the word *ἀθροισμὸς*, and the absurdity of making Agamemnon *see* the Trojan camp; and the

^b "La diction a deux parties; car elle comprend ordinairement les pensées & l'expression." p. 468. note 27.

the Grecian fleet, by night, and when he was *shut up* in his tent. To this, Aristotle is understood to reply, that the word is *metaphorical*; he saw with his *mind's eye*.—For my part, I would much rather confess, that I do not understand the instance at all, than suppose the philosopher capable of thus explaining away one of the finest descriptive touches in the whole Iliad. The entire passage is this:

Ἦτοι ὅτ' ἐς πεδὶον το Τρωϊκὸν ἀβησσει,
Θαύμαζεν πυρὰ πολλὰ, τὰ καίετο Ἰλίοθι προ,
Αὐλῶν συριγγῶν τ' ἐνοπῆν, ὅραδον τ' ἀνθρώπων.
Il. X. v. 11.

I can hardly think it possible for any man, of the least taste, to read these lines, and understand them to express merely the *thoughts* of Agamemnon. Mr. Pope, who has shewn so much taste in making the most of all Homer's *picturesque* descriptions^a, has, in his translation, done ample justice to this. Yet, in the *note*^b, this cruel metaphorical *sponge* is applied, without compunction, upon the supposed authority of Aristotle; though, after all, the evident corruption and deficiency of this whole passage leaves it dubious, whether this,

or,

^a See *Diss. I.* vol. i. p. 46, &c.

^b *Il. X. v. 13.* where, in the note, this explanation by *metaphor* is given with seeming acquiescence. In Clarke's Homer, too, it is adopted, and ἀβησσει is explained, "*animo videret: secum circumspectaret.* Κατὰ μεταφορὰν "ἐρηται. *Aristot. Poetic. cap. xxv.*"

or, indeed, any other meaning, assigned, or assignable, be the true one.

All, in this description, seems clearly *literal*. The verb, ἀθρῆσαι, is no where in Homer, I believe, applied to *mental* vision. Still less is θαυμάζειν applicable to mere *thought*, or *recollection*. And what, after all, is Agamemnon made to *see*? Only what he might easily see, even as he lay on his couch—the *fires* of the Trojan camp. Add to this, the sense still more evidently literal of what follows—of his *hearing* the military music^c, and “the *busy hum of men*.”

There are few descriptions in Homer, that, to me, appear more beautiful than this little military night-scene. Whatever may be supposed with respect to *Agamemnon*, we, who read, are made to *see*, and *hear*. But, take away the literal sense, and you take away, with it, the whole beauty of the passage.—And, after all, what is the difficulty? Agamemnon, though retired to his tent, was kept awake by his anxiety. The enemy was not far off; and he apprehended the design of some nocturnal incursion^d. In this situation, is it difficult to imagine, that he might frequently rise, and look with an anxious eye

^c Pope has expressed this, I think, in a very happy line:—

“Hears in the passing wind their music blow.”

^d Δυσμενεις δ' ἄνδρες σχεδόν διαται, ἔδε τι ἰδμεν,

Μη πως καὶ διὰ πύλας μενοινῶσι μαχεῖσθαι. v. 100, 101.

eye *towards* the Trojan camp, and *towards* the ships?—for this is all which the expressions, ΕΞ πειθὸς ἀθροισίη—ΕΞ νηας ἰδοί—here imply. Nor is it at all improbable, that he might have these views as he lay upon his bed, through windows, or apertures, made perhaps for that very purpose. The commentators seem to have thought only of a modern officer, snugly shut up in a close and comfortable tent, and disturbed by no fear, but that of a sore throat, or the rheumatism. The *tents* of the antients were mere huts, or hovels*. The *marquee* of Achilles himself, as it is minutely described by Homer†, seems to have been little better than a cow-house.

As I have given the passage from Homer, the reader may not be displeased to compare that sketch with a far more finished and exquisite *night-piece*, but of the same kind, by our own great Poet.

From camp to camp, through the foul womb of
The *hum* of either army stilly sounds, [night,
That the fix'd centinels almost receive
The secret whispers of each other's watch :
Fire answers *fire* ; and through their paly flames
Each battle sees the other's umber'd face :

Steed

* “ Trojanis temporibus, tentoria nondum erant *lintea*.

“ Achivorum *κασιαι* stipitibus lignisque constabant, vimine
“ *intertexto*, humoque aggesta ; adeoque tuguria potius.”

Heyne ad Virgil. *Æn.* I. *Excurs.* 16.

† *Il.* Ω. 449. Pope's transl. XXIV. 553, and the note.

Steed threatens steed, in high and boastful neighs,
 Piercing the night's dull ear; and from the tents,
 The armourers, accomplishing the knights,
 With busy hammers closing rivets up,
 Give dreadful note of preparation *. *Henry V. Act iv.*

NOTE 242.

P. 195. Αὐλῶν συριγγῶν θ' ὁμάδων.—Π. Κ. v. 13.

—So Aristotle. In our editions of Homer, the whole line is—

Αὐλῶν συριγγῶν τ' ἐνοπῆν, ὁμάδων τ' ἀνθρώπων.

I cannot agree with those commentators who take the objection here to fall upon the word *ἐνοπῆν*, which means, *voice*, “& ne se dit proprement,” says Dacier, “que des *hommes*.” This would be a mere *verbal* objection; for the *meaning* is plain enough. But Aristotle, as I have already observed, is not here considering criticisms on the diction, but, such criticisms on the *διανοία*, or *thoughts*, as may be obviated by means of the diction.

Farther; he is here shewing, how objections may be removed by having recourse to metaphor—by saying, “the expression is not to be taken in its *proper*, but, in its *metaphorical* sense.” But Dacier's explanation makes the *objection* to be, not the impropriety of the *literal* sense, (for that was out of the question here), but only the impropriety, or harshness, of the *metaphor*;

* See REMARK 33. p. 467 of this vol.

metaphor; and the *answer*, according to him, is no other, than a denial of the charge, and a justification of the metaphor. And this will be equally the case, whether we take Aristotle's quotation as it stands—*εὐρυγύν θ' ὄμαδον*—or suppose him to mean, *εὐρυγύν τ' ἰσότην*, as we read it in our editions: except, that the former would be much the bolder and harsher metaphor of the two.

So much then for, what the criticism was *not*. What it *was*, must always, I fear, in the present condition of the text, remain a problem. One conjecture only occurs to me, and that, such as I cannot take upon me to offer with any degree of confidence. Perhaps Aristotle had, originally, quoted, or meant, at least, to refer to, the *whole* verse, as we read it; and the censure might be pointed at the expression—*ὈΜΑΔΟΝ τ' ἀνθρώπων*. The proper and derivative sense of *ὄμαδος* seems to be that of a *crowd*, a *multitude*, a *heap**; its secondary sense, by a common metonymy of *cause for effect*, the *murmur*, or *tumult*, occasioned by a multitude. So *Hesychius*: *ὄμαδος* — (1.) ΑΘΡΟΙΣΙΣ, (2.) ΘΟΡΤΒΟΣ. (1.) ΟΧΛΟΣ, (2.) ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ.—ΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ, ἀπὸ τῆς ὄμας.—Perhaps, then, some hypercritic might take, or *chuse* to take, the word here in its primary sense, of *multitude*, and ask, how Agamemnon could, by night,

* In the *Orphean Argonautics*, v. 112, *ἰσότης* ὈΜΑΔΟΣ, occurs, for "a heap of sand." *Apollon. Rhodius* uses the word in the same sense—as, l. 347. IV. 198.

night, perceive and “wonder at,” the *multitude of men*? θαυμαζειν—ὄμαδον ἀνθρώπων. To this it would be a proper answer, to say—you mistake the meaning of the word ὄμαδον: it is not used here in its proper sense, of a *multitude*, but, in its metaphorical sense, for the *effect* produced by the *voices* and the bustle of a multitude. The criticism, I confess, would be frivolous enough; yet not more so than many others, to which Aristotle has condescended to furnish answers. It will perhaps be thought a more solid objection to my conjecture, that the word, ὄμαδος, seems to be constantly used by Homer in the *secondary* sense. So, *Il. M.* 471.—B. 96.—*Od. K.* 556: Κινυμένων δ’ ἰταρῶν ΟΜΑΔΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΟΥΠΙΟΝ ΑΚΟΤΣΑΣ. Nor can I say, that I have found any instance in *Homer*, of this word used in its *primary* sense. The *other* sense may, therefore, appear too common and established to have admitted of any difficulty. But to this circumstance, a critic, disposed to cavil, and furnished with sufficient authorities for the *primary* sense from *other* authors, may easily be imagined to have paid no regard.

NOTE, 243.

P. 195. ALL, IS PUT FOR MANY—.

ΤΟ γὰρ ΠΑΝΤΕΣ, ἀντὶ τῶ πολλῶ, κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἰρηται. The word, παντες, does not occur in any of the preceding examples. But, says M. Batteux, it is *virtually* contained in the first example—

ΑΛΛΟΙ

ἄλλοι μὲν ῥα θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι, &c.—for ἄλλοι means ΠΑΝΤΕΣ ἄλλοι. “Aristote traduit *l'idée*, & non le mot.” Dacier understands the passage in the same manner. This explanation appears to me forced and improbable. Aristotle says plainly, ΤΟ ΠΑΝΤΙΣ - - - εἴρηται—i. e. “the word *παντί*,” and I believe, with Victorius, Piccolomini, and Heinsius, that some corresponding *example* is lost, as the *explanations* of the other examples appear to be likewise.

NOTE 244.

P. 196. ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ δε οἱ εὐχῶ ἀρεσθαι.

Καὶ το πρὸς το ἱνυπνιον τε Ἀγαμέμνονι, ὅτι
’ΟΥΚ ΑΤΤΟΣ ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν—

- - - δίδομεν δε οἱ εὐχῶ ἀρεσθαι.

ἀλλὰ ΤΩ ΕΝΤΥΗΝΙΩ ΕΝΕΤΕΛΑΕΤΟ δίδοναι.—
De Soph. Elench. p. 284, ed. *Dindorf*.—This clearly confirms the common explanation, which makes *Hippias* substitute *δίδομεν*, the infinitive, (for *διδόμεναι*,) used imperatively, instead of *δίδομεν*, the first person plural of the present tense.

A very curious solution this. Jupiter tells no lie. He only orders the dream to lie for him:
“Ce qui est *très différent*,” says Dacier; “car
“alors le mensonge ne vient pas de Jupiter, il
“vient du songe.”—Dacier tells us also, that this hemistich, which does not appear in our copies
of

of Homer^a, was altered, "par une *fraude pieuse*." I cannot see any great *piety* in the fraud; because nothing appears to be added to the impiety of the passage by the words objected to, or to be taken from it, by the suppression of them. If the words were in *Aristotle's* Homer, they were probably in *Plato's* also. Yet, in the passage at the end of the second book of his *Republic*, where he alludes to this part of Homer, he, very properly, takes no notice of these words, but censures the *whole* circumstance, of Jupiter's being represented as *sending* such a deceitful dream:—την τε ἰνυκτις ΠΟΜΠΗΝ ὑπο Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι^b.—The theology, indeed, of this charming writer, was of a very different complexion from that of Hippias, or of Dacier.—Κομιδὴ ἄρα ὁ ΘΕΟΣ ἄπλεν καὶ ἀλήθης, ἐν τε ἔργῳ, καὶ ἐν λόγῳ· καὶ ὅτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται, ὅτε ἄλλης ἱξάπαται, ὅτε κατὰ φαντασίας, ὅτε κατὰ λόγους, καὶ κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, εἴθ' ὑπάρ, εἴθ' οὐκ^c.

NOTE 245.

P. 196. Το μὲν ΟΥ καταπυθῆναι ὁμῶς.

This correction, also, of Hippias, is somewhat more explicitly mentioned, *De Soph. Elench.* p. 284. The passage was censured as *absurd*, (ὡς ἀτοπὸς ἰσχυροτά) by those critics who read ἱ. But what the

^a Instead of it, we read—Τρῆισσι δὲ καὶ ἑφῆτα. II. B. 15.—See Clarke's note.

^b P. 154, ed. Mass.

^c *Ibid.*

the absurdity was, we are not told by Aristotle. His commentators tell us, that it consisted in first calling the post "*dry*," *αὖρον*, and then saying—"where it was rotted by rain." I cannot say I comprehend this. Are *rotteness* and *dryness*, as *Beni* very well asks, incompatible?—Nor is it clear, what construction, or what sense, was given to the passage, by those who read *ζ*, instead of *ς*.—But the reader will hardly thank me for detaining him with a dissertation upon a rotten post.

NOTE 246.

P. 196. AND MIX'D BEFORE UNMIX'D.

Ζωρα τε τα πριν ΑΚΡΗΤΑ, [*διαλλαττομενα κελυβες* : for so the verse is completed, in *Simplicius* and *Athenæus*.] This seems the best and most authentic reading, and *Dacier's* the most reasonable explanation. The meaning of the words, *ζωρα*, *ζωροτερον*, was matter of great dispute among the antients themselves. See *Plutarch's Sympos. Prob. V. 4*.—*M. Batteux*, taking it to mean *pure*, *unmixed*, reads, consistently with that idea, for *ακρητα*, *ΚΕΚΡΑΤΟ*. But, that this word, whatever it was, meant *unmixed*, seems plain from the passage of *Athenæus*, p. 423, 424, about *Theophrastus* ; who, it seems, in a treatise on drunken-

ness,

^a The lines are—

Εστις ξυλον αδον, οσον τ' οργυ', υπερ αυης.

Η δρυς, ή πευκη, το μεν ε καταπυθεται ομβρη.

Il. ψ. 327.

ness, adduced these very lines of *Empedocles* to prove, that the meaning of ζυροτερον was, not *pure* wine, but *wine mixed with water*.

The expression, διαλλαττοντα κελυβας, seems to prove, as Dacier has explained it, that the second verse was not intended merely as explanatory repetition, in other *terms*, of the change described in the first, but as descriptive of a *contrary* change; an interpretation which is somewhat supported by the two following lines of the same Poet, on the same subject:—

ΑΛΛΟΤΕ μὲν, φιλοτητι συνερχομεν' εἰς ἐν ἅπαντα,
 ΑΛΛΟΤΕ δ' ΑΥ, διχ' ἑκάστα φορευμενα νεκρῶ.
 ἔχθρῃ*.

—and, perhaps, still better, by the lines quoted by Aristotle, *Phys. Auscult.* VIII. p. 408. The expression—ΜΑΘΟΝ ἀθανατ' εἶναι—is well explained by Casaubon, upon Athenæus, p. 718,—“μαθον, “ pro ἐπίσθαισαν, aut ἐπιφυσισαν:—*didicerant esse*, “ pro *erant*, vel *solebant*, esse,” &c. See also the verses just referred to, in the *Phys. Auscult.* where the same expression occurs—ΜΕΜΑΘΗΚΕ φευσθαι.

Of *διαίρεσις* and *συνθεσις*, and the ambiguity of *punctuation*, as a source of sophistical argumentation, more may be seen, if it be thought worth seeing, *Rhet.* II. 24. p. 580. *De Soph. Elench.* p. 284, 288, 303, *ed. Duval*.

* *Poss. Philos. H. Steph.* p. 21.

NOTE 247.

P. 197. TO AMBIGUITY—.

Αμφιβολία, *i. e.* *such* ambiguity, as does not depend on the different senses of *single words*, (which Aristotle calls ὁμωνυμία,) but on the different senses, of which *two or more words* are capable, independently of their punctuation. See, *De Soph. Elench.* I. cap. iv. which clears up his distinctions, between διαίρεσις, ἀμφιβολία, ὁμωνυμία, &c.

NOTE 248.

P. 197. WHATEVER IS POURED OUT TO DRINK AS WINE.

Upon *v.* 363 of *Od. Ω.* (—κίρωντας αἶθοπα οἶνον—) Eustathius says—τετρεῖσιν, ἰμβαλλοντας εἰς κρατῆρας : and Gataker remarks, on occasion of the same passage—“ το κίραν, sive κίρασαι, licet *miscere* “ *proprie significet, usurpatur tamen simpliciter* “ ἀντι τε, ἰγχυειν, καὶ δίδοναι πίνειν· *pro infundere,* “ *in calicem scil. sive cyathum, et bibendum por-* “ *rigere* *.” As a proof that the verb was so used, without the idea of *mixing*, we meet with it applied to *nectar* :

—ΚΕΡΑΣΣΕ δὲ νεκτάρ ἐρυθρον. *Od. E.* 93.

The Gods hardly drank *nectar and water*.—But it is even applied to pure *water* itself :

Θυμηρεῖς ΚΕΡΑΣΑΣΑ κατὰ κρατῆ- τε καὶ ὤμων.
i. e. *pouring* it over my head and shoulders.

Od. K. 362.

* See Clarke's Homer.

NOTE 249.

P. 197. HENCE GANYMEDE, &c.

I have adhered, without scruple, to the transposition mentioned in Mr. Winstanley's note²; which had been proposed, I know not by whom, before Victorius published his commentary. Victorius opposes it; but, I think, without sufficient reason. Piccolomini saw, and has well defended, the necessity of it, which appears to me to be obvious. I would read the whole passage thus: Τα δε, κατα το ἰδιότητος της λεξεως· οἶον, τον [forte, TO] κεκραμμενον, οἶνον φασιν εἶναι· ὅθεν εἰρηται ὁ Γανυμηδης,

Διὶ οἶνοχρυσειν,

ὃ πιοντων οἶνον. Εἰη δ' αὖν ταυτο γι και κατα μεταφοραν. Και, Χαλμιας, τας του σιδηρον εργαζομενους· ὅθεν πιποιηται,

Κνημικ νεοτευκτη κασσιτεροιο.

This differs from Mr. Winstanley's arrangement, only with respect to the words—εἰη δ' αὖν ταυτο γι, &c. which appear to me to belong to the single example immediately preceding them in the editions. The commentators agree, I think, in making them refer to *all* the examples. But I cannot be persuaded, that Aristotle, after formally proposing the ἰδιότητος της λεξεως, as a *distinct* solution, would immediately say, that *all* the instances he gives might

might as well be defended *κατα μεταφοραν*. I understand him to say — “though *this* example, “indeed, may *also* be defended by metaphor.” The expression confirms this :—*ειν δ’ αὖ ΤΟΤΤΟ ΓΕ καὶ κατα μεταφοραν*.

Besides, there seems to be a pretty plain reason, why this instance might be considered as a metaphor, and the others not so. *Nectar* was *the wine of the Gods*; and the resemblance was sufficiently obvious, to make the substitution of the one for the other an easy metaphor. With the other examples the case is different. *Brass* and *iron* are indeed, each of them, *species* of *metals*. But the common *genus* is too *general* to constitute that obvious resemblance which is requisite to a metaphor. Their likeness, to use the philosopher’s own language, is not perceived *by the genus*^b. Oil and vinegar are both liquids; yet the substitution of the one for the other would make a very strange sort of metaphor; because they have no *other* resemblance to each other, but as liquids. Hence, Aristotle denominates such substitutions not *metaphors*, but *customary modes of speech*; both because the *resemblance* is not obvious enough for metaphor, and because, as the name implies, they are *common* and *established* expressions, (*κρυπτα*,) however, in themselves, improper.

^b See NOTE 183.

NOTE 250.

P. 198. THE MEANING IS, WAS STOPPED ONLY, OR REPELLED.

Dacier supposes the critics to have objected to the improbability of a long spear's remaining fixed in a shield, like an arrow, or light dart. I cannot so conceive it. The lines themselves are the best comment here.

Οὐδε τοτ' Ἀπείαιο δαΐφρον[Ⓢ] ὀβριμον ἐγχ[Ⓢ].
 Ρηζε σακ[Ⓢ] χρυσ[Ⓢ] γαρ ἐρυκακε, δωρα θεοιο.
 Ἀλλα δυω μὲν ἔλασσε δια πτυχας, αἱ δ' αἶ' ἐτι τρεκ
 Ησαν ἐπι πιντε πτυχας ἔλασσε Κυλλοποδιων,
 Τας δυο, χαλκειας, δυο δ' ἐνδοθι, κασσιτεριο,
 Την δε μιαν, χρυσην· τη ῥ' ἐσχετο χαλκειον ἐγχ[Ⓢ].

II. T. 267, &c.

The shield was composed of five plates; the two first, of brass; the two *innermost*, next the body, (for that seems to be the sense of ἐνδοθι^a;) of tin, κασσιτεριο^b; and one in the middle, of gold; and *there* the spear was stopped: Τῇ ῥ' ἐσχετο. Now this might mean, *stuck*, or, *was fastened*, in it^c. But this, it was objected, would

have

^a It may, however, mean—*within* the brass plates. If so, we must understand the two *external* plates, on the opposite sides of the shield, to have been brass, and the two *iron*, *within*, and contiguous to, them. In either case, the plate of gold will be the *third* and *middle* plate.

^b Meaning, I suppose, according to the ἰσ[Ⓢ] λεγ[Ⓢ], *iron*.

^c As, by the way, the same word clearly appears to mean

have been a manifest contradiction; for Homer had said, not only that the gold *stopped* it—*χρυσὸν γὰρ ἱερύκασι*—but, still more expressly, that the spear penetrated *two* of the plates, and that the *three others* remained unpierced. But the spear could not well be *fixed*, or *fastened*, in the plate of gold, which was the *third*, without piercing it.—And thus the objection appears to have been rightly understood by *Victorius* and *Goulston*.

NOTE 251.

P. 199. OF HOW MANY DIFFERENT SENSES, &c.

I may say with *Victorius*, "*hic locus valdè me torsit*." The words are these:—το δὲ, ποσαχως ἰνδεχεται, ὡς πωρ· μαλὶς· ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι κατὰ τὴν κατ' ἀντικρυ.—In this passage, as in many others, there is just glimpse enough of *some* meaning, to mock a commentator with the hopes of discovery, and to deprive him of the comfort of doing at once, what, after all his efforts, he will probably find himself obliged to do at last—of abandoning the passage as unintelligible. For my own part, I do not see *one* clear and satisfactory sense, that can be made of the words, without conjectural emendation; and if we open that door, we shall

be,

mean in a similar passage, *Il. H. 248*. But, there, it is used with the preposition *iv*.

Ἐξ δὲ δια πτυχας ἡδὲ δαίρων χαλκῶν ἀτρίης,

ΕΝ Τῇ δ' ἰβδόματι μιν ΣΧΕΤΟ.

be, again, confounded by the number of different senses which ingenuity may propose, with equal pretensions to our acceptance.

Dacier translates thus: " Et le plus court moyen de se tirer de ces endroits, c'est de prendre le mot dans un sens tout contraire à celui qu'on lui donne ordinairement." Piccolomini and Beni understand it thus: " How many senses a word admits of, may best be known by considering the significations *opposed* to it:" a sense preferable, I think, at least, to any other that has been offered, because it certainly does receive some support from the fifteenth chapter of Aristotle's first book of *Topics*^{*}; where he treats of *Homonymy*, or *equivocation*, and points out different means, by which we may discover, what, and how many, different senses a word will admit of; and among these is the rule here supposed to be alluded to; *i. e.* that any single word must admit of as many different significations as are *opposed* to it. As, for example, to the word *acute*, we oppose, sometimes *grave*, sometimes *blunt*, sometimes *dull*, or *stupid*. *Acute* therefore has, of course, three different senses, corresponding to those three *opposite* senses.

But though this explanation of the passage must be allowed to give an *Aristotelic* meaning, yet I cannot think it a meaning that arises, fairly and clearly, from the text. In particular, the expression,

^{*} P. 189. See *Sect.* 2, 3.

sion, KATA TΗΝ [*scil. σημασίαν*—for so it is supplied—] KAT' ANTIKPT, has, to me, a very suspicious appearance. I much doubt, whether Aristotle would have used the word ἀντικρυ to denote contrariety of *meaning*, or any thing but *local* opposition. I believe he would have used ἐναντίον, or ἀντικείμενον; as he does *constantly* in those parts of his logical works, where he treats of *contrariety*, and of the *opposite senses* of words^b; and where I have not found the phrase κατ' ἀντικρυ, once made use of in that sense.—However, as this interpretation seems to be the *least* exceptionable of any, and I see nothing better to propose, I have admitted it in my version: but I should certainly not accuse any reader of being very fastidious, if he preferred a blank to this, or any other meaning, that has been given to this *dark saying*.—Emendatory conjectures, indeed, have occurred to me, as to others; but none of them plausible enough even to impose upon myself.

NOTE 252.

P. 199. ARGUE FROM THESE PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THEIR OWN.

ΑΥΤΟΙ ΚΑΤΑΨΗΦΙΣΑΜΕΝΟΙ.—I cannot think this word so free from all difficulty as Mr. Winstanley does. He says, “Egregie dictum κατα-
“ ψηφισαμενοι, ut sensus sit: hi perinde ac *judices*
“ *quidam*

^b See *Topic* I. 15, above referred to; and, II. 7, 8, *et passim*.

“*quidam decernentes ratiocinantur*,” &c.—But the question is, whether the word will admit that sense, or any other, than that of *condemning*, passing sentence *against*, &c. which is not to Aristotle’s purpose in this place. The fair sense of καταψηφισαμενοι συλλογίζονται, is, if I mistake not, “they argue, or form their conclusion, *after*, or, *in consequence of*, having *condemned*”—what?—We must necessarily understand them to have condemned, either the *passage* in question, or, the *opinion of others* about the sense of it. But Aristotle, in what follows, says plainly, that they condemned the passage, or the opinions of others relative to it, *in consequence* of their *own* preconceived and erroneous *notions*; and the idea of *condemnation*, or *censure*, here, would be only an awkward, tautological anticipation of the ΕΗΕΤΙΜΩΣΙΝ, ἀν’ ὑπεραντίον ἢ τῇ αὐτῶν οἴσσει, which follows. I think, therefore, that the proposed correction of *Heinsius*, κατασφισαμενοι, must be allowed the praise, both of ingenuity and probability. In my version, however, I have contented myself with making the best I could of that reading which has the authority of all the manuscripts, and all the commentators, except *Heinsius*, on its side.—*Victorius* thinks the word will bear the sense of “*cum sententiam tulerint* ;” but he adds—“*quamvis in præpositione, quæ verbo adjuncta est, vis insit contra alios id faciendi*.”

NOTE 253.

P. 199-200. THE OBJECTION ITSELF, THEREFORE, IS PROBABLY FOUNDED ON A MISTAKE.

Δι' ἀμαρτυμα δε το προβλημα εἶναι ἴσι. "Metuo
" ne hic locus corruptus mancusve sit." *Victor*.—
To give these words any meaning that may not easily be controverted, is, I believέ, impossible. I have made them say, what it seems to me most probable that the author *meant* to say: "So far
" is this criticism from proving Homer to be
" wrong, that it is, itself, probably, founded on a
" mistake."

NOTE 254.

P. 200. THE IMITATIONS OF POETRY SHOULD RESEMBLE THE PAINTINGS OF ZEUXIS—.

Τοις τες δ' εἶναι, ὡς Ζευξίς ἔγραφεν, ἀλλὰ
καὶ πρὸς το βελτιον· το γὰρ παραδειγμα δε
ὑπερεχειν.

M. Batteux proposes this arrangement:—
Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς το βελτιον· το γὰρ παραδειγμα δε
ὑπεριχειν, τοις τες δ' εἶναι, ὡς Ζευξίς ἔγραφεν^a.

That the words, τοις τες δ' εἶναι, ὡς Ζευξίς ἔγραφεν, belong to the *second* way of defending the impossible, by referring it to the βελτιον—ὅσα δε εἶναι, &c.
seems

^a So, at least, the passage is printed in the edition I use of M. Batteux's *Quatrè Poetiques*, (Paris 1771,) not as they are quoted by Mr. Winstanley, p. 309.

seems clear. Nor is it any objection to this, as some have thought it ^b, that Aristotle had before mentioned the paintings of *Zeuxis*, as deficient in the expression of the *manners* ^c. For it by no means follows, from this deficiency of *Zeuxis* as to *manners*, that he did not represent *προς το βελτιον*, with respect to beauty, grace, dignity of form ^d, &c.: and it seems to be *this* kind of improvement, in painting, by which Aristotle, here and elsewhere, illustrates the *μιμησις βελτιον* ^e of poetry. Compare, particularly, *cap.* xv. *Επει δε μιμησις ἐστὶ τῆ Τραγ. βελτ. &c.* ^e.

The story of the manner, in which *Zeuxis* is said to have *collected* the *βελτιον* for his famous picture of *Helen*, is well known. See *Cic. de Invent.* II. 1. *Plin. Nat. Hist.* XXXV. 9. *Bayle*, art. *ZEUXIS*.

I agree, therefore, perfectly with *Mr. Winstanley*, that the words, *τοις τὸ δ' εἶναι οἷος Ζ. ἰγρ.* should be transposed: but I do not see, that any alteration, farther than the mere transposition, is necessary. I would read—*Αλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βελτιον* [*scil. δεῖ ἀναγεῖν*] *τοις τὸ δ' εἶναι* [*scil. δεῖ*] *οἷος Ζευξίς ἰγγραφέν το γὰρ παραδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερεχειν.*

^b See Goulston's version and notes. *

^c *Cap.* iii. *Transl.* vol. i. p. 119.

^d *Zeuxis* plus membris corporis dedit, id *amplius atque augustius* ratus, atque (ut existimant,) *HOMERUM* secutus, cui validissima quæque forma, etiam in fœminis, placet. *Quintil.* XII. 10. p. 627, *ed. Gibs.*

^e *Transl.* vol. i. p. 146.

NOTE 255.

P. 201. TO OPINION, OR WHAT IS SAID TO BE, MAY BE REFERRED, &c.

Προς ἃ φασι, τὰ ἀλογα : [*scil.* διὰ ἀναγιν.] for so, I think, with Mr. Winstanley, the passage is to be understood; and so it is explained and translated by Castelvetro. The expression, ἃ φασι, or ὅια φασι, is used by Aristotle as synonymous with δοξα, and ὅια δοκει. Thus,—ὅια ΦΑΣΙ καὶ ΔΟΚΕΙ, at the beginning of this chapter : and afterwards—ἐπεφασιν.

But it will not, I think, be found possible to give this passage a consistent sense, unless we understand him to *mean*, what, as the text stands, he does not expressly *say*, *i. e.*—"By general *opinion* we may excuse, *not only the πιθανον ἀδυνατον, but even such things as are manifestly improbable, or absurd.*" As if he had written, προς ἃ φασι, ΚΑΙ τὰ ἀλογα. And thus Goulston has supplied :—"Ad ea quæ aiunt, [*rediguntur hæc quæ dixi; et*] illa, quæ sine ratione sunt."

NOTE 256.

P. 201. WHEN THINGS ARE SAID, WHICH APPEAR TO BE CONTRADICTORY.

Τα δ' ὑπεναντία ὡς εἰρημένα—. The words, ὡς εἰρημένα, have distressed all the commentators; and no sense, which they have laboured to force

upon the expression, is, to my apprehension, satisfactory. Heinsius corrected by transposition—
 Τα δ' ὡς ὑπεναντία εἰρημένα: “Ea, quæ *tanquam*
 “*subcontraria dicta videntur.*”—An easier and
 more probable emendation, I think, would be—
 Τα δ' THENANTΙΩΣ εἰρημένα.

NOTE 257.

P. 201. AND IN THE SAME SENSE—.

The word is, ὡσαυτως: “*simili modo*,” as all the commentators render it. I cannot say I have been able thoroughly to satisfy myself, as to the precise meaning of the expression, from any thing I have found in Aristotle’s logical works*. If, “in the same *manner*,” does not mean, “in the same *sense*,” I confess I do not know what it means. I understand Aristotle to say, that, if the *subject* of the propositions, charged with being contradictory, be the *same*, and spoken of in the *same respect*, we must still examine, farther, whether the two propositions admit of a *sense* really and accurately *opposite* to each other; which cannot be the case, unless the *same words*, in each proposition, have exactly the *same sense*. And this meaning seems to be supported by the following passage from the treatise Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας:—Καὶ ἐξω τούτῳ ΑΝΤΙΦΑΣΙΣ, (*nempe*) καταφασις καὶ ἀποφασις αἱ ἀντικειμέναι. Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεισθαι, τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ

κατὰ

* See *De Sophist. Elench.* 285, D. 287, E.

κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, μὴ ὁμωνυμίας δ^β. That is, as it is well explained in the analytical Synopsis prefixed to Duval's edition:—"Affirmatio & negatio oppositæ, contradictionem faciunt. "Oppositio est ejusdem, de eodem, non homonymè; nam accipi debent termini in oppositione, "EODEM MODO AC SENSU."

All that follows—viz. ὥς τε καὶ αὐτὸν, ἃ πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγει, ἢ ὃ αὖ φρονιμὸς ὑποθῆται—is either so corrupt, or so darkly expressed, that I have only to confess myself unable even to guess what Aristotle meant to say. Commentators indeed have explained, and translators have translated; but I have seen no explanation that approaches to satisfaction, nor any translation, but what is either unintelligible, or unwarrantable, or both. I do not mean to except myself; for I had translated thus:—"We must also consider the *person* "who speaks, and whether the contradiction be "to what *he himself* said, or to what any reasonable man would *understand* him to have said." But, to wave other objections, which, no doubt, the learned reader will easily make for me, the verb,

^b Cap. vi. p. 39. Elsewhere he expresses this—ἐλεγχ^ο μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἀντιφασίς τε αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν^ο, ΜΗ ὀνόματος, ἀλλὰ πρᾶγματος. *De Soph. Elench.* p. 285, D.

^c Alluding, as I supposed, to the former passage about the verbal ὑπεκρίσιν, and Glauco's answer, viz. the contradiction is only to the critic's erroneous *opinion*, and *misconception*, of the passage: ἀλογως προϋπολαμβάνουσι.

verb, ὑποθεσθαι, will, I believe, by no means bear this sense, of *supposing, understanding*—ὑπολαμβάνειν. At least, *Aristotle* seems always to use it in that of *advising, suggesting, &c.* So *Rhet.* I. 9. p. 533.—
 ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν βέλῃ, ὅρα τι αὖ ΤΠΟΘΕΙΟ· καὶ ὅταν
 ΤΠΟΘΕΣΘΑΙ, ὅρα τι αὖ ἐπαινεῖσθαι. Accordingly, Goulston has given the word this sense in his version:—"videndumque, an eâ in re, quod prudens præceperit, secutus sit." But, of what force this circumstance is, or how it is to be applied to obviate the charge of *contradiction*, I do not see.

Being therefore obliged to reject the only version, which seemed to me to offer any tolerable meaning, I have left a blank in my translation.

NOTE 258.

P. 201. WHEN EXCUSED BY NO NECESSITY, &c.

—Ὅταν μὴ ἀναγκῆς ἔσῃ, μὴδὲν χρῆσθαι τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγείτῃ πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὁρέῃ τε Μενέλαῳ.—Such was the confused state in which *Robortelli* found the text, which he, very ingeniously and solidly, rectified thus:

—Ὅταν μὴ ἀναγκῆς ἔσῃ μὴδὲν, χρῆσθαι τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης ΕΝ τῷ ΑἰΓΕΙ· Τῇ πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ὁρέῃ τε Μενέλαῳ.

Some MSS. for Αἰγείτῃ, give Αἰγείτῃ, which, as Goulston has observed, suggests the true reading—ἐν τῷ ΑἰΓΕΙ, ἢ Τῇ πονηρίᾳ—κ. τ. λ.

By the *Ægeus*, Robortelli understood the character of that name, in the *Medea* of Euripides. To this Victorius very reasonably objected, that the mode of expression, *ἐν τῷ Αἰγῷ*, seems plainly to indicate a *Tragedy* so named; not a character only in a Tragedy of a different name. But this is no objection to Robortelli's reading, though it is to his explanation of it. See the fragments at the end of the Oxford Euripides, where several passages of the *Ægeus* are quoted from Stobæus, &c.

NOTE 259.

P. 202. THUS THE SOURCES OF OBJECTIONS ARE FIVE, &c.

This enumeration may seem, at the first view, to be deficient; for one of the objections was—*Οὐκ ἀληθῆ*:—"the representation is not conformable to truth." But this, perhaps, may be considered as falling under the charge of *ἀλογον*. For he, who accuses a Poet of departing from nature, experience, and the *δία ἥν, ἡ ἔστι*, says, in other words, it is *improbable, incredible, absurd*, &c. Or, when this objection was relative to *truth* of another sort—to theological truth, as violated by the poetic representations of the Gods, it then came, properly, under the *βλαβερον*; it was of immoral and pernicious tendency. And thus we find Plato objecting continually to the theology of Homer; sometimes, as *not true*—*ΟΤΚ*
-ΑΛΗΘΗ;

ΑΛΗΘΗ^α; sometimes, as *hurtful*—τοῖς ἀκούσι
ΒΑΑΒΕΡΑ^β.

The objections answered by considerations drawn from the *diction*, (*Sect. 5.*) appear to be all reducible to one or other of these *five* sources,

NOTE 260.

P. 202. OR, OF IMMORAL TENDENCY.

Βλαβερὰ: i. e. *hurtful on account of their immoral tendency*. So the word is used by Plato; to whose objections, and to the very *language* in which he expresses them, Aristotle so frequently alludes. Censuring the immoral tendency of some of Homer's representations of his hero Achilles, Plato says—Οὐθ' ἴσια ταῦτα, εἴτ' ἀληθῆ·
- - - καὶ μὴ τοῖς γε ἀκούσι ΒΑΑΒΕΡΑ·—The reason follows: πας γὰρ ἑαυτῷ συγγνωμὴν ἔξει, κακῷ ὄντι, πισθεὶς, ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττει τε καὶ ἐπράττει
“Οἱ θεῶν ἀγχισποροὶ - - -.” Ὡς ἴσμεν, παύσειν τὰς τοιαύτας μυθεύας, μὴ ἡμῖν πολλὰν εὐχέρειαν ἐντίκτωσι τοῖς ἴσιν, πονηρίας. *De Rep.* III. p. 176, *ed. Mass.*

Compare the precept, *cap.* xv^a. about making the character as morally *good* as possible: and see NOTE 108. It is obvious however to observe, that when the *μοχθηρία*, the *villainy* of a character,

is

^a See NOTE 235.

^b See the passage from Plato in the next NOTE, where both these expressions occur.

^c *Transl.* vol. i. p. 143.

Is overcharged, it brings with it its own antidote. Such characters as *Iago*^b, or *Glenatoun*, can be ~~safer~~ to no reader or spectator. They excite only pure and unmitigated disgust. Not all the art of the Poet, or the charms of Poetry, can cheat us into any degree of sympathy with them, even for the moment in which they are speaking. We feel, there, no such struggle between immoral approbation and moral indignation, as Dr. Johnson has described, in his observations upon the different *effects* produced on the spectator, by the villainy of Rowe's *Lothario*, and that of Richardson's *Lovelace*. The passage is so much to the purpose of this note, so justly thought, and so well expressed, that I am persuaded I shall gratify the reader by transcribing it.

“ The character of *Lothario* seems to have
 “ been expanded by Richardson into *Lovelace*;
 “ but he has excelled his original in the *moral*
 “ *effect* of the fiction. *Lothario*, with gaiety
 “ which cannot be hated, and bravery which
 “ cannot be despised, retains too much of the
 “ spectator's kindness. It was in the power of
 “ Richardson alone to teach us at once esteem
 “ and

^b “ There is always danger, lest wickedness, conjoined
 “ with abilities, should steal upon esteem, though it
 “ misses of approbation; but the character of *Iago* is so
 “ conducted, that he is, from the first scene to the last,
 “ hated and despised.” [Dr. Johnson. Note at the end
 of *Othello*.]—Not so, Shakspeare's *Richard*.

“ and detestation, to make virtuous resentment
 “ overpower all the benevolence which wit, and
 “ elegance, and courage, naturally excite, and to
 “ lose at last the hero in the villain.”

NOTE 261.

P. 202. OR AS CONTRARY TO TECHNICAL
 ACCURACY.

—Παρα την ὀρθότητα, την κατα τέχνην. Most of the commentators understand the art of *Poetry* itself. But, if I am right in the explanation I have given, NOTE 233, of the expression, πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην, the sense of the expression here must be the same. I understand Aristotle to mean, the *rightness*, not of *Poetry* itself, but of *other* arts, which may be incidentally the subject of the Poetry; and the words, I think, express the source, or εἰδος, as he terms it, of objections relative to all faults κατα συμβεβηκός, as opposed to those, which he distinguishes by the various expressions of, ἀμαρτίαι καθ' ἑαυτὴν, &c.^a

The other interpretation of the words is fairly liable, I think, to the following objections. 1. If we understand the *poetic* art itself to be meant, then the objection to faults κατα συμβεβηκός—to impossibilities and inaccuracies with respect to *other* arts and sciences—will be entirely omitted
 in

^a Lives of the Poets, vol. ii. 326.

^a See NOTE 233.

In this enumeration. This is very improbable, considering how common a source of critical censure this was. For while, on the one hand, the extravagant admirers of Homer made no scruple to assert, that his Poems contained the principles of *all arts and sciences*; on the other, we know how eagerly the *Zoilists* caught at every apparent inaccuracy of this kind; and, particularly, with respect to his *geography*. One instance, at least, of this sort of cavil, we have in this chapter: the censure of the passage, 'Οἷη δ' ἄμμορος, *Il. Σ.* 489. fell on Homer's ignorance of astronomy^b.—

2. By the manner in which Aristotle here mentions, first, the five sources of critical censures, and then, immediately, the twelve sources of λυσεις or *answers*, it is plain, I think, that he means—answers to those censures, and to *all* of them. But this cannot be the case, if we understand *essential faults* in the *Poetry itself*, or *bad imitation*: for this admits of *no* answer, but a direct denial of the fact. Whereas, if we understand *incidental errors* in *other* arts, all will be consistent; and *every* fault enumerated will find its answer in some of the λυσεις, which had been pointed out in the preceding part of the chapter, and are referred to in this enumeration.—3. If the *art* here mentioned be the art of *Poetry* itself, and

^b For instances of such objections, both to the geography, and the astronomy, of Homer, the reader may consult *Strabo*, *passim*.

and the faults against that art be, as I understand them to be, *essential* faults, faults which constitute bad Poetry, *i.e.* in Aristotle's view, bad *imitation*, this plainly implies, that the *four other* faults enumerated are *not* essential, but accidental faults; *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. But, that *such* faults as *improbability*, and *impossibility*, (*ἀλογα, βλαβερα,*) which had just before been singled out from the rest, as *ὄρθαι ἐπιτιμήσεως*—as the most solid objections, and such as admitted of no excuse—that *these* should be considered by Aristotle as faults merely incidental, not to be objected to the Poetry itself, not affecting the merit of the *imitation*, *ἢ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἁμαρτῖαι*, is what, as I have before said, I cannot easily conceive^c.

The expression itself—*κατὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τῆς κατὰ τέχνης*, is indeed ambiguous; and they, who prefer the sense which I have rejected, will perhaps think it favoured by the similar expression, *clearly* applied to faults against the art of *Poetry* itself, in the passage,—*ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμαρτημα, τῶν ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ, ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβηκός*. The expressions, however, are not exactly the same. There, it is, *κατὰ τὴν τέχνην*—"against the art:" here,—*κατὰ τέχνην*: "contrary to the rectitude of *art*."—But Aristotle had before used an expression, that seemed still more strongly to point at the art of *Poetry*: *τὰ πρὸς Αἴττην τὴν Τεχνην ἀδύνατα*: which, however, it seems
necessary,

^c NOTE 233.

necessary, for the reasons given in NOTE 233, to understand in the same sense, which I have here given to *κατὰ τεχνικὰ*. But that passage, and indeed this *whole* chapter, is, in its present state, so full of obscurity and ambiguity, that every interpretation which can be given must necessarily be, in a great measure, conjectural and disputable. All I can venture to be confident of is, that my explanation of this passage is *consistent* with my explanation of the other; and that either both are right, or both are wrong.

NOTE 262.

P. 202. THE ANSWERS, WHICH ARE TWELVE, &c.

How the different *Ἀνσεις* or *solutions* proposed throughout the chapter are reducible to 12, and *which* are the 12 that Aristotle meant, are questions, which the defective state of the original renders it very difficult, if not impossible, to answer, with any certainty. And indeed the matter is of so little importance, that it is by no means worth while to enter into any examination of the various modes of reckoning, by which different expositors have endeavoured to solve the problem. *Victorius*, indeed, is so wise, as to give up the attempt. It will be very easy however, and therefore, I hope, not *very* foolish, just to enumerate all the *Ἀνσεις*, which actually have been mentioned in the chapter, in the order in which they occur, and

then to examine, by way of experiment, whether they are any way reducible to *twelve*.

- 1.—*ἐν γὰρ τῇ τέλει, τῇ αὐτῇ*.—i. e. The end of Poetry is better answered, &c.
- 2.—*κατὰ συμβεβηκός* - - - - The fault is *incidental*.
- 3.—*οἷα δέ, (οἱ, βέλτιον)* - - - It is what is *best*, or what *should* be.
- 4.—*οἷα φασί, (οἱ, οἷα δοκεῖ)* - - - It is according to *general opinion*.
- 5.—*οἷα ἦν, ἢ ἔστιν (οἱ, ὅπως εἶχεν, οἱ, ἄλλα)* - - - - to *truth*.
- [6.—*σκέπτεσθαι—εἰς τὸν πραττόντα, πρὸς ἐν, ὅτι, &c.*] - [Consider *circumstances*.]
- 7.—*Γλῶττι* - - - - - Defend, by the *foreign sense* of the word.
- 8.—*Μεταφορά* - - - - - by *Metaphor*.
- 9.—*κατὰ Προσῳδίαν* - - - - - by *Accent*.
- 10.—*Διαίρεσις* - - - - - by *Punctuation*.
- 11.—*Ἀμφιβολία* - - - - - by *Ambiguity*.
- 12.—*κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως* - - - - - by *Customary speech*.
- 13.—*Ποσαχμὶς ἐν σημαίνει—οἱ, καθ' ὁμωνυμίαν* by the *different senses* of a word.
- [14.—*Γλαυκῶντος*] - - - - - [Glauco's answer.]
- [15.—*εἰνός, καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰνός γινεσθαι*] [Probable, that many things should happen *improbably*.]
- [16.—*Οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἢ ἔπρος τὸ αὐτό, &c.*] [The *same thing* is not spoken of, or, not in the *same respect*, &c.]

Here are, then, 16 different *answers*. Of these, it seems, upon the whole, most probable, that the 12 not enclosed in brackets, are the 12 which Aristotle means. My reason is, that in the beginning of the chapter, after laying down the *three* distinct considerations, of the different *objects* of imitation, the privileges of poetical *language*, and the

the distinction of *essential* and *incidental* faults, he immediately, and explicitly, refers to those three principles, as *sources* of *all* the *answers*.
 Ωςτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα - - - ΕΚ ΤΟΤΩΝ ἐπισκο-
 πητά ΑΤΕΙΝ. Now it will be found, I believe, that the 12 answers above mentioned *are* drawn from those sources, and that the *four* remaining answers are not.

But *why* these four, which evidently are proposed as answers, and seem to be *distinct* answers, were not admitted in the concluding enumeration, it may not be easy to shew. - Perhaps, Aristotle reckoned only as *one* solution, the *two* which he assigns to the *same* objection, with an ἢ, or ἢτως τε καὶ, &c. This would throw out N^o 14, and 15, which seem, indeed, to be mentioned only as a sort of secondary or subsidiary answers. As to N^o 6, and 16, he might consider them as *one*; both of them, in fact, saying the same thing, and nearly in the same words—*i. e.* "*circumstances* "*must be considered.*" Still however, taking these together as *one* answer, that answer will be supernumerary; and how it is fairly to be got rid of, it is difficult to see: the more difficult, because it is the *only* λυσις furnished by the whole chapter to the objection of *immoral tendency*, (βλαβερα,) upon which so great stress is laid.

All that seems tolerably clear is, that the 12 answers intended in the recapitulation are those 12, which are deducible from the *three* principles

laid down at the opening of the chapter. In this idea, which I had formed before I consulted any commentator, I was glad to find myself supported by *Goulston*, in his accurate analysis; where he makes the 12 answers to be those here assigned, and draws them from the three sources at the beginning of the chapter: *viz.* *three* from the *first* source, (N^o 3, 4, 5,)—*seven* from the *second*—the *diction*, (N^o 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,)—and *two* from the *third* source, (N^o 1, and 2.)

NOTE 263.

P. 203. IF THAT WHICH IS THE LEAST VULGAR OR POPULAR BE THE BEST—.

—ΗΥΕΡ ΟΦΤΙΚΗ.—The word *φωρτικος* is used in a number of different, and sometimes nicely discriminated, senses, which cannot, all of them, be expressed by any *single* word in our language. Sometimes, for example, it is to be rendered by *extravagant*, *violent*, *charged*, *outré*^a, &c. as in the

^a The Latin writers use *molestus* in this sense; for whatever is violent, overdone, laboured, affected, &c. Thus Cicero, in the following elegant passage of his *Brutus*: “Volo enim, ut in scenâ, sic etiam in foro, non eos modò laudari, qui *celeri* motu & *difficili* utantur, sed eos etiam quos statarios appellant, quorum sit illa *simplex*, in agendo, *veritas*, non MOLESTA.” *i.e.* *μη φωρτικη*. cap. xxx. Again—“Latinè loquendi accurate, et sine MOLESTIA diligens, elegantia: *i.e.* without *labour*

the following passage of *Diog. Laertius* about Bion:—*ἦν δὲ καὶ θαυρική, καὶ πολὺς ἐν τῇ γελοίᾳ διαφορῇσαι, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΙΣ ὀνόμασι κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων χρώμεν*^b.—i. e. *extravagant, exaggerated, outrés*, as Bayle has well explained it, art. BION, note [B], where he gives an instance of this extravagance of expression in that philosopher, from Plutarch, who calls it ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ^c.

Sometimes, applied to *persons*, it means *troublesome, tiresome, &c.* as in *Ælian*—*πολὺς ἦν λαλῶν, καὶ ἰδοκεῖ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ*. *Var. Hist.* XII. 13.—Sometimes, *insolent, overbearing, &c.* as, in the same writer, it is said of a famous courtesan,—*Ἡ δὲ ἦν ΤΙΠΕΡΗΦΑΝΟΣ καὶ δεινῶς ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗ*. XII. 63^d.—Sometimes, again, and that very frequently, it is used as synonymous with *ἀνελευθερῶς, βαρυνῶς*, *popular, low, vulgar, &c.* as opposed to what is *liberal, refined, delicate, genteel, &c.* Thus Plutarch—*ἀνελευθερῶς κομιδὴ καὶ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΑΣ—φαντασίας*. p. 216, ed. H. S. And Plato—*ὁ φιλοτιμῶς* - - -

ΤΗΝ

“labour or affectation.” cap. xxxviii.—Catullus, too, of an affected grin;

- - - - - illa, quam videtis
Turpe incedere, mimicè ac MOLESTE
Ridentem, catuli ore Gallicani.

^b IV. 52.

^c *Ἐρωτικ.* p. 1371. ed. H. St. See also the *Timon* of Lucian, ed. Ben. p. 59.—*ἵνα σοὶ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΣ διαλεγώμαι*—i. e. (as the context shews,) *with the extravagance of Tragic rant*.

^d *Τυροπονικῶς, ὑπερφρον, βαρὺς, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ, ἐπαχὺς*. *Jul. Poll.* VI. 5.

την μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἡδονὴν ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗΝ τιμᾶται—"The ambitious man looks upon gain "as a *vulgar* sort of pleasure," *De Rep.* IX. p. 254, ed. *Mass.*—Jul. Pollux describes a species of dance called *Μοθων*, as, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΝ ὄρχημα καὶ ναυτικόν—"a *vulgar* and *sailor-like* dance;" the *hornpipe*, I suppose, of the Greeks*. And thus Athenæus, where he mentions, from Herodotus, the curious story of *Agarista*, (the daughter of Clisthenes, king of Sicyon,) and her suitors, says, that Clisthenes rejected *Hippoclidēs*, ἰδὼν - - - ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΣ ὀρχησαμένον: because he did not *dance like a gentleman*^f: a charge, which, according to Herodotus, seems indeed to have been pretty well founded; for he tells us, that Hippoclidēs got upon a table and *danced upon his head*^g.—But let us return to Aristotle. This *last* sense of the word φορτικόν appears to me clearly to be that, in which it is here used by him. I cannot think, that by φορτικῇ, he intended to express, as Dacier, and the commentators before him, explain it, the *trouble* and *expence* of theatrical exhibition—the number of things wanted—actors, scenes, dresses, music, &c.^h Of all the commentators I have seen,

M. Batteux

* And see *Suidas*, v. *Μοθων*.

^f P. 628.

^g — Τῇ κεφαλῇ ἐμβασί, ἐπὶ τὴν τραπέζαν, τοῖς ΣΥΕΛΕΙ ΕΧΕΙΡΟΝΟΜΗΣΕ. *Herod.* VI. p. 238. ed. *H. St.*

^h "ἡττον φορτικῇ—i. e. quæ paucioribus eget adjunctis "extrinsecus sumptis," &c. *Robortelli*.—"Men *graveza*," in the same sense, *Castelvetro*.—"Manco *carca e manco*

"bisognosa

M. Batteux alone gives, in a short note, what I think the true meaning of the word in this place:—

“ Φορτικόν, grossier, digne des mercenaires. Aristote, Politic. VIII. c. 6. oppose le spectateur mercenaire & ignorant, φορτικόν, au spectateur honnête; & le plaisir grossier, ἡδονὴ φορτικὴ, les danses grossières, κινήσεις φορτικωτέρας, au plaisir délicat, aux danses honnêtes.”

Aristotle himself will here be his best commentator, in the passages to which M. Batteux refers.

Some sorts of *rhythm*, he says, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΑΣ ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις, (*violent and vulgar*,) οἱ δὲ, ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΩΤΕΡΑΣ¹. Again, in the next chapter, relative to the musical education of youth, he speaks of the pleasure of a *popular* musical audience, as a *vulgar*, *illiberal* sort of pleasure. “The performer there,” he says, “aims only at the *pleasure* of the hearers,” καὶ ταύτης ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗΣ διότι τῶν ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΩΝ κρινομένη ἐστὶν τῆς ἰργασίας, (“such performance does not become a *gentleman*,”) ἀλλὰ ΘΗΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΑΝ· (the playing

“bisognosa d’aiuto.” Piccol.—Bemi follows Robertelli. Victorinus renders—“importuna et molesta,” but enters into no particular explanation. Dacier—“la moins chargée, & celle qui demande le moins d’aide & de secours.”

¹ De Rep. VIII. 5. p. 455, E.

² In discussing, however, the question, whether boys should learn Music practically, and play or sing themselves,

ing of a man who is *paid* for playing:) καὶ ΒΑΝΑΤΣΟΥΣ δὲ (*mechanics*) συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι· πονηρῶς γὰρ ὁ σκοπῶς πρὸς ὃν ποιεῖται τὸ τελεῶν· ὁ γὰρ ΘΕΑΤΗΣ, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ ὢν, μεταβαλλεῖν εἴθε τῆς μουσικῆς.— *Ibid.* p. 457, 8.—In the next chapter is the following passage, still more directly to our present purpose, in which he expressly distinguishes, as here, the two sorts of spectators, or hearers:—θεατῆς διττῶς, ὁ μὲν ΕΛΕΤΘΕΡΟΣ καὶ ΠΕΠΑΙΔΕΤΜΕΝΟΣ, ὁ δὲ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ, ἐκ βαναυσικῆς, καὶ θητῶν, καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων, συγκρίμειν. p. 459, A¹.

The word occurs frequently in other parts of Aristotle's writings, and seems generally, if not always, to be used in the same sense^m.

By φορτικῆ, then, applied to Tragedy, I think it clear, that he means only—calculated for φορτικοὶ spectators;

selves, Aristotle determines, that they *should*, and gives this reason, that "it is a thing impossible, or, at least, "very difficult, for those, who do not actually *practise* an "art, to be *good judges* of it." p. 456.—It might be so in those days. Modern connoisseurs, both in Music and Painting, find no such difficulty.

¹ So Plutarch, in the beginning of his *Comparison of Aristophanes and Menander*, p. 1567, ed. H. S.—Τὸ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΝ, φησὶν, ἐν λόγοις, καὶ θυμικόν, καὶ ΒΑΝΑΤΣΟΝ, ὡς ἔστιν Ἀριστοφάνει, Μενάνδρῳ δὲ ἑδάμῳ. Καὶ γὰρ, ὁ μὲν ΑΠΑΙΔΕΤΤΟΣ καὶ ΙΔΙΩΤΗΣ ὡς ἐκεῖνῳ λέγει ἀλίσκεται, ὁ δὲ πεπαιδευμένῳ δυσχεραίνει.

^m *Ethic. Nicom.* IV. 8.—βαυμολοχοὶ—καὶ φορτικοί. And I. 5, where he says, that, 'ΟΙ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ καὶ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΤΑΤΟΙ, held the *summum bonum* to be *pleasure*. See also *Rhet.* III, 1, p. 584, A.

spectators; adapted to the entertainment of *popular* audiences"—to the taste, as we commonly express it, of the *upper gallery*, as opposed to the refined and cultivated taste of men of reading and reflection.

As far as I can judge, from a comparison of the different senses of the word with its etymology; the common idea, which runs through and connects them all, is that of *excess*, or, perhaps, more exactly, of offensive, disgusting, or *burdensome*, by *excess*, of some kind or other.

NOTE 264.

P. 203. AS IF THE AUDIENCE, WITHOUT THE AID OF ACTION, &c.

Ὡς γὰρ ἐκ αἰσθανομένων, ἂν μὴ ΑΥΤΟΣ ΠΡΟΣΩΗ, πολλὰν κίνησιν κινῶνται.—This wound has been sufficiently probed. When I found, that the "*medica manus*" of Mr. Toup had been tried upon it, I looked, at least, for the "*salubres Ambrosiæ succos, et odoriferam panaceam*," if not for the precious *Dictamnus*, that would entirely heal it. He proposed to read—ἂν μὲν ΑΥΤΟΣ ΠΡΟΣΩΗ.^b I should be very sorry to do
any

^a Mr. Pope, probably without thinking of Aristotle, has almost translated him, where, in his preface to Shakspeare, he says—"It must be allowed, that stage-poetry, of all others, is more particularly levelled to "*please the populace*."

^o From ΦΟΡΤΟΣ—onus.

^a Æn. XII. 411.

^b See Mr. Winstanley's note, p. 309 of his edition.

any injustice to the emendation of so masterly a Greek scholar; but I am obliged to confess, that I do not understand it. "The imitators have recourse to every kind of motion, just as if the audience were not able to understand, (or, to *hear*) them, *without the addition or accompaniment of a flute.*" How any sense can be made of this, or of any other fair version of the passage, so corrected, I cannot discover. The emendation, surely, requires to be explained, at least; and if Mr. Toup gave any explanation in his letter to Mr. Winstanley, it is to be wished, that the learned editor had communicated it to the public in his note.

It is some comfort, however, that the general meaning of the passage seems liable to little or no difficulty; and, accordingly, in that, all the commentators, I think, are agreed, however widely they may differ as to the *reading*.

NOTE 265.

P. 203. LIKE BAD FLUTE-PLAYERS, WHO WHIRL THEMSELVES ROUND, WHEN THEY WOULD IMITATE THE MOTION OF THE DISCUS—.

This is one of those antique curiosities, which we stare at, without knowing very well what to make of it.—'Αν ΔΙΣΚΟΝ δεη μιμεσθαι. We should think it very strange, if we were told of a flute-player *having occasion to imitate a quoit*. But we

are not to understand this of a mere instrumental solo, but of a performer accompanying *words* sung by a Chorus, (as appears from the mention of the *Coryphæus*,) and endeavouring, in an absurd manner, to express them. The ancient *Αυλητής*, or *Tibicen*, was not, it seems, a mere sedentary performer, like those of a modern orchestra. He accompanied the Chorus with his *person*, as well as with his instrument, and seems to have paraded about the stage, in a pompous dress; to have made a part of the *Ὀψις*, or *shew*, and to have joined in all the *turns*, and *returns*, and various evolutions, of the choral dance. Hence the description of Horace:

Sic priscae *motumque* et luxuriam addidit arti
Tibicen, *traxitque* VAGUS *per pulpita vestem*.

A. P. 214.

Lucian, in his *Harmonides*, describing the requisites of a good *Αυλητής*, mentions, among the rest,—*καὶ ΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ ἐν ῥυθμῳ*.*—The great masters, no doubt, respected themselves, and confined their motion to the dignity of a sort of rhythmic strut. But Aristotle, here, is describing the tricks of the *φαυλοὶ* or *φρεντικοὶ* performers. Such a performer *might* have occasion, or rather take occasion, to imitate the whirling or rolling of a disc, if the subject, for example, of the choral song chanced to be the story of *Apollo* and *Hyacinthus*; which is mentioned by Lucian in a long list of fabulous subjects,

* P, 638, ed. B.n.

subjects, enumerated as a part of the knowledge requisite to an accomplished pantomimic dancer^b. Or, the subject might be taken from Homer, *Od.* *l.* 186, &c.

Κυλιόμενοι. Dacier, in his note, translates this, "*rolling themselves upon the ground.*" This would be φορτικόν indeed. Yet in this idea he follows *Victorius*; who enters into a discussion, of some length, to prove that κυλιόμενοι can mean nothing but *rolling on the ground*. Nor will he allow the difficulty of doing this *while they were playing* to be a sufficient objection. Certainly, the usual and proper sense of the word is on his side. But it was natural enough, surely, to apply to the motion *imitating*, the term proper to the motion *imitated*.

^b *De Salt.* p. 933. ed. Ben.—A modern dancer—perhaps even *M. Vestris* himself—would stare at the account which Lucian gives in that treatise, of the accomplishments necessary to make a *perfect dancer*. "He must not only understand music, but poetry, *geometry*, and above all, *philosophy, natural and moral*; rhetoric, painting, sculpture; especially, he must have an excellent memory, and have all history at his fingers ends, from the creation of the world down to Cleopatra," &c. *Logic*, indeed, Lucian confesses, is not absolutely necessary. But so great, he says, must be his knowledge, that, "like *Homer's Chalcas*, he must know—

" - - - τα τ' ὄντα, τα τ' ἔσσομενα, προ τ' ἔοντα !"

All this Lucian professes to prove; but, as might well be expected, some of his assertions are very lamely made out, others slurred over, or entirely neglected. The treatise;

NOTE 266.

P. 203. AND PULL THE CORYPHÆUS WHEN SCYLLA IS THE SUBJECT.

Ἐλκοντες τον Κορυφαιον.—To imitate *Scylla*,—"naves in saxa trahentem," as Virgil has expressed it*. But it is not easy to see, how the performer, at least while he was playing, could well spare a hand for this operation.—This was even worse than what we call *humouring* a catch; when, for instance, a singer who is performing Purcell's "*Fie, nay prithee, John*"—thinks it necessary to collar his neighbour.

NOTE 267.

P. 204. THE TRAGIC IMITATION, WHEN ENTIRE.

Ἡ ὍΛΗ ΤΕΧΝΗ. Heinsius proposed, ἡ ἈΛΛΗ ΤΕΧΝΗ. But I believe the established reading to be right. The *whole* art—i.e. Tragedy, as *represented*; with *all its constituent parts*, and, as it was said before, *ἀπαντα μιμουμένη*. For it might, as Aristotle presently observes, be read, or recited, like an Epic Poem; and, in that view, the comparison here made would not hold.

Τεχνη—

treatise, however, is, upon the whole, a curious piece; and, though far from sufficient to give a clear and complete idea of the pantomimic dance of the antients, yet it affords more information about it, than is to be found, I believe, any where else.

* *Æn.* III. 425.

Τεχνη—i. e. the *Tragic* art : for so he uses the word, *cap.* i. not for the whole Poetic art, but for a single branch of it:—ἐν ταῖς εἰρημαῖς ΤΕΧΝΑΙΣ—i. e. Epic Poetry, Tragedy, Comedy, &c. So too at the end of that chapter: τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ΤΕΧΝΩΝ. And, again, at the end of *this* chapter, (as I understand the passage,) τῆς ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ἱρῆς. See NOTE 277.

NOTE 268.

P. 204. TO HEARERS OF THE BETTER SORT—.

—Θιατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς : to which he opposes φαυλοὶ. The word ἐπιεικεῖς seems rightly explained here by Dacier—"les honnêtes gens ; c'est à dire, les gens " qui ont eu une meilleure education." The passage, which he quotes from *Plato*, is much to the purpose of this chapter. Συγχωρῶ δὲ τογὲ τοσούτοι καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς πολλοῖς, δεῖν τὴν μουσικὴν ἡδονὴν κρίνεσθαι· μὴ μόντοι τῶν ἐπιτυχοῦντων· ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἕκαστος εἶναι μῦσαν καλλίστην, ἥτις τότε βεατιστότης, καὶ ἰκανῶς πεπαιδευμένους τερπεί. —*De Leg.* II. p. 658.

Aristotle uses ἐπιεικής in the same sense, *Eth. Nicom.* IV. 8, p. 186, ed. *Wilk.*—τοιαῦτα λεγέειν καὶ ἀκχεῖν, οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ εὐετῶν ἀρμόττει.

NOTE 269.

P. 204. AND IN SINGING—.

Και διδόντα. There seems great reason to suspect this word. For, what is the force of the preposition here? Some commentators, without disputing the reading, neglect the preposition entirely, and render the word as if it were the simple participle, **ῥιδόντα**. Others, understand, *singing throughout*: “*qui continenter canit.*” Goulst. But the proper sense of **διδόν**, would, I think, be—to sing *dissonantly*—to sing *out of tune*,—as, **ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩΝ**. And so the word is actually used in the treatise **Περὶ Κόσμου**, in Aristotle’s works, and opposed to **ΣΥΝῤῥδον**, as **ΔΙΑΦΩΝΩΝ** is to **ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩΝ**:—**συμφερόμενον, και διαφερόμενον· συνῥδον, και ΔΙΑΙΔΟΝ**^a. “The agreeing, and the disagreeing, “the *consonant*, and the *dissonant*”^b. But as the word cannot here be admitted, in that which appears to be its only proper and warrantable sense, I suspect, it might, originally, have been only **ῥιδόντα**. Considering how frequently Δ and Α were confounded by transcribers, **ΚΑΙ ΑΙΔΟΝΤΑ** might easily be blundered into **ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΙΔΟΝΤΑ**. One MS. reading is **διαΔιδόντα**; where the ΔΙ, plainly enough, arose from the ΑΙ.

The commentators understand from this passage, that there were two sorts of rhapsodists; one,

^a Tom. I. p. 609. ^b Harris. *Philos. Arrang.* p. 47.

one, of those who *recited* Epic Poetry, and another, of those who *sung* it. Whether this can be proved from other passages of antient authors, I know not. From this, it certainly cannot. Aristotle says, ΚΑΙ ῥαψῳδοῦντα—ΚΑΙ διαδόντα*. Whatever the διαδων was, he is here clearly distinguished from the ῥαψῳδων—the *rhapsodist*.

That the rhapsodists did not, in the strict and *musical* sense, at least, of the word, *sing* the verses of Homer, but *recited* or *declaimed* them only, we may pretty safely infer, from what is expressly said of Epic Poetry at the beginning of this work—that “it imitates by *words only*,” without melody and rhythm—i.e. without *music*. This, indeed, will not prove that Epic Poetry was *never* sung, any more than what was said of Tragedy—that it imitates by *words* and *music*—will prove that it was never recited, or read. Yet the least, I think, that can be inferred from it, is, that Epic Poetry was, in general, and for the most part, recited or declaimed only; and, consequently, that the *rhapsodists*, properly so called, being the established

performers

* This passage is much mistaken by M. Batteux, who renders it, “Qu'on peut *faire des gestes* en recitant l'Épopée, --- qu'on peut même chanter,” &c. *Faire des gestes*, comes far short of ΠΕΡΙΕΡΓΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ σήμειον. The *καὶ* which precedes the participle, ῥαψῳδοῦντα, is omitted: and to produce his sense of διαδόντα—qu'on peut même chanter, the Greek should be—ἐντὶ περιεργαζέσθαι --- καὶ διαΔΕΙΝ.

performers of Epic Poetry, as the *actors*⁴ were of Tragic, performed it always in that manner; without *singing*, any farther, than as the tones of loud and sustained declamation approach more nearly to singing than those of common reading. The earliest *Lyric* Poet-Musicians, indeed, as we learn from Plutarch and Athenæus, used to sing even the hexameters of *Homer* and *Hesiod*, as well as their own, to the lyre. But they, plainly, speak of this, as of an *antient* practice:—τον Τερπανδρον, ΚΙΘΑΡΩΔΙΚΩΝ ποιητην ὄντα νομῶν, [*hymns*,] κατὰ νομον ἱκάσων, ΤΟΙΣ ΕΠΕΣΙ, τοῖς ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ΤΟΙΣ ὍΜΗΡΟΥ, ΜΕΛΗ περιτιθέντα, Αἰδεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν. *Plut. Dial. de Mus.* p. 2074, ed. H. St. And afterwards—ὅτι δὲ οἱ κιθαρωδικοὶ νομοὶ, ὍΙ ΠΑΛΑΙ, ἐξ ΕΠΩΝ συνίσταντο, Τιμοθεὺς ἰδηλώσει, &c. p. 2075. So, too, Athenæus:—“*Chamæleon*, in his book about Stesichorus, καὶ μελωδῆσθαι φησι, ἔμνονον τὰ Ὅμηρου, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἑσίοδου, καὶ Ἀρχιλόχου, &c. ΚΑΙ μελωδῆσθαι—“ were even sung.” p. 620.

It is not, however, at all improbable, that *Homer* might be sometimes *sung*, in Aristotle's time, and that this *Mnasitheus*, (of whom nothing is known,) might be a performer in this way. But, that this was a distinct thing from *ῥαψῳδία* seems pretty clear.

⁴ *ῥαψῳδοί*, and *ὑποκριταί*, are continually joined together. See Plato, in that entertaining dialogue, the *Ion*, tom. I. p. 532, D. 535, E. and in a great many other places.

NOTE 270.

P. 205. WHOSE GESTURES RESEMBLE THOSE OF IMMODEST WOMEN.

The passage of Aulus Gellius, to which I referred in my note on the translation, as a story, both curious in itself, and confirming what was there advanced, is this. "Histrio in terrâ Græciâ
 " fuit famâ celebri: qui, gestûs et vocis claritudine
 " & venustate, cæteris antestabat. Nomen fuisse
 " aiunt POLUM. Tragoedias poetarum nobilium
 " scitè atque asseveratè actitavit. Is Polus
 " unicè amatum filium morte amisit. Eum luctum
 " quum satis visus est eluxisse, rediit ad quæstum
 " artis. In eo tempore Athenis *Electram* So-
 " phoclis acturus, gestare urnam quasi cum
 " Orestis ossibus debebat. Ita compositum fa-
 " bulæ argumentum est, ut, veluti fratris reliquias
 " ferens Electra, compleret commiseretæque in-
 " teritum ejus, qui per vim extinctus existimatur.
 " Igitur Polus, lugubri habitu *Electræ* indutus,
 " ossa atque urnam à sepulchro tulit filii; & quasi
 " Orestis amplexus, oplevit omnia, non simula-
 " chris neque imitamentis, sed luctu atque lamentis
 " veris & spirantibus. Itaque, quum agi fabula
 " videretur, dolor actitatus est." *A. Gell. VII. 5.*

NOTE 271.

P. 205. THE MUSIC AND THE DECORATION, BY THE LATTER OF WHICH THE ILLUSION IS HEIGHTENED, &c.

The Greek, here, in either of the two readings warranted by manuscript authority, is unsatisfactory and suspicious, and the sense, consequently, uncertain. The reading of the old editions is—*δι' ἧς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἰσίσανται ἰσαρπύζονται*: which Victorius renders—"per quam voluptates percipiunt evidentissimè:"—"through, or by means of, which, they perceive the pleasures most evidently." Nothing can well be more harsh, or strange.—*ἰσίσανται*—they perceive:—Who?—The spectators. To this mode of speaking, however, I should not object; because this *ellipsis*, of *ἀνθρωποι*, is frequent in both the Greek and Latin writers*. Thus, in the beginning of this chapter, *κινεῖται*. This answers to that very convenient idiom, of which the French make so much use, and which we so often find the want of—*on s'agite*—*on apperçoit*, &c.^b

But,

* See *Sanct. Minerv.* IV. 4. and *Periz.* note 39.

^b According to Menage, the Fr. *on*, is only a corruption of *homme*; and *on dit*, for example, was antiently written, "*huom dit*." And thus the Italian writers use *uom*. Thus—"quando uom se n'accorge." *Tasso's Aminta*.—"Uom dice." *Petrarch, Son.* 190, &c. And thus the Germans use the word *man*: *man sagt*—*man say*—*they say*, &c.—See Menage's *Osservaz.* sopra l'*Aminta*.

But, the verb, *ἐπισανται*, will, I apprehend, by no means bear the sense here forced upon it, of *perceiving* pleasure^c; or any sense, but that of *understanding*, or *knowing*. Were I, therefore, obliged to make *some* sense of this reading, it would be this:—"per quam [*quæ efficiuntur*] voluptates, "*nōrunt* homines apertissimè:"—"the pleasures, "which are produced through which, are clearly "*understood*—well known to all." But this, I confess, is violent interpretation; and, in particular, I *doubt* whether the word *ἐναργες* is ever used, by Aristotle at least, as merely synonymous to *φανερὸν*; as evident to *reason* or *understanding*, and opposed to *doubtful*. It always means, I believe, evident, clear, visible, to *the eye of imagination*. Thus, *cap. xvii.*—*Δεῖ δὲ τὰς μὲν συνίσταται* - - - *ὅτι μάλιστα ΠΡΟ ΟΜΜΑΤΩΝ τιθεμένων* *ἔτω γὰρ ἂν ΕΝΑΡΓΕΣΤΑΤΑ ὈΡΩΝ, ὥσπερ ΠΑΡ' ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΟΙΣ,* &c. These words seem to furnish the best comment upon the passage in question, and will perhaps lead us to the most reasonable and least exceptionable interpretation of it; for perfect satisfaction is not, I think, to be expected, in the present condition of the text. We ought, surely, at all events, to adhere to the proper and clear meaning of the adverb *ἐναργεστατα*, as used in the passage just cited; where the word itself, and the

explanatory

^c *Vict.* himself admits this objection: "Verbum hoc (*ἐπισανται*) insolens videtur in hoc significatu."

explanatory expressions which accompany it, afford a pretty strong presumption, that Aristotle, here, meant to express the particular advantage which Tragedy receives from the ὀψις , or, from actual *representation**, as giving to the imitation the greatest possible *reality* of effect, and producing the most perfect illusion in the spectator. Yet this, it must be owned, is very obscurely expressed, if it *be* expressed, by the Greek; which, according to the *best* reading, that of Victorius, and of many MSS^d. will stand thus: $\text{καὶ ἴτι, ἢ μικρὸν μέρῳ τὴν μῦσικον καὶ τὴν ὀψιν ἔχει, δι' ἧς 'ΑΙ 'ΗΔΟΝΑΙ ΣΤΗΝΙΣ-ΤΑΝΤΑΙ ἡναργισατα}$: that is, according to the only *sense* which I can find for it—"and the decoration, " or spectacle; by means of which, the pleasures " we receive from Tragedy", are rendered more
" sensible,

* So the passage was understood by the editor of the *Ox. ed.* without accents, 1760, who refers δι' ἧς to the ὀψις , and proposes this emendation: $\text{δι' ἧς, (scil. ὀψεως) ΤΗΣ 'ΗΔΟΝΗΣ συνίσταται ΤΑ ἡναργισατα}$ —"per quam, "*voluptatis pars evidentissima efficitur; quippe quæ oculis* " *subjecta est fidelibus.*" But I cannot think that Aristotle would have written, $\text{δι' ἧς, ΤΗΣ ἡδονης}$ - - .

^d See Mr. Winstanley's edition.

^a It is, certainly, most natural to understand the pleasures of the music and decoration to be here spoken of. And so it is generally understood. But I cannot see how the words will admit that sense: for the Greek does not say—"by which the most sensible and striking pleasures are produced," but, "by which the pleasures (i.e. some other " pleasures,) are produced in the most sensible and

"sensible, striking, illusive," &c. But many objections may, undoubtedly, be made. For the fair and literal version would be this: "by means of which, the pleasures are formed, composed, constructed, or constituted^f, in the clearest and most visible manner." I give, here, what I apprehend to be the only fair sense of the verb, συνισθαι; but it seems to be, by no means, the proper word in this place, and probably is not the word which Aristotle wrote. If any one MS. would offer me ΠΑΡΙΣΤΑΤΖΙ, I would readily accept it. *Ælian*, describing the effect of a trumpet, sounding suddenly, at the instant when a famous painting was exhibited, of a warrior in the act of rushing to the battle, says—ἀμα τε ἐν το μὲλ^g ἤκειτο τραχυ και φοβερ^{ον} - - και ἰδεικνυτο ἡ γραφ^η, και ὁ γρατιωτης ἰβλεπετο, τε μὲλ^{ης} ΕΝΑΡΓΕΣΤΕΡΑΝ την φαντασιαν τε ἐκβοηθ^{ον}τι ἐτι και πολλ^{ον} ΠΑΡΑΣΤΗΣΑΝΤΟΣ: i. e. "presenting to the imagination a still more lively and striking image^g." But again—αἱ ἡδοναι, is not what one would expect here. To speak, indeed, of *terror* and *pity*, as the pleasures of Tragedy, is perfectly agreeable, both to the doctrine, and to the language, of the author,

"striking way"—ἐναργεστα. To express the other sense, Aristotle would probably have written, ἐνεργεστα:—αἱ ἐνεργεσταὶ συνιστάνται ἡδοναι.

^f Vict.—conflantur—coagmentantur. And, indeed, in this sense, and no other, is the verb συνισθαι used throughout the treatise.

^g Var. Hist. II. 44.

author, throughout^b. But, it is not, properly, the *pleasure*—it is not the *terror*, or the *pity*—that is rendered more *ἰναργες*; but that *pleasure* is heightened by the *action* being rendered so.

Upon the whole, however, I see no other meaning that can be obtained from the words, without still greater violence and improbability of interpretation. Dacier, Batteux, and Goulston, make the assertion—*αἱ ἡδοναί*, &c. relate to both music and decoration. But it is, surely, quite unwarrantable to give to—*δὲ* 'HΣ, the sense of, *δὲ* 'ΩΝ, or *δὲ* 'ΑΙΝ. Besides that the *music*, however great the *pleasure* it may afford, cannot, I think, properly be considered as contributing to the *ἰναργεια*, or as heightening the *illusion*, of Tragedy. *Victorius*, who read—*τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὰς ὀφείας*, very consistently made *ἡς* refer to *μουσικῇ* only: and *Castelvetro* very properly observes, that, “if we read—*τὴν ὁψιν*—le predette parole [i. e. *δὲ ἡς αἱ ἡδοναί*, κ. τ. αλ.] havranno rispetto *alla vista*; e conteneranno la commendatione della detta vista, *per la quale si costituisca il diletto più manifestamente—che non si fa per le parole dell'epopea.*” p. 690. He appears, I think, to have understood the passage in the way I have proposed. But he mentions another reading, which I have not seen noticed anywhere else—*ἰναργεῖατα*^c. This had occurred to me, formerly, as a conjecture,

^b See NOTE 277.

^c “Alcuni testi leggono *ἰναργεῖατα.*” — — —

conjecture, before I had seen Castelvetro's commentary. But it gives much the same sense, and would remove no difficulty with respect to the passage *itself*; though, as I shall presently have occasion to observe, it might suit better with what follows.

NOTE 272.

P. 205. IT HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF GREATER CLEARNESS - - - AS WELL IN READING, AS IN REPRESENTATION. .

Εἶτα, καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρὸς ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναγνώσει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων.—It seems rather strange, that, immediately after mentioning the *ἰσχυρὸς* of the Ὀψις, Aristotle should say — “Then, it has *also* the “*ἰσχυρὸς*,” &c. It was this which induced me to suspect, that for *ἰσχυρὸς*, in the preceding passage, we should read—*ἐργασατα*: “By means of “which, [*i. e.* of the Ὀψις,] the pleasures we receive “from Tragedy (those, of *terror and pity excited “by imitation*, as he says *cap. xiv* ².) are rendered “more forcible and efficacious.” But the objection is, perhaps, not of sufficient force to warrant a departure from the established reading of all the manuscripts, *ἰσχυρὸς*: and we may, well enough, understand the author, as if he had said—“Then, “farther, another advantage is, that Tragedy has “*this ἰσχυρὸς*, not only on the stage, and on account of the Ὀψις, but even in *reading* also.”

That

² —τὴν ἀπὸ ἔκσε καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως ἩΔΟΝΗΝ.

That *ἀναγνώσις* is right, (not *ἀναγνωρισίς*;) I cannot entertain a doubt. Nothing can be more evidently nonsensical than this distinction—"both in the *discoveries*, and in the *incidents*;" as if a discovery were not an incident.

The expression, *ἐπὶ τῶν ἰργῶν*, for, in *representation, acting, performance, &c.* seems liable to no difficulty. Thus, *De Rep.* VIII. p. 455, *ὅλον ἐκ τῶν ΕΡΓΩΝ*—from what happens in the *performance* of such music^b. And see *ibid. cap. vi.* throughout which, *ἰργα* is repeatedly used for musical *performance*; particularly, p. 457, —*ταυμασια και περιττα ΤΩΝ ΕΡΓΩΝ*, "surprising and elaborate *performance*."

NOTE 273.

P. 206. ATTAINING THE END OF ITS IMITATION IN A SHORTER COMPASS.

Dryden says of this passage—"It is one reason of Aristotle's, to prove that Tragedy is the more noble, because it turns in a shorter compass; the whole action being circumscribed within the space of four and twenty hours. He might prove as well, that a mushroom is to be preferred before a peach, because it shoots up in the compass of a night." &c.

If Aristotle had said, that Tragedy was the more noble, because a Poet could *compose* a Tragedy in much less time than an Epic Poem,

the

^b See *Diss.* II. vol. i. p. 80.

the simile would have been justly applied. Dryden had, but just before, said, that "the effects of Tragedy are too *violent* to be lasting." But he did not give himself time to see, that Tragedy owes this greater *violence of effect* to the shortness of its plan; that is, to its stricter unity, its more concentrated and unbroken *interest*, its "close accelerated plot"; to that *αἰσχροῦ*, as Aristotle calls it, so essential to the purpose of Tragedy, which is, to give the *pleasure of strong emotion*. The Epic Poem is of too tedious a length, too various and episodic, to produce *that* effect in the same degree as Tragedy, which is read, or seen, *at once*, and without interruption.

But the case was, that Dryden, (who, as I have before had occasion to remark ^b, appears to have taken his idea of Aristotle from French translation,) wrote this in the preface to his translation of an *Epic Poem* ^c; on the contrary, when he was writing on *Tragedy*, he gave *Tragedy* the preference ^d.

NOTE 274.

P. 206. HIS POEM, IF PROPORTIONABLY CONTRACTED, WILL APPEAR CURTAILED.

—*Μυστροφ*.—Nothing is more diverting than the explanation which some commentators give of this word,

^a Dr. Hurd's *Disc. on Poet. Imit.* p. 140.

^b Vol. i. p. 281, note ^d. ^c Preface to the *Æneid*.

^d "Though *Tragedy* be justly preferred above the other"—i.e. the Epic Poem. *Essay on Dram. Poesy*.

word, and its application here. The Poem, it seems, is compared to the tail of a mouse, or a rat, which *grows less and less towards the end*:—" *versus extremum attenuata* *." I never heard, that any naturalists have observed this property to be peculiar to the tails of rats and mice. The fact seems to be, that the words *μικρον*, and *μειρον*, however their etymologies may appear to differ, have both the same meaning—that of cropped, curtailed, *tronqué*, as M. Batteux translates it. *Μικροῦ σιχῶ*, i. e. ὁ κατὰ τὸ τέλος ἑλλειπὺν χρόνον. [*Hephæst. p. 92, ed. De Pauw.*—To which is opposed, *δολιχέστερον*—a *long-tailed* verse: ὁ κατὰ τὸ τέλος πλεονάζων συλλαβή.

In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle applies *μειρον* to a period that is too short, and disappoints the ear by ending abruptly. The passage is curious for its expression, and illustrates both the *word* itself, and its application, here, to a Poem, which disappoints the expectation of a reader in the same manner, by ending before its time. Δεῖ δὲ, καὶ τὰ κῆλα, καὶ τὰς περιόδους, μῆτε ΜΕΙΟΥΤΡΟΤΕΣ εἶναι, μῆτε ΜΑΚΡΑΣ· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ΜΙΚΡΟΝ [i. e. *μειρον*] προσπταίειν πολλὰκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ, ὅταν, ἐπὶ ὁρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πορρῶ, καὶ τὸ μετρὸν ἔῃ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅρα, ΑΝΤΙΣΠΑΣΘΗ· παύσαμιν, ὍΙΟΝ, ΠΡΟΣΠΤΑΙΕΙΝ γιγνίσθαι, διὰ τὴν ΑΝΤΙΚΡΟΤΕΣΙΝ. *Rhet. III. 9, p. 592, ed. Duval.*

* So Robortelli, Victorius, Goulston.—" Appaia una *coda di topo*." *Castelvetro*.—" Venga ella à far' appa-
rentia di *coda di sorcio*, col suo fine angusto." *Piccol.*

NOTE 275.

P. 206. IF EXTENDED TO THE USUAL LENGTH.

Ακολουθῶντα τῷ τε μέτρῳ μήκει—. Almost all the commentators and translators understand — *answerable to the length of the metre*. And this is, certainly, the most obvious and unforced sense of the words: for, had Aristotle meant, by μέτρον, the standard *measure*, or *length*, of the *Poem*, as other commentators understand it, he, probably, would have rather said—τῷ τε ΜΗΚΟΥΣ ΜΕΤΡΩ.² Μέτρον is so used in the passage given in the last note: το ΜΕΤΡΟΝ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅρα. If, however, *metre* be the sense, (for, after all, the passage is ambiguous,) the expression must, I think, be understood as a short way of saying—“conformable to the usual length of *Poems in that metre*”—of *Poems in heroic verse*. See what is said, *cap.* xxiv. about the adaptation of the hexameter to Epic Poetry: ἔδεις ΜΑΚΡΑΝ συρᾶσιν ἐν ἄλλῃ πεποιηκεν ἢ τῷ ἥρωϊ.—I cannot conceive that Aristotle meant to say, that the length of the Epic Poem was proportioned, or ought to be proportioned, to the *length of the metre*. Yet so the commentators. “Si—Poeta secutus fuerit longitudinem, quæ instar videtur ejus carminis.” *Vict.*—“Si cum metri longitudine provehatur.” *Goulst. &c.* It was not the *length* of the hexameter

² As, μέγας ὁρῶ, *cap.* xxiv. and *cap.* vii.

hexameter which made it the fittest measure for heroic Poetry, but the nature of the *feet* of which it is composed ; and on *that* account it was preferred, *as γαστριμαγοῦνται καὶ ὀγκωδίζονται τῶν μέτρων. cap. xxiv.* The length of a verse is to be measured by the *times* (χρόνοι) which compose it. Now the hexameter is but *one-third* longer than the Iambic trimeter ; their respective *times* being 24, and 18 : so that the length of an Epic Poem would be strictly proportioned to the length of its *verse*—*τῷ τε μέτρῳ μήκει*—were it longer by *one third* only than a Tragedy.

NOTE 276.

P. 206. DILUTED.

ῥαρη—*watery*. Aristotle uses the same metaphor in the following passage of his second book *De Republicā*, where, opposing, the community of wives and children proposed by *Plato**, he very justly objects, that it would weaken the bond of social union, by *diluting* the social affections, and destroying—

Relations dear, and all the charities
Of father, son, and brother - - -

Par. Lost, iv. 756.

—Εν δὲ τῇ πόλει, τὴν ΦΙΛΙΑΝ ἀναγκάσειον
ῥΑΡΗ γίνεσθαι, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην,
καὶ

* *Rep. V.*

και ἤκιστα λεγειν τον ἔμον^b, ἢ υἱον, πατέρα, ἢ πατέρα, υἱον. Ωσπερ γαρ μικρον γλυκυ, εἰς πολυ ὕδωρ μιχθεν, ἀναισθητον ποιει την κρασιν, ἔτω συμβαινει και την οἰκειοτητα, την προς ἀλλήλους, την ἀπο των ὀνοματων τετων—κ.τ.λ. I stop there, because the passage is evidently defective, though the sense is plain.

NOTE 277.

P. 207. AND, ALSO, IN THE PECULIAR END AT WHICH IT AIMS—.

Και, ἐτι, τῇ τῆς τεχνῆς ἰργῷ—. The expression is ambiguous. It may mean, either the end, or business, of the *Poetic art* in general, or, that of Tragedy—of the *Tragic art*^a. The latter, however, seems, pretty clearly, to be the meaning: for his expression—τατοις τε διαφερα πασι, ΚΑΙ ΕΤΙ τῇ τῆς τεχνῆς ἰργῷ—shews the author to be speaking, here, of a *distinct* advantage. But, if we understand it to mean, that Tragedy answers the end of *Poetry* better than the Epic, this cannot be considered as an advantage distinct from those enumerated before, which are, plainly, such as contribute to the *general* end of Poetry—that of giving

^b He alludes here to Plato's expressions, who contended, on the contrary, that the bond of social unity must be the closer, where all the citizens—ἀμα φθγγονται
--- τα τοιαυτα ῥήματα, το τε ΕΜΟΝ, και το 'ΟΥΚ ΕΜΟΝ.
p. 356, ed. Mass.

^a See NOTE 267.

giving pleasure—of interesting, delighting, striking, &c. Whereas, if the *peculiar* end of Tragedy be superior to that of Epic Poetry, this, indeed, is an additional and separate advantage. Besides, the parenthetical insertion which immediately follows—*δε γὰρ, ἡ τὴν τυχεσάν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς* (i.e. the *Epic and Tragic Poems*,) *ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημωρεῖν*—plainly implies, that the *τεχνικὸν ἔργον*, of which he had been speaking, was that of affording the particular pleasure *proper* to the species. And thus, too, the word *ἔργον* is used in other passages: *τραγῳδίας ἔργον*, *cap. vi.* and *cap. xiii.*

The words, *μαλλον τε τέλος τυγχανουσα*, present a similar, but more embarrassing, ambiguity. Is *τελος*, here, the end of *Poetry*, or the end of *Tragedy*? If we take it in the latter sense, Aristotle will say, that Tragedy is superior, *both* because its end—the peculiar effect which it purposes to produce—is superior to that of the Epic Poem, *and*, because it attains that end more perfectly than the Epic attains *its* end. But this Aristotle has not proved, nor does it appear to be true. On the other hand, if we understand *τελος* to mean the end of the *poetic art*^b, it is obviously true, that, if Tragedy be superior in all those respects which he had mentioned—in its closer *unity*, its *brevity*, its *variety*, its *music*, and its *decorations*—
and,

^b As it does in a similar expression, *cap. xxv.* which favours the same sense here: “*εἰ τυγχάναι τε τέλος τε αὐτῆς*”—i.e. of *Poetry* in general.

and, *besides*, (καὶ ἔτι) in the specific end at which it aims—it must, on the whole, be preferable to the Epic Poem, as answering more effectually the end of *Poetry*, by giving greater pleasure.

For, that this, in Aristotle's view, was the great end of the art, and of all its branches, appears, if I mistake not, evidently, from many other passages of this treatise, as well as from that now before us. Nor does he, any where, appear to me to give any countenance to an idea, which rational criticism has, now, pretty well exploded—that *utility* and *instruction* are the end of Poetry. That it may indeed be rendered, in some degree, useful and improving, few will deny; none, that it *ought* to be made so, if it can. But, that the *chief end* and *purpose* of Poetry is to *instruct*—that Homer wrote his *Iliad* on purpose to teach mankind the mischiefs of discord among chiefs, and his *Odyssey*, to prove to them the advantages of staying at home and taking care of their families—this is so manifestly absurd, that one is really astonished to see so many writers, one after the other, discoursing gravely in defence of it⁴. It

⁴ “ La vérité qui sert de fond à cette fiction, et qui avec elle compose la Fable, est, Que l'absence d'une personne hors de chez soi, ou qui n'a point l'œil à ce qui s'y fait, y cause de grands desordres.”—And again—“ Ces grands noms de Rois, de Heros, d'Achille, d'Agamemnon, & d'Ulysse, ne designent pas moins les derniers Bourgeois,” &c.—Du Poeme Ep. I. 10.

⁴ Piccolomini, in particular, p. 369, &c. of his *Annot. nella Poet. d'Arist.* And the reader may see, if he has

It is true indeed, that Aristotle, in his account of Tragedy, mentions the correction and refinement of the passions, pity, terror, &c. as a useful effect of Tragic representations. But he no where, either in his definition, where we might surely have expected him to be explicit, or in any other part of his book, calls that effect the *end* of Tragedy. All his expressions prove, that *his* end, both of Tragic and of Epic Poetry, was *pleasure*; though, with respect to Tragedy, he asserts, (by way, as I have before suggested, of obviating Plato's objections to it*,) that the pleasure arising from it was so far from being pernicious, that it was even useful; so far from *inflaming* the passions of men, that it tended, on the contrary, to purify and moderate them in common life. When the reader sees the expressions, to which I allude, laid together, he will hardly, I think, entertain any doubt upon this head.—τα μεγιστα, εις ΨΥΧΑΓΩΓΗΙ[†]

ἢ Τραν-

any stomach to see, the disgusting nonsense of Le Bossu upon this subject, *ch.* ii. iii. iv. &c. of his first book. By way of perfect contrast, he may then turn to the Dissertation on the *Idea of Universal Poetry*, [Dr. Hurd's *Hor.* vol. ii.] See also Dr. Beattie's *Essay on Poetry and Music*, *ch.* i.—This absurd notion was also long ago combated in a masterly manner by that fine and philosophical writer, La Motte, in the discourse prefixed to his *Odes*, p. 23—31.

* NOTE 45, p. 3. of this volume.

† This looks much, as if he would have assented to the rational assertion of *Eratosthenes*, which Strabo combats,

ἡ Τραγωδία, μυθε μέρη εἶναι, &c. *cap.* vi.—εἰς δὲ εἰς αὐτὴ ἀπο Τραγωδίας ἮΔΟΝΗ. *cap.* xiii.—ὃ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἮΔΟΝΗΝ ἀπο Τραγωδίας, ἀλλὰ ΤΗΝ ΟΙΚΕΙΑΝ. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπο εἰλε καὶ φοβῶ, δια μιμησεως, δεῖ ἮΔΟΝΗΝ παρασκευάζειν τὸν ποιητὴν—*cap.* xiv.—ἢ, ὥσπερ ζῶν ἐν ὅλῳ, ποιῇ τὴν ΟΙΚΕΙΑΝ ἮΔΟΝΗΝ *cap.* xxiii.—τὴν ὅψιν, δι' ἧς Αἰ ἮΔΟΝΑΙ, &c. *cap.* ult.—δεῖ γὰρ ὃ τὴν τυχεύσαν ἮΔΟΝΗΝ ποιεῖν ΑΤΤΑΣ, ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημενῶν. *ibid.*

From all this it appears, I think, indubitably, that the great *end* of Poetry in general, was, in Aristotle's opinion, to give *pleasure*; as *Castelvetro*, long ago, rightly contended. “Coloro, che vogliono, che la poesia sia trovata principalmente per giovare, o per giovare e per dilettae insieme, veggano che non s'oppongano all' autorità d'Aristotele, il quale, qui ed altrove, non par che le assegni altro, che *diletto*; e se pure le concede alcuno giovamento, glielo concede per accidente; come è la purgatione dello spavento e della compassione per mezzo della *Tragedia*.” p. 505.

The *peculiar end* of Tragedy, he has expressly told us, is to afford *that pleasure*, which results from fictitious terror and pity: τὴν ἀπο εἰλε καὶ φοβῶ δια μιμησεως ἡδονήν.—What he regarded as the peculiar end of *Epic Poetry*, I observe that he has

bats,—ποιητὴν πάντα στοχαζέσθαι ΨΥΧΑΓΩΓΙΑΣ, ὅτ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΙΑΣ. *Strab.*, p. 15. And see the *Diss. on the Idea of Univ. Poetry*, above referred to.

has no where distinctly said. But from what he *has* said, of the advantages which its plan affords, with respect to *grandeur*, and *variety*, and the admission of the *wonderful* and *surprising*^k, and also of the superior *richness* of its *language*^h, we may collect, that his ideas on this subject accorded with those of the best modern critics; and that he held the *end* of the Epic Poem to be, according to the exact description of an eminent writer, “*admiration*, produced by a *grandeur* of design, “and *variety* of important incidents, and *sustained* by all the energy and minute particularity of *description*^l.”

This *end*, however, and these peculiar advantages, of the *Epic* plan, Aristotle has not, as I have before remarked^k, brought forward, to complete the comparison in this chapter: but he plainly, and, I think, justly, considered them as more than compensated by the closer interest, more perfect illusion, stronger emotion, deeper impression, and, in *his* view, more useful tendency, of Tragedy. The Epic Poem loses in force of *effect*, what it gains in variety; in nature and passion, what it gains in grandeur and sublimity. The very necessity, and the merit, of its *variety*,
and

^k Cap. xxiv.—*Transl. Part III. Sect. 2.*

^h Cap. xxii. *ad fin.* and cap. xxiv.—*Διο και ηρωτας, &c. Transl.* vol. i. p. 174, 175. and 180, 181.

^l Dr. Hurd's *Disc. on Poet. Imit.* p. 141.

^k Vol. i. p. 58, 59.

and of the ἐπισοδαὶ ἀνομοιοὶς ἐπισοδαίς¹, are a confession of its defects, as implying a too great extent of plan, a feebleness of interest, a want of relief. It seems, indeed, to be the great art of the Epic Poet, to make us amends, by the striking beauty of particular *parts*, for the fatigue and *ennui* which unavoidably results, more or less, from the *whole*. A strong proof of the superiority of Tragedy, and of the justness of Aristotle's decision, is, that every reader is most delighted with the *Episodes* of Epic Poetry; with those subordinate and more compressed actions, which give us the very pleasure of *Tragedy*—which interest and affect us by exciting *pity* and *terror*: with the meeting of Hector and Andromache, and the supplication of Priam to Achilles for the body of his son, in the *Iliad*; with the love, despair, and death, of Dido, the episode of Nisus and Euryalus, and the parting scene between old Evander and his son, in the *Æneid*².

But though, of all the pleasures which Poetry, or Music, or Painting, can afford, the pleasure of *emotion* deserves to be esteemed the greatest, yet all

¹ *Cap.* xxiv.

² *Æn.* VIII. 557, &c.—particularly, from v. 572 to 584. I do not know any where a finer example of natural pathos, heightened by the nicest selection of expression, and by such harmony of versification, as would almost make nonsense pass upon the understanding for sense, through the recommendation, if I may be allowed such an expression, of the ear.

all those arts certainly afford considerable pleasures of *other* kinds; and, perhaps, to do full justice to the *Epic Poem*, we ought not to characterize it by any one particular and principal pleasure, but by that *variety*, which is peculiar to it, and which comprehends, in some degree or other, *every* sort of pleasure, that *serious* Poetry can give^a. Whatever, therefore, may be decided with respect to the comparative excellence of the *Poems* themselves, we may safely perhaps assent to the general decision of criticism, respecting the comparative *merits* of the *Poets*, and allow, that “the first praise of genius is due to the writer of an *Epic Poem*; as it requires an assemblage of all the powers which are singly sufficient for other compositions*.”

^a Some writers give still greater latitude to the variety of *Epic Poetry*. And indeed, if what *should*, or *may*, be done, is to be determined by what *has* been done by the best *Epic Poets*—by Homer, Virgil, and Tasso, (for Ariosto is a *comic Poet*;) it even admits, occasionally, of some departure from rigid dignity, and of some approach, at least, to the smile of *Comedy*, though not to the broad laugh of *Farce*. See Lord Kaims, *Elem. of Criticism*, vol. i. p. 289, and the treatise Περὶ Ὅλης ποίσεως, p. 257, vol. v. of *Ed. Hom. Ernest*.

* Dr. Johnson's *Life of Milton*.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

VOL. I.

Page 21, *Note* v. It ought to have been mentioned, that this book of the *Odyssey* was not translated by Pope himself, but by Fenton.

P. 147. BY AGATHO.] Perhaps I ought rather to have adhered to the old and best authenticated reading, *ἀγαθόν*. Victorius found *Αγαθόν* only in one MS. and was induced to prefer it, principally because the other reading could not well be reconciled with *his* interpretation of the passage. He also objects, that the conjunction, *καί*, in that reading, would have no meaning, "*cum esset, illo pacto, nihil quod copularet.*" But *καί* must then be rendered *etiam*, and, indeed, can be understood no otherwise, if we read *ἀγαθόν*; and the sense will be—"as Achilles is made a good character *even* by Homer;" as if he had added—who has so well observed the *οἶκον*, the historical likeness, and has painted in so strong colours the angry violence of his temper. This sense would be sufficiently expressed in my translation, by reading—"as Achilles is drawn, *even* by HOMER."

P. 187, *Note* 9. "*But that part,*" &c.] I found reason to alter my opinion, and the *NOTE* referred to, after this note on the translation was printed. *Dele*, therefore, "*But that part,*" &c. to "*Sect. 22,*" inclusively. And read—*See the NOTE.*

P. 259. It escaped me, till that note was printed, that *Ælian* also says, "*Dionysius the Colophonian:*" it

must therefore be allowed to be probable, that if Aristotle and Plutarch speak of the same painter, so do also Aristotle and Ælian. The difficulty, however, pointed out, of reconciling Ælian's account with that of Aristotle, will still remain.

P. 294. Though I think it clear, that Stanley misunderstood the passage of Aristotle, I confess it is by no means clear, that he misunderstood that of Philostratus. This, therefore, was too hastily advanced: for though the general use of the adverb ἀπορᾶν certainly favours the sense in which I understood the passage, yet I fear there is no good authority for the word χορῶ, used as we use *chorus*, to signify the choral *ode* or *song*. It always, I believe, means the choral *performers*. The verb, *overrule*, also contributed to mislead me, if I was misled; as it is more applicable to the *contraction* of *proximity*, than to the *diminution* of *number*. Yet it is used in the same sense, and on the same subject, by *Jul. Pollux*, IV. 15, *ad finem*.

VOL. II.

Page 83. See also the description, in the *Trachiniae* of Sophocles, of Hercules dashing out the brains of Lichas against a rock, v. 779—782.

P. 98. "Purple dresses," &c.]

----- χορῶ ἀνδρῶν,

ΊΜΑΤΙΑ ΧΡΥΣΑ ΠΑΡΑΣΧΩΝ ΤΩΙ ΧΟΡΩΙ, *παν* ὄρεται.

Translated by Grotius,

----- "Aut lectus scenæ præbitor,

"Aureas gregi cum vestes dederit, fert centunculum."

Antiphanes, apud Athen. p. 103.

Grotii Excerpta, &c. p. 627.


P. 197, NOTE 135. The alteration, however, from ΘΕΑΤΩ, to ΠΟΙΗΤΩ, is rather violent; and it is suggested to me by Castelvetro's conjecture, that Aristotle

might, perhaps, express the *sense* given by Dacier, without using the word *παρὼν*, and that what he said might be this: "which escaped him [*i. e.* Carcinus] *for want of seeing the action, as a spectator.*"—ὁ μὴ ὄψατα ΩΣ [or ΩΣΠΕΡ] θεῶν [sc. ὄντα] ἐλὰσθαι. This is favoured by the preceding expression,—ὍΡΩΝ, ΩΣΠΕΡ παρ' αὐτοῦ γινόμενον τοῖς πρᾶττομενοις.

P. 224. "παῖδιον — *never used but to signify a child.*"—Unless *ἰπποβοσκίως*, as a term of endearment; as we often apply *child* to a grown person: a sense in which it can hardly be used here.

P. 333. "*One Tragedy at each different festival.*" And thus, I find, Menage understood. "On ne représentoit, chacun de ces jours-là, qu'un poëme de chaque *poëte.*" *Pratique de Theatre*, par D'Aubignac, ii. p. 48.

REMARKS
UPON THE FIRST EDITION,
BY THE
TRANSLATOR,
ADDED TO
THIS EDITION.



DISSERTATION I.

REMARK I.

Vol. I. page 54.—THE ACKNOWLEDGED SUPER-
 IORITY OF VIRGIL IN TOUCHES OF THIS KIND.

I should have noticed Lucretius, v. 1369—1377 :—

Inque dies magis in montem succedere sylvas
 Cogebant, infraque locum concedere cultis :
 Prata, lacus, rivos, segetes, vinetaque læta
 Collibus, et campis ut haberent, atque olearum
 Cærule distinguens inter plaga currere posset
 Per tumulos, et convalles, camposque profusa :
 Ut nunc esse vides vario distincta lepôre
 Omnia, quæ pomis intersita dulcibus ornant,
 Arbustisque tenent felicibus obsita circum.

—which is much more landscape-painting than any
 other passage in the Latin poets, that I recollect.

DISSERTATION II.

REMARK 2.

Vol. I. page 87.—EXCEPT THE ACTION (IF THE EXPRESSION IS ALLOWABLE) OF SPEAKING.

“ Speaking is acting, both in *philosophical strictness*, and as to all moral purposes.” Paley’s Prin. of Mor. Phil. II. 286. 7th Ed.

REMARK 3.

Vol. I. p. 89, 90. note ¹.

See Serre —Essais sur les Principes de l’Harmonie, p. 46—47. “ On peut en conséquence concevoir que cet ancien genre pouvoit fournir à la mélodie, surtout à une mélodie recitante, des intervalles que leur extrême petitesse rendoit très-propres aux expressions de mollesse et de langueur, aux expressions de sentimens qui supposent dans l’ame, et en consequence dans l’organe vocale, une sorte d’*inertie*, un penchant à ne former que les plus petits intervalles mélodiques, que l’harmonie, qu’une succession fondamentale très-naturelle puisse suggerer.”

His “*inertie*” touches upon my solution of Dr. Beattie’s question, which I gave in a letter to my friend the Rev. Mr. Elmsall: i. e. — a low-spirited man speaks in *small* intervals, and *minor* thirds, and semitones, &c. for the same reason as he takes short steps, and moves languidly, &c.

TRANSLATION AND NOTES.

REMARK 4.

NOTE 14. Vol. I. p. 264.—MANDRABULUS.

"Nomen - - - Comœdiam potius quam Tragœdiam indicat." Mr. Tyrwhitt, p. 121. From *Μανδρα, stabulum*. This argument from the derivation of the *name* escaped me.

REMARK 5.

NOTE 15. *ibid.*—HEGEMON—INVENTOR OF PARODIES.

My Translation—*inventor of parodies*, wants either alteration, or explanation, from Athenæus. See Mr. Tyrwhitt, p. 121. "Quod Hegemo *primus parodias fecisse* dicitur, nihil plus significat, quam eum hanc ludicræ poeseos speciem *primum* seorsim excoluisse, et pro acroamate in scenâ exhibuisse, &c."

REMARK 6.

NOTE 16. Vol. I. p. 266.—THE DELIAD.

See the excellent note of Mr. Tyrwhitt, p. 122.

REMARK 7.

NOTE 18. note ^c. Vol. I. p. 275.

The observation of the Monthly Review, July 1793, p. 243, about the inconsistency of my remark and my version, is fair, and must be noticed.

REMARK

REMARK 8.

NOTE 22. Vol. I. p. 281.—*Μαθαῖναι*—to discover.
See Eurip. Phoeniss. v. 48. and 50.—to find out.

REMARK 9.

Ibid. note *. Vol. I. p. 280.—*Μυμουμένην*—and so Mr. Tyrwhitt, p. 126.

REMARK 10.

TRANSLATION, Vol. I. p. 110.—HOMER ALONE—.

My version, here, does not say *all* that Aristotle says. He says, Homer was not only, the *only* good Epic poet, but the only Epic Poet whose poetry was *dramatic*.

REMARK 11.

TRANSLATION, *ibid.*—ONCE MADE THEIR APPEARANCE.

See Mr. Tyrwhitt, p. 129. v. *παράφρωνος*.—This agrees with my idea of the word.—*Entrevoir*.

REMARK 12.

TRANSLATION, Vol. I. p. 111.—ÆSCHYLUS FIRST ADDED A SECOND ACTOR.

See Mr. Tyrwhitt, p. 131. v. *ὑποκριτῶν*—.

Hesychius says the same, v. *ὑποκριτῆς*,—ὃ ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ ἀποκρινομένη—where Salmatius corrects, *ὑποκρινομένη* : but, I believe, *ἀποκρινομένη* is right. He that *answers* upon the stage:

REMARK 13.

NOTE 30. Vol. I. p. 294.—ÆSCHYLUS—ABRIDGED THE CHORAL PART.

Mr. Tyrwhitt, p. 133, quotes Philostratus, and takes *χορῶν* for the odes themselves. Perhaps any *pentimento*, in the Addenda, was needless.

REMARK 14.

NOTE 30. Vol. I. p. 294.—*I believe the passage may be rectified by transposition.*

I was not aware, that Dr. Bentley had so corrected this passage in his Dissertation upon Phalaris, p. 263, 264.

REMARK 15.

NOTE 38. Vol. I. p. 320.—THE RIDICULOUS, &c.

I should have mentioned Plato De Rep. L. V. p. 330. (Ed. Massey.)—where he says, nothing is ridiculous but what is *κακόν*.

See the excellent note of Mr. Tyrwhitt, 'H δὲ *καμωδία* ἐστὶν, p. 137.

REMARK 16.

NOTE 42. Vol. I. p. 337.—*On the whole, it seems not improbable, &c.*

I need not have altered *μῦθοις* to *μῦθοιΝ*. The phrase, *μέχρι τε συνῆλθε εἶναι*, escaped me. Mr. Tyrwhitt, p. 141.

REMARK 17.

NOTE 44. Vol. II. p. 2.—*Perfectly to exclude the inaccuracies, &c.*

“Loquendi eadem quidem ratio veteri ævo frequentata, ut sententia aliqua simul cum negatione contrarii efferatur; quod vulgo, ut multa alia prisci sermonis simplicitati et infantie omnino communia, Orientis linguis proprium esse putant.” Heyne’s Opusc. Acad. Vol. 2. p. 106. note 1.

REMARK 18.

NOTE 45. Vol. II. p. 3.—EFFECTING, THROUGH PITY AND TERROR, &c.

I should have observed, that in the expression—*καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς, καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς*,—the former alludes to the *Tragic music*, and the purgation of Terror and Pity, &c.; and the latter—*ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς*—to *sacred music*.

REMARK

REMARK 19.

NOTE 46. Vol. II. p. 26, 27.—*Not improperly compared to our recitative.*

That the Music to which its *Iambics* were set, was a kind of Recitative, is supported by a passage in the treatise of Philodemus *Περὶ Μουσικῆς*, discovered in the Ruins of Herculaneum, (printed at Naples 1793) where he speaks of that melody as—*μαλλον τη λαλια συνεγγιζοντι*. Columna 29. p. 117.

REMARK 20.

NOTE 57. Vol. II. p. 39.—*Τα ενωτα.*

So Æschin. *Περὶ Παρακρησῶς*. p. 257. Taylor. 8vo. *ἔθεν τῶν ἐνοτων ἐπιτῖν, ὡς γε οἶμαι, παρελπιον*,—*quæ quasi in hærent ipsi rei.* Vict.

Mr. Tyrwhitt's remark, that Aristotle is speaking of the *Sentiments*, not of the *Diction* or *Language*, is important. p. 145. *Οἱ μὲν αρχαιοί.*

REMARK 21.

NOTE 127. Vol. II. p. 181.—*THE DISCOVERY BY THE SOUND OF THE SHUTTLE.*

Mr. Tyrwhitt understands by *κερκis*, the *web*, *telam*. But the *many* passages about the musicality of the *κερκis*—(shuttle) seem to be strong against Mr. T. and in favour of my conjecture.

See Epigram of Antip. Sidon. Brunck's Aristoph. Vol. 3. p. 141.

REMARK 22.

NOTE 138. Vol. II. p. 207.—*Plato says of a dog, &c.*

And Theocritus, *Εἰδ.* κ. v. 80—82.

Εἰ οἱ καὶ φρετὲς ὡδὲ νοημῶνες ἐνδιδεν ἦσαν

Ἴδει δ' ὅτε χερὶ χαλεπαίνεμεν, ὥτε καὶ ἐκ,

ὄβη ἄν τοι θῆρον τις ἐθῆρισεν περὶ τμήης.

REMARK 23.

TRANSLATION, Vol. I. p. 154.—TOSSED BY MANY TEMPESTS.

Χιμασθεις, long-tossed, weather-beaten—.

--- multum ille et terris jactatus et alto. *Æn.* I. 3.
—and, perhaps,

Πολλα δ' οὐ ποντῷ παθεν ἀλγέα—Od. A. 4.

REMARK 24.

NOTE 149. Vol. II. p. 223.—THE LYNCEUS OF THEODECTES.

Well observed by Mr. Tyrwhitt, p. 151, about Abas (the *παῖδον*)—and Hyginus, fab. 170 and 273.

REMARK 25.

NOTE 153. note ^b. Vol. II. p. 237.—*A few ideas, even roughly thrown out, from an artist of genius.*

“ The knowledge which an artist has of his subject will more than compensate for any want of elegance in the manner of treating it, or even of perspicuity, which is more essential; and I am convinced, that one short essay, written by a Painter, will contribute more to advance the Theory of our Art, than a thousand volumes such as we sometimes see; the purpose of which appears to be rather to display the refinement of the author's own conceptions of impossible practice, than to convey useful knowledge or instruction of any kind whatever.” Sir Jos. Reynolds's Disc. 15. Vol. II. p. 186.

REMARK 26.

NOTE 183. note ^b Vol. II. p. 283.

See Malone's *Dryden*, Vol. III. p. 411. He uses this metaphor, probably without thinking of Homer. “ His succeeding years afford him little more than the stubble of his own harvest.”

REMARK 27.

NOTE 214. Vol. II. p. 330.—HOMER GAVE BOTH THE FIRST, &c.

Sir Jos. Reynolds says of Titian—"He was the *first* and the *greatest* master of this art." Vol. II. p. 50.

See Parkhurst's Gr. Lex. ἀγύρια *inava*—large money. Matt. xxviii. 12.—οἰκλὸς *inave*—a great number of people. Mark x. 46.

REMARK 28.

NOTE 216. Vol. II. p. 341.—FOR, IN THIS RESPECT ALSO, THE NARRATIVE IMITATION IS ABUNDANT, AND VARIOUS, BEYOND THE REST.

Mr. Tyrwhitt has given a good explanation of περιττῶν, p. 194. "Hæc vox non semper in inalam partem accipitur; sæpe autem eam ornatus abundantiam denotat, quæ citra vitium summa est." But he does not account for the KAI in his mode of explaining. His note does not satisfy me that all is right.—I think this one of my best conjectural corrections.

REMARK 29.

NOTE 220. Vol. II. p. 344.—BUT EPIC POETRY --- ADMITS EVEN THE IMPROBABLE AND INCREDIBLE, &c.

This passage *now* seems plain enough. "In *Tragedy* the wonderful should be produced; but *Epic* admits better of the *improbable* (by which the wonderful is chiefly effected,) because there, we do not *see* the action."

Mr. Tyrwhitt's version seems right. "Ac in tragœdiis quidem, id quod admirabile est, effingere oportet: sed in epopœia magis licet id, quod præter rationem est, per quod maxime contingit ipsum admirabile, quia non intuemur agentem." p. 92.

REMARK 30.

TRANSLATION, Vol. I. p. 185.—IN THE MYSIANS, THE MAN WHO TRAVELS FROM TEGEA TO MYSIA WITHOUT SPEAKING.

For the discovery of the subject of this Tragedy, and of the cause of the silence here censured, we are indebted to the very curious and masterly note of Mr. Tyrwhitt,—“*Telephum igitur avunculos suos apud Tegram occidisse fortasse finxerat poeta, et illinc mutum in Mysiam rediisse. Mos scilicet erat cædis alicujus reum mutum restare, donec sacris quibusdam expiatoriis lustraretur.*” See the *whole* note, p. 195, 197.

REMARK 31.

NOTE 224. Vol. II. p. 355.—THE ABSURDITY IS CONCEALED UNDER THE VARIOUS BEAUTIES, &c:

Ἔγω δὲ πλεον ἔλπομαι
Λογον Ὀδυσσεύς, ἢ παθεν,
Δια τὸν ἀδυστὴν γενεᾶν Ὀμήρου.

Ἐπεὶ ΨΕΥΔΕΞΕΣΙΝ οἱ ποταμὸς γῆ μαχάρα
Σέμνον ἔπειτ' τι σοφία δὲ
ΚΛΕΙΠΤΕΙ παραγοῖσα μύθους.

Pind. Nem. Z.
v. 29—34.

REMARK 32.

NOTE 238. Vol. II. p. 382.—BUT, AS XENOPHANES SAYS, &c.

— ἀλλ' ΟΥΝ φασὶ ταῦτα. I am now clear that this emendation, proposed by Mr. Tyrwhitt, is solid. I had made it myself in MS.

REMARK 33.

NOTE 241. Vol. II. p. 386.—WHEN ON THE TROJAN PLAIN, &c.

Mr. Tyrwhitt seems quite right in his conjecture that all the passages were from Il. K.—I think the objection,

H H 2

clearly,

clearly, was to the contradiction of saying, that all *Gods* and *men* were asleep, and *at the same time*, that Agamemnon heard the noise of fifes, &c.—and saw the fires, &c.

This explanation gets rid of the solution of ἀφρονείη, as *mental* vision, and also removes all difficulty about ἑμαυτὸν, and the *supposed* objection to *that* line, considered as a *separate* difficulty.

I must take the words—ἀμα δὲ φησιν—into my version. His other conjecture, πάντες οὐκ, is *less* probable.

REMARK 34.

NOTE 242. Vol. II. p. 392.—Ομάδος seems to be constantly used by *Homer* in the *secondary* sense.

But see Il. H. 307. and O. 689.

REMARK 35.

NOTE 245. Vol. II. p. 394.—Τὸ μὲν ὅτ καταπύθεται διέβρω.

Alex. Aphrod. quoted by Mr. Tyrwhitt, p. 207, (and, in Latin, by Beni,) makes the absurdity of ἔ (where rotted) to be,—that part of the same post should be rotted, and part sound.

The difficulty about accents (*ibid.*), and the passage of Sophocles Elench. are curious.

REMARK 36.

NOTE 269. Vol. II. p. 431.—AND IN SINGING—

I was wrong in saying that *singing out of tune*, was the only warranted sense of διαδιν. See Mr. Tyrwhitt on this passage. Also Theoc. Eid. 5. 22; and Valckenaer's note on Eid. 6. 15. But my conjecture is still good, I think.

INDEX I.

OF POETS, CRITICS, PHILOSOPHERS, &c.

MENTIONED BY ARISTOTLE.

A.

ÆSCHYLUS - - Vol. i. page 111. 157. 172.

AGATHO - - - - i. 128. 147. 158, 159.—A Tragic Poet, the contemporary of Socrates, Euripides, &c. A few fragments only of his works remain, which confirm the account given by antient writers of his style; that it abounded with ornamental refinements, and particularly with *antitheses*. [See *Ælian*, *V. H.* XIV. 13. and *Aristoph. Thesmoph.* v. 58, &c. and Kuster's note.] The following lines may afford a pretty good specimen of his turn, both of writing and thinking:

Ταχὴν τυχὴν ἐγρέξῃ, καὶ τυχὴν τεχνην.

Arist. Ethic. Nic. vi. 5.

Τὸ μὲν παρέρχον, ἔργον ὡς, ποιούμεθα,
Τὸ δ' ἔργον, ὡς παρέρχον, ἐκποιούμεθα.

Athen. v. init.

See also NOTE 156. (vol. ii. p. 242.)—Grotii *Excerpta ex Trag.* &c. p. 437. Bayle, Art. AGATHON. And Sydenham's translation of the *Συμπόσιον* of Plato, (*The Banquet*,) p. 9, 10. 122, note 96.

ARIPHRADES - - - i. 173. He is known only by the wretched piece of prosaic criticism there mentioned.

ARISTOPHANES - - - - - i. 106

ASTYDAMAS - - - i. 141. There were two Tragic Poets of this name, father and son. The former is said to have written not fewer than 240 Tragedies. *Suidas*:—who has also recorded his vanity, *art.* Σαυτὴν ἰσχυρίσας.

C.

CALLIPPIDES - - - i. 204. A famous Tragic actor. See Plutarch, *Apophthegm. Lacon.* p. 376, *ed. H. St.* From the story there told, it seems probable enough, though, I think, by no means certain, that the proverbial expression, Τραγικὸς πιδναῖος, (*ἐκ τῶν παρ' Ἀξίας*) ΣΕΜΝΥΝΟΜΕ-

ΜΩΝ, *Suid. and Hesych.*) might, as it has been supposed, have originally alluded to the vanity of this actor. In the *Symposium* of Xenophon, when the buffoon, Philip, is asked — *Επὶ τῇ γελωτοποιίῃ μὲν φρονίς*; — he answers, *Διακρίτων γ', οἶμαι, ἢ ΚΑΛΑΙΠΗΡΙΑΗΣ ὁ ὀνομασμένος, ὃς ΤΙΕΡ-ΣΕΜΝΥΝΕΤΑΙ ὅτι δύναται πολλὰς κλαυκτάς καθίζειν.* p. 880, ed. *Leunclavii*.—It seems much more doubtful, whether the passages referred to by Dacier, in Suetonius, *Tiber. cap. 38.* and Cic. *ad Attic. lib. xiii. ep. 12.* have the same allusion.

CARCINUS - - Vol. i. page 148. 151. Of this Tragic Poet only a few trifling lines are preserved. What Suidas says of him gives us no very high idea of his genius; viz. that, of 160 Tragedies which he composed, *one* only obtained the prize in the dramatic contests.

CHEREMON - - - i. 104. 181.— See NOTE 11. (vol. i. p. 254.) For the passage there mentioned, and other fragments, the reader may also see *Grotii Excerpta*, p. 845, and Sir William Jones's *Poes. Asiat. Comment.* p. 408.

CHIONIDES - - - i. 107. One of the earliest and most eminent Athenian Poets of the *old Comedy*. *Suidas.*

CLEOPHON - - - i. 105. 170. See NOTE 14. (vol. i. p. 263.)

CRATES - - - i. 114. He is said to have flourished about 12 or 15 years before Aristophanes; of course, in the time of the *old Comedy*.

D.

DICEOGENES - - - i. 149. Tragic and Dithyrambic Poet. *Suid.*

DIONYSIUS - - - i. 105. See NOTE 12. (vol. i. p. 257.) and the *additions and corrections* (vol. ii. p. 454.)

E.

EMPEDOCLUS - - - i. 103. 167. 196. The Sicilian Poet-philosopher, contemporary with Sophocles. See NOTES 8 and 9 (vol. i. p. 248, and 249) and p. 196, note 4. He is often quoted by Aristotle, and many fragments of his Poetry are preserved in various ancient authors. See *Diog. Laert. in vitâ*: the *Poesis Philosophica* of H. Stephens, &c.

EPICHRMUS - - - i. 107. 114.— of Syracuse, a *philosophical* and a *comic* Poet. The names of 40 of his *Comédies* are recorded, and a considerable number of fragments from them, and some from his philosophical poetry, are extant. See *Grotii Excerpta*, and the *Poes. Philos.* of H. Stephens.

EUCLID - - - Vol. i. page 171. Of what Euclid Aristotle speaks, it seems impossible to ascertain. Victorius says, he is here called *the old Euclid*, to distinguish him from Euclid the philosopher, the disciple of Soerates, and founder of the *Megaric* sect. [*Diog. Laert. in vitâ.*] But as that Euclid flourished, according to the common account, about 60 years before Aristotle, he might well enough be called *ὁ ἀρχαῖος*, and there is certainly no improbability in supposing a cavilling logician to have been also a cavilling critic. See *Diog. Laert.* and Bayle, art. EUCLIDE.

EURIPIDES - - - i. 137. 140. 150. 153. 172. 191. 201.

G.

GLAUCO - - - - i. 199. Whether this was Glaucos the *Teian* mentioned by Aristotle, *Rhet. III. 1*, as Dacier asserts after Robortelli, is very uncertain.—I know not why Goulston, in his version, calls him "*Glaucos Sophista.*"

H.

HEGEMON - - - - i. 105. See note 15. (vol. i. p. 264.)
HERODOTUS - - - - - i. 127
HIPPIAS, of *Thasos* - i. 196.—known, I believe, only from this mention of him.
HOMER - - - - - i. 103. 105, 106. 109. 125. 147. 171. 177. 179. 182, 183. 186.

M.

MAGNES - - - - - i. 107. An Athenian Poet of the old Comedy. *Suidas.*
MNASITHEUS - - - i. 204.—of whom nothing more is known.
MYNISCUS - - - - - i. 204. I do not know that he is any where else mentioned, except by Athenæus, who calls him "*the Tragic actor, Myniscus,*" and gives him an honourable place in his *Memoirs of Gluttony*, lib. viii. p. 344.

N.

NICOCHARIS (or **NICOCHARES**) i. 106. In NOTE 16. (vol. i. p. 266), I have, with Dacier and others, supposed him to be the Athenian Comic Poet, contemporary with Aristophanes. [*Suidas.*] But this seems doubtful. Victorius thinks, with some reason, that Aristotle added, *ὁ τῆς Ἀντιόχου*, in order to distinguish him from that Poet. And, farther, he is here instancing in *narrative* or *Epic* Poetry, and the *Delia* was certainly a poem of that kind. But no such Poem is attributed to Nicochares the Comic Poet.

P

PAUSAN - - - Vol. i. page 105. See NOTE 12. (vol. i. p. 255. 257. 260).

PHILONENUS - - - i. 106.—of Cythera, contemporary with Plato; a Tragic and Dithyrambic Poet, famous for his musical innovations, his jokes, and his gluttony. See Dr. Burney's *Hist. of Music*, vol. i. p. 418, &c.—*Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscip.* tome xix. p. 315, octavo.—But there were several persons of the same name, and, unfortunately, of similar character, who appear to have been confounded with each other, even by antient writers themselves. See Perizonius, *Ælian. V. Hist.* X. 9.

PHORMIS [PHORMOS, *Athen. and Suid.*] i. 114. A Sicilian Comic Poet contemporary with Epicharmus.

POLYNOTUS - - - i. 105. 119.—See NOTE 12. (vol. i. p. 255).—Pliny, *N. Hist. lib.* xxxv. cap. 9.—*Ælian, V. Hist.* IV. 3. where Perizonius points out, as some illustration of the passage of Aristotle, cited NOTE 12. vol. i. p. 255, a picture of this painter, mentioned by Pausanias, (*in Phocicis*,) which represented the punishment of an undutiful son in the infernal regions.

POLYIDES, *the Sophist*, i. 150. 153.—does not occur, that I know of, any where else. The title of *Sophist* seems sufficiently to distinguish him, if the name does not, (for in some MSS. it is Πολυιδος,) from *Polyidus* the Dithyrambic Poet, Musician, and Painter, mentioned by *Diodor. Siculus*, [*lib.* xiv.] and *Etymol. Mag. voce* Ατλας.

PROTAGORAS - - - i. 161. See NOTE 165. (vol. ii. p. 256.)

S.

SOPHOCLES - - - i. 106. 112. 141. 146. 149. 151. 158. 191. 206.

SOPHRON - - - i. 103. This famous Sicilian Poet was contemporary with Euripides. He wrote *Mimes*, some for male, and others for female characters, in the Doric dialect. Some very obscure fragments are preserved by Demetrius, Athenæus, &c. See NOTE 6. (vol. i. p. 244 to 247).

SOSISTRATUS - - - i. 204. A rhapsodist.

STHENELUS - - - i. 170. See NOTE 194. (vol. ii. p. 302.) He is mentioned, I believe, only by Aristotle, and by Harpocration, who records him as a Tragic Poet of the age of Pericles, and says, that he was accused of plagiarism.

THEODECTES,

T.

THEODECTES - - Vol. i. page 150. 154. A Rhetorician, of Phaselis in Lycia; the scholar of Plato and Isocrates. He is said to have composed 50 Tragedies, and an *Art of Rhetoric* in verse. He is frequently mentioned by Aristotle, Dion. Halicarn. Quintilian, &c. His fellow citizens erected a statue to his memory. See *Plut. in vitâ Alexandri*, p. 1236, ed. H. S. Only a few trifling fragments of his works remain.

TIMOTHEUS - - - i. 106. See NOTE 17. (vol. i. p. 267.) The famous Poet-musician of Miletus, contemporary with Euripides. He was banished by the Spartans for improving a musical instrument by the addition of a few strings, which they called "*dishonouring the antient Music,*" and "*corrupting the ears of youth:*" — *λυμαίνοντας τὰς ἀκοὰς τῶν νῦν*. The words of this curious decree are preserved by Boethius. See *Casaub. in Athen.* p. 613, or page 66, 67, of the *Ox. ed. of Aratus*. The reader will find a full and entertaining account of Timotheus in Dr. Burney's *Hist. of Music*, vol. i. p. 405.

TYNDARUS [*al. PINDARUS*] i. 204.—An Actor, clearly; but we know nothing farther.

X.

XENARCHUS - - - i. 103. A Comic Poet, of whom the reader may see a pleasant fragment in *Athen.* p. 225, describing a curious trick practised by the Athenian fish-mongers to evade the law by which they were forbid to pour water upon their stale fish in order to make them appear fresh. See *Grotii Excerpta ex Trag.* &c. p. 697.

XENOPHANES - - - i. 191. The Colophonian, eminent in the class of philosophical Poets, or, rather, poetical philosophers, about the time of Pythagoras. See NOTE 238. (vol. ii. p. 382.)—*Diog. Laert.* IX. 18.—*Bayle*, art. **XENOPHANES**.

Z.

ZEUXIS - - - - - i. 119. 200. The famous painter. See the note p. 200, and NOTE 254. (vol. ii. p. 405).

INDEX, II.

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
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
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THE END.







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